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ABSTRACT
In its examination of bilateral Canada-European Community (EC) relations since 1957, this 
dissertation tests two hypotheses: that the Canadian foreign policy process is predominantly 
state-led; and that given Canada's relative power capability in the immediate post-Cold War 
period (1989-1993), it faced considerable constraints in not only its broader foreign policy 
choices but specifically with regard to the EC "pillar" of its European foreign policy 
framework. This study's overview of the history of bilateral Canalda-EC relations, its analysis 
of the Canadian government's interests in the negotiations leading to the 1990 EC-Canada 
Transatlantic Declaration and the Canadian response to the Single European Market, highlight 
a watershed - starting in 1989 and lasting four years - in Canada's post-Second W orld War 
international relations. It was during this period that Ottawa was forced to make a 
fundamental reassessment not only of the value of its traditional Atlanticist foreign policy 
orientation but also the relative value of the three "pillars" (NATO, CSCE, and the EC) that 
upheld this approach. The dissertation concludes by outlining the choices available to 
Canadian decision makers at the end of 1993, as they sought to use Canada's bilateral 
relationship with the Community to reconfigure transatlantic economic, political and security 
relations.
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PREFACE
I started research on this dissertation in October 1990 and finished writing in September 
1994. At the London School of Economics I familiarized myself with the European 
Community dimension of the subject matter and explored the utility of various theoretical 
frameworks. A generous fellowship from the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
International Trade (DFAIT) enabled me to spend a most fruitful academic year in 1991-92 
in the Economic Planning section of the Department's Policy Planning Staff as the first 
Norman Robertson Research Fellow. It was here that I found a suitable and rewarding 
environment to undertake the research papers that make up the core of this dissertation and to 
interview officials who had made and were making Canada's policy towards the European 
Community. In the fall of 1992 I was invited to gain another perspective on the decision­
making process by working in the Office of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (OMTN) at 
DFAIT, where I examined bilateral Canada-EC relations in the context of Canada's 
multilateral trade relations. In 1993 I founded a journal, Canadian Foreign Policy, to bridge 
the gap between the academic and foreign policy decision-making communities. During the 
1994-95 academic year, based on the research interests covered in this dissertation, I taught a 
course on Canadian foreign policy and, another, on the international institutions and foreign 
policy of Europe at the Department of Political Science at McGill University in Montreal.
My supervisor, Dr. Michael Hodges at the London School of Economics, was patient 
and helpfUl throughout this process. In the Canadian academic community, I owe debts of 
gratitude to the following professors who, over the last four years, have read parts of this 
dissertation in the form of articles and monographs: Kim R  Nossal (McMaster University, 
Ontario) for conveying to me the subtleties of Canada's foreign policy process; Hans 
Michelmann (University of Saskatchewan, Saskatchewan), Charles Pentland (Queen's 
University, Ontario), and Panayotis Soldatos (l'Universite de Montreal) for their insights as 
Canada's few remaining academicians with an interest in Canada-EC relations; and Alexander 
Moens (Simon Fraser University, British Columbia) for his helpful comments on the changing 
nature of the European defence architecture.
In the Canadian public service, I am especially grateful for the assistance of two 
officials: Michael Hart, who was director of the Economic Planning unit on the Policy 
Planning Staff during the period of my Fellowship and who was instrumental in giving me 
access to senior EAITC officials; Howard Balloch, who was director-general of the Policy 
Planning Staff and who, along with Mr. Hart, had created the Fellowship program to permit 
junior academics to gain a fuller understanding of the Canadian foreign policy process; and 
Dr. John Curtis, a former professor of mine and Senior Advisor at OMTN, who provided me 
with helpful points detailing the intersection between Canada's Uruguay Round trade policy 
positions and its trade policy concerns vis-a-vis the EC. Finally, I would like to acknowledge 
the administrative support provided to me by the Professional Association of Foreign Service 
Officers (PAFSO) in 1994-95.
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TABLE 1: EC-CANADA RELATIONS: TOE BALANCE SHEET
ASPECT OF RELATIONSHIP CENTRIPETAL FORCES CENTRIFUGAL FORCES
Civilization common Judeo-Christian heritage different political cultures
Historical Experiences wartime and post-war cohesion; ethnic and trade links end to post-war cohesion with collapse o f communist regimes in 
Central and Eastern Europe starting in 1989 and then the Soviet Union; 
closing of all Canadian military bases in Germany by 1994; Canada's 
"psychic link" with Western Europe eroding as "special relationship" 
with the UK grows more tenuous as Canada becomes "nation o f the 
Americas" and the UK incrementally begins to define itself more and 
more as "European" nation; growing proportion of Canadians o f Asian 
descent, diluting ethnic tics
Political-Economic Systems pluralist democracies, mixed capitalist, developed economics; mutual 
commitment to human rights and good governance around the world
EC states more corporatist in outlook; mixed pluralist political- 
economic systems allow special interest groups as producers to demand 
protectionist action by the state that when taken can disrupt overall tics
Strategic Security collective self-defence through sister organization, NATO, had equal 
stake in the defence o f Western democracies against threat from Soviet 
Union; the mutuality o f interests in managing the emerging, post-Cold 
War cooperative security issues such as drug interdiction, terrorism, 
refugee flows, environmental security, proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction etc.
the collapse o f Soviet Union and the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact 
have resulted in the disappearance of a "transcendental, value-driven" 
reason for Canada to have an active stake iri European security; the 
uncertain missions of NATO and the CSCE - the primary "pillars" in 
Canada's European policy framework - in the post-Cold War world are 
reducing Canadian influence in European eyes; the European desire to 
establish independent Common Security and Defence Policy through 
European Security and Defence Identity, the re-invigorated West 
European Union, and the Franco-German Corps.
Interdependence because the EC in aggregate represents Canada's second largest trade 
partner after the U.S., there are relatively close trade and investment 
ties; the fact of two cultures - English and the French - has led to close 
political relations with the UK and France; the issuance o f the EC- 
Canada Transatlantic Declaration has meant closer political links with 
the Community; a series of bilateral Mutual Recognition Agreements 
and Memoranda of Understanding were completed or under negotiation 
on issues such as standards and certification, Science and Technology, 
customs, competition policy, and fisheries; Canada and the EC consult 
and have common interests on a number of international issues such as 
the progress in the rebuilding of the East European economies, Third 
World debt alleviation, and sustainable development
asymmetric economic and political relations, i.e., any changes in 
bilateral relations have greater impact on Canada; lack of interest on 
both sides - and especially in Washington - to enshrine 
interdependence and individual bilateral issues in a broader Canada-EC 
free trade agreement or transatlantic treaty to create "Atlantic 
Community"; pull o f faster growing Asia Pacific region for Canada and 
the pull the deepening and widening agenda of the Community
International Trade common stake in liberal world trade order Canada more vulnerable than EC to neo-protectionism; politicization of 
EC-U.S. trade conflicts could lead to Canada being "side-swiped"; 
international regime on investment more important for Canada than the 
EC
Bilateral Trade EC dependence on Canadian resource exports, especially forestry 
products and minerals and metals; Canadian dependence on EC exports 
of finished goods
Canadian merchandise trade deficit with EC; greater intra-North 
American and intra-EC trade and steady erosion of EC as market for 
Canadian exports; "EC 1992" will present only niche markets for 
certain Canadian industries; creation of pan-European market - to 
include ETTA nations through the EEA and the anticipated expansion 
of the EC to 16 in 1995 plus the push to the eastern half o f  Europe 
through "association’ agreement - means Canada may become only 
residual supplier to EC market since its export mix is heavily resource- 
dependent
Bilateral Investment heavy dependence on each other's investment markets, with EC second 
largest source of inward foreign direct investment into Canada after the 
U.S.; total joint investment stock at end of 1993 exceeded $50 billion
barriers to trade in services and investment, especially at the level of 
the individual Member States; NAFTA has more extensive investment 
provisions that does "EC 1992”, indication that height o f Canadian 
investment occurred by a small number o f Canadian MNEs in run-up 
to ”1992” and that the coming years will sec a steady decrease in 
annual Canadian FDl to the EC
Domestic Conditions growing interdependence means that domestic conditions such as labour 
standards, inter-provincial barriers, social policy, and the environment 
have increasing international dimensions
the ECs and Canada's respective attentions to domestic economic 
downturns characterized by high unemployment rates and, in Canada's 
case, a dangerously large national debt and deficit, have meant that 
domestic economic issues are superseding "foreign" issues on the 
national agenda; on the political side, since the rejection o f the Mccch 
Lake and Charlottetown accords, Canada is also facing constitutional 
turmoil over the question of Quebec
Leadership politically strong leaders capable of balancing bilateral relations so that 
no one dispute poisons broader relations; the Transatlantic Declaration 
provides bilateral political forum, for political resolution to irritants - 
such as Atlantic fisheries and plant health issues on Canadian the 
Canadian side and environmental practices and beverage appellations on 
the EC side
weak leaders susceptible to producer group protection calls; less 
capable of providing balance to overall relationship as each side means 
less to the other in political and economic terms
members of numerous multilateral organizations and groupings of states 
as ful) members or observers
changes in the international system from one of bipolarity to 
multinodal and increased interdependence complicates bilateral 
relations; increased political and economic stature o f EC and reduced 
U.S. hegemony means Canada may lose ability to "free-ride" on U.S. 
interests against Europeans; EC more worried about stability in the 
East and Russia than Canada's unique interests within what to the EC 
is usually "one" North American "pillar"
Foreign Policy broad accord on long-term Western goals such as assistance to Central 
and Eastern Europe and the states of the former Soviet Union; mutual 
sensitivities to the emerging "cooperative security" issues such as illegal 
migrations, sustainable development, AIDs, and human rights (to 
include women's rights)
trend of EC foreign policy independent of, and conflicting with, U.S. 
may mean that Canada will have to choose to side with one or the 
other, and, given its increasing economic ties with the U.S. this may 
mean that Ottawa's foreign policy is more closely aligned with that of 
Washington; lack of mechanism to coordinate foreign policy outside 
NATO, NACC, and EC institutional constraints; the TAD may not act 
as the best instrument to systematize bilateral relations
Source: Author's observations based on categories used to define EC-U.S. relations as developed by Roy H. Ginsberg. "US-EC Relations." in Juliet Lodge, ed„ The Fjimpeai Community a id  the Chrflenge o f  the Rittire (London: Pinter Publishing L td . 19*9), Table 14 I, pp 258-59
1CHAPTER ONE 
SETTING THE STAGE FOR CANADA-EC RELATIONS
"Small powers always expect more than they can, get."
A. E. Ritchie1
1.1 INTRODUCTION
"Three pillars" have supported Canada's policy framework for 
its relations with Europe and its response to European 
integration, namely, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO), the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE)2, and the European Community (EC) , now the European 
Union (EU) .3 During the period from 1985. to 1993, the process 
of integration accelerated markedly and is evidenced in three 
-key areas of interest for . Canada: economic,- political, and 
security. . While each "pillar" deals to some extent with these 
key areas, the European Community had by the early 1990s 
carved Out a greater role for itself in all three domains.4 
Indeed, the EC showed the potential to one day supplant NATO 
as. Canada's "first, pillar" in Europe.
Although this study takes an historical perspective to 
Canada-EC relations, it concentrates, on the second term of the 
Conservative government led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
(1989-1993). It was during this period that Europe - West and 
East - and, in particular the European Community, again 
occupied a central place on the Canadian foreign policy
• 2 
agenda. This period also highlights the redefinition of 
Canada-EC relations . within the changing context of. 
transatlanticism of the early 1990s.
In light of the essentially economic nature of bilateral 
relations, the focus within this study will be on security in 
an economic and political context rather than on those aspects 
of transatlantic, security relations that' are already well 
covered in the Canadian and European defence policy 
literature.5 Finally, for the purposes of this dissertation, 
the nomenclature of the EC, Canadian and ’other institutions 
will follow that in use at the time of reference.
The dissertation poses two fundamental questions. First, 
given the pace of global economic, integration and the creation 
of a. Single European' Market (SEM), have Canadian policy 
responses to European integration been primarily industry- or 
state-led? Secondly, what does an analysis of this bilateral 
relationship reveal about the foreign policy choices and 
capabilities of a-middle power such as Canada in a p>ost-Cold 
War international system characterized by both globalization 
and . regionalism? In particular, is Canada well or badly 
positioned to further its interests, bilaterally, 
multilaterally, or within the Triad (e.g., the trading blocs 
of North America, Europe, Japan)? This dissertation's 
analysis of Canada-EC relations offers a test of whether a 
middle power such as Canada has the potential to exert more - 
rather than less - influence in the post-Cold War era.
The originality of this study lies in:. (1) its 
integration of the political, economic and, in recent years, 
the nascent security strands of Ottawa's approach to the EC;
(2) the fact that it is the first comprehensive analysis of 
Canada's relations with the Community in almost a decade; and
(3) its two-pronged extension of the debate on the future of 
transatlantic. relationsfirst, by including the EC as a 
legitimate institutional "player" and, secondly, by adding a 
Canadian perspective on the EC to a field of literature which 
has. been devoted, almost exclusively to discussing 
transatlanticism in the context of NATO, the CSCE, and U.S.-EC 
relations. The Canada-EC partnership was largely forgotten 
through most of the 1980s on both sides of the Atlantic until 
the overlapping developments of the completion of the Canada- 
U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) followed by negotiations to 
create a North American trade bloc, the momentum of' the Single 
Market, and the collapse of.communism in Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Unipn starting in 1989, again put the EC firmly on 
the Canadian foreign policy agenda . and Canada on the 
Community's external relations screen.
The reader should be clear what this study is not; namely 
an analysis of■ European integration; or of Canada's place in 
the Community's external relations. This dissertation is 
concerned with both the process (particularly chapters Three 
to Seven) and substance (Chapters Eight to Eleven) of Canada's 
approach towards the Community.
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What little has been written about Canada-EC relations 
over the last three decades (see review of literature on page 
31) has tended to be lumped around,particular issues, .such as 
the spate of academic analyses in the 1970s on Canada-EC 
relations in the context, of the "Third Option" policy of 
diversifying Canada's external relations away from the United 
States, and thereafter to examinations of the 1976 Canada-EC 
Framework Agreement. Since the early 1980s, however, the 
bilateral relationship has been woefully under-researched with 
regard to both the policy process and on issue areas such as 
the impact of the Single Market on Canadian interests, or, on 
the implications of the 1990 EC-Canada Transatlantic 
Declaration for creating more balanced bilateral.political 
links. ■
But beyond the importance of adding to a body of 
research, why is a comprehensive examination, of Canada's 
approach to the EC worthy of. study at this time? Put quite 
simply, the official end of the Cold War in November. 1990 also 
appeared . to mark the end of the need for an Atlanticist 
Canadian foreign policy. Actually the major turning point in 
Canada' s post-Second World War foreign policy away from Europe 
preceded the end of the Cold War by at least a decade and had 
its roots in the- domestic consensus surrounding Canada's 
declining economic competitiveness, highlighted by world 
recessions in the early 1970s, the late 1970s and again in the 
early.1980s. This consensus was, however, overshadowed at the
5time by the continuing exigencies of Cold War alliance 
structures. It was only with the rapprochement of the U.S. and 
the Soviet Union, dating from Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to 
power in 1985, that Canada in its actions (as opposed to its 
declaratory policy) became openly less and less an "Atlantic" 
and "European" nation. At the same time, the European 
Community - embodying Western Europe - was itself undergoing 
a process of sometimes wrenching change as it pursued 
political, economic, and monetary integration and acted as a 
magnet for both members of the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) and the former Comnunist nations of Eastern Europe. The 
question then remains whether there are sufficient bilateral 
economic interests at stake and whether there is sufficient 
political will on both sides so that Canada-EC relations may 
be strengthened for the new millennium.
1.2 STRUCTURE OF STUDY
The study is divided into four parts. The following discussion 
will provide an overview of the structure and content of each 
part. Especially in its methodological exegesis, Chapter Two 
of Part One provides an overview of various theoretical 
frameworks that attempt to explain Canada's foreign policy 
outlook and actions (see discussion on methodology at the end 
of this chapter) . Chapter Three provides an analysis of the 
foreign policy-making process in Canada and outlines the roles
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of the domestic actors and their positions toward the EC. 
Part Two
»
Chapters Four, Five, Six,- and Seven, provide' a detailed 
discussion of the evolution of Canadian interests vis-a-Vis 
the EC from the Treaty of Rome to 1991. The discussion moves 
chronologically from a focus on market access issues in the 
1960s to the .architecture of the EC institutions in’the 1970s 
as Canadian and Commission interests converged, to a period of 
mutual neglect in the 1980s, and finally to a period of. 
intense activity in 1989-91 as Canada rethought its approach 
to the European Community in the.context of trying to carve 
out a niche, for itself in the reconfiguration of overall 
transatlantic relations.
These chapters highlight the four major determinants of 
Canada-EC relations. In • a seminal article in 1991, Charles 
Pentland wrote that the "twin themes of access and 
architecture" were always the foundation of Canada1s.policy 
approach to European integration.6 By "access" he meant access 
for Canadian exports and investment into the. integrating 
markets of the EC characterized by a common commercial policy 
and the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) ; and his term 
"architecture" referred to the'scope and institutional design 
of Europe (e.g., the evolving roles of the Commission, the 
European Parliament and Council of Ministers as well as the
7EC's relations to other European institutions), taking into 
account Canada's place in the transatlantic framework. Access 
and architecture are together the first determinants' of 
Canada's approach to, and observation of, the. process of 
European integration.
To Pentland's "twin themes" this dissertation adds three 
more major determinants. The second one is the ebb and flow of 
the tide of Canada-U.S. and EC-U.S. relations. That is, 
Canada's, reaction to the evolution of European integration 
cannot be fully understood unless it is put into the broader 
context of the evolving pattern of bilateral Canada-U.S. 
relations, and Ottawa's historic need to- achieve 
diversification - through "counterweights" to, first, Britain 
and then the United States. - in its foreign relations.7 As 
well, Washington's role • as the primary international 
interlocutor, of both Ottawa and Brussels makes an appreciation 
of EC-U.S. relations integral to understanding the evolution- 
of Canada-EC relations.
A third determinant is the emergence of differentiated 
images of the European Community among bureaucratic, political-
t
and. business elites in Canada. Indeed, historically, bilateral 
relations have been state- or, more . specifically, 
bureaucratically-led on both sides,.with little political or 
business support sustained at a high level in either domain.
The final major determinant of Canada's approach to 
European integration is a perennial concern among Canadian
analysts and decision makers that West.European politicians, 
Commission officials, and American politicians (e.g., John F. 
Kennedy) and officials (e.g., Henry' Kissinger's "Year of 
Europe"), have tended to bury Canada's diplomatic identity 
under a "North American" rubric representing a so-called "two 
pillars" image of the Atlantic world. Thus, while Canada 
approaches Europe within a "three pillars" framework, Western 
Europe and the United States (in Canadian eyes.) tend to 
subsume Canada within a . "two pillars" image of transatlantic 
relations.
For most of its history Canada has viewed itself as a 
"European" nation. A graph of its relations with Europe in 
terms of peaks and troughs would indicate that in the period 
from Confederation in 1867 to the signing of the Statute of 
Westminster in 19.31, its national interests to a greater or 
lesser extent mirrored those of the United Kingdom. 
Thereafter, with the ever greater pull of north-south economic 
integration, London's influence on Canadian affairs waned as 
relations with Washington began to take precedence. From 1948 
until 1984, the nature of Canada's policy towards Europe can, 
in large measure, be ascertained by looking at.the degree to 
which Europe figured, in the foreign policy priorities of 
successive prime ministers. Louis St. Laurent, both as 
secretary of state for. external affairs and as prime minister, 
was a strong supporter of the reconstruction of a war-ravaged 
continent through Canada's leadership in the creation of
multilateral security and economic fora, namely, the General 
Agreement on Tariffs.and Trade (GATT) and NATO. Prime minister 
John Diefenbaker 1 s stubborn Anglophilism during the late 1950s 
and early 1960s, symbolized by among other issues his desire 
to diversify 20 per cent of Canada's trade away from the U.S. 
and to the UK, not surprisingly drove a wedge in Canada-U.S. 
relations. Lester Pearson in his successive roles as Canada's 
senior diplomat, secretary of state for external affairs, and 
finally prime minister, believed strongly in a "North Atlantic 
Community" in which Europe .could be. used to balance the 
influence of the United States.8 Pierre Trudeau's dilettantism 
in the late 1960s and desire for a less NATO-centric foreign 
policy led to the first serious questioning of Canada's 
European vocation.9 Somewhat ironically, his government's 
subsequent attempt to create, a more "independent" and 
"nationalist" foreign policy in the early to.mid-1970s instead 
created a peak in Canada's relations with Western Europe and, 
in particular, with the Community, as Ottawa came to the 
conclusion that stronger relations with the Community would 
lessen Canada's dependence on the United States.
After 1984, the interplay of a trend and two events 
marked . the beginnings of a rethinking of Canada's foreign 
policy orientation towards Europe, the EC, and its commitment 
to the Atlantic community in generalThe trend towards an 
increasingly global economy (starting in the 1960s but gaining 
significant momentum by the 1980s) was accompanied by the
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ascension to power in Canada of a Conservative government led 
by Brian Mulroney, the first post-War Canadian prime minister 
to promote publicly Canada's proximity to the United.States. 
It was also accompanied by the collapse of communist regimes 
in Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the late 
1980s.and early 1990s.
Under -the leadership of prime minister Mulroney, Canada 
became committed to fuller economic integration and political 
involvement within the Americas through a number of major 
policy initiatives. Those included signing the Canada-U.S. 
Free Trade Agreement (CUFTA) in 1988, joining the Organization 
of American States (OAS) in 1990, ratifying the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 19.93, and increasing the 
prospect for further hemispheric integration ‘ through .the 
NAFTA's accession clause. There also emerged a strong sense 
that Canada could not afford to be left out of the 
economically dynamic Asia-Pacific region, prompting aggressive 
Canadian support of multilateral economic and security fora 
(e.g., Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation).10
In aggregate, then, these initiatives created a strong 
incentive for a profound change in Canada's traditional 
Eurocentric foreign policy orientation. Indeed, the decade 
from 1983 to 1993 saw Canada become more and more a "nation of 
the Americas. "n In the words of John Halstead, Canada's, former 
Ambassador to NATO and astute observer of the evolution of 
Atlanticism, it appeared that by the early 1990s the Canadian
11
dilemma had become how to "reconcile an■Atlanticist foreign 
policy with a continentalist economic policy and a defence 
policy increasingly limited to territorial defence . and 
peacekeeping."12 Canada was clearly on the cusp of a new type 
of partnership with Europe.
1.2.1 Adjusting to the Post-Cold War System: Canada and the EC
Both Parts One and Two demonstrate that perhaps more than any 
other Western industrialized state, Canada has had to make a 
number of major adjustments with respect to its post-Cold War 
foreign' policy, priorities. Although every state has been 
affected by an increasingly multipolar world in which economic 
and political power is more diffuse, diplomacy is based 
increasingly on economic rather than ideological rivalry, and 
new regional groupings are coming into prominence, some states 
have been affected more than others.13 Canada in the post- 
Second World War period has used the leverage of ah 
"internationalist" foreign, policy (see Chapter Two) based on 
mediation, multilateralism,- and coalition-building, to project 
an influence that is greater than its relative size would 
indicate. This has prompted scholars, practitioners, and other 
observers to label Canada as the quintessential "middle 
power" .14 Given Canada’s high dependence on trade (representing 
25 per cent of its Gross Domestic Product [GDP] ) , ■ over the- 
past 4'5 years successive Canadian governments have relied on
12
and advocated a "rules-based multilateralism" in a variety of 
U.S.-led international economic fora such as the GATT to' 
achieve this additional leverage.1 On the security and 
political fronts, Ottawa has favoured a more cohesive Western 
Europe, nested in and reinforcing the U.S.-dominated NATO, 
with Canada benefitting from an active American presence in 
Europe. However, with the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and the relative decline of the United States, other actors 
such as Western Europe, Japan and the Newly Industrializing 
Economies (NIEs) of Asia-Pacific have assumed new roles and 
increased: influence on the international stage. By the late 
1,980s, Canada, existed in a world where the sources of economic 
tension - or, as Sylvia Ostry has described it, "systems 
friction" - were at least ais powerful as the forces- driving 
economic integration. For a middle-sized, open economy caught 
. between the twin realities of diminishing relative power 
. (exemplified by steady declines in its slice of the global 
economic pie coupled with the loss of its traditional 
mediation role in East-West relations) and growing global 
interests, these trends, were, to say the least, unsettling.. 
Thus in the early 1990s,- to use Wolfers's terms, not only were 
Canada's "possession" and "milieu" objectives being tested, 
but also the means by which it pursued them.2
And just as Canada's position in the international system 
was changing so was that of Europe. Indicative of the speed 
and the breadth of change that have swept across Europe since
13
1985, but particularly since 1989, were the movement to the 
completion of the Single European Market (SEM), the at times 
painful absorption of a united Germany, the attempt to create 
a European Monetary Union by the end of the decade, the 
strengthening of resolve towards political union, the movement 
towards a common foreign and security policy and the emergence 
of a European defence identity that challenged the traditional 
institutions of the Atlantic alliance/ the establishment of a 
European Economic Area (EEA), and. the emergent pan-
i .
Europeanism. The European Community either created, or was 
directly affected by, the above events and processes. More 
subtle, perhaps, was the EC's growing influence outside of 
Europe as a dialogue partner with numerous groupings of 
states, and through its independent voice in international 
organizations, most notably in the United Nations (UN), the 
Group of Seven (G-7),. the GATT, the Quadrilateral Group, and 
at the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), where it has observer status.17 -For these reasons, by 
the early 1990s the EC as an institution had become . the 
dominant force in Europe and an increasingly important global 
actor as well. '
1,2.2 Changing Canadian Leverage in Transatlantic Relations
As this study will show, the underlying challenge in Canada's 
approach to the EC was always how to gain satisfactory
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leverage. As a-member of NATO, to which the original six EC 
Member States also belonged, Canada was able to use its 
security role in Europe as a subtle but effective • lever in its 
bilateral relations with the Member States and, by extension, 
in its bilateral relations with the Community. This lever 
never approximated direct linkage. Canada had no such power. 
Issues .in the transatlantic complexity were rarely driven in 
a tit-for-tat manner'. Indeed, given the broad distribution of 
power within the transatlantic community, it. has always been 
,dj.f,fd,c\il;t tp predict the outcomes of specific disputes or 
tensions' and to disentangle the links on the fluctuating 
transatlantic agenda of political, security and economic 
concerns.
in the transformed geopolitics . of the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, however, issues of partnership, procedures and 
leverage had new salience for policymakers on both sides of 
the Atlantic. The removal of major structural features such as 
the Cold War, and the difficulties in completing the Uruguay 
Round, created a situation in- which the broad, traditional 
expectations and images of Europe held by Canadian decision 
makers were no longer sustainable. The notion of "linkage" 
became more important in the 1990s because notions of economic 
partnership and security alliance could no longer be consigned, 
to separate boxes.18
How did this affect Cariada-EC relations? As. a result of 
revision to the founding Treaties in the Single European Act
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(SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty on European.Union,, the EC had 
evolved into other spheres of competence and well beyond the 
achievement of strictly a customs union; something that its 
founders had envisaged. In addition to full economic 
integration, by the early 1990s foreign, security and defence- 
policy were also seen as legitimate objectives in the drive 
towards political union. EC decisions began to affect Canadian 
interests beyond the traditional areas of external and 
internal trade,• agriculture, fisheries, atomic energy,.
f
including, inter, alia, the "high" politics of sanctions on
South Africa, East-West relations, aid to Central and Eastern
Europe, population migrations and the environment. That
evolution made Canada's dual-track approach within its "three
pillar" European policy framework, that is, relegating its
*
participation in the CSCE and NATO exclusively to. the security 
track and its. relations with the EC exclusively to the 
economic track, an increasingly untenabl-e way to organize its 
transatlantic relations by the end of the 1980s. How to set 
the foundation for redefined bilateral Canada-EC: relations in 
face of the end of the Cold War and the prospect of European 
economic, political and monetary integration was thus a cause 
for reflection and action in Ottawa.
As this • study wiil show, the challenge for Canadian 
decision-makers was not necessarily, to increase the number- of 
diplomatic contacts with the West Europeans but rather to 
systematize relations with the increasingly important .EC
16
•pillar of Canada's European policy framework. The West 
Europeans were allies (and occasionally adversaries) in most 
of Canada's international economic and political activities. 
In addition to NATO-and the CSCE, Canada met with its European 
counterparts in the Group of Steven (G-7) the Commonwealth, La 
Francophonie, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 
(NAFO), the OECD,. peacekeeping endeavours, development 
assistance, International Financial Institutions {e.g., World. 
Bank,, International Monetary Fund) , arid participatory or 
observer.functions within social and economic bodies such as 
the! UN' Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE} , the .-European. 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and the 
Council of Europe.
MAJOR INTERLOCKING CANADA-WESTERN EUROPE INSTITUTIONAL LINKS 
Europe
France
UK
Germany
Italy
G7
G7
G7
G7
UN
UN
UN
UN
OECD
OECD
OECD
OECD
UNECE
UNECE
UNECE
UNECE
NATO 
NATO . 
NATO 
NATO
CSCE
CSCE
•CSCE
CSCE
EC
EC
EC
EC
WEU
WEU
WEU
WEU
CEa
CE
CE
CE
EBRD . 
EBRD ■ 
EBRD 
EBRD
EC G7b UNC.OECDd EC WEU
NORTH AMERICA
U.S. G7 UN OECD UNECE NATO CSCE CEe EBRD
Canada G7 UN OECD UNECE NATO CSCE CE* EBRD
a Council of Europe; h,c, d/observer status
And, as the table above shows, in Europe itself, the only 
distinctly European institutions that Canada did not have a 
formal role in were the Community and the Western European 
Union (WEU).
Furthermore, within the structural context of EC-Canadian
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relations, there were . a number' of privileged bilateral 
relationships between Ottawa and the national capitals of the 
Member States.' The most obvious but. not the only one was that 
between Canada and the UK. Another was the Canada-France 
relationship, strengthened in the 1980s through La 
Francophonie after a deterioration in the 1970s with Canada's, 
perception of French interference in Quebec. Finally, in light 
of German unification, and Bonn's support of a continuing 
Canadian presence in Europe, it would appear that the Ottawa- 
Bonn axis also increased in importance in the context of 
Canada's bilateral relations'with the EC.
Yet by the end of the 1980s. these numerous contacts 
proved insufficient in the eyes of Canadian policymakers to 
.protect Canada's European interests. In particular, the EC's 
post-1989 role in the co-ordination of Group of 24 (G-24) .aid 
to Eastern Europe and the former USSR heightened its profile 
in the eyes of Canadian policymakers. The Canadian government 
decided that the twin institutional mechanisms of its 
privileged relationship with the EC - the 1976 Framework 
Agreement for Commercial and Economic Co-operation (hereafter 
referred to as the Framework Agreement) and the 1988 special 
access to European Political Co-operation (EPC) -were 
necessary but not sufficient to maintain Canadian interests in 
Western Europe. As a result, an attempt was made through the 
1990 EC-Canada Transatlantic Declaration (TAD) ' to infuse 
political energy into Canada-EC relations and to create a more
18
balanced framework for Canada-West European relations.19 
Part Three
The third part of this dissertation examines the impact of the 
SEM on Canada's economic interests and the changing structure 
of transatlantic economic and security relationship. It does 
so by looking at the state of Canada-EC economic and trade 
relations until the end of 1993, applying the implications of 
the SEM for Canadian suppliers’-in directly affected industries 
such as financial Services and telscontounications, .as, well as 
in forestry products, with the latter industry, affected less 
directly by the creation of a SEM; but remaining the major 
source of revenue in Canada's export trade with the Community. 
An examination of bilateral trade and investment flows between 
1984 and. 1993 in Chapter Eight reveals the anomaly that 
despite, an erosion of bilateral trade, mutual direct 
investment’ had more than doubled within almost a decade to $50 
billion by the end of 1993 as compared to $19.6 billion in 
1984. .
Although the TAD was significant in.that it highlighted 
the growing political role of the EC in North American eyes, 
the key challenge posed by the EC to Canada was its growing 
weight as a trading entity, resulting from the deepening of 
integration through the so-called "1992" program and the 
effective widening of its approach to market liberalization to
19
include the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) , the 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) , and some 
Mediterranean nations. If the primary effect on Canada of the 
EC's establishment in 1957 was discrimination against Canada 
in those areas where the EC developed common policies (e.g., 
the Common External Tariff and the Common Agricultural Policy 
- CAP) , then the considerable concern thirty years later in 
Canadian government and business circles over effects of the 
EC's "deepening" and "widening" processes on Canadian market 
access is not surprising.
Thematically, Chapter Nine considers the Canadian policy 
responses and options within the context of the Uruguay Round, 
in order to assess the degree of Canadian access to the 
European market. The SEM had a number of policy implications 
for third countries such as Canada.20 First, at the same time 
that it was reducing or removing regulatory barriers it was 
also throwing the structural inpediments that existed in the 
Community into sharper focus. It was clear that as Canada and 
the European Community became more economically integrated and 
non-tariff barriers were removed, the structural impediments 
would assume a greater importance.
Secondly, policy integration brought about by the SEA in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s meant that the Community had 
assumed more and more responsibilities, especially where 
policies of the Member States impinged upon its external 
economic relations. Not only this, but it was recognized by
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Canadian decision-makers that EC policy making wo.uld have 
spill-over effects, through the acquis communautaires, 
throughout the rest of Western Europe, that is, in the EFTA, 
the CEE countries, and the Mediterranean states, as these 
countries strove to harmonize their policies with those of the 
Community, some going so far as to apply for full membership.
Thirdly, the' Community was . also more prepared to 
intervene in order to create a genuine internal market,,, thus 
pursuing more ‘ intrusive policies to remove structural 
impediments to access within its market. This involved the 
exercise of•supranational powers in competition policy or the 
introduction of common EC procedures in areas such as 
purchasing practices or attempts to develop common standards. 
In other words, integration could also be seen as a process of 
re-regulation at- the European level.
To answer how the above processes conditioned Canadian 
responses to European economic integration, Part Three 
(Chapter 8.2 and 8.3) highlights how the domestic debate on 
Canada's -declining international competitiveness. - a 
motivating force for securing a free trade agreement with the 
United States - was central in prompting Canadian policymakers 
to take the lead in seeking more secure access to the West 
European market. What were the differences in Canada's 
response to North American and European integration? A number 
of Canadian analysts (e.g., Rugman, Eden and Molot, Doern and 
Tomlin21) have asserted that sustained pressure from both the
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Canadian and American business communities led the Canadian 
government to seek a free trade agreement with the United 
States, a deal that in subsequent years led to significant 
increases in bilateral trade and investment flows. In the case 
of the Canadian response to the SEM, this study will evaluate 
the relative involvements of . the state and private sector 
actors and suggest that in the period leading up to the SEM 
exactly the reverse occurred -there was a distinctly muted 
response from Canada's-private sector but very activist state 
involvement. First the "Third Option" and then the Framework 
Agreement, point to the historical precedents for state-led 
Canadian responses to Western Europe's expanding economic 
clout. However, in light of the consensus that began to form 
in Canada (by the late 1970s) that the state-led approach.to. 
securing increased access to West European markets had failed 
to produce any significant gains (a claim that is only 
partially true and will be discussed), the question arises 
whether a decade later during a major advance in the 
Community's program to create an economic union, a development 
that would once again present both challenges and 
opportunities for Canada-EC commercial relations, an Ottawa- 
based response would once more lead to both unreal 
expectations and ultimately disappointment.
The second half of Part Three (Chapters Ten and Eleven) 
of the dissertation examines the structural sources of 
changing transatlantic relations in the early 1990s.
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In particular the following general areas are examined:
1) The impact on Canada-EC relations of radical 
structural change affecting .Europe and United*.States. In 
particular the fact that between 1983 and 1993 the 
respective economic weights of the EC and the U.S. had 
changed in the international system.
2) The loss of Canada's Atlanticist influence in the wake 
of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, particularly 
as it framed the Canada-EC economic relationship.
3) The replacement of military and ideological' rivalry 
with economic rivalry. The immediate post-Cold War period ' 
accentuated rather than diminished transatlantic economic 
friction. In an era of greater interdependence this was 
bound to heighten the importance of market access issues 
in Canada-EC relations.
The last section analyzes how the repositioning of Europe,
Japan and the U.S. in the global political economy had-
important policy and institutional implications for a middle
power such as Canada during the Mulroney government's decade^
long tenure. Four,major interrelated processes significantly
influenced Canada-EC relations during this period: the Single
European Market, the CUFTA, the NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of
•multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT.
The argument in the last section of this disseration is 
that the international configuration of economic power will 
decisively influence any meaningful Canadian and indeed North 
American initiative, to improve transatlantic relations. - This 
is because the management of transatlantic trade and economic 
issues will prove critical as economic security becomes a 
paramount national interest. Within this context, Chapter Ten • 
compares an. array of new economic frameworks within which
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Ottawa contemplated managing its bilateral relations with 
Brussels, including the prospects for a transatlantic free 
trade agreement. The look ahead to the future or next stage in 
Canada-EC relations draws from the experience of having a 17- 
year old Framework Agreement, the "lessons" of closer EFTA-EC 
ties, the limits to greater transatlantic integration given 
the level of North American integration, and, most 
importantly, the political will for closer relations in Ottawa 
and in Brussels (at the level of the Comnission and Connunity 
presidencies).
1.3 METHODOLOGY
Several partially conflicting and partially complementary 
"models," "frameworks," "conceptual schemes" and "variable 
sets" are offered in the foreign policy-making literature. 
Political scientists1 at all points on the ideological 
spectrum who have studied Canada' s foreign policy in the post­
war years, including James Eayres2, Robert Farrell3, Bruce 
Thordarson4, Cranford Pratt5, Denis Stairs6, Kim Nossal7, and 
John Kirton8 have developed such analytical schemata with 
respect to Canada's foreign relations. Their work in turn has 
been greatly influenced by the institutionalist and decision­
making models in the American foreign policy analysis 
literature, particularly scholars such as Graham Allison and 
Morton Halperin.9 However, these models focus primarily on
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political relations, whereas EC-Canada relations have for most 
of their history been based on economic diplomacy. Thus, this - 
study would ‘ benefit also from the approaches of the 
. International Political Economy (IPE) school of foreign policy 
making. Within this literature are prominent scholars 
•exploring the domestic determinants of foreign economic policy 
making and state-societal interaction (American scholars such 
as Steven Krasner, Benjamin Cohen, Helen Milner, Peter 
Katzenstein, John G. Ikenberry, and John Mastanduno are 
prominent) .31
1.3.1 Framework for Understanding- Canada-EC Relations
The analytical framework underlying this study presupposes 
five major sets of variables that shaped bilateral Canada-EC 
relations during the period under examination (following from 
Table 1 on pp .xvi-xvii)32:
1. Systemic: on the economic side this was characterized by 
the process of increased globalization, interdependence, 
the. emergence of the Triad, the attempt to complete the 
Uruguay Round, and the new trade, policy agenda-; on the 
political/security side this was characterized by first 
and foremost the end of the Cold War, the changing roles 
of the traditional European security fora of NATO and the 
CSCE, the debate over an independent European security 
apparatus such as the re-invigorated WEU, and the greater 
importance of so-called "cooperative security" issues.
2. Domestic:, this would include the nature of the Canadian 
economy. Policy developments in this area were
. characterized by continental economic integration, first 
through completion of the CUFTA and then through the 
NAFTA. At the' same time, there was concern about 
national unity and constitutional reform in the form of 
the failed Meech . Lake and Charlottetown .accords. In
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Europe, there was a concerted effort to realize the goals 
of economic, political and monetary union, which, as 
the ratification process of the Maastricht Treaty 
demonstrated, was problematic. .
3. Organizational: this refers to the . interaction of the 
bureaucratic system and the role of political leadership, 
that is, the. respective roles-of politicians in Canada 
and. their officials in mapping out a policy framework 
for. relations with the European Community. Given the 
asymmetry in power, the degree of interest the Member 
States and the institutions of the: European Community 
(primarily Commission, Council and, to a. lesser extent, 
Parliament) had in furthering bilateral relations was a 
critical determining variable.
4. Sociological: this refers to the impact of values,
cultural perceptions, and the personal motivations of the 
elite actors (e.g., officials, politicians and business 
people) in Canada and. Europe in orienting transatlantic 
relations. For example, >it is important to know during 
which periods the "Europeanists" in the Department of 
External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC) 
were in the ascendancy and when and why their influence 
was superceded by that of the proponents of Canada-U.S. 
free trade. And, related to the organizational variable 
above, was the pro-Europe lobby situated solely in 
EAITC's European affairs bureaux or were they dispersed 
among other divisions such as the Policy Planning Staff, 
the Political and Security Affairs bureau (responsible 
for Canadian policy in NATO and the CSCE) , and the Under­
secretary of State for External Affairs' office? On the. 
non-government’ side, what was the view with which 
Canadian business leaders greeted the emergence of the 
SEM?. .
5. Policy: this refers to foreign policy objectives, policy 
decisions, and their implementation. This would'include 
the Transatlantic Declaration and government and private 
sector strategies and responses to the SEM.
Of course,,overlaying the above variables is the question-of 
national interests.' This study must answer the question of 
what specific policies were part, of Canada's . European 
framework in the 1980s and early 1990s? And to what extent 
were the policies consistent with national goals? Secondly,
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with regard to the "choice of policies" the questions would be 
somewhat different. For example, based on the description of 
Canada's foreign-policy community in Chapter Three, who were 
the key actors? What were their policy preferences? What 
were their respective bargaining resources? What was the 
relative importance of domestic and external factors (see 
Chapter Two) in .the policy making process? (And how relevant 
is the distinction between traditionally domestic and 
international .interests in a world characterized by the 
intermeshing of economic, political and security agendas?) 
Finally, whose interests were reflected'in policy outcomes and 
why? .
To explain why relations did not becpme more market- 
driven requires a decision-making analysis, that is, an 
examination of the relative importance of systemic, state and 
societal forces in Canadian foreign policy making. This study 
therefore invokes the bureaucratic politics, paradigm as its 
particular conceptual lens. It supports the statist approach 
to Canadian foreign policy, which asserts that government 
actors in Canada are able to translate their preferences into 
public policies with a fair degree of autonomy from society.33
1.3.2 Research Sources
In carrying out the research for this dissertation, this 
author benefited greatly from a year-long academic fellowship
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in 1991-1992 on the Policy Planning Staff34 of the Department 
of External Affairs and International Trade35, following which 
he was a researcher in EAITC's Multilateral Trade Negotiatons 
Branch, which co-ordinated and negotiated Canada.'s positions 
in the GATT.
The primary sources for this study consist of classified 
and unclassified documents and statements from EAITC. 
Specifically, • the documentation included policy papers, 
correspondence and speeches prepared by officials on the 
Policy Planning Staff and in the European Bureau at EAITC 
headquarters in Ottawa, and telex and memoranda traffic from 
Canada's foreign missions in Washington and Western Europe 
(London, Brussels, Bonn). In keeping with the normal 
procedures of releasing confidential information, the author 
was informed that he could not cite classified' material 
directly from EAITC files.39 The scheduled interviews with 
officials to a great extent mitigated this problem of 
collection.40 Where possible the author has identified the 
individuals in the interview (see interview list in Appendix 
One). If they did not wish to be identified, the author 
attempted to seek alternate sources. This, however, was not 
always possible. As a result, some of the information in -this 
study has not been, substantiated by citations and in certain 
cases the author indicates . only "confidential interview," 
preserving the official's anpnymity.
Since this study looks at EC-Canada relations from the
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Canadian standpoint, it is not .surprising that most of the 
interviews were conducted with Canadian officials or private 
sector representatives. A large proportion of those government 
interviews were conducted with persons who had been or were 
members of EAITC.- The author did Interview a number of 
Commission officials in DG I as well as Canada-based staff at 
the Delegation to the European Communities in Ottawa. 
Interviews took place between January 1992'and November 1993 
and. those with government'officials were conducted either in 
person -at EAITC Headquarters in Ottawa or by telephone with 
officials stationed abroad.
With regard to the interviews, it must be noted that 
having read the classified and unclassified departmental 
documentation in addition to the memoranda to Cabinet, the 
author knew.which questions to ask. This meant that officials1 
recollections of their actions on specific policy issues could 
be double-checked41, but perhaps more importantly through the 
author's access to documents prepared for Cabinet (see 
discussion below on the value of this source) it was simple to 
discern specific EAITC recommendations.to the government of 
the day on any given vertical issue area or on Canada's 
bilateral or multilateral relations. . The anecdotal information 
gleaned - • through interviews in conjunction with the 
Departmental documentation thus allowed-the author to build a 
very accurate chronology of Canadian policy outputs vis-a-vis 
the EC, and to assess . whether the actual outcomes and
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implementations diverged or were consistent with the 
anticipated policy outputs. •
This author's greatest advantage, however, was having 
access to all "Memoranda- to Cabinet" pertaining to Canada's 
relations with Europe from 1980 to 1992-. This is significant 
because under the terms of Canada's Access to Information 
legislation, Cabinet documents (classified as "secret") are 
removed from files before being made available to academic 
researchers, making it much harder - although certainly not 
impossible - to piece together . the evolution of policy 
initiatives. This rule was not applied to this author since 
he was considered, during the period of his academic 
fellowship, to be a member of the Department.
Cabinet documents were- invaluable because they outlined 
explicitly .the full dimension ' - economic, political, and 
strategic - of Canadian interests in Europe during the period 
considered, by this study. Their value resulted from two 
factors. The first is one of practical concern, for a 
researcher. First, because Canada's foreign relations (see 
discussion on expansion of the Department of External Affairs 
in Chapter Three) axe managed predominantly by one federal 
government department rather than two or three as is the case, 
for example, in Japan and the United States, the collection of 
information is that much easier.
Second, under a parliamentary system of government 
characterized by party unity, the "Memoranda to Cabinet"
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represent the final outcome of bargaining among the various 
federal departments and the affected ministers. On Canada's 
relations with Europe, the views of line departments (e.g., 
Fisheries and Oceans, Industry, Science and Technology, 
National Defence) were thus distilled in these documents; 
furthermore, the Cabinet documents explicitly drew the links 
between Canada's economic and political/security interests in 
its European policy framework. With access to Cabinet 
documents and interview material it was much easier to 
identify whose interests were reflected in the memoranda sent 
to Cabinet, as well as the extent to which dissenting opinions 
were included.
While on the Policy Planning Staff the author had access 
to the embryonic efforts of what was to have been a major 
government study of Canada-EC relations in 1990. 
Unfortunately, this internal study was aborted shortly after 
it had begun when the Department' s efforts were redirected to 
extensive background research on the implications for Canada 
of the then U.S.-Mexico free trade negotiations. Neverthless, 
the documents that were prepared for this EC project proved 
valuable in allowing the author to ascertain the government's 
strategy towards the Community - particularly on the economic 
front during 1989 and 1990. (See Primary Sources listed on p. 
567)
Finally, with regard to data on Canadian private sector 
responses to the SEM, in addition to using the more general 
statistics compiled by Statistics Canada, this author (see
3 1  •
Chapter Nine.) also developed a more specific database of 
Canadian firms, with major interests in the Community. This 
database contained-factual information on 253 Cahadian firms' 
investment/' joint ventures, and other types of business 
alliances in the Community (see Table 17 in Appendix Three).
The secondary sources of information for this study can 
be divided into three categories. The first examines the 
larger EC Member States' own approaches vis-a-vis the 
Community, such as the work by W. Wallace (1984), Hodges et 
al. (1990) and Franklin (1990), as well as the larger dynamic 
of the transformation of Western Europe that is found, for 
example, in the writings of W. Wallace (1990).42 The second 
category on the external relations of the Community is a 
result of what appears to be two waves of interest, with the 
first occurring in the mid-1970s and then another occurring, 
not surprisingly, in ■the late 1980s as questions of 
enlargement and third-country reactions to the SEM began to 
preoccupy analysts and decision makers, (see especially 
Redmond, 1993) .43
As even a cursory data . base, search shows, book and 
periodical literature on the "external relations" of the 
Community tend to concentrate on the EC's major interlocutors 
such as the United States, .EFTA, Japan, developing’countries 
(e/g., the ACP) ,. and, more recently, Central and Eastern 
Europe, thus often ignoring medium-sized industrialized 
countries such as Canada. For example, on Japan-EC relations,
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there have studies by Rothacher (1983) 44, Daniels (1989) 45, and 
El-Agraa (19 9 3 ) 46; but the richest and most far-ranging studies 
since 1984 (many actually book-length) have been specifically 
on EC-U.S. relations47, including those by Smith (1984, 
1991) 48, Baldwin (1986) 49, Tsoukalis (1986)50, Ginsberg (1989) 51, 
Schwartz (1989) 52, Hufbauer (1990)53, Woolcock^ (1991) 54, 
HaftendOrn. and Tuschhoff (19 9 3 ) 55, and Smith and Woolcock 
. (19 9 3 ) 56.
Given the rich vein of research on EC-U.S. relations, the 
inspiration and justification for this dissertation topic are 
to be found in the lack of a distinctive body of literature 
focusing on the EC's relations with, or impact on, non- 
European industrialized "liberal democratic" states, sometimes 
also referred to. as "middle powers". Juliet Lodge's book on 
EC-New Zealand agricultural reflations and Miller's more 
general book on EC-Australia trade relations are exceptions 
that prove the rule.57 As yet there is no book-length treatment 
of Canada's relations with the Community.
Given this apparent lacunae in the literature, the third 
category of secondary readings for .this study consists of 
existing scholarly and public sector work on specifically 
Canada-EC relations. This dissertation seeks to add to as well 
as to tie together the various dimensions of Canada's 
relations with the Community that are evident in this corpus 
of knowledge. For an early examination of Canadian reactions 
to the creation of the Common Market, the edited volume of
papers presented at a. symposium held in Canada in 1962 
*
entitled, Canada, the Commonwealth and the Common Market, has 
proved to be both illuminating and a rich source for drawing 
comparisons to later Canadian reactions to the various 
successive phases of European integration.58 To date, this is 
the only single text that provides a cross-section of Canadian 
views - business, labour, government - on Canada's relations 
with the Community. On the process of Canada-EC relations, the 
writings of Pentland (1977, 1991) 59, von Riekhoff (19 7 8 ) 60,
Boardman (1979) 61, Dobell (1985) 62, Soldatos (1988) 63, and 
Granatstein and Bothwell (1990) 64, on the "Third Option" and 
its implications have proved to be very useful, as well as the 
.unpublished doctoral dissertation of Daniel Roseman (1983) and 
Boardman et al. (19 8 4 ) 65 on the Framework Agreement. In the
business studies and economics literature, there is the work 
by Papadopolous (1986) 66, Soldatos . (1988, . 1990) 67, Pitts 
(1990) 68,- and Demers and Demers (1991) 69. On the public sector 
side, EAITC published a number of industry studies between 
1989 and 1991 to assist Canadian business in understanding the 
implications of the SEM as part of. its trade promotion 
efforts.70 Although the bodies of research and analysis 
outlined.above probed bilateral trade and investment flows or 
the structure of bureaucratic consultative mechanisms under 
the Framework Agreement, they did not succeed in providing 
robust frameworks for understanding the.often cross-cutting 
trade and security policy dimensions of this rapidly evolving.
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bilateral relationship in the post-1989 period.
The explanation for the lack of a current and 
comprehensive treatment . of Canadian-EC. relations • is 
multifaceted. One reason is institutional, resting on the 
priorities of the organizations that have funded Canadian 
foreign policy research in recent years; another, is simply 
the declining number of Canadian scholars over the last decade 
•with not only an interest in the overall direction of Canadian 
foreign policy but who are also interested in transatlantic 
relations.71 Finally, both the overall paucity of Canada-EC 
research as well as the absence of a single comprehensive work 
are also due in part to the.sui generis nature of the object 
of scrutiny, to the political and economic evolution of the EC 
itself, and to the differentiated post-Cold War foreign policy 
concerns of Canada and the Community.
1.4 CONCLUSION
A number of significant observations arise from this study's 
outline of the evolution of Canada's policy response to the 
process, of European integration. First, at each successive 
stage of European economic integration, from the late 1940s to 
the early 1990s, Canadian politicians, business people and 
government officials were concerned about the potential 
discriminatory impact of this process on Canadian commercial 
interests. The major difference between the early, reactions
and those later on was that by the mid-1980s, with Canadian 
attention focused on- the impact of North American economic 
integration, for the first time in Canada's history as a 
nation and a colony a consensus had formed domestically that 
the historic Anglo-European option was no longe'r realistic.
Second, this study will show that Canada's approach to 
the EC is intimately related to how it views its "Atlantic" 
role. The late John Holmes, perhaps still the most prescient 
observer of Canadian foreign policy, noted that in the 
immediate post-war period and until the formation of the EC, 
the concept of an Atlantic Community was excessively driven, by 
the "idealism" of Pearson and his colleagues at the Department 
of External Affairs due to what Holmes perceived as’ their 
over-attachment to Article 2 of the NATO Treaty.72 In the 
1970s, Canada's desire for closer ties with.Western Europe and 
the EC. in particular, was propelled in large' part as a 
byproduct of the Trudeau government's nationalist fervour. By 
the 1980s, however, "Atlanticism" had clearly lost its lustre. 
As this study .documents, only in the aftermath of the. historic 
CUFTA and NAFTA negotiations and because of the Community's 
"1992" program and the collapse of communism in the CEE's 
after 1989, was the concept of an Atlantic, free trade area 
briefly revived during the second term of the Mulroney 
government. Indeed, . it can be said that the TAD and the 
decision^to withdraw all^ Cariadian troops from Europe remain 
the only lasting evidence, of the Canadian’ government's
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introspection'concerning its Atlantic role during this period.
Third, the historical analysis also highlights the 
remarkable similarities between the debates on the appropriate 
transatlantic institutional, structure that took place within 
the Canadian government in the period leading up to the 
creation of NATO (September 1947 — April 19.49 ) 73, and those 
more than forty years later (mid-1989 - 1991) concerning
Canada's foreign policy role in Europe'tothe post-Cold War 
period.74 Indeed, as this study's analysis of post-TAD 
transatlantic policy options suggests, the policy debate 
surrounding the negotiations of the NATO Treaty may actually 
hold lessons, for the ability of Canada in the post-Cold War 
period to influence the creation and/or re-configuration of 
transatlantic institutions. But perhaps this study's most 
important contribution is that it confirms what Lester Pearson 
always recognized, namely,, that the United States is the "key 
to- any progress toward an Atlantic alliance" and by definition 
the 'key' in the calculus of both EC and Canadian policymakers 
as they modulate their approaches to each other.75 It seems 
that what became even less certain by the early 1990s in the 
context of EC-Canadian relations was the role of Canada's 
"other" special relationship, namely, that with the United 
Kingdom.76 It also' raises the interesting question of whether 
the pre-Second World War "North Atlantic Triangle" - Canada, 
UK, and the United States - is being replaced definitively by 
an EC-North America axis, centred in Brussels and Washington.
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Although these two questions are certainly touched upon in 
this • dissertation in the context of the future of 
transatlantic relations, a detailed exploration of possible 
answers - since it would be beyond the scope of this study's 
more discrete focus on Canada-EC relations - is left for 
future research. This study concludes that the essential 
challenge for Canada-EC relations in the 1990s is not so much 
whether Canada should scale-back its European presence, but 
rather to what degree Canada can re-create the leverage lost 
with the passing of the Cold War, a period during which a 
Canadian security commitment was accepted and expected by its 
European allies, "and during which the necessary political 
stability to encourage transatlantic commerce was provided.
The. challenge to linkage politics posed by pan- 
Europeanism in the 1990s is to what degree Canada-Europe and 
Canada-Community collaboration on co-operative security issues 
encompassing refugees/migration, terrorism, the environment, 
poverty and human welfare, and inter-ethnic conflicts, will 
help to rebuild some of the traditional- Canadian leverage 
exercised through NATO and the CSCE. Further, what impact, if 
any, will these efforts have on the choices available to 
Canada in its response to the emergence of a Single European 
Market, a process that has far more important and numerous 
consequences than first expected, due to the exigencies' of 
integration? Without the unifying pressure of East-West 
polarization, the EC's Member States in' the post-Cold War
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period have felt it increasingly unnecessary to maintain a 
common front with North America on international security or 
trade issues, leading to an unraveling of the traditional 
transatlantic political-security nexus.. Already by the early 
1990s this created a fertile environment for the increased 
politicization of transatlantic economic and trade relations, 
and thus within the "two pillar"■ framework of transatlanticism 
witnessed the "side-swiping" of Canada in an escalation of EC- 
U.S. disharmony.
To prevent marginalization, the argument is made here 
that Canada's relations with Western Europe in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s exhibited a leverage-building approach with 
three broad components: policy — greater integration of the 
economic and security tracks of its European policy framework; 
structural - pursuit of changes in the institutional 
frameworks governing transatlantic relations; and attitudinal 
— increased coalition-building among the major stakeholders on 
both sides of the Atlantic.(e.g., the Canadian and Commission 
bureaucracies, the Canadian and European parliaments, 
political leaders and the business communities on both sides 
of the Atlantic). Since the dissertation compares the.nature 
of structural changes in the transatlantic relationship to the 
policy and institutional adjustments that were made, 
naturally arising from such an approach is the question of 
whether the various adjustments in Canada's leverage-building 
were sufficient and effective in the pursuit of Canada's
European interests during the two'.terms of the Mulroney 
government. The study concludes that the policy aind. 
institutional adjustments in Canadian-EC relations during this 
period only partially absorbed the impact of underlying 
structural changes in transatlantic economic, political and 
security relations. ■
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1. As cited in J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: 
Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1990), p. 172 and footnote 89. Ritchie was among 
the original elite corps who constituted Canada's first foreign 
service (after Statute of Westminster in 1932) . He rose to become 
Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.
2. The name of the CSCE has been changed to the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Given this study's time 
frame, the acronym "CSCE" will be used.
3. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), Euratom and the 
European Economic Community (EEC) were formally amalgamated July 1, 
1967 to become the European Community (EC).. The EC became the 
European Union after ratification of the Maastricht Treaty on 
November 1, 1993. For a good review of the rise of the EC, see John 
Pinder, European Community (London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs, 1989), esp. Ch..Is
4.. The twelve Member States are: Germany, France, the United
Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece, and Luxembourg. As of January.1, 1995, three new 
states - Austria, Sweden, and Finland - joined the EU.
5. The best regular source for Canadian views on European security 
is the periodical Canadian Defence Quarterly. See also the most-up- 
to-date research bibliography on Canada's defence and security 
literature in David B. Dewitt and' David Leyton-Brown, eds. , 
Canada’s International Security Policy (Toronto: Prentice-Hall 
Canada Ltd., 1995), Appendix.
6. Charles Pentland, "Europe 1992 and the Canadian Response," in 
Fen Osier Hampson and Christopher J. Maule (eds.), Canada Among 
Nations 1990-1991, (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 1991), p.
■ i26.
7. For an excellent historical discussion of the importance of 
diversification in Canada's foreign policy policy in the context of 
Canada's relations with Europe see Panayotis Soldatos, "En guise 
d'introduction: Le Canada devant la diversification et • le 
continentalisme libre-echang.iste, ". in A. P. Donneur and P. Soldatos 
(eds.) Le Canada a 1'ere de. 1 'Apres-Guerre Froide et des Blocs 
Regionaux (Toronto: Captus Press, 1993), especially pp. 1-3; See
•also Donald Barry, "The United States and the Development•of the 
Canada-European Community Contractual Link Relationship, " American 
Review of Canadian Studies, Vol. 10, (Spring), pp. 63-74.
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8. According to an acclaimed biography of Lester B. Pearson by John 
English, Pearson believed "that Canada's identity depended upon the. 
nourishment that flowed from its links to Europe and that without 
such links the economic and political sinews of Canadian nationhood 
would shrivel." John English, The Life of Lester Pearson, (Toronto: 
Alfred A. Knopf,•1992), p. 110. For an equally profound treatment 
of Pearson's thinking, on the North Atlantic community see John 
Holmes, The Shaping of Peace: Canada and the search for world 
order, 1943-1957, Vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1982), Ch. 5. And for Pearson's "Atlantic Vision" in his ovm. words 
see Lester B. Pearson, Mike: The Memoirs of the Right Honourable 
Lester B. Pearson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), Ch;.
3 .
-9. The best treatment of Trudeau's "Europe" policy from the late 
1960s to the early 1970s can be found in Peter Dobell, Canada's 
■Search for New Roles:.Foreign Policy in the Trudeau Era (Oxford, 
UK: Oxford University Press, 1972; and Peter C. Dobell, Canada in 
World Affairs, Volume XVII, 1971-1973 (Toronto: Canadian Institute 
of^International Affairs, 1985), Ch, 8. On a reappraisal of the 
Third Option see’Panayotis Soldatos in Paul Painchaud, (ed.) From 
Mackenzie King to Pierre Trudeau: Forty Years of Canadian
Diplomacy, 1945-1985 (St. Foy, Quebec: Universite Laval Presse, 
1985) ; and J.K. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre 
Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1990), pp. 111-172.
.10. See, for example, Lawrence Woods, Asia-Pacific Diplomacy: 
Nongovernmental Organizations and International ’ Relations 
(Vancouver, BC: University of British Columbia Press, 1993).
11. A phrase coined by Michael Hart in his chapter entitled, 
"Canada Discovers its Vocation as a Nation of the Americas," in Fen 
Osier Hampson and Christopher J. Maule, eds., Canada Among Nations 
1990-91: After the Cold.War (Ottawa: Carleton University Press, 
1991)., pp. 83-108.
12. John Halstead, "Atlantic Community or Continental Drift?" 
Journal of European Integration, Vol. 16, No. 2, (Spring 1993), p. 
158.
13. A 'multipolar1 rather than 'multinodal' world is referred to 
here because there will continue to be economic, competition, 
although now among a greater number of regional groupings. 
Multimodality would not be appropriate.in this instance since it 
de-emphasized competition.
14. A classic exposition on why Canada adopted an internationalist 
foreign policy can be found in John W. Holmes, The. Shaping of 
Peace, Vol. 2, Canada and the Search for World Order 1943-1957 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982). .
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15. For an excellent historical examination of multilateralism in 
Canadian foreign policy, see- Tom Keating, Canada and the World 
Order: The Multilateralist Tradition in Canadian Foreign Policy 
(Toronto: McLelland and Stewart, 1993) .
'16. According to Wolfers, possession' goals are. a means of 
preserving or enhancing a country's possessions (e.g., natural 
resources)milieu goals are aimed at influencing the nature of the 
international envirqnment beyond, a .country's borders. Arnold 
Wolfers, Discord and. Collaboration: Essays, on International
Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1962), ch. 5, pp. 67-80.
17. The G-7 has been a prestigious forum for the discussion of 
macroeconomic policy since 1975 and, since 1980, ■• international 
political issues as well. It .is important to,note that the G-7 
summits are made up of no less than four EU Member States (Germany, 
France, UK, Italy) plus the President of the Commission to. 
represent, the' interests of the smaller Community members. The 
Quadrilateral Group includes the EU, US, Canada and Japan. The EU 
also is a dialogue partner of the. following groups of countries': 
ACP states (69), Andean Pact, Arab League, ASEAN, Contadora,. 
Central America, Council of Europe, EFTA, Front Line states, G8, 
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CHAPTER TWO
THE THEORY OF MIDDLE POWER FOREIGN POLICYMAKING
2.1 Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War, academics have viewed 
Canada's international status in three markedly different 
ways. The first and most popular systemic model, often called 
the "liberal-internationalist" assumes that Canadian foreign 
policy can best be understood if Canada is seen as a middle 
power seeking to contribute to international peace and 
stability by advocating and supporting an increasing 
institutionalization of international relations in ways that 
would ensure a major role for Canada.1 Based on a strong 
network of international organizations in which all states 
have the potential to influence events, the new system 
eventually replaced the anarchy and reliance on force 
propounded by classical realists in their balance of power 
theories. Canada's "global" foreign policy was evident in its 
role as a founding member of most post-war multilateral 
economic (e.g., GATT, OECD, IMF, IBRD) and security fora 
(e.g., NATO, CSCE). With the end of the Cold War, Canada, 
reinforcing the increasing importance of Asia Pacific in its 
foreign policy, began promoting itself as a player in 
discussions to create a North Asian multilateral security 
forum.2 This desire to belong was a result of historical 
experience which had shown that international - organizations
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played an important role in setting the rules and standards 
which could benefit all Canadians, whether it was enhancing 
global peace and security or ensuring equal access to global 
markets for Canada's farmers and fishermen. By the late 1980s, 
however, with fiscal realities looming large in Ottawa, 
Canada's membership in .a wide assortment of -international 
organizations with varying levels of influence, ranging from 
the prestigious G-7 to the more obscure International Tropical 
Timber Organization, prompted questions from both inside and 
outside of government about the necessity for Canada to be the 
quintessential joiner.
Allen Sens states that Canada's Cold War internationalism 
(including its defence component), was based on a clear 
conception of Canada's national security interests. "While 
historical affinities and political and economic membership in 
the West contributed to Canada's Cold War internationalism," 
he concludes that "the pursuit of a policy of active 
engagement abroad and full partnership in the emergent Pax 
Americana was: founded on the reality of geography and - the 
strategic dynamic' of the Cold War."3 The concern was that an 
outbreak of hostilities in Europe or elsewhere could escalate 
to a superpower, confrontation which would place Canada at 
risk, for any full-scale war between the superpowers would 
leave Canada (which was part of the "North American Target 
Set") either a direct target of attack or at best a victim of 
severe collateral damage. Therefore', in addition to
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participation in North American defence, it was in Canada's 
interests to contribute to efforts to deter a general European 
war and prevent, control, or contain the spread of hostilities 
in areas of tension around the world.
A second dimension of Canadian internationalism noted by 
Sens was concern over Canadian sovereignty and independence. 
The maintenance of international commitments and the exertion 
of "middle power" roles - in particular the commitment to 
collective defence in Europe and United Nations (UN) 
peacekeeping — would act as counterweights to the political 
and economic influence of the United States as well as a more 
general expression of the Canadian government's claim to be 
acting as an independent, sovereign political entity.4
The need for "counterweights." and "independence", as we 
shall see in subsequent chapters, has deep historical roots in 
Canada's. external relations, As Canadian historian Kenneth 
McNaught has written, the "most consistent theme running 
through the sometimes tenuous tale of Canada' s relations, with 
the outside world has been, a concern for survival."5 This 
theme was borne out in the Old Province of Quebec, the 
Loyalist migrations to British. North America after the 
American Revolution, the War of 1812, the border raids in the 
183 0s and 1860s, and the pressures of American expansionism in 
the 1880s and early 1900s that led to the creation by Canada's 
first prime minister, Sir John A. MacDonald, of a-National 
Policy to protect the Canadian market' from being hurt by
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cheaper American imports. These events were marked by
successive decisions against political union with the United
States. Nineteenth-century Canadian, foreign policy was based
on a consciously-formulated concept of balance - between the
threats posed by American expansionism and required "loyalty"
to Britain. The principal counterweight to dependence on
Britain was encouragement of trade with the United States or
a counteracting nationalism.6 This search for counterweight
and diversification in diplomatic ties ■ has also been the
leitmotif of Canada's international relations in the 20th
century . In the 1980s, when commentators - focused on the
Mulroney government's increased bilateralism with Washington,
this observation overlooked the same government's strong
.support for multilateral ties through NATO, the UN, the'
Commonwealth and La Francophonie.
In the above described•"comfortable configuration,"7 as
Dewitt and Kirton have termed it, Canada became a state of
medium strength that rarely used its: power directly in the
pursuit of ’national advantage. Rather:.
acting-as a skilled diplomat, it has played an 
active, responsible, and influential part in a 
multitude • of global ' issues, developing 
harmonious, effective, and expansive ties with 
states of similar strength and common 
political tradition. An.d in keeping with the 
values of contemporary liberalism, Canada has 
pursued the central purpose of steadily 
constructing a more durable international 
order for all.8
Those who saw the post-War period as producing a bi-polar
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system, with the United States and the Soviet Union direcly 
pitted against each other, quickly challenged the traditional 
view of international relations.9 These observers described a 
network of satellite states supporting the two primary 
protagonists. The United States in the West was seen as 
primarily concerned with protecting the capitalist system and 
with maintaining its own pre-eminent position. Countries such 
as Canada were, presented in a very unflattering light/ their 
role in international affairs deft relatively insignificant, 
and their freedom to operate independently, either 
domestically or internationally, strictly limited. Members of 
the Western Alliance were termed minor powers -and wholly 
dependent.
In this, 'capitalist class', model of Canadian foreign
policy propounded by academics such as Cranford Pratt, Canada
is a permeated, semi-peripheral power that
...has had its internal structure determined 
largely by sources of public and private power 
centred in - the United States. It has been 
forced to secure from a globally dominant 
economic power the resources required to meet 
basic needs... In conformance with Marxist 
predictions, Canada has been induced to 
collaborate with preponderant America,' provide 
uncritical support for American actions and 
purposes, and passively promote those open 
international regimes and gradual reforms by 
which the global dominance of imperialist 
powers is sustained.10
In the early 1980s, Dewitt .and Kirton found both of these 
interpretations deficient and instead posited one of the most 
pro-statist arguments for Canadian foreign policy.11 Within
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a "complex neo-realist" framework, Dewitt and Kirton attempted
to explain the shift of .Canada's foreign policy in the 1970s
from one reflecting liberal internationalism to another more
narrowly self-serving. Their rethinking of Canadian foreign
policy reflected dissatisfaction with traditional theories,
most especially their absence of hypotheses regarding the role
of middle powers, in a world characterized by declining
American influence.
Dewitt and Kirton viewed Canada's position in the
international system in purely structural terms and concluded
that the combination of declining U.S. power and Canada's more
assertive economic nationalism had catapulted Canada into the
league of "principal powers". By their definition, a
"principal power" contains three characteristics:
First, they are the states in the hierarchy 
that stand at the top of the international 
status ranking, collectively possessing, 
decisive capability and differentiated from 
lower-ranking powers by both objective and 
subjective criteria. Secondly, they act as 
principals in their international activities 
and associations, rather than as agents for 
other states or groupings or as mediators 
between principals. And thirdly, they have a 
principal role in establishing, specifying, 
and enforcing international order.12
The Kirton and Dewitt principal power thesis was: certainly 
provocative and perhaps appropriate in the early 1980s when 
questions of non-structural leadership.in the international- 
system were of lesser interest and relevance because the 
political-economic hegemony of the United States-, despite its
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noticeable decline, was still primary. By the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, however, the principal power thesis had become 
less relevant for Canada in light of the dramatic changes in 
the international system, reflected not exclusively but 
perhaps most profoundly by the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. *
2.2 "Relocating" Canada As a Middle Power in the Post-Cold War 
Era
In collaboration, Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott, and Kim 
Nossal, have in recent years attempted to reconceptualize and 
to "relocate" middle power foreign policy theorizing, shifting 
the focus to the changing nature of what John Holmes 
ironically termed "middlepowermanship"13 in the post-Cold War 
era.14 Rather than narrowly focusing on American leadership in 
the world system and, by extension, how middle powers will 
respond, they have placed greater emphasis on the sources of 
innovation and initiative available to middle powers under 
conditions of "waning hegemony."15 For Cooper et al. the 
changing nature of leadership and followership was one of the 
key justifications for wishing to- "relocate" the idea of 
middle powers in the contemporary international system.
They extend their analysis to include the number -of 
actors with a potential to exercise non-structural leadership, 
given that the structural leadership of the great powers is no
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longer the. most important source of initiative in the 
international order of the 1990s. In a variety of issue areas 
on the international agenda they conclude that other forms of 
leadership can act significantly in "catalyzing" the process 
of reform and change, especially on those issues requiring 
considerable cooperation and collaboration. They envisage 
appropriately qualified secondary powers such as Canada 
playing this role in a way that might not have been possible 
in the pash:
Cooper et al; see Canada as the quintessential middle 
power or secondary-level state and proffer an1 "egotistic" 
framework for its foreign policy outlook but then veer away 
from the Kirton and Dewitt . thesis by advocating a .less 
structural definition.16 Less interested in concepts of 
aggregate state power or location in the hierarchy of states, 
they reject idealist and normative influences inherent in the 
Pearsonian notion of Canada as a "boy scout" in the 
international system, as a much respected mediator between the 
superpowers and between the First and Third worlds.
■. Although theories of the statecraft of middle powers have 
traditionally assumed a promotion of "social justice" and 
"peace," Cooper et al. direct their focus upon the impact of 
rationality in shaping Canada's activities, examining what 
types of actions Canada' takes rather than what actions it 
should take. They argue that the traditional frameworks for 
understanding Canadian foreign policy were not adaptable to
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the new circumstances of the late 1980s and. early 1990s. For
instance, because non-structurally: determined types of
leadership will have increasing room to blossom in the 1990s
and were not sufficiently highlighted by the Dewitt and Kirton
analysis, Cooper, Higgott and Nossall have, proposed the heed
to formulate a model of "middle power leadership" to account
for Canada's systemic position.17 It is their contention that
in the post-hegemonic international system, middle powers such
as Canada are exercising and will exercise increasing
"technical" and "entrepreneurial" leadership as opposed to the
more structurally determined • leadership (i.e., defined in
military or economic terms) found in traditional models.18
.They consider globalization and interdependence to have
diminished - though not undermined - the role of structure in
the explanation ■ of international relations, epitomized
especially in the work of Kenneth Waltz.19 As Higgott notes,
Understanding in international politics will 
have to.be less structurally determined than 
has been the case for much of the Post-World 
War Two era. in the dependency literature on . .
the one hand and even the realist and neo­
realist international political theory on the 
other.20
They are careful to emphasize, that this argument does not 
presume that' the change in the relational .power between the 
U.S. and the rest of the world since 1970 was accompanied by 
a •commensurate decline in what Susan Strange and others have 
identified as its residual or structural power.21 They do 
assume a continuing although not hegemonic role for the United
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States and contend that- "mitigating economic and political 
intellectual influences" will emanate from other principal 
centres of structual power in the international system, 
especially Japan and the EC. Thus in the post-Cold War world 
questions of power shift are still salient for Canada/ as more 
"principal" powers inhabit a world which Smith and; Woolcock 
have described as one of "competitive co-operation" between 
the U.S. and the EC.22
Cooper et al. see middle powers having the opportunity to 
fill the gap in the international power base resulting from 
the relative decline of American resources and therefore from 
the umbrella of structural leadership and willingness to lead, 
and' to "take on greater — albeit selective — forms of 
responsibility. 1,23 Or as Puchala and Coate note: "numerous
middle powers are now looking for ways to assert themselves in 
the context, of the. . .leadership void.1,24 Thus, Cooper et al. 
adopt a "behavioural" approach that emphasizes not what middle 
powers should be doing (i.e., placing them on a higher moral 
ground) but rather what diplomatic behaviour they do, or could 
display. In this view, the diplomacy of middle powers such as 
Canada is, defined by a tendency to pursue multilateral 
solutions to international problems, to embrace compromise 
solutions to international disputes, and to adopt notions of 
"good.international citizenship." 25
Cooper et al. cite, two other -factors reinforcing the 
ability and willingness of middle powers to adopt a more
60
activist, initiative-oriented approach within the 
international arena.. The first is the search for national 
economic well-being and the second arises out of overlapping 
domestic and foreign policy -considerations presuming "high" 
policy issues to have dominated the 1950s and 1960s, they find 
"low" policy issues ascendant. in the 1970s, 19.80s, and the 
early 1990s. Economic security and social or "cooperative 
security" concerns such as the environment and human rights 
they see as having joined traditional political and security 
concerns to form the bedrock of contemporary international 
relations. This tendency in turn has altered perceptions and 
definitions of national interest. For middle powers, in 
particular. the search for national economic well-being has 
become as important as traditional security, which fixed on 
physical or territorial conceptions■of integrity.26 .
The second factor prompting middle power activism, the 
increased intermeshing of domestic economics and politics with 
foreign policy, also acknowledges the influence of •"low" 
policy issues with domestic, forces and issues developing 
international ramifications and international issues entering 
the national-arena. Consequently, a middle power may pull back 
for fear of causing pain to certain domestic interest groups 
that have been made more vulnerable by the changing states in 
the international economic order.27 Cooper et al. point to the 
Cutler and Zacher thesis that middle powers today, although 
still portrayed as having a-firm attachment to multilateralism
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and international institution-building, instead engage in 
behaviour ‘revealing an uneven commitment to multilateralism, 
illustrated by Canada's negotiations of the CUFTA and the 
NAFTA'.28
Cooper et al. see the leadership behaviour of middle 
powers such as Canada in the 1980s and i990s as neither 
classically based on coercion and force nor economic as 
Japan's has been. They view middle power leadership and 
initiative within a non-structural context,- associating such 
influence with an imaginative and energetic application of 
diplomatic capabilities. They describe middle power skills as 
"...persuasion, coalition building, and the art of the 
'.indirect' approach".29
In attempting to schematize the. emergent pattern of 
middle power leadership, Higgott and Cooper advocate the 
dimensions highlighted by Oran Young30 as a useful starting 
point-for mapping out categories of action.31 Young describes 
a middle power leader as exhibiting three major 
characteristics. First, it may act as a catalyst in a 
diplomatic endeavour, providing the. intellectual or political 
impetus which triggers an initiatve. Secondly, in the the 
early and middle stages of an initiative, with the focus on 
agenda setting, the actor- (or actors) would facilitate some 
form of coalition' activity- Within the third phase, it would 
serve as a manager emphasizing institution-building.
Higgott and Cooper employ the concept of institution-
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building here in its broadest sense to include not only the 
creation of formal organizations and regimes but also the 
development of conventions and norms (see Keohane, 1990) 32. 
This managerial stage also requires • the development of 
confidence-building measures ' and facilities for dispute 
resolution, in which they describe diplomacy frequently 
centred on a small core group of domestic and international 
officials -whose specific technical skills push a project 
forward.
What Cooper and Higgott are calling for is a reappraisal 
of the role of 'agency' in foreign policy analysis, advocating 
in the formulation of foreign policy theories a greater 
emphasis on the "...complex and. nuanced interplay of the 
agent-structure relationship33 and on the leadership 
capabilities and policy-making, functions of foreign policy­
making personnel and institutions in a much wider range of 
states...".34 They view these and other factors as. modifying 
and constraining the structures of anarchy which are. too often 
simply assumed as a given in neo-realist theory.3-5
Cooper, Higgott and Nossal . are acknowledging that the 
'source of leadership' in international relations is both 
systemic and domestic but that-while the systemic strain may 
lead.to various forms of policy response it is domestic actors 
who are the source of this response.36 In short, they are 
calling for a closer analysis of the actions of the 
leadership, both in the political executive and the
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bureaucracy, in the formulation of foreign policy actions. 
This suggestion also appears in state-centric views of foreign 
economic policy put forward by Ikenberry et. al. In this 
context, David Lake advocates particular attention to 
executive branch officials, who face the national electorate, 
bear, responsiblity for the economic and territorial security 
of the nation-state, require a sensitivity to the constraints 
and opportunities created by the international system, and 
would most probably seek to adopt policies consistent with 
these national interests-.37
Carrying .Lake's return to the state as primary actor a 
step further, and as will be described in greater detail in 
the next chapter on the Canadian foreign policy process and 
actors, Canada's foreign policy derives largely from the 
outcome of bargaining between the representative elements of 
the state, namely the foreign policy bureaucracy, Cabinet and 
to a lesser extent, Parliament. Therefore, the extent to which 
systemic constraints are reflected in foreign policy and 
international economic policy is determined by the relative 
success of the foreign-policy executive within the domestic 
political arena. This success, in turn, is conditioned by the 
structure of the state.
2.2.3 Bureaucratic Politics
The assumption in the state as actor approach is that, the
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executive has defined the national interest, partially, if not 
wholly, distinct from the concerns of societal groups or 
particular governmental institutions. This state-centred view 
is associated with Allison1S Model III — the governmental or 
bureaucratic politics model of decision-making.38 According to 
model III, "The •'leaders1 who sit on top of organizations are 
not a monolithic group. Rather, each individual in this group 
is, in his own right, a player in a central, competitive game. 
The name of the game is politics: bargaining along regularized 
circuits among players positioned hierarchically within 
government."
Players "make governmental decisions not by a single 
rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is 
politics".39 This model shows the deviation from ideal 
rationality in decisions by revealing the political 
gamesmanship, behind them. As Ikenberry notes, this is a 
modification of a purely state-centric view, since the 
proponents of the state as actor approach do not.assume that 
the state always acts as. a rational, unified entity, or is 
necessarily even the most important actor.40 But as Welch 
points out, neither does model III "suppose that the 
individual players behave irrationally in the games in which 
they participate, merely that the net effect of those games is 
to deflect state behavior from the course that would have been 
chosen by the unitary actor."41
It will be evident in the decision-making analysis in
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Chapters Four to Seven, that as Allison suggests, the
bureaucratic position determines a player's perception of an 
issue: Where you sit influences what you see as well as where 
you stand (on any issue)."42 Although as Welch points out in 
his critique of Allison's model III, Allison confuses matters 
when he seems to contradict himself by saying that "Each 
player pulls and hauls with the power at his discretion for 
outcomes that will advance his conception of national,
organizational, group, and personal interests, "43 and that 
"each person comes to his position with baggage in tow. His 
bags include sensitivities to certain issues, commitments to 
various projects,, and personal standing with and debts to 
groups in society".44 Moreover, "individuals' perceptions of 
the issues will differ radically. These differences will be 
partially predictable from the pressure of their position plus 
their personality".45
The above discussion indicates that it is easy to
overstate the role of bureaucracies. In the present study it
will therefore be important- to. determine if Canadian officials 
emerge as central actors.' In other words, in Canadian policy 
formulation vis-a-vis the EC, not only is it important to know 
how activist were the Canadian prime ministers and the 
secretaries of state for External Affairs, but also the senior 
bureaucrats, since studies have shown that these state actors 
have substantial scope for shaping the political struggle to 
their ends and are not necessarily responders to interest
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group initiatives.46.
Secondly, what resources does a state possess in a given
issue-area, and in what circumstances can it bring influence
to bear on the policy making process? To answer these
questions, it is necessary first to ascertain what types of
strategies are available to state officials for expanding
their influence in the. policy process. State officials can:
i) utilize their "special legitimacy," derived from a position
at the intersection of the domestic ,and international
political economy, to implement international policy; ii).
build new institutions or alter older ones to shift the
distribution of power within government towards a specific
goal; and/or iii) mobilize societal groups with interests that
complement their own to offset political adversaries.47
Such tests induce a rethinking of the statels role. This
rethinking enhances the system-centered approaches, given that
.the state translates the constraints and opportunities of
international structures into its international economic and
foreign policies. Moving beyond the determination of whether
a state is "strong" or "weak," what is needed is. a focus on
agent structure that will allow a more contextual examination
of means and degree to which the state has an impact . on
policy. As Zysman states:
...a government's ability to act in one policy 
arena will be very different from its ability 
to act in another...The policy tasks in each 
sector vary, as does the pattern of interest 
organization. Consequently,' a state's
'strength' - the ability to formulate and
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implement policy - varies with its capacity to 
execute these different tasks.48
This quotation clearly raises'questions about the fungibility 
of power.49 In this respect, Zysman quite appropriately 
objects to Katzenstein's placement of states on a continuum 
according to relative strength.
Statist theory therefore offers attractive advantages as 
a theoretical framework for the study of the internal 
determinants of a nation's foreign policy. But as Ginsberg 
notes, as. much a,s a. domestic-centred model provides a more 
fruitful way of explaining a nation's foreign policy actions, 
it "yields little insight into what triggers foreign policy 
actions."50 This discussion of some of the general merits and 
drawbacks of the international and internal approaches would 
encourage their application to .the dominant frameworks for 
explaining Canadian fo.reign policy.
2.3 IN SUPPORT OF A MODIFIED STATE-ORIENTED APPROACH
As. will be described in the next chapter bn the Canadian 
foreign policy-making process, a general consensus exists in 
the statist literature that Canada possesses a strong state. 
That’ is, . the Canadian state tends to be centralized rather 
than divided along bureaucratic and institutional lines. 
Federal officials have power and a range of policy instruments 
available to undertake unilateral policy initiatives. Canadian
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officials also can function in face of significant opposition 
from non-state actors.. This ability to function unilaterally 
has to do largely with the nature of a public service career, 
in Canada., where there is not so much .cross-fertilization 
among government, academe, and the business community.as in 
some other countries such as the United States. Hence the 
development of a distinct corporate culture in. government, 
contributing to a sense of "separateness” from society.51 
Contributing to this ability to "make" policy, the fact that 
most Canadian governments since the Second World War have-had 
healthy majorities has meant that the mandarinate has been 
less influenced by the views of opposition parties.
Another factor supporting, the strong state thesis is that 
pluralist perspectives on state-societal relations are less 
analytically persuasive since ir^ terest groups which are 
effective in Canadian society are not widely representative. 
The "dominant class" model . of Canadian foreign policy 
attributes to the corporate sector an unmatched intimacy of 
access, acceptability, and influence in policy, making 
circles.52 Other analysts do not pick out any single interest 
group, pointing out instead that in.Canada, in contrast to the 
sitution in the U.S., domestic interest groups tend not to 
play a significant role in shaping the behaviour of the 
state.53 For these reasons the pluralist theory has little 
explanatory power and is .not persuasive framework for the 
analysis of Canadian foreign policy.54
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Some analysts explain foreign policy outcomes by linking 
the concerns of the international realist with the student of 
bureaucratic politics. However, some Canadian scholars remain 
unconvinced by this connection which ascribes too much faith 
to the senior bureaucracy’s ability to effect policy change, 
and underrepresents other domestic actors such as interest 
groups, classes, political parties and the media.55 The pro- 
statist obsevers are also seen as dealing inadequately with 
domestic actors such as the Parliament, and the Prime 
Minister, even though these institutions have formal authority 
over the bureaucracy. In addition, questions are left 
unanswered concerning how much, power is relinquished to the 
bureaucracy in the policy-making process.
Given such lacunae, Nossal concludes that few students of 
Canadian foreign policy, would adopt a pure state-centric 
approach.-56' Instead, Nossal suggests that Canadian foreign 
policy-making should be viewed from a "modified statist" 
perspective. He points out that the major histories of. 
Canadian foreign policy provide a "selective but not 
unrepresentative sample"- of paradigms that "fall between the 
stools of statism and liberalism [pluralism] .1,57 Nossal sees 
analysts.of.Canadian foreign policy such as C.P. Stacey, John 
Holmes, and James Eayrs as focusing on the state and the often 
contending attitudes of its officials as the source of 
Canadian foreign policy.58
In many respects, these studies point to a behaviour of
the state which conforms to the precepts of Nordlinger's and 
Krasner's "autonomous" model. Supporting Cooper et al. 's
proposition about the role of state officials in middle
powers, whether elected or bureaucratic, these officials 
clearly have their own conception of the national interest and 
therefore organizational and personal interests must also be 
factored into-their foreign policy decisions. To reiterate, if 
their preferences are at variance with, society's interests, 
then officials can be described as using their authority and 
resources to convince society of the correctness of the
state's preferences.59
But, again, this is not to suggest that a purely
' autonomous' model is the correct theoretical approach for the 
analysis of Canadian foreign policy. While the state is not a 
passive reactor .to societal demands, neither is it. fully 
"autonomous". A modified statist model suggests that the 
Canadian state is partially constrained and impelled by. 
societal preferences. How does society constrain the state?. 
Denis Stairs suggests that this may be done at four levels: 
administration-setting, policy-setting, agenda-setting, and 
parameter-setting,60 with systemic developments .exerting 
pressure at each level.
In sum, a modified statist model of Canadian foreign 
policy shows the state enjoying a relative autonomy from civil 
society, to borrow an expression from the neo-Marxists. This 
modified statist position is more consistent with Allison's
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"bureaucratic-politics" model rather than his Model II 
approach.. Whereas Model II is linked to a pure statist 
.perspective through its assertion that all divergencies of 
policy occur within the apparatus of the state, Model III 
assumes a definite linkage between state officials and civil 
society in the policy making process. The bureaucratic- 
politics model acknowledges that the lines of communication 
between elected officials and. bureaucrats can at times be 
weak. It demonstrates how the policy process can be difficult 
to manage and pricks the balloons of political control and 
inherent state rationality.61
Another attractive feature of a modif ied-statist’ approach 
is that it can be a natural partner to an international 
realist theory.. The latter hypothesizes how changes'in the 
international system will call forth foreign policy changes, 
and the former provides an approach to the internal 
determinants of foreign policy, to explain how . the 
international systemic determinants are actually translated 
into concrete policies.62
To conclude, a quick summary of■the levels, of analysis 
dilemma is in order, to put the modified statist position in 
perspective. Jervis offers perhaps the best refinement of the 
levels of analysis problem when he extends it by two levels63: 
(1) the level of decision-making; (2) the level of 
bureaucracy; (3) the nature of the state; (4) the workings of 
domestic politics; and (5) the international environment.
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Analysis at each of these levels pre-supposes a claim: that if 
we know enough about the setting in which foreign policy, is 
made - society, state, or international - we can explain and 
predict the actor's behaviour.
Yet, as is evidenced in -this study, emphasis on one of 
these variables would seem to diminish the importance of the 
others. The significance of the.systemic setting as a force 
that shapes foreign policy, for example, suggests an image of 
foreign-policy officials unconstrained by their own 
bureaucracy or domestic political situation and actors. This 
chapter and the one to follow shows that this is not 
representative of the Canadian case. Given the power accorded 
to the bureaucracy in Canada even more unacceptable is the 
classical pluralist model that ascribes to private interests 
the ability to define public preference and the exercise of 
public choice. In conclusion, then, although the value of- a 
■society-centred approach - particularly the inclusion of 
domestic political and cognitive factors - is clear, this 
approach even more so than. the systemic model begs for a 
discussion of additional influences in the formulation of 
Canadian foreign policy. The rest of this dissertation will 
undertake to develop contextual and empirically informed 
answers, to the question of how and why the Canadian state has 
mattered more than the private sector in the conduct of 
Canadian foreign policy vis-a-vis the Community.
2.4 CONCLUSION
This overview suggests that neither the domestic nor the 
international level of analysis is sufficient on its own, the 
real issue concerns the relative importance to,be. attached to 
domestic- or system-level variables and the manner in which 
these variables can be presumed to interact.6* The challenge, 
according to Benjamin Cohen, is for the analyst to "formalize1 
the links, between the internal and external influences -on 
policy. But while significant scope for methodological 
pluralism exists, this study‘ does not endorse a highly 
impractical synthesis of the approaches,65 although it does 
recognize the need for a "formalization" of linkages among 
some levels of analysis (viz. society, state and systems) to 
ameliorate some of the rather ad hoc attempts in this 
direction made by researchers heretofore.66
This chapter has. shown that systems theories must be 
accorded a very prominent role when shedding some light on the 
national interests.of a middle-sized, non-hegemonic state such 
as Canada that, is highly dependent on foreign trade and 
investment. That being said,' the discussion above also pointed 
out what systemic theories can and cannot explain. Indeed it 
has been conjectured that however appealing a geo-political 
argument is to explain Canada's post-Cold War. foreign policy, 
it is inherently limited. Geographic exposure to "threat" is 
too crude an environmental effect for any but the most general
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behavioural predictions. This dissertation's analysis of 
Canada's policy approach to the European integration will show 
that, external "threats" are not necessarily sufficient 
conditions for state behaviour and may therefore not by 
themselves, explain policy choice.
In short, as systems theories do not provide 
policymakers with much direct help, their most policy-relevant 
insight may be simply that a system of complex interdependence 
needs to be managed, if it is to remain stable. . This function 
has been provided-historically by a hegemonic state; now in a 
post-hegemonic world a- middle-sized state- such as Canada can 
engage in non-structural forms of leadership in response to 
change in systemic conditions.
Finally systemic theories can be seen, as a trigger to 
alert governments and electorates to changes in the 
international system that may require changes in national 
policy. The Community's desire to create a Single Market by 
January 1993, for example, as indicated in the White Paper of 
1985, was if not an. explicit then certainly an implicit., 
"threat" to non-Member countries such as Canada. This threat 
existed because if the Canadian government and population 
misunderstood the impact of the EC's program on the 
international system, then there was a likelihood that 
Canada's policy vis-a-vis the EC would be misguided.
In sum, an examination of only the international system 
without a concurrent examination of the ac.tions of executive .
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officials or the organizational structure of the Canadian 
state is insufficient for an understanding of Canada's foreign 
policy approach to European integration. Without theories 
concerning the domestic determinants of Canadian foreign, 
policy, we are left with a theory that is limited to 
explaining recurrent patterns of behaviour within the 
international arena.
Taking Higgott1s and Cooper's typology of Canada's 
foreign policy as an example of "routine diffuse 
internationalism", where the relatively autonomous Canadian 
state takes on a leadership role based on its "technical" and 
"entrepreneurial" attributes, we would expect Canadian 
politicians and government officials to become key managers of ,■ 
a cross-section of transatlantic and Canada-EC issue-areas.67 
This approach recognizes the importance of bureaucratic 
politics for a realistic understanding Of the Canadian foreign 
policy process. If we agree with David Kozak that "policy 
positions are determined by or a function of an actor's 
perspective as developed by his or her bureaucratic culture," 
then to understand Canada's policy approach towards the EC, as 
the next chapter shows, it will be important to understand the . 
EC's priority .in the outlook of EAITC, the Privy Council 
Office (PCO) and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) between 
1983 - 1993, and the reality that governments only have finite 
time, energy, and money to devote.to priorities.68
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CHAPTER THREE
ACTORS AND PROCESS IN CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Canadian foreign policymaking is predominantly state-led. As 
such, this chapter will focus on the actors in the domestic 
arena and examine the following domestic trends: the existence 
of powerful ‘but disunited federal government agencies and 
departments such as the Prime Minister,!s Office (PMO) and 
External Affairs and International Trade Canada (EAITC);.the 
impact • of a confederal political structure that channels 
significant power to the provinces; the existence of a 
Westminster system, in which the legislature acts as a 
legitimating mechanism for the Cabinet's foreign and trade 
policy actions; and the existence of a domestic business lobby 
which is highly dependent on the state for a substantial 
source of its funding and whose primary concern is bilateral 
relations with the United States. All these trends conspire to 
create a domestic policy environment characterized by parallel 
policy making but in. which the federal government still has 
considerable power to implement its preferred policies.1
The Canadian reaction to the process of European 
integration, and specifically to the rise of the SEM, shows how 
such' a multifaceted issue cuts' across the interests of 
important ' domestic actors and creates uncertainty at many
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different levels of- action. Although there is abundant 
literature on how the CUFTA presented a challenge to the way 
in which Canadian policy processes and policy responses, are 
framed, there is little research on the impact of the SEM and 
what strengths and weaknesses it reveals in the Canadian 
policy system.2 The objective in this chapter is to map out 
the multilayered process of decision making and show how this 
machinery was positioned vis-a-vis the EC in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. This will lay the foundation for the 
decision-making analysis found in the subsequent chapters of 
this study.
The chapter begins with a a.discussion of the role of the 
federal government in the making of foreign policy, focusing 
on the reasons for the increasing fragmentation of foreign 
policy decision making both between EAITC and other federal, 
government departments and, significantly, between the 
secretary of state for External Affairs and the prime 
minister.3 What this discussion highlights is the increased 
re-localization of foreign policy initiatives in the PMO, a 
development that can be traced to the management of foreign 
policy under Trudeau's Liberal government4 . and that was 
accentuated through Mulroney's preference for personal 
diplomacy. With the increased "sharing" of Canada's foreign, 
policy territory, the discussion suggests that to understand 
the nature, of Canada's foreign policy approach to the EC in 
the period being studied, it will thus be necessary to^
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determine where the EC fit into Mulroney's personal diplomacy 
and the respective foreign policy spheres of his two
secretaries of state for External Affairs, especially that of 
Joe Clark (1984-1991).
A second theme in this chapter is the declining relative 
influence of EAITC as other domestic actors such as the
provinces have increased their international activities. This 
has reduced the federal government’s ability to develop a 
coherent overarching framework, for Canada's’ diplomatic 
relations in a post-Cold War international system.
The third part of this chapter looks at.the degree to 
which the interests of government and the Canadian private 
sector intersected in response to the creation of the SEM. It 
emphasizes that from a policy standpoint the Canadian business 
community - as represented by a handful of major national 
private sector associations - concentrated its limited
resources on, first, providing policy advice and views on 
issues specific to Canada-U.S., economic and trade relations, 
and, second, on Canada's approach to the Uruguay Round 
negotiations. The analysis shows a business community which 
paid scant attention to the implications of the SEM for
Canadian economic interests.
This chapter sets the stage by explaining why Canada's 
policy approach towards the EC was guided largely by 
government actors, in this case Prime Minister Mulroney, Joe 
Clark as secretary .of state for external affairs, and
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officials at EAITC. Mulroney turned his full attention to 
Europe - both West and East - only after the CUFTA was signed. 
Throughout his period in office, Mulroney put strong emphasis 
on personal contacts with other national leaders (especially 
with the American presidents, Reagan and Bush)’; he also 
.attempted through the micro-level of personal diplomacy to 
have Canada play a meaningful role in the establishment of a 
"New World Order". Because the prime minister exercises the 
most crucial, executive powers, heads the Cabinet and 
effectively controls the exercise of legislative powers in the 
Canadian parliamentary system, Mulroney's. position in the 
Canadian government was pre-eminent and the powers of his 
office immense in relation to both other elected politicians 
and the bureaucracy. Indeed, as prime minister his powers 
exceeded those of any other leader of a democratic regime5; 
thus, by winning two comfortable majorities, in 1984 and 1988, 
Mulroney had significant latitude from a domestic perspective 
to shape the direction of Canadian foreign policy (his tenure 
was characterized by a convergence of. U.S. and. Canadian 
foreign policy objectives), to attempt to set the agenda of 
allied and other relations, and to position Canada in the new 
"Euro-Atlantic architecture".
3.2 EAITC and the PMO
The. Westminster system of government, with its traditions of
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party unity in which "a relatively small body [Cabinet] 
reaches decisions in secret, that has full command over the 
levers of executive power vis-a-vis the bureaucracy, and that 
controls the legislative agenda, " should in theory make policy 
co-ordination at the governmental level far easier than in, 
say, the presidential system that one finds in the United 
States.6 Nevertheless, as is the case in the U.S. there are 
inter-departmental coordination issues.7 In the 1930s, 1940s 
and 1950s the departments of External Affairs and Finance 
fulfilled the overall coordinating role for Canada's 
international economic and foreign policies; trade development 
was the responsibility of the Department of Trade and Commerce 
which housed Canada's Trade Commissioner Service (TCS) , .The 
peak of External Affairs's own influence in government was 
during the "Golden Years" of Canada's diplomacy, the decade 
from 1947 to 1957, a period during which Canada had for a time 
the fourth largest navy in the world, was the founding member 
of numerous international organizations, and attained a 
reputation as a peacekeeper and / mediator. ’ These
accomplishments ensured that Canada's foreign policy, approach, 
would be "global".
Beginning in the 1960s, as Western Europe began to assert 
its economic muscle and Canada's international influence began 
to wane, so did the pre-eminent role of the Department of 
External Affairs within the federal bureaucracy.8 The 
Department'.s decreased influence was, in some sense,
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inevitable once the federal public service began to expand 
rapidly as government inserted itself more and more into civil 
society. By the time Trudeau was elected and questioned the 
need for a foreign service at all, since he could read 
everything he needed to know in the New York Times, the slide 
became irreversible and continued throughout the 1970s.
In 1982, the . Canada's Trade Commissioner Service 
(responsible-for promoting exports) was amalgamated with the 
Department of External Affairs.' The rationale for the move, 
foreshadowed by integration earlier in operations abroad, was 
that foreign policy had to serve broader national interests 
and, in an increasingly interdependent world, it was 
detrimental to those national interests if trade development 
remained in a domestic department. Along with its historic 
role in the formation of Canadian trade policy, External 
Affairs was. now responsible for the whole range of Canadian 
interests overseas - economic, trade development, immigration, 
political, aid, and culture. - centralized under one 
department.
The infusion of the responsibility for international 
market development, while causing significant organizational 
confusion within the Department itself-until the late 1980s 
and leading to coordination problems and competition with 
other federal government departments such as Industry,. Science 
and Technology Canada (ISTC), was nevertheless catalytic in 
changing how EAITC approached the world.9 This led to a shift
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from the traditional "maintaining good bilateral relations" 
posture to one which focused on using bilateral relations 
primarily in terms of building leverage to achieve specific 
bilateral and multilateral goals which were of highest 
priority to Canada. A specific target in this vein was the 
United States during the successive negotiations leading to 
the COTTA and NAFTA, and increased engagement in the Asia 
Pacific region. At the same time, there was an institutional 
shift away from an attachment to Europe as the focal point of 
Canada's international interests - an attachment anchored in 
the value Canada attached to its membership in NATO. A second 
shift was significant expansion of EAITC's client base to 
include exporters. In support of its focus on core economic 
interests, EAITC rapidly expanded its business liaison 
capability in order to be taken more seriously by other 
government departments such as Finance and ISTC, the economic 
agencies of the provinces, and the business community as 
represented by chambers of commerce and other producer 
associations. This expansion to economic concerns also led to 
two new Cabinet portfolios, that of "minister for 
International Trade" and "minister for External Relations".
The significance of these shifts was that within the 
state-led context of Canadian foreign policymaking they 
appeared to confer upon EAITC - since it had the statutory 
mandate to manage Canada's external relations - even greater 
power. No other federal department had three ministers. But it 
was the "ever-changing permutations and combinations of the 
three Ministers with the Prime Minister and their Cabinet 
colleagues on the one hand and their civil servants on the
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other" which determined the Department's influence and its 
ability to coordinate policy and resolve conflict.10 The point 
here is that in the Canadian system it is not the number of 
ministers that mattered so .much as their Cabinet seniority and 
access to the Prime Minister. What is being described is a 
Cabinet decision-making process that is opaque in the sense 
that the formal Cabinet decisions are only the tip of the 
iceberg; government policy was often made by the Prime
Minister or one or two other ministers and it was not always
eiasy to keep abreast of such decisions and trace their roots 
to particular government departments. As will be shown in 
Chapters Six and Seven on the negotiations leading up to the 
Transatlantic Declaration, the impetus for change in Ottawa's 
policy on its relations with Europe emerged less from EAITC 
than they did from the PMO.
Carpiicating the foreign policy process further are the 
roles played by the PMO and. the Privy Council Office (PCO) ,
with the former acting as political office of the Prime
Minister and the latter as the nerve centre of the federal 
bureaucracy. The focal role of the Prime Minister and the PMO 
in the conduct of Canada's international relations is not 
surprising considering that by the late 1980s the waning of 
East-West tensions and the continuing communications 
revolution had placed traditional perceptions of diplomacy 
increasingly under siege. One of the most telling signs of 
this new age of diplomacy was the localization of "high" and 
"low" politics, that is, political/security and trade issues,
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at the executive level — whether in the White House, in the 
Chancellery.or in the PMO. This came about as a .result .of the 
increasingly . policy-oriented discussions among * national 
leaders at regional, plurilateral.and multilateral security 
and economic fora. The result was that federal government 
departments such as External Affairs became increasingly 
reactive, driven to following up on and bringing substance to 
the Prime Minister's declaratory statements.
Based on the above discusion, the' foreign policy 
decision-making process during the Mulroney years can perhaps 
best be conceptualized in terms of the Prime Minister's 
interests intersecting the triangular relationship between the 
stature of his secretary of state for External Affairs, 
patterns and directions in Canadian foreign policy, and the 
stature of EAITC within the foreign policy•bureaucracy. In a 
fragmented foreign policy decision-making process it therefore 
becomes imperative to know how much attention the various 
actors apportioned to Canada-EC affairs. The challenge for 
this study is to fit the EC into this configuration of 
personal diplomacy and institutional orientation.
Although Mulroney, like Trudeau before him, used his PMO 
as a "counterweight" to the monopoly of advice coming from the 
federal bureaucracy, what was 'different was that his PMO was 
often pitted directly against the- views emanating from the 
federal bureaucracy (which he suspected was pro-Liberal). 
Thus, to facilitate this "second-guessing", of bureaucratic
advice not only was this.political office made much bigger 
than Trudeau's but it would, also eventually have greater 
influence on foreign policy matters.11 Nossal states that 
Mulroney came into office with a critique of Canadian foreign 
policy that focused on what he saw as the deteriorating 
relationship with the United States and the "slack support for 
what he called Canada's 'four great allies' - the United 
States, Britain, -France, and Israel..."12 In terms of the 
management of his foreign policy, Nossal, citing Kirton, 
points out that Mulroney, who derived personal enjoyment from 
the ceremonial aspects of foreign relations (e.g., summits, 
media attention) but not the "complex details, of policy, " kept 
the profile-enhancing foreign policy files to himself and 
eventually delegated more of the day-to-day elements of 
foreign policy to Clark.13
Perhaps not surprisingly, given the Conservative 
government's push to negotiate a free trade agreement with the. 
United States, the trade ministers played a very minor role in. 
the conceptual development of Canada's policy framework for 
its' relations with Europe, using their limited time on
European issues to sort out specific bilateral trade irritants 
and to- lead trade • missions. Pat Carney, for example, at
Clark's urging, was appointed trade minister to take 
responsibility for trade negotiations with the United States
and to sell free trade to Canadians.14 In the eyes of
Commission officials at the EC Delegation office in Ottawa in
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the. late 1980s, it was somewhat dismaying to find themselves 
criss-crossing Canada to exhort Canadian exporters and 
investors to look at the potential opportunities of the SEM, 
a task they felt would have been more appropriately carried 
out by Canada's international trade minister.
Feeding this organizational disconnect was the fact that 
although institutional ties between Canada and the EC were 
based on the predominantly economic nature of Ottawa-Brussels 
diplomacy, these links were overseen, not by Canada's trade 
minister,, but by Clark who had little interest in economic and 
trade matters, or, for that matter in European affairs. This 
responsibility followed from the institutional structure which 
had been established under the 1976 Framework Agreement which 
meant that Canada's External Affairs minister was the highest 
level institutionalized political contact with the Community 
(at that time Canada did not have a minister for international 
trade). It was only in 1990 that Canada's trade minister 
became part of the institutional process by "being present"
Sr
during the annual meetings between Clark and his EC 
counterpart. Ottawa's desire to send the "right" political 
signals to the Cormiission, in this case having the "senior" 
Departmental minister overseeing the bilateral relationship, 
was also a reason for making Clark the top man on the Canadian 
side. Even after the issuance of the TAD in 1990, there was no 
indication that this division of labour on Canada-EC relations 
was going to change, since under the TAD it was the External
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Affairs minister and the Prime Minister, but not the 
International Trade minister, who . were part of the 
institutionalization of EC-Canada political ties.
Returning to our discussion of the role of the PMO in the 
policy process, Nossal states that at first the initial moves 
to increase its size did not have a marked irrpact on policy15, 
but that later appointments did - notably that of Derek Burney 
as chief of staff in the spring of 1987, who would become 
Canada's ambassador to the United States a year later, and the 
appointment of a non-Extemal Affairs official, Sylvia Ostry, 
as Mulroney's personal representative or "sherpa" to the 1988 
G-7 Suimrit in Toronto.16 Mulroney further solidified his 
control on certain foreign policy files, such as surrmit 
diplomacy, by creating a Suirmit Management Office within the 
PMO.. Nossal argues that these institutional moves contributed 
to a "distancing of the prime minister from the external 
affairs portfolio".17 More precise, perhaps, would be that he 
distanced himself from EAITC on those issues (NATO, G-7) which 
afforded him the greatest national and international profile. 
Ironically, one of the . reasons he could do this was that he 
had a wealth of foreign policy expertise oh secondment from 
EAITC in the PMO and POO. Burney, for instance, came from 
EAITC, as did for varying periods, Mulroney' s deputy chief of 
staff, press, secretary, and speechwriters.18 The case of Burney 
is, perhaps, the most illustrative of the pivotal roles played 
by senior bureaucrats in the making of Canada's foreign
93
policy: he was a staunch proponent of free trade with the 
U.S. when it was unpopular in the early 1980s (see Chapter 
5.3) , and he also played a role in outlining Canada's trade 
policy options - including free trade - with the European 
Community when he was Canadian airibassador to the United States 
in 1990 (see Chapter 6.3.2) . Mulroney would come to depend on 
these officials, rather than the Department, for foreign 
policy advice on those specific areas in which he took an 
interest. Relations with the EC only became one of those 
areas, as we shall see, in the context of:the coupletion of 
the CUFTA, the momentum that was building towards "Europe 
1992," and, starting in 1989 with the redrawing of Europe in 
the aftermath of the collapse of the communist regimes in 
Eastern and Central Europe. In other words,' Ottawa only 
focused its attention on the EC pillar of its European policy 
approach when the latter's key role in the emerging post-Cold 
War Europe became impossible for the Canadian Cabinet and, 
particularly a prime minister who saw himself as an 
international statesmen, to ignore
At the same time, in the domestic arena it was not just 
the PMO which was usurping traditional External Affairs turf 
and making it more complicated for the Department to exercise 
its mandate. The diffusion of foreign policy interests in the 
post-Cold War period along with successive drastic budget cuts 
at External Affairs between 1983 and 1993 meant that the key 
issues of finance, agriculture, overseas development
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assistance, fisheries, and the environment, to name, a few, 
were increasingly being managed by expert line departments.19 
And although the responsibility for export market development 
lay nominally with EAITC, by 1990 there existed 17 other 
federal government departments and government-funded agencies 
engaged in the delivery of export development services.20 
Meanwhile the provinces (to be .discussed in greater detail 
below),' Aboriginal groups, .ethnic organizations, business 
associations, and other special interest groups also presented 
themselves increasingly in the international arena to pursue 
their own objectives.
Not surprisingly, then, the more domestic actors there 
were, the more duplication and friction occurred in the 
management of Canada's external relations: whether on the 
export preparedness of Canadian companies; or program delivery 
abroad; or the creation of a potentially fertile environment 
for future trade disputes between Canada and the U.S. and 
Canada and its other GATT partners due to the domestic support 
measures of rioncentral governments.; or on the development of 
consultative processes with industry. The result of EAITC 
having fewer dollars and at the same time being unable to shed 
certain functional and area responsibilities, was a reduction 
in.the focus and thrust of the Department in the 1980s. This 
decline was apparent across a host of policy areas such as 
aid, trade development, multilateral relations and security 
and intelligence policy.21
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External Affairs responded to this assault on its pre­
eminent role in the management of foreign policy when, in 
1992, it decided to "streamline" its^  operations and to focus 
only on "core" functions. It would henceforth concentrate on 
trade policy, trade development and political-security 
relations and divest ' itself of all other non-essential 
activities (e.g., international sport, consular service).22 
However, it was not clear how a "back to basics" philosophy at 
EAITC could be reconciled with the Mulroney government's own 
assertions that Canada in the post-Cold War era would have to 
secure a cooperative basis for its international security 
approach which increasingly addressed such fundamental issues 
as: international mass migration, drug trafficking, human
rights, sustainable development, weapons proliferation, 
advancement of women, AIDS, fisheries, and the international 
co-ordination of monetary policy, ail of which implied an 
expansionnot a contraction - of the foreign ministry. Not 
only this., but coincident with the broadening of the 
international relations agenda was a greater emphasis in the 
post-Cold War on multilateral negotiation• and rule-making, 
implying even greater pressure on the foreign ministry to 
respond. In terms of Canada's relations with the EC, as Canada 
moved its policy focus away from NATO and the CSCE as its 
European pillars and concentrated more on the EC, the new 
areas of transatlantic cooperation would be precisely in those 
cooperative security areas which EAITC, in its "streamlined"
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state, would be hard-pressed to manage effectively. Other 
government departments (e.g., Fisheries and Oceans, 
Environment) would, as a result, develop Canada's policies on 
a variety of these emerging international issues without any 
guarantee that Canada, through EAITC, would be able to fashion 
a coherent, integrated policy framework for its relations with 
Europe as a whole and the EC specifically. In short, it was 
not clear whether the changing nature of transatlantic 
relations, that is,, the shift away from "military" security to 
"cooperative" security, was appropriately reflected in the 
domestic institutional response*in Canada.
3.3 The Provinces
Canadian provinces have a long history of direct, international 
activities. An initial expansion phase Of provincial 
representation occurred during the late 1960s, followed by 
more, expansions in the late 1970s (there were 35 
"international" provincial offices • in 1977) and the late 
1980s; by 1992 there was a network of 73 provincial offices 
abroad (U.S. states had 132 offices abroad).23.The rationale 
for increased provincial roles was quite simple: although'the 
provinces accepted Ottawa's jurisdication over Canada's 
.international affairs (it being an essential attribute of 
sovereignty, and because they could not therefore enjoy full 
international personalities in the legal sense), the provinces
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nevertheless felt that they each had to complement the federal 
government's efforts since it would be difficult for Ottawa to 
define a "national interest" which . would take into 
consideration particular interests of each province.24 This was 
especially evident to the larger, more economically vibrant 
provinces such as Ontario, Quebec, Alberta, and British 
Columbia.
By the early 1990s, due to growing provincial debts such 
international profiles abroad were no longer sustainable and 
most provinces radically curtailed their international 
presence. In 1993, Ontario took the unprecedented step of 
closing all of its international offices. Quebec dropped some 
of its marginal ones and reduced staff in many others. Because 
provincial, governments lack the jurisdiction, to involve 
themselves in more than very limited spheres of external 
activities, their international, forays have been confined 
primarily to the promotion of trade, investment, tourism, 
international education ‘(since education is a provincial 
responsibility) and cultural affairs.25 That being said, 
provincial diplomatic activity has steadily crept beyond these 
parameters. Furthermore, as decentralization has accelerated 
in Canada, those trade policy  ^ as - opposed to promotion -• 
functions carried out by non-central governments {e.g., export 
subsidies, procurement restrictions, and preferential 
treatment - "Buy Quebec"), have caused friction with federal 
initiatives since the provincial actions have been beyond the
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direct purview of the CUFTA, the NAFTA, and the GATT.26 This 
fragmentation of Canada's foreign policy-making territory also 
has a national unity dimension since the constitutional 
problems .raised by the failures of both the Meech Lake and 
then in 1992 the Charlottetown Accprd undermined Ottawa's 
credibility abroad, both in the eyes of foreign investors (as. 
evidenced by the reactions of bond rating agencies), and- 
foreign governments who negotiate bilateral agreements with 
Canada.
With regard to provincial diplomacy towards Europe, there 
appeared to be a parallel approach by the federal and 
provincial governments as the momentum increased towards the 
Single Market in the late 1980s. The provinces - especially 
Quebec, Ontario, and British Columbia, which were dependent on 
the EC for exports valued at'between $2.5 and $3 billion - 
were increasingly conscious of what the EC meant for their 
regional economies. As Table 2 at the end of this chapter 
shows, by the end of-1990, there were 21 provincial offices in 
the Community (only Quebec and Ontario had offices in 
Brussels) , . and they were firmly part of the European 
landscape. Unlike the over 20 offices in the EC from U.S. 
states which, according to Smith "...in a growing range, of’ 
cases ... negotiated] with the EC to protect their 
essentially sub-national interests," the provincial offices, 
with the notable exception of Quebec, appeared, to stick to 
providing information about the SEM and sponsored their
99
industries on tours of the EC.27 The negotiations of agreements 
and the resolution of conflicts was left primarily to Ottawa 
and the Canadian Delegation to-the. Communities in Brussels.
The emergence of the SEM presented a number of concerns 
to the provinces. For instance, the pulp and paper, producing 
regions, of British Columbia, Quebec and the Maritimes were 
very concerned about environmental legislation and phyto- 
sanitary regulations that would diminish their exports .(see 
discussion in Chapter Nine). As a result there were a host of 
provincial activities to raise awareness of- the SEM, with 
Ontario and particularly Quebec (with eight offices in the EC 
alone)- taking the lead, in an attempt to counteract the 
perennial criticism from.the private sector that the federal 
and provincial governments (to the considerable confusion of 
those outside of Canada)' were constantly duplicating each 
other's trade promotion programs, a great effort was made by 
the federal government to share sponsorship of "EC 1992" 
business awareness programs with.the provinces; in. addition, 
in the latter half of 1993, due to the high interest exhibited 
by the provincial governments, EAITC extensively briefed the 
provinces on the impact of the changing EC. Significantly, 
however, the federal government never went so far as to invite 
the provinces to be part of the Canada-EC institutional 
structure under the Framework Agreement.28 Quebec, however, 
with its own officials'designated exclusively to EC matters, 
continued, to engage in unilateral promotion activities.
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3.4 Parliament
Another element of the foreign policy machinery relevant to 
this discussion is the role of Parliament. However, unlike 
what Smith asserts was the U.S. Congress's "crucial" role in 
the formulation of the U.S. 's "European Community Policy, " the 
Canadian Parliament on almost all foreign and trade policy 
issues - with the notable exceptions of debates on the CUFTA 
and the stationing and testihg of American cruise missiles on 
Canadian soil - has performed mostly a legitimation function 
for the Government's foreign policy actions.29 Less kindly, 
according to Dobell, an expert on the functioning- of the 
Canadian Parliament, " [t]he most significant characteristic of 
parliamentary involvement in external policy until the 1970s 
was passivity".30 Its reaction to European integration in the 
1980s and early 1990s was no exception; it did not play a 
catalytic role.
In fact, the most sustained attention to the EC on the 
part of Canadian legislators was through the Canada-Europe 
Parliamentary association which allowed Canadian legislators 
and legislators from the European Parliament and several 
Member States to exchange views. However, this mechanism - 
variously portrayed by outsiders as a "boondoggle" or a "perk" 
that gave MPs excuses to travel abroad - contributed very 
little to enhancing Canada's policy approach to the EC in the 
1980s.
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That being said, the influence of Parliament as a 
policy mechanism and agenda-setter in Canada-EC relations was 
not always so negligible. For example, a Senate Committee on 
Foreign Affairs completed an important study on Canada-EC 
relations in 1972. The report, described as "the Canadian 
handbook on the European Community" detailed the extent of 
Canada-EC trade relations and the specific problems posed by 
the Community for Canada. It recommended greater efforts by 
the Canadian private sector to penetrate EC markets, the 
establishment of a regular link with the European Parliament 
in Strasbourg, the opening of a Community office in Ottawa, 
and a visit by the Canadian prime minister to Brussels. Aside 
from impressive factual data, according to Dobell, the 
report1s main value was to highlight the importance of the 
Community to Canada. The committee had undertaken the study in 
the belief "that not enough attention was being given in 
Canada to developments in Western Europe and their potential’ 
impact on Canada's. position in the world community".31
As. a -testament to the power of the committee's 
recommendations, Dobell reports that the gaps in Canada's 
Europe policy that were publicized ,by the committee prompted 
Trudeau to lend his personal support to Canada's efforts to 
gain a. non-pref erential agreement with the EC.32 And, 
significantly, the Senate report's call for a Community office 
in Ottawa was taken .up enthusiastically by a delegation from 
the European Parliament (part . of the nascent Canada-Europe
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parliamentary association) which in turn convinced an at first 
reluctant Council of Ministers of the need for such an office. 
Dobell Concludes that the creation of bilateral institutional 
mechanisms such as the Framework Agreement and diplomatic 
missions in Brussels and Ottawa owe much to the "strong 
support" from Parliamentarians on both sides of the Atlantic 
during this period.33
This type of support would not be evident in the context
of post-Cold War Canada-EC relations^however. An examination
of the House of Commons debates between 1989 and 1992 shows
that the legislators were preoccupied with the CUFTA, NAFTA
and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The evolving Community
received only cursory mention in the context of .regional
integration movements.. As well, there were long-standing
practical reasons why Parliament did not play a constructive
role in Canada's policy toward the Community. The Senate
Committee, like the House of Commons Standing Committee on
External Affairs and International Trade, apart from
investigating Canada-U.S. free trade, was largely dependent on
EAITC . (due to financial constraints) for information about
foreign policy initiatives, and only rarely produced, truely
independent, detailed, and ' quality research on external
A
relations.
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3.5 The Canadian Private Sector
Much of the attention of the bureaucracy, Parliament, and the 
PMO on. Canada's relations with the EC, was only shaped 
partially by the perceived needs of Canadian industry. Thus it 
is instructive to look at business priorities in the 1980s. In 
response to the pressures of globalization, the Canadian 
government had worked to position Canada strategically by 
negotiating■ the CUFTA and the NAFTA, while simultaneously 
pursuing the completion of the Uruguay Round. The Canadian 
business . community embraced and supported this policy 
orientation. The corporate community had a deep interest in 
the emerging trade policy issues and the fora in which they 
would be dis'cussed. At the same time both it and the 
government were troubled by a number, of paradoxes that 
highlighted Canada's lack of preparedness for an increasingly 
globalized economy. First, although Canada enjoyed a 
diversified economy, world class technologies, a highly 
educated workforce, and an excellent international reputation, 
its -share of world trade in the decade of the 1980s' dropped 
from 5.2 per cent to 3.8 per cent - a .27 per cent drop - as 
more countries produced globally competitive products. Second, 
while world trading patterns had changed, the bulk of Canada's 
international trade was still being conducted by a very small 
number of companies, with roughly 70 per cent of Canada's 
export trade being conducted by 100 companies.34 When the
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Canada-U.S. trade figures and intra-firm transactions are 
calculated out of these. numbers, the number of small- and 
medium-sized companies trading outside of Canada was very 
Small with only 15 per cent of manufacturers engaged in 
exports. Finally, Canada was reported to lead industrialized 
countries in trade promotion expenditure, yet its per dollar 
return was among the lowest.35.
The feeling among business was that without an 
appropriate response, Canada's declining world market share in 
the trade of goods and services would be reinforced by the 
regional - of which the SEM was just one example - and 
multilateral liberalization of barriers to trade. The response 
was two-tracked.: first, business.called for Canada ‘to "get its 
domestic house in order" (e.g., calling.for a reduction in 
federal spending to reduce the accumulated debt, 
interprovincial trade barriers), at the same time that market 
access barriers abroad were addressed; and second, as an 
indicator of where the overwhelming interests of the corporate 
community lay in preparing for the'"new" economy^ the business 
community focused its resources overwhelmingly on ensuring 
secure access to the U.S. market. •
The private sector1s .general disinterest in furthering 
relations with Western Europe and in improving market access 
as a result of the SEM can be seen in the actions of Canada's 
major business lobbies. For instance, the Canadian Chamber of 
Commerce (CCC), Canada's largest and most representative
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business association, used its International Affairs Committee 
and its Committee on Canada-United States Relations (under 
joint direction with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce) as the 
principal vehicles for feeding detailed, concrete trade policy 
recommendations to the Minister for International Trade on 
such issues as the GATT, CUFTA and NAFTA, but not on the SEM. 
The Committee even went so far as to produce policy positions 
on specific Canada-U.S. trade disputes. In fact, as the free 
trade with the United States became a national debate all the 
broad-based, horizontal business associations such as the 
Canadian Exporters Association, the Canadian Manufacturers' 
Association, and the Canadian Federation, of Independent 
Business created Canada-U.S. market access committees and free 
trade consultative committees. But it was the Business Council 
on National Issues (BCNI) which represents the 150 largest 
companies in Canada, and is roughly equivalent to the European 
Roundtable in terms 6f. the influence it wields in Canada's 
corporate and political corridors of. power, that engaged in 
arguably the most highly public and effective private, campaign 
to push for free trade.36
In an effort to. manage the business community's growing 
desire to be involved in the trade policy-making process, 
especially with regard to free trade with the United States, 
the federal government in 1986 created the International Trade 
Advisory Committee (ITAC) and the Sectoral Advisory Groups on 
International Trade (SAGIT), both of which were administered
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by EAITC.37 This business sector activity raises the question 
of where were Canada's labour organizations. Indeed, one of 
the reasons why this study focuses on the business community's 
reaction to EC-Canada relations is that organized labour has 
had a very limited impact on the direction of Canada's foreign 
or trade policy.38
A number of' interesting trends .come to light in this 
necessarily brief ' overview of the Canadian business 
community's institutional reaction’to the process of global 
economic liberalization. First, the business community clearly 
saw free trade with the United States as a .springboard to the 
rest of the world. Second, although relations within the 
horizontal business association community (described above)grew 
very competitive, in the 1980s as the government-business 
interface became characterized as one of business growing ever
i
more dependent on federal funding to "internationalize"; 
Canada's private sector39, on the issue of free trade with the 
United States that portion of the business community 
representing medium- to large-sized firms stood united in its 
vigorous and public support. (There was a more muted reponse 
on NAFTA, probably, because so much less was at stake.) The 
same cannot be said for the business community's interest in, 
and policy activity, on the process of European economic 
integration. With 75 per cent of Canadian trade with the U.S., 
it is not difficult to deduce where limited corporate 
resources.were being devoted: trade with the United States was
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a matter of survival; trade with Europe was not. Although by 
1989 the EC "1992" program had made it onto the corporate 
agenda (as evidenced by the perfunctory reference to European 
integration in the speeches of business leaders)# these 
references were for the most part declaratory (praising the 
increased liberalization of trade in a Europe without borders 
and noting with foreboding the harm of a discriminatory trade 
bloc) . Significantly, they did not appear to have been 
supported by any sustained analysis.
The exception to this lack of a hard look at the 
implications of the SEM for Canadian business may have been a 
speech delivered in 1992 by the director of international 
policy for the CCC, who concluded "A variety of forces at work 
in the international economy will likely conspire to reduce 
the relative importance of the transatlantic trade 
relationship. In particular, it is likely that the 
relationship will grow . in absolute terms but diminish in 
relative terms."40 These conclusions may have resulted from a 
survey by the Canadian Chamber in 1992 when, to the amazement 
of the Chamber staff, there.was no support, either within its 
own membership or from, other business interests, for the 
creation of a consultative committee on the SEM. That there 
would be no support for a bilateral business council or A 
business-oriented consultative mechanism does not strike the 
observer as particularly unusual given the life-span of an EC- 
oriented .initiative within the ITAC. An "EC 1992" committee
1 0 8 .
had been set up at the ITAC. in 1988 under the chairmanship of 
David Culver/ then chairman of ALCAN, a Canadian multinational 
corporation with significant interests in Europe. It lasted 
all of 18 months before being wound down. What is unusual.is 
that this was the corporate reaction in the face of a 
government trade promotion campaign .(see description of "Going 
Global" in Chapter Nine) that for two years had hailed the 
opportunities for Canadian firms as a result of "EC 1992".
Another point to note is that, since the preferred forum 
to discuss Canada-EC bilateral issues was through the 
bureaucratically-driven Joint Cooperation Committee of the 
Framework Agreement and through the GATT, it was rare that the 
business-oriented ITACs or SAGITs were used to air or resolve 
•trade irritants. An exception, for example/ was the raising in 
199i at an ITAC meeting • of the pinewood nematode phyto- 
sanitary issue that affected the sale of Canadian greenwood 
lumber to. the EC (see Chapter 9.6.2.1).41
From the above description, it can be determined that, 
reflecting Canada's growing economic integration in North 
America, Canadian business had significant interest in, and 
therefore devoted considerable time and resources to, policy 
consultations on issues affecting intra-North American trade, 
and investment. Conversely, it had far less interest in 
developing policy recommendations for the government on 
Canada's approach to the SEM, this despite the fact that the 
EC. as a region was Canada's second largest partner. What
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emerges is a picture of a business community that was mostly 
reactive to the emergence of the SEM, preferring to be 
"active" only when given the incentive by government in the 
form of contracts to run business awareness conferences and 
seminars.
The situation was different, of course, at the level of 
single industry trade associations directly affected by 
particular EC policy actions. Associations such as the 
Confederatation of Forest Industries (COFI) of British 
Columbia (which received considerable federal funding) and 
Quebec1 s Bureau de producteurs du bois and the Maritime Lumber 
Bureau all took an intense interest in forestry issues in 
Canada-EC relations. Interestingly, with the exception of COFI 
which had an office in the UK, these vertical7 industry 
associations rarely lobbied the EC or the Member States 
directly to resolve market access issues; instead, they 
lobbied line departments such as Forestry Canada, Fisheries 
and Oceans, and Energy, Mines and Resources. These departments 
then consulted with the relevant divisions within EAITC that 
addressed their particular concerns, making the role of the 
federal government on many bilateral Canada-EC issues, in the 
words of a federal official, "one-step removed".42
3.5.1 Canadian Private Sector Alignment vis-a-vis the SEM
As background to Chapter Nine, if one were to try to move away 
from some of the above more general observations about the
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Canadian business community's attitude, and to more precisely 
isolate its reaction to the SEM (given the scope and 
complexity of the SEM) , it is easy to conclude that Canadian 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and larger firms 
were affected in different ways, and that this complicated 
Ottawa's attempts to promote Canada's international business 
interests. There was, for example, a concern that SME 
exporters in the resource sectors would be damaged - 
especially if they could not afford to invest in the EC. At 
the same time, and as will be discussed in Chapters Eight and 
Nine, with direct Canadian investment abroad outstripping 
inward investment - corporate foreign investment almost 
quintupled after 1980 with 1,396 Canadian-based firms 
operating 6,328 affiliates abroad by 199243 - Canadian MNEs 
clearly saw the advantage of the larger market and made 
considerable investments.44 Compounding this difficulty in 
differentiating Canadian corporate responses was the fact that 
the Canadian economy was so heavily inter-penetrated by 
foreign - mostly U.S. - capital. Thus, in those industry 
sectors in which a significant portion of firms were branch 
plants of U.S. multinationals, there would have been a 
different perspective on these firms' interests vis-a-vis the 
EC. Such differences in perspective and activity fed directly 
into the Canadian corporate responses to the SEM.
Two dimensions of Canadian corporate behaviour were 
significant to the formation of attitudes towards European 
integration in general: first, the size and orientation of the 
enterprise, and second, the sector(s) in which it was active.
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Attitudes towards the EC were fundamentally, shaped by the 
differences of resources and scale between SMEs. and large, 
particularly, multinational firms and by the related 
differences between exporters to Europe, investors to Europe 
and manufacturers. Simply, the larger and more multinational 
an enterprise was, the more likely it was to respond 
positively to the deepening of European integration, and the 
more "European" its activities in the Community were likely to 
be. SMEs with no established European presence were less 
likely to be enthusiastic about the SEM, and were more likely 
to feel threatened by the prospect of a "Fortress Europe".45
Canadian corporate attitudes towards the SEM also varied 
according to the nature of the sectors in which Canadian firms 
were active and from where in Canada they were exporting. 
Quebec-based SMEs were viewed as more entrepreneurial, and 
because of the cultural and language affinities, more likely 
than Alberta- or even Maritime-based SMEs to look to Europe. 
In terms of industry sectors, the discussion in Chapter Nine 
will show the problems of the telecommunications sector and. 
the issues attached to market access. The SEM was not solely 
a high-technology program, but it was replete with 
implications for.the sector - one that was a Canadian strength 
- especially when coupled with established EC. policies on 
local content, anti-dumping and related areas.
The fear that the SEM would work only to the advantage of 
the large Canadian multinationals was not without some
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justification.
. In stark contrast to the resources available to small, 
medium- and large-sized American firms through the network of 
trade and industrial associations such as individual American 
Chambers of Comnerce in the EC Member States (which Smith 
suggests sometimes led American business to be better briefed 
on the implications of EC policies than the U.S. government), 
Canadian firms - apart from multinationals with subsidiaries 
in the EC (a few even had offices in Brussels) and a Canadian 
Standards Association office in Brussels - had no 
sophisticated business association network. to monitor 
Comnunity legislation. These firms relied heavily on the 
Canadian government embassies and high comnissions.46 Despite 
their obvious "information deficit" on the changing nature of 
doing business.in the Comnunity and this "deficit's" obvious 
implication for the corporate bottom line, there was no 
interest by the Canadian private sector to band together to 
create a Canadian chamber network in Europe. As a measure of 
where the priorities of the Canadian business comnunity lay, s 
it is interesting to note that the Canadian Chamber in 1992 - 
as part of its desire to end the "universality" of the federal 
government's trade development approach and at the same time 
to provide more relevant and targetted market intelligence to 
its members - offered to replace some of Canada's consulates 
in the United States with private sector trade offices47; there 
was no similar offer to start opening private sector offices
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in Western Europe. Smith states that on occasion the White 
House's confrontational style vis-a-vis the Community was 
"moderated" by "advice from the battle-front" and that the 
American Chamber of Commerce had seen it as "its duty to 
inform members of Congress about the true meaning of 1992".48 
In the Canadian case, neither the Canadian Chamber of Commerce 
nor the BCNI ever made a presentation to the Canadian House of 
Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and 
International Trade in which Canada's relations with the EC 
were singled out or in which the potential implications of the 
SEM were stated.49
This being, said, Canada's business community was not 
totally "blind" to developments in the EC. The BCNI's high 
profile president, Tom D'Aquino, for example, always attended 
the annual World Economic Forum in Davos along with a very 
small contingent of CEOs from his membership, and thus has had 
the opportunity to network with European business and 
government leaders. The BCNI - unique among Canada' s business 
‘associations - had "working relationships" with UNICE, the 
European Roundtable, the Conseil national du patronat 
francais, the Confederation of British Industries (CBI) , and 
the Confindustria (the Italian employers federation) . There 
were also a host of long-standing Canada-based bilateral 
chambers of commerce (see Table 2 at the end of this chapter) 
with ties to Western Europe {e.g.,. Canada-UK Committee 
administered by the Canadian Chamber of. Commerce, Canada-
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Germany Chamber of Commerce, Canada-France Chamber of 
Commerce, Canada-Italy Chamber of Commerce, Canada-Netherlands 
Chamber of Commerce). But with the exception of the Canada- 
German .Chamber, which had three offices in Canada offering 
services .to both its Canadian and German members, the other 
chambers served more or less as networking fora rather than as 
organizations providing monitoring services or policy advice. 
They also -had minimal) if any contacts, with Canada's 
horizontal business associations. In 1990, in an effort to 
provide the Canadian business- community with a "one-stop 
shopping" service on EC issues, a number of .these bilateral 
chambers hired a consultant and created the Canada-EC Chambers, 
of Commerce in Montreal. This initiative, however, was largely 
ineffectual in increasing the profile of EC issues in Canada.
What the above description shows, and what will be 
amplified in Chapter Nine, is that despite the SEM program 
bringing about some legitimate concerns for Canadian 
exporters, the concern was not acute- .enough across the 
Canadian business community - although clearly vertical 
business . associations such as those in the forestry and 
telecommunications sectors did take a keen interest in. its 
implications - for consultative- mechanisms to be set up. A 
noticeable exception to this lack of any broad-based action by 
the private sector, was the. realization by business that the 
traditional, almost unidimensional focus on export promotion 
no. longer counted as a sound international business strategy
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for Canada in a world economy in which growth in investment 
outstripped that in trade, and where trade and investment grew 
more quickly within the regional groupings of the Triad than 
between them. Business commentators suggested that private and 
public sector programs focus less on trade development as 
traditionally construed, and more on encouraging strategic 
alliances (e.g., building global research and communications 
linkages through investment).
To put this in the Canada-EC context, one way for Canada to 
avoid being hurt by the consequences of any trade diversion 
resulting from the SEM was for Canadian exporters to 
increasingly look to strategic alliances.50 While the large 
Canadian firms could afford to establish a European presence to 
prove their credentials as entrants to the SEM (see Chapter 
9,7.1) , it was felt that Canadian SMEs - especially in the high 
technology sector such as communications - could benefit from 
programs that would allow them to be better linked to world 
markets. But as this chapter's last section will show, the 
Canadian approach to the SEM was caught and indeed compromised 
by the alrger debate between Ottawa and the private sector on 
the structure of Canada's trade promotion system. That is, 
Ottawa and the private sector could agree on a less export- 
oriented approach, but they could not reach a consensus on a 
radical shift away from a focus on OECD markets.
3.6 THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECTOR "DISCONNECT" ON EUROPE 
By 1993, it was not clear who would continue to pay for Canada's 
international activities - especially on the trade side, as 
public sector debt swelled. In the 1980s, beyond the issue of 
free trade where both business and government agreed,
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there had been a growing disconnect between the Canadian
business community's perception of Canada's national foreign
policy and trade interests and the Government's overriding
philosophy of "universality", that is, its emphasis on
providing all services and all programs in all markets.51 Both
the private sector, which had benefited handsomely in the
1980s from government trade development subsidies, and the
public sector which had used these subsidies as a way of
".encouraging" a reluctant private sector into foreign markets.,
realized, however, that with dwindling resources ."hard'
choices" would have to be made in the 1990s about Canada's
international priorities. The business community, calling for
an end to universality in the federal government-controlled
trade development system, urged the government to be strategic
and focus its resources only on specific, high-potential
countries. As Jock Finlayson, Vice President of Policy and
Research at BCNI, opined:
Foreign affairs, trade policy and trade 
development cannot escape the painful fiscal 
arithmetic confronting Ottawa. ... greater 
selectivity in targeting key foreign markets, 
and a more hard-headed approach to setting 
priorities for the allocation of overall 
diplomatic and program resources - these 
should be the guideposts for Canada's foreign 
and trade policymakers in the years ahead.
Unless there is a more strategic and selective 
approach to resource allocation, Canada risks 
dispersing its limited trade policy, and trade 
development resources across too many 
competing priorities and markets., resulting in 
poor commercial payoffs.52
While it is. beyond the scope'of this chapter and this study to
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analyze Canada's trade development system in detail, the 
differing weight given to Europe by the private arid public 
sectors in the space of three years indicated a lack of 
consensus between the private and public sectors on Europe's 
relative position in Canada's hierarchy of foreign policy 
interests. In 1989 one of the recommendations to the federal 
government from the ITAC's short-lived "Europe 1992" committee 
was that Canada should, react aggressively to the rise of the 
SEM by investing more in business promotion targeted at 
Western Europe. The government, as the discussion in Chapter 
Nine will show> reacted positively to this recommendation and 
followed up through the "Europe 1992" arm of its 1989 "Going 
Global" trade development plan.53 The federal government's 
"1992" strategy was four-pronged with: (1) the provision of an 
assessment of, and an information campaign . on, the 
implications, technical requirements and market opportunities 
of the post-1992 European market; (2) a strengthening of 
Canada's ability to voice effectively its concerns to the 
central EC-level and in key European capitals; (3.) a trade and 
investment development strategy for sectors that offered real 
potential for Canadian companies; and (4) a cooperation 
framework for joint research in industrial technology.54
In 1990, federal officials, seizing on the increased 
political attention to Canada-EC relations (leading ultimately 
to the TAD)55 and wishing to broaden relations beyond simply 
economic and trade matters, drew up a wish list- of new
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transatlantic institutional mechanisms and agreements. It was 
felt that such mechanisms would help to realize the four goals 
mentioned above and would enhance Canada-EC bilateral 
relations in light of the process beyond '1992' to incorporate 
monetary union and further political integration. The list 
included:
(1) a Canada-Europe panel of distinguished persons to 
report on the future of the Atlantic relationship;
(2) a private'sector Canada-EC Trade Advisory Committee;
(3) a Canada-EC task force on bilateral trade irritants;
(4) an Atlantic Environmental Charter;
(5) a Parliament of the Atlantic that would be linked to 
the NATO-related North Atlantic Council (apparently the 
bureaucrats had little faith in the. existing Canada-EC 
Parliamentary association);
(6) the establishment of regular consultations between 
the Canadian prime minister and the . President of the. 
European Commission and the President of the European 
Council, and between key EC .Commissioners and Canadian 
ministers;
■ ‘ (7) a Science and Technology Agreement between the EC and 
Canada;
(8) increased Canadian, participation in the Eureka 
projects;
(9) "Forum for Atlantic Democracy" that would bring North 
American and West European politicians, academics and 
private sector leaders together to discuss and.compare 
the challenge of democratic government;
(10) an Atlantic Standards Council;
(11) an Atlantic fund for cultural exchange;
(12) a joint Canada-EC Commission on social policy 
issues;
(13) youth exchanges along the iines of the Erasmus 
program; and
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(14) official exchanges between Canada and the EC.
As this study will show, of these fourteen action 
recommendations, by the end of 1993 only two - the 
consultations between EC and Canadian politicians (i.e., the 
TAD) and the Science and Technology Agreement, had' been 
realized or were close to completion.56 The Canadian business 
community - unlike its American counterpart57 - was certainly 
not eager to participate in a broad reconceptualization of. 
transatlantic relations; rather, it was content, to let the 
federal government to take the lead in this endeavour.
In fact, in 1993 Canadian business representatives - 
after having had their companies benefit from government- 
sponsored services and publications on the SEM - recommended 
that the Mulroney Government spend less on programs aimed at 
helping Canadian companies in the OECD markets, indicating 
that these markets were already familiar to Canadian business 
people.58 Since the EC market represented a large proportion 
of the OECD, it appeared that the business community was now, 
after three years, urging the government to pull its'resources 
out of Europe. Business leaders did. not, however, advocate a 
withdrawal from the United States, the largest- single OECD 
market, because in Finlayson's words "it provid[ed] new 
Canadian exporters with their first experience in a foreign 
market..." and, with regard to Japan, because it "differed 
sufficiently" from other OECD countries it too could qualify 
as an exception.59
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It thus appeared that despite government encouragement 
and despite recommendations by its own representatives (i.e., 
ITAC committee on "1992" program), the Canadian private sector 
neither wanted to invest its own resources, nor those of the 
government it supported through taxes, to improving and 
deepening transatlantic business ties. Private sector 
spokespersons, using EAITC's own internal analyses60, singled 
Europe out as a largely saturated market that was still a 
trade development priority only on the basis of historical 
market share, and that for this reason the government' s 
limited resources had to be re-allocated away from Europe to 
the more difficult non-OECD and higher growth markets Of Asia 
Pacific and Latin America.61 They pointed out that the member 
states of APEC together were responsible for about 40 per cent 
of world trade, and that included among their number were most 
of the world's fastest growing and most dynamic economies - 
specifically "Greater China" (China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) .62 
The business community further rationalized that since 
Canada's military role in Europe was winding down this was 
further justification for reducing the 40 per cent of the 
estimated $500-600 million federal trade promotion budget that 
in 1992 was allocated to Europe.63 The business community, 
however,. was careful to not suggest a complete withdrawal of 
federal government resources from Europe by noting that 
"although a reduction in aggregate diplomatic and trade 
development resources dedicated to Europe is suggested,
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through reallocation it should be possible to increase the 
attention given to two or three high-potential European 
markets even as the overall commitment to the region is scaled 
back."64 In short, from the private sector1s.perspective the 
strategy was to pick "winners" and "losers", to select high- 
growth industries where Canada possessed a ..comparative 
advantage and match them with those areas of the world which 
were the fastest growing. Europe as a unified market, in its 
eyes, was not one of those "winners".’
3.7 CONCLUSION
What is evident in this chapter's analysis of the machinery of 
Canadian foreign policy making and its configuration vis-a-vis 
the Community, is the complex process of commercial and 
political bargaining within the federal government, between 
the federal government and provinces, but less, so between the 
executive and Parliament and between government and business. 
Parliament, as we pointed out-, does not appear to be a potent 
source of policy making.on foreign policy issues in general 
and was largely reactive to issues in Canada-EC relations. 
This being so, in the following chapters it will be impossible 
to remain unaware of the complex internal balancing between 
the PMO, EAITC and other federal government departments. This 
is highlighted by the critical variable of the interaction of 
ministers, bureaucrats, and their access to the-Prime Minister
and his thinking, as the primary domestic determinants of 
Canada's foreign policy. This chapter has also suggested that 
although both-.the federal and provincial governments have 
traditionally played vital roles as information providers on 
international trade, on the whole it was the federal 
government that took the lead in negotiating both market 
access issues with the‘ Community . and in developing trade 
promotion programs.
The corporate community's disinterest can be attributed, 
in large measure, to -the fact that the program leading up to 
the SEM intersected with the divisive free trade debate, the 
NAFTA, and the problematic Uruguay Round, thus leaving little 
energy within the Canadian private sector to devote to EC- 
specific concerns. Another factor to consider is that since 
Canada's small (relative to other G7 members) business 
community was splintered among several competing horizontal 
business associations representing, for example, small 
business, manufacturers, exporters, and multinationals, it was 
difficult for the business community to speak with "one voice" 
on any but the most overarching and broad issues such as free 
trade. Without the. economies of scale and research 
capabilities of the larger national . institutions that are 
found in the U.S. and Western Europe (e.g.> the UK's CBI), it 
was difficult to find institutional support for non-core, that 
.is, non-U.S., policy analysis and prescriptions. This apparent 
business association disinterest may have reflected the
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relative decline of Europe in terms of Canada's world trade 
(which will be discussed in Chapter Eight), but nevertheless 
appears puzzling given that an increasing proportion of the 
surge in Canadian outward investment in the . late 1980s and 
early 1990s went to the EC.
It can therefore be concluded from this chapter' s 
discussion that while it is true that, in the context of the 
history of Canada-EC relations, the SEM perhaps had the single 
greatest impact on Canadian corporate behaviour, nevertheless 
in the interaction between government and firms, the Canadian 
response to the rise of an economically unifying Europe in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s can be appropritely characterized 
as having been state-led. This chapter in its outline of, 
first, the characteristics and motivation of Canada's foreign 
policy actors, and second, their approach to the Community, 
has laid the foundation for this dissertation's focus on the 
impact of state and non-state actors in the Canadian policy 
process vis-a-vis the EC. Thus the stage is set for more 
detailed discussions in Part Three of this study on specific 
reactions to the SEM. But for the observations of this chapter 
to have any lasting value, there is a need to put the 
developments leading up to the SEM into a historical context, 
and to relate them to the relative positions of the EC and 
Canada in the international system.
What Smith states as relevant for future American-EC 
relations, namely, the "intangible factors of trust and 
expectation, of lessons learnt and misleamt" we will see was 
equally , apt . for a full understanding of Canada-EC 
transatlantic ties until 1993.65
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TABLE 2: CANADIAN GOVERNMENT & BUSINESS REPRESENTATION IN THE EC (AS OF 1993)
COUNTRY PROVINCES* FEDERAL* INDUSTRY ASSOC. BUSINESS
CLUBS
COMPANY
OFFICES*
(Number)
United Kingdom Alberta, British 
Columbia, 
Manitoba, Nova 
Scotia, -Ontario, 
Quebec
London - 76 officers Bristol: Bureau du 
Promotion des 
Industries du Bois 
(Quebec)
London: Council of 
Forest Industries of 
British Columbia
Canada-United 
Kingdom Chamber 
of Commerce
25$
Germany • British Columbia, 
New Brunswick, 
Nova Scotia, 
Ontario (2), 
Quebec
Bonn, Dusseldoirf, 
Berlin, Munich - 47
Canadian-German 
Chamber of 
Industry and 
Commerce 
(Canada-based); 
Canadian Business 
Club Dusseldorf; 
Deutsch
Kanadischeer Club
Hamburg; German
Canadian Business
Club Koeln/Bonn;
Deutsche
Kanadischer
Wirtschaftsklub
Muenchen;
Deutsche
Kanadischer
Wirtschaftsklub
Frankfurt
55
France Nova Scotia, 
Ontario, Quebecd
Paris,; Lyon, Strasbourg, 
Toulouse - 60
Chambre de 
commerce 
Francaise au 
Canada and Club 
de relations 
d'affaires, (both 
Canada-based); 
Chambre de 
Commerce-France 
Canada
80
Netherlands None The Hague - 22 Netherlands 
/Canadian Chamber 
of Commerce
50
Italy Ontario, Quebec Rome, Milan - 36 
officer?
Italian Chamber of 
Commerce of 
Canada (Canada- 
based); Italo- 
Canadian Chamber 
of Commerce
22
126
TABLE 2: CANADIAN GOVERNMENT & BUSINESS REPRESENTATION IN THE EC (AS OF 1993)
Ireland None Dublin - 4 Ireland-Canada
Business
Association
15
Belgium Quebec Brussels -  21 Belgium- 
Luxembourg- 
Canada Chamber 
of Commerce; 
Canada-Belgium 
Committee
29
Luxembourg None No resident staff 
(affairs handled by 
embassy in Belgium)
Belgium- 
Luxembourg- 
Canada Chamber . 
of Commerce
2 .
Denmark None Copenhagen - 5 The Fiddlehead 
Club
5
Spain None Madrid, Barcelona - 13 Asociacion 
Hispano- 
Canadiense de 
cooperatcion 
commercial, 
cientifica y cultural
16
Greece None Athens - 15 Hellenic Canadian 
Association
4
Portugal None Lisbon - 10 Camara de 
Comercio E 
Industria Luso- 
Canadiana
6
European Communities None Brussels - 20 Canadian Standards’ 
Association
Association of
Canada-European
Community
Chambers of
Commerce
(Canada-based)*
Other Canadian 
representation within EC 
territory
North Atlantic Council- 
30
OECD - 12
TOTAL 18 offices 14 missions - 371 
officials
3 20 540 (estimated 
1992)
United States 23 offices r 196 officials n.a. n.a. n.a.
Note: Europe (including states of former Soviet Union) represents the largest line item expenditure under Canada's bilateral relations and operations, see Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, 
Part III Expenditure Pltm 1994-1995 Estimates (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1994), p.I-9, Figure 2.
* Included are the number of Canadian officials attached to each diplomatic mission to indicate relative importance of the EC Member State in federal government eyes. The figure includes Canadian 
military attaches assigned to embassies and high commissions, but-does not include locally-engaged. staff which, in the case of missions such as London, can increase personnel sizes to over 300 
employees. • '
k This would include subsidiaries, branches, joint ventures, and sales offices of Canadian companies with interests in the EC. This is a very conservative estimate.
* As postscript, Ontario shut down all of its international- offices in Feb. 1993.
* France is the only country that accords Quebec diplomatic status.
* This is made up of representatives of Canada-based Member State chambers of commerce.
'  These are’ 1991 figures.
Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and Internationa] Trade, Canadian Representatives Abroad, December 1993; Author's survey of Canadian companies with major interests in the EC (see Chapter 
Nine); and James D. McNiven and Dianna Cahn, "Canadian Provincial Trade Offices in the United States," in D. Brown and E- Fry, eds.. States and Provinces in the International Economy (Berkeley: Regents
of the University of California, 1993).
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CHAPTER FOUR
... we do riot know — indeed Europe does not know —how fa r  or how fast its experiment in integration w ill take 
it, or what form it w ill assume on arrival... Canada is not seeking preferential treatment or special advantage ... 
but only a guarantee o f  fa ir  treatment at the hands o f  an economic unit rapidly becoming the m ost pow erful in 
the world.
Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Mansion House, London, - 
March 1975'
CANADIAN APPROACHES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: THE FIRST TWENTY YEARS
4.1 INTRODUCTION
The next two chapters will show that during the three decades 
following the Treaty of Rome, Canada did .not possess a clear 
policy, understood to be a coherent, interrelated set of ends, 
norms and means, in its relations, with the European Community. On 
the one hand, the increased integration of Europe promised to bring 
lasting peace to a region that had been torn asunder twice by wars, 
in the first half of the century. On the other hand, by the mid- to 
late-1980s the momementum of economic integration had raised the 
spectre of a protectionist trading bloc.2 Institutionally, Canadian 
decision makers were uncertain how to approach and interact with a 
hybrid international actor, given that the EC exhibited 
characteristics of both an international organization and a 
supranational entity but was clearly neither. Adding to the 
confusion for Canadian officials and business people alike was the 
apparent paradox, namely, that they were dealing with an economic 
giant, responsible for the trade policy and increasingly also the 
domestic economic policy of all of its Member States, and yet this, 
economic powerhouse was at the same time a ."political pygmy". This
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latter image ensured that Canadian Prime Ministers and successive 
Secretaries of State for External Affairs would continue to engage 
their European counterparts either bilaterally or through NATO. For 
Ottawa's relations with Brussels, it served to guarantee the 
absence of regular, high-level bilateral political links between 
the Canadian Prime Minister and the presidencies of the’Community 
and • the Commission,' something, that was only rectified with the 
issuance of the TAD in 1990 (see Chapter Seven). The prevalence of 
inter-bureaucratic contacts between Ottawa at the expense of high- 
level political links served to exacerbate the problems of.mutual 
understanding in Canada-EC relations . and contributed in large 
measure to the absence of a coherent Canadian.policy towards the 
Community. Thus, it can be said that Canada's diplomatic relations 
with the EC displayed a fundamental disequilibrium since from 
Ottawa's vantage point it was almost entirely based on economic and 
trade interests.
•However, given the EC's influential role in the economic and 
political evolution of Western Europe between 1958 and 1988, 
Ottawa's difficulty in managing its relations with the Community 
merits deeper exploration. One has to look at, for example, how the 
EC's unique status cuts across the four determinants of bilateral 
relations listed in Chapter One. The EC as a trading bloc, as a 
supranational organization possessing quasi-federal structures and 
features, is far more than the sum' of its. parts, a fact which 
presents a considerable challenge ‘ to its international 
interlocutors. Pentland, writing in 1979, has perhaps best
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described the complex and sometimes contradictory character of the 
Union:
The European ..Community is a unique entity on 
the international landscape: less than a full 
economic union, it is more than a simple free 
trade area or customs union; less than a 
. fully-fledged state or global actor, it is 
more than a classical international 
organization.3
The EC's ambiguity is amplified by the evolutionary character of 
its competencies. The division of.power between the Commission and 
the Council of Ministers, the division in the Member States' ranks, 
the development of European Political Cooperation (EPC), for 
example, have at times — particularly since the mid-1970s — 
confounded Ottawa's attempts’to come to terms with the expanding 
Community.
In particular, the historical division of competencies between 
the EC and EPC oh economic and foreign policy matters respectively 
made it difficult for third countries such as Canada to calibrate 
their approach to Brussels. Third countries have experienced 
difficulties negotiating with the EC partly for procedural reasons. 
The Community's procedures resulted in many of the EC's bargaining 
positions having been elaborated as complex compromises.among the 
Member States - decreasing the likelihood of later changes. In 
addition, the outcome of these complex internal decision-making 
procedures - particularly those emanating from "package deals" - 
was and is difficult to comprehend and often surprises the 
Community's external partners.4 The following chapters will show 
Canada, unlike a larger country such as the United States, lacking
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the power with which to "shake up" this decision-making process.5
In the 1990s, the confluence of growing policy 
interdependence, the globalization of business, and the re- 
intensification of a .common European foreign policy, pointed to a 
new plateau of complexity in bilateral EC-Canadian relations. At 
the same time, the number of important actors was on the rise. 
Whereas Canada could previously target the Commission and a few key 
Member States/ now it also had to consider the growing authority of 
the European Parliament (through its cooperation and co-decision 
powers) and the central role of the Council of Ministers. These 
developments made the task of consolidating existing bilateral 
mechanisms of cooperation and' consultation considerably more 
arduous.
4.2 CANADIAN REACTION TO THE CREATION OF THE EC
The analysis of Canada's- reaction to the process of European 
integration would be incomplete without a review of the major 
forces and-alliances shaping Canadian foreign policy in the early 
postwar years and during the building of the European Economic 
Community between 1951 and 1957. Most diplomats and academic 
observers would agree that the hallmarks of Canadian foreign policy 
in these years can be epitomized by secretary of state for External 
Affairs Louis St. Laurent ‘ s ""Gray Lecture," which was delivered at 
the University of Toronto in 1947.6 At the centre of. foreign policy 
considerations during his tenure was the contention
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that "the security of this country lies in the development of a 
firm structure of international organization-1,7 The key to global 
peace and Canadian prosperity St. Laurent saw as the construction, 
of strong international organizations and the development of 
international law.8
During this period, Canada was instrumental in the creation of 
both the United Nations and NATO. A central objective of Canadian 
foreign policymakers was to strike a balance between the world's 
former great power, the U.K., and the United • States. Canada's 
relations with the rest of Europe and ties with the Commonwealth’ 
were clearly subordinate to its links with the Anglo-American 
alliance.9 Although Ottawa was intent on buffering the fall of’ the 
U.K.'s power in the Western Hemisphere, this did not take place 
with the same zeal displayed prior to 1945.
In 1948, with the beginnings of the Cold War in Europe,
European reconstruction was the highest priority on Canada's 
foreign policy agenda. Canada's Lester Pearson, then under­
secretary of state for external affairs, was one of the. most
fervent advocates of the "embryo of an Atlantic community which 
would be the successor to the "North Atlantic" triangle of the 
1930s and 19.40s, . in which Canada had enjoyed close and
counterbalancing ties with both Britain and the United States."10 
Notable Canadian diplomats such as Pearson and Escott Reid saw NATO- 
as a unique mechanism for promoting transatlantic cooperation and 
understanding‘beyond a strictly military and political role, in 
effect creating an "Atlantic Union" (as characterized in the
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Canadian-authored Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty and
elaborated in the; 1956 Report of the "Three Wise Men, " which 
included Pearson) .11 Canada did not eventually find adequate support 
for the concept of a broader "Union," with dissenters in Canada and 
among Canada's allies noting the number of existing transatlantic 
economic mechanisms (e.g., United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe) and arguing against the need to create new ones.
For Canada, the North Atlantic proposals offered something, 
more, than bilateral alliances with its two most important partners .
• i, .
According to historian John English, Prime Minister Mackenzie King 
had apparently been "suspicious" of bilateral alliances with the UK 
and, in May 1948, rejected the option of a bilateral free trade 
agreement with the United States. For Noman Robertson, then a high 
ranking Canadian diplomat, NATO, thus provided "a providential 
solution for so many of [Canada's] problems" - how to assure
American commitment to European defence, how to avoid a bilateral
Canadian-American commitment, and how to escape being "orphaned" by 
a purely American-European entente.12 These three objectives would 
prove to be. the basis of all successive approaches to Europe by the 
Canadian government, whether under Liberal or Conservative
governments.
Muirhead, in his rich and detailed study, The Development of 
Postwar Canadian Trade Policy: The Failure of the Anglo-European 
Option, concludes that Canada's attempts to develop trade relations 
with the United Kingdom and Europe between 1947 and 1957 failed 
miserably. In the same way that Canada's commitment to NATO was
seen as a key pillar of its foreign policy, trade with the UK in 
particular was regarded as critical to Canadian prosperity and as 
an important counterweight to growing trade with the United Sates. 
He writes that by 1950 Canadian policymakers had not yet abandoned 
"all hope of ever re-establishing the old North Atlantic triangle, 
though the prospects of doing so seemed bleak, " and that Canada was 
settling "more comfortably into a continental role".13 His study 
reveals that necessities and not preferences determined Canadian 
policy outcomes and that "Canadian policy was multilateral by 
preference, bilateral by necessity, and manifestly continental by 
default".14 His study is also noteworthy in that, as Cutler points 
out, it reveals the "limits placed on policy autonomy by the desire 
in Ottawa to appease both London and Washington" and shows how the 
external determinants of Canada's foreign economic policy loom 
large in policy outcomes in the late. 1940 and 1950s.15 . .
Historically, Canada had to be wary of closer European' 
economic cooperation (a caution that had its.origins in. the Great 
Depression of the 1930s). In terms of the general support for the 
principle of European integration, it was not an 'issue - in the 
early 1950s - in which Ottawa was actively engaged. The Department 
of External Affairs, for example, decided not to recommend that a 
delegation be accredited to the High Authority of the European Coal 
and Steel Community, feeling that Canada's interests did not 
justify such.representation. Understandably Canadian policymakers 
took a much more aggrieved position on regional groupings that 
threatened to keep Canada's products out of their markets such as
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the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), with its 
collective approach to currency ' convertibility and its 
deliberations concerning trade liberalizations.16
4.2.1 The Economic Effect on Canada of the EEC and EFTA
Muirhead contends that Canada remained relatively neutral during 
the early stages (for example, during the Messina conference of 
1955) of what would later become the European Economic Community 
(EEC) .■ Ottawa was in favour of the integration movement but opposed 
to the development of a discriminatory free trade area, and it 
wanted the integration process to evolve into a North Atlantic-wide 
free trade area that would breathe some life into the moribund 
Article 2 of the NATO Treaty.17 By late 1956, although St.. Laurent 
(now prime minister) indicated strong support for the principle of 
economic integration, the Canadian government became increasingly 
alarmed by the possibility:of restricted trade, indeed moreso by 
the prospect of a -UK-led European Free Trade Area (EFTA)18 than by 
an EEC (since 15 per cent of Canada1s exports went to Britain and 
only 6 per cent went to the countries comprising the EEC).' There 
was also a concern among some Canadian mandarins . about the 
political and military implications of European . economic 
integration, a-process that if "... carried through steadfastly..." 
could have seriously damaged * the Atlantic Alliance and . left a 
"stretched and strained" Canada as the United States and Europe 
drifted apart.19
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What can be-concluded from Canada's commitment to Europe from 
1947 until the. the formation of the EEC? Muirhead notes a-sense-'of 
"betrayal" and "disappointment", since, unlike the United States, 
Canada could do little to influence the course of European events 
during this period to better suit its interests. Although it had 
spent a . better part of a decade attempting to convince the 
Europeans of the benefits of a multilateral and non-discriminatory 
trade,, what had been created was in essence a regional bloc.,20 There 
was real concern about the discriminatory impact of the EEC on 
specific Canadian commodities such as wheat (more than 30 per cent 
of.Canada's total world sales were sold to the six); in the case of 
flaxseed and polystyrene, the figure was more than 70 per cent; as 
well more than 10 per cent of Canadian sales of barley, iron ore, 
nickel., tobacco, and aluminum wejjtT to EEC countries. With ■ such 
significant proportions of-Canada's world sales^  any adustments or 
re-orientation in European trade patterns had the potential to 
seriously disrupt Canada's agriculture and industry.21
In terms of a possible EFTA, despite the UK representing such 
a large market, for Canada there was less, concern about ' its 
discriminatory elements since each country was free to pursue its 
own commercial policy and. set its own tariff rate on any product. 
Interestingly, in light of this study's focus on post-1989 Canadian 
reactions to European integration which, as we shall see in Part 
Three, included calculations of the European Economic Area's impact 
on Canadian commercial interests and the costs and benefits of 
transatlantic free.trade, in the 1950s the primary Canadian concern
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with EFTA was not with the arrangement per se but precisely that it 
might merge with the Common Market, and form a Europe-wide free 
trade zone with the more restrictive Common Market features. 
Canadian officials felt that such an arrangement would hit Canada 
especially hard in the areas of agriculture and fisheries.22
In short, Ottawa felt "betrayed" that it did not receive a 
commensurate commercial return in Europe after its heavy commitment 
to European security through NATO and the extension of financial 
assistance to its West European allies through the OEEC. In other 
words, the European mind-set was not acknowledging a link between 
the security (i.e., Canada's role . in the liberation of Western 
Europe from Nazi occupation, and then after the threat of Soviet 
domination) and economic components of the transatlantic 
relationship. Thus the only reliable market 12 years after the 
Second World War was the United States which was the destination of 
60 per cent of Canadian exports and the source of 70 per cent of 
Canada' s imports, and which had exempted Canada from certain pieces 
of restrictive trade legislation and which continued to purchase 
huge quantities of Canadian raw materials. While this created a 
dependency, Canada clearly had few other options - a fact that once 
more reinforced how a trade dependent economy was vulnerable to the 
actions of others for its economic well-being.
By 1957,' at the same time that the EEC was being formed, 
Canadians, witnessing the creation of a branch-plant economy in 
Canada as a result of enormous inflows of American investment, 
began to have considerable doubts about their economic relationship 
with the United States. The release of the Gordon Report in that 
year revealed the size of U.S. economic influence in Canada, which,
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many feared,, posed a threat to Canadian sovereignty. This distrust 
of the U.S. would, at first glance, appear to have found 
understanding in the eyes of Canada's European allies since they 
too were receiving large amounts of U.S. investment. One could 
therefore assume that such an understanding would have buttressed 
Canada's political and economic links with Western .Europe. Indeed, 
the official beginning of Canada's relationship with the newly- 
formed EEC was in 1959 when Canada signed an agreement with the 
European Coal and Steel Comnunity and its ambassador to Belgium was 
accredited to the EEC.
But while Canada forged new links with the new European 
economic bloc, it was also faced with the prospect of an erosion of 
its trade ties with western Europe because the EEC's Common 
Corrmercial Policy and the CAP were now added to the factors which 
had traditionally impeded Canada's transatlantic trade, factors 
including transportation costs, comnunications, languages, customs 
and consumer tastes.23 Mirroring Canada's reaction to the creation 
of the Single Market thirty years later, Canadian decision makers 
in 1957 viewed the creation of a large preferential trading area as 
inevitably resulting in trade discrimination and trade diversion to 
the detriment of third countries in the short-term - no matter how 
much the new economies of scale resulted in trade growth.24 
Nevertheless, they believed that the advantages of European 
unification far outweighed all possible disadvantages. Canada was 
left little choice in the matter of course, and would have to adapt 
its policies accordingly.
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The formation of the EC was but one aspect of a fundamental 
and inexorable change in the structure of: the international system 
in the late 1950s. Change was accompanied by the resurgence of. 
Western Europe and Japan, the decline., of Great Britain and the 
spread of industrialization in the world, the result of the near, 
monopoly of North American producers, and the gradual shift from a 
strictly bipolar world of military alliances to a more multipolar 
one based on regional trading blocs. There were other more direct 
indicators closer to home. As. mentioned, Canada's economy was 
becoming more closely integrated with that of. the United States. 
Finding themselves losing overseas market shares to more efficient 
competitors, Canadian exporters were also inclined to focus on 
the more familiar American market.
One development in the early years of the Community, however, 
did provoke, considerable concern in. the Diefenbaker government, 
namely, the United Kingdom's unsuccessful first bid for EC 
membership in 1961.25 The Canadian government drew pessimistic 
conclusions about.both the economic and political consequences'of 
British membership. At that time, Britain still took 15 per cent of 
Canada's exports, as opposed to 57 per cent from the United States 
and about 10 per cent from the rest of Western Europe. In Prime 
Minister Diefenbaker's eyes, the cornerstone of Canada's trade 
policy was still Britain and the Commonwealth - preferences.26 For 
this reason, as Roseman points out, Diefenbaker saw the UK's bid to 
join the EC as the worst of all possible scenarios, since the 
preferences would then be replaced.by the common external tariff.27
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The estimated impact of Britain's accession and the consequent loss 
of preferences to Canada varied, running from a high of $900. 
million in exports being affected (since total exports to the UK at 
that time was approximately $1 billion and of those 95 per cent 
were free of duty, with about half in a preferential position) ; to 
the estimate by the former president of the Canadian Exporters' 
Association of a direct loss of $400-500 million; and to the much 
more plausible estimate made by eminent Canadian economist, Harry. 
Johnson, of between $55 to $70 million or less than 10 per cent of 
total exports.28
In addition to fearing that Canadian exports - especially 
agricultural products since they amounted to a large proportion of 
Canada's exports29 - would suffer drastically, the Diefenbaker 
government was concerned that Britain's role as primus inter pares 
•within the Commonwealth would be ended, and even that North 
America's commitment to Western defence would be weakened.30 Thus, 
Diefenbaker also opposed (1) the UK's forming of a European Free 
Trade Area and (2) London's offer of a Canada-UK free trade area - 
a response, apparently, to Diefenbaker's own calls in early 1957 
for closer Canada-UK trade relations which he felt would lessen 
Canada's dependence on the U.S..31 As a further measure of Ottawa's 
preoccupation with Britain's unsuccessful attempt to gain 
accession, during the Dillon Round of GATT negotiations between 
1960 and 1962, the Diefenbaker government in fact entertained the 
possibility of applying to become an "associate member" of the EC.32 
This option was quickly dismissed by knowledgeable observers of
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transatlantic relations who understood that in the final analysis
the .aim of the Common Market was in fact political and that
therefore by definition Canada could not be considered a "European"
.nation, although the Liberals seemed to support, this strategy -
apparently to forestall being left behind as the Americans pursued
links of their own with the Common Market.33
And, if an associate membership was not an available option to
Canada, then another strategy was to promote an Atlantic Community'
that would bind Canada, the United States.and the UK to the Common
Market. Lester Pearson, who as the new Liberal leader in 1958
became the leader of the Official Opposition, was as suspicious as
Diefenbaker of the increasing influence of the United States on
Canadian iife, but departed from the Conservative prime minister by
warmly endorsing Britain's bid for membership in the Common Market.
He believed that Britain within the EC would better.strengthen a
North Atlantic Community and thus better serve Canada's interests.
Just a few days after he was elected, Pearson, in a speech, defined
what would be the Liberal Party's view on Atlantic relations while.
in Opposition:
If then we do not wish to ' weaken the western .
• coalition; and if, in Canada, we do not wish either 
to face • the United States alone . or become too 
dependent economically on it, then surely the best 
policy for us is to seek economic interdependence 
within the North Atlantic Community through freer 
trade . . .- For Canada, a North Atlantic area with the 
freest possible trade would certainly mean a much 
greater export market in the U.S.A.. and in Europe; 
lower Costs of production for many Canadian 
industries, and lower living' costs,. I would hope, 
for Canadian consumers .... There are undoubtedly 
certain industries that would have to receive 
special consideration in any such freer trade
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agreements, just as such consideration is being 
given in Europe to special economic situations in 
the negotiation of the. free trade area there.
. . .This is an appropriate time to push this proposal 
... This is a challenging prospect and is surely . 
worth serious and immediate consideration, 
negotiation and planning. Could there be a finer 
initiative for Canada? All this is, of course, long 
range policy.34 .
The Liberal criticism of the Conservative foreign policy was that 
by rejecting closer relations with both the United States and the 
EEC, it amounted to a form of "plague on both your houses" and was 
thus a dangerous form of "economic' isolationism" that ignored 
Canada's two leading markets.35 The Liberals further asserted that 
the Diefenbaker government should have spent less time lobbying for 
Britain's continuing leadership of the Conmonwealth and London's 
rejection of the Comnpn Market (since Canada had no leverage to 
prevent the latter) , and more time doggedly pursuing an Atlantic 
Free Trade Area which was. consistent with both Canada's desire to 
promote "free trade in a free world". and the "only satisfactory 
solution to the problem of Western unity" in a world faced with a 
Soviet global threat.36
The Canadian private sector's perception of Canada's foreign 
interests in the early 1960s in many ways mirrored those of the' 
politicians. Business leaders such as the then-president of the 
Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, R.W. Fowler, noted that while 
-the single most important factor in Canada' s trade policy was the 
development of the European Cannon Market, Canadians, in his view, 
could not look at European integration in isolation and would also 
have to "view European development in the context of the’ influence
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[it. was] having on American thinking and policy." In short, it was 
the action in Europe and the reaction in the United States, and 
vice-versa, that was of vital importance to Canadian trade,.since 
it was .recognized that Canadian economic policy was "caught in a 
vise". between these two forces on opposite sides of the Atlantic.37
. The utility of the above historical background is that the 
concerns expressed by Canadian business people, politicians and 
officials in the late 1950s about the impact on Canada of the EEC's 
formation, are both similar and different to the reactions thirty 
years later as the EC moved definitively towards economic union. As 
the discussion in Chapter Three has already pointed out (see also 
Chapter Ten), the generation of Canadian business leaders in the 
1980s clearly did not share the previous generation's view of a 
unified European market as pivotal to- Canada's national economic 
prosperity. But while Canada's trade policy priorities had clearly 
shifted in the minds of the business community, the reaction among 
Canadian politicians and officials (as will be described in 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven) in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
towards European economic union, that is, the prospects of. 
decreased Canadian access to European markets, as- a result of the 
parallel processes of "deepening" and "widening", bore a striking 
similarity to the concerns expressed by officials and politicians 
a generation earlier. while the official Canadian reaction to 
the prospect of a Single Market may h,ave rung the .same notes as in 
1960, the trade policy context could not^be^more different by the 
1980s.- The Muironey government had, after all, explicitly chosen
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the "continentalist" option. Furthermpre, just as the Liberals had 
looked to an Atlantic free trade option in. the early 1960s - tied 
to Chapter 2 of Kennedy's 1962 Trade Expansion Act38 - but had 
realized that this was a "non-starter" given the Americans' lack of 
interest in joining regional trade blocs and the Europeans' 
(specifically the . Commission's) repudiation of • any such 
transatlantic alliance on the grounds that "Europeanism" was not 
reconcilable with "Americanism" (since the United States was both 
a nation of the Atlantic and the . Pacific)39, ! the Mulroney 
government's suggestion of an Atlantic free trade zone in 1990 
would be similarly rejected by the Americans and the Europeans. As 
the following chapters will show, although Canada was prepared to 
work with and within the post-Cold War transatlantic institutions 
and forces and to bend them to serve'its interests, it was clearly 
no. longer as likely to be crushed between the two powerful 
millstones on either side of the Atlantic.
4.3 1960s: PARTIAL PARTNERS
During most of the 1960s the combination of rapid economic growth 
in Europe, combined with successful tariff cuts of the Kennedy 
Round, left few barriers to the access of Canadian exports and 
investment (apart from agriculture) in the EC market.40 By the late 
1960s, however, confrontations between Canadian and EC negotiators 
at the GATT concerning the Community's Common Agriculture Policy 
(CAP) highlighted Canada's inability to ensure adequate, trade
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access through multilateral channels, and suggested the potential 
need for a more a direct bilateral link to the Community 41. These 
bilateral problems coincided with a recurrence of Canadian fears of 
"excessive" dependence on the United States, and with the election 
in 1968 of a decidedly nationalist Liberal government led by the 
charismatic Pierre Trudeau. By then the stage was set for Canadian 
politicians and senior officials (primarily 1 Europeanists1 at the 
Department of External Affairs42) to push Canada's relations with 
Western Europe higher on the Canadian foreign policy agenda.43
4.3.1 The "STAFEUR Report"
A Eurocentric foreign policy was at first rejected by Trudeau.
During the 1968 election campaign, Trudeau announced his intention
to launch a "pragmatic and realistic" review of Canada's foreign
policy which would’ embrace defence, economic and aid policies.
Trudeau committed his government to "take a hard look, in
consultation with our allies, at our military role in NATO and [to]
determine whether our present military commitment is still
appropriate to the present situation in Europe." Perhaps most
ominously Trudeau spoke of Canada's need
not so much to go crusading abroad as to
mobilize at home our aspirations... Our
paramount interest is to ensure the political 
survival of Canada as a federal and bilingual 
sovereign state. This means strengthening 
Canadian unity as a basically North American 
country.44
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Consistent with this pledge, after his electoral victory Trudeau 
assigned the foreign policy review to EAITC, Treasury Board, the 
Privy Council Office, and the Department of Finance. Mitchell 
Sharp, his secretary of state for external affairs, had already 
authorized the creation of an interdepartmental Special Task Force 
on Europe (known as STAFEUR) in the spring of 1968. Its mandate 
included a major examination of Canadian relations with Europe, 
with a particular focus, on NATO and Canada's role therein. The 
STAFEUR Report45 was completed by the end of February 1969. Parts 
of the Report contributed to preparation of a booklet on Europe, 
one of six in a series entitled Foreign Policy for Canadians 
(hereafter referred to as the FPC), which was released in 1970 and 
represented the Trudeau Government's redefinition of Canadian 
foreign policy.46
The 1969 STAUFER Report was highly pro-Atlanticist in its 
outlook. • In retrospect, the Report appears much more forward- 
looking in terms of Canada's relations with Western Europe than 
some of its writers could have imagined at the time. Many of its 
recommendations would have resonated with policymakers struggling 
to develop a Canadian response to post-1989 events in Europe. 
Officials at EAITC concluded at the time that - it was not in 
Canada's interests to loosen its ties with Europe, and that to do 
so would mean "having to pay an excessive price in political and
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possible economic terms."47 The.Report noted that Canada's interest 
in Europe was greater than in any other area except North America, 
given that all of Canada's major interests, political, military, 
economic, scientific, and cultural, converged in Europe.48
The Report was surprisingly prescient for a period within 
which East-West tensions were high as a result of American 
involvement in ' Vietnam,, especially - as it did not equate these 
"ties" with an indefinite Canadian military commitment to the 
continent. Instead, it foresaw the day when "political society" in 
Europe would resist communism, Germany would be in-.a state of 
."peaceful evolution,•" and "other [non-military] forms of Canadian 
presence" would require development to maintain the transatlantic 
ties important to Canada.49
In keeping with a condern at the political level that Canada 
was becoming overly dependent on a North American outlook, the 
Report encouraged "additional organic links" with Western Europe 
through NATO and "other economic.and political organizations." In 
the event of NATO becoming "unnecessary" or "transformed," these 
other links would remain arid would serve Canadian objectives.50 The 
Report was, no doubt also influenced by having been written in the 
aftermath of the Warsaw Pact's invasion of Czechoslovakia. It 
argued strongly for Canadian membership in the North Atlantic 
alliance. Perhaps to account for Trudeau's scepticism about 
Canada's military commitment to Europe it also advocated a 
continuing, albeit.possibly smaller military contribution to NATO 
as a symbol of Canada's stake in the defence of Europe.51 The Report
153
never went so far as an attempt at estimating when Soviet hegemony 
in Eastern Europe would end or defining "other forms of presence" 
or “organic links." Nonetheless, as later chapters of this study 
will indicate concerning the push for bilateral cooperation on 
various transnational challenges in the post-Cold War era, the 
STAFEUR Report was in many ways prophetic.
With regard to NATO, the Report found its utility in 
peacekeeping functions for military stability and in its role as an 
"important forum!for the expression of Canadian views on a wide 
range of international issues and for the achievement of.a number 
of Canadian political aims in Europe".52 It acknowledged that a 
diminishing Western European dependence on American political and 
military leadership was probably inevitable in the long-run. It 
ailso forecast that an integrating Western Europe would be . a 
"magnet" for EFTA nations.
On the progress of European integration, it is significant 
that the Report addresses full European union at a time when Europe 
had just completed the process of establishing a customs union, 
stating that such a union would work against Canadian interests not 
only by excluding Canada from Europe but also by excluding Canada, 
from any Europe-United States dialogue. Furthermore, it would lead 
ultimately to a parallel trend toward continentalism in North 
America, within which Canada could expect increased integration 
with the United States. In this context, the Report referred to the 
"two-pillar" principle of Canada's relations with.Europe, leaving 
Canada necessarily either entirely excluded or else included within
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the American "pillar."53.
That is, Canada wished to counter tendencies by Europeans as 
a group to bypass Canada in their dealings with the United States. 
Related to this concern, was the painful recognition that Canada's 
objectives vis-a-vis Europe were absent . from . European 
preoccupations in their dealings with Canada. This great disparity 
between the historical importance of Europe for Canada and the 
political importance of Canada for Europe constitutes the single 
most persistent limiting factor affecting the range and scope of 
policy options available to Canada. It was, in the Report's words, 
"a sobering but- seemingly inescapable fact • of life."54 It also 
reflected the Europeans' two pillar image of transatlantic 
relations.
In preparing a blueprint for Canada's policy approach to the 
EC for the 1970s, however, Canadian officials were careful to 
describe this "two-pillar" .theory an oversimplification: Canada 
would more likely face a process of Community-building, albeit 
uneven in nature, with which Canada must come to. terms.55 In this 
realistic appraisal of the range of Canada's responses to evolving 
European integration, a positive spin was. given even to concern 
that Britain's accession to the EC would have "short-run" 
commercial drawbacks for Canada. Unlike the Diefenbaker 
government's earlier misgivings about the deleterious impact of 
European integration on Canada's foreign trade, the. Report saw 
disadvantages suffered by Canada as balanced by improved access to 
'an enlarged and more open Europe. Canadian officials further
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speculated that, with Britain as a Member State, Canadian interests 
would be "given greater weight."56
In summary, Canadian officials concluded fhat (1) Canada had 
no hope of reversing the process of European integration, and its 
interest.might not even be served in the attempt, and (2) it was 
"not clear" Canada's interest would be served if U.S. influence 
became "even more predominant. "57 The Canadian side was particularly 
concerned over European interest in greater autonomy and over the 
uncertainty of future U.S. policy towards Europe, leaving the 
environment no longer one of "counterbalancing interdependence" 
which Canadian officials had felt benefited them in the past, but 
rather one in which the prospects of an Atlantic community had 
diminished, to be replaced by political and economic 
bipolarization.58 From this perspective, officials'advocated that 
Canada "obtain" its historical "diversification" once again, seeing 
it still-in the national interest. They described Canada as best 
achieving leverage by developing its multinational relations with 
Europe.
The language ' of the Report leaves no doubt that 
diversification would be a.future goal. Reinvigorated Canada-Europe 
relations would act as a "counterweight" to the "relatively 
benevolent but overwhelming influence of the United States."59 
Canadian officials saw certain features of Europe's future 
configuration as coinciding with national interests. They 
recognized that: (1) Canada's security was intimately linked with
Europe; (2). Europe was maintaining a [sic] interdependent
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relationship with North America while becoming increasingly self- 
reliant;. (3) Europe would become united and outward-looking rather 
than fragmented . and inward-looking; and (4). Europe would be 
prepared to enter into an active partnership with Canada in certain 
areas of mutual interests.
As we shall see in the following discussion, Trudeau at first 
•ignored the recommendations, of the STAFEUR Report and sought non- 
European counterweights to perceived U.S. influence, put when this 
approach failed, in stark contrast . to successive American 
administrations the Liberal government warmed up to the idea of 
closer relations with the European Community. Also indicated in 
this paper- is the possibility that the acrimony in Brussels- 
Washington relations during the 1960s and 1970s presented an 
opportunity for Canada to present itself to the Europeans as a more 
cooperative and distinct partner in North America, thereby for a 
time rendering the."two pillar"- analogy false.
4.3.2 Diverging EC-U.S. Interests
In Chapter One, it was stated that Canada's relations with Brussels 
are greatly affected by Washington's relations with Brussels. , By 
the early 1960s Washington had begun to lose its impact upon the 
EC's integration. Ginsberg characterizes bilateral relations during 
the period from T963 to 1970 as one that "gyrated between 
insensitivity and hostility" as the U.S. and the EC attempted to 
adjust to altering relative positions in the world.60 American
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policymakers became progressively more sceptical about implications 
of European economic and political integration for a host of major 
reasons61: the EC's granting of tariff reductions on certain imports 
from close trading partners in the Mediterranean and Africa were 
regarded as highly discriminatory vis-a-vis American exports; the 
notorious chicken war of 1963 and 1964 caused by the CAP'S 
devastating effect on U.S. market share of the EC poultry market; 
the EC's toughness in its negotiations with United States, during 
the Kennedy Round of MTNs; by EC Member States' silence over, or 
condemnation of, involvement in Vietnam 62; and the 1970
introduction of a foreign policy co-ordination system under the 
framework of EPC was seen by some U.S. decision makers as a threat 
to American leadership , on foreign policy matters.63 From ah 
institutional perspective, the Nixon administration disregarded
traditional U.S. support for EC bodies, preferring instead
bilateral ties with member governments.
Thus by the early 1970s, the United States was becoming
increasingly disillusioned with the impact of European integration 
on its interests. Then, secretary of state Henry Kissinger's "Year 
of Europe" initiative, instead of reconciling these transatlantic 
tensions, succeeded in exacerbating . them: Europeans viewed the
attempt by the United States to redirect development of EC foreign 
policy back to an Atlantic-based .centre as "patronizing and 
clumsy."64 Relations between Brussels and Washington stagnated even 
further as evidenced in the foreign policy differences between the 
EC and the U.S. on the Yom Kippur War, and are characterized by
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Ginsberg as moving in the 1970s between unilateral neglect and 
bilateral cooperation.65 By contrast, Canada shared many common 
interests with Brussels during these same years.
4.4 1970s: TRUDEAU'S EUROPE POLICY
The early Trudeau years can be seen as a watershed in post-War 
Canadian foreign policy/ leading some observers to characterize 
Canada as a "principal power" rather than a "-middle power" during 
this period.66 This development was somewhat ironic given Trudeau's 
shift away from Pearsonian internationalism to an initial 
scepticism towards the Commonwealth/ given also his complaint that 
NATO had dictated Canada's external policies/ and his advocacy of 
greater attention to domestic policies as opposed to European 
security.67 Indeed, some analysts saw .Trudeau as "bored" with the 
Western half of the European- continent during the first few years 
of his government68. 'For instance, although Trudeau accepted greater 
political, economic and cultural ties with Europe, he seemed to 
take greater interest in the diplomatic coup over relations with 
Beijing (wherein he granted Communist China diplomatic recognition 
ahead of the U.S.), the well publicized visits by his ministers to 
Latin America, and his own travels to New Zealand, Australia, 
Japan., Malaysia, India, Pakistan apd the Soviet Union. These 
actions underlined Trudeau's Conviction that Canada's foreign 
policy priorities entailed generating relationships well.away from 
the North Atlantic.69 This was also the message of the first book
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of the FPC in which the government stated that
The.predominance, of transatlantic ties - with Britain, France 
and Western Europe generally (and. new links with the Common 
Market) - . will be adjusted to reflect a more evenly 
distributed policy emphasis, which envisages esqpanding 
activities in the Pacific Basin and Latin' America.70
Ironically, this very strategy was to be adopted by the Mulroney-
led Conservative government .more than .20 years later'. At the time,
Trudeau's predecessor and mentor, the by now-retired Lester
Pearson, did not agree with his protege's approach, seeing it as
defining Canada's national interests too narrowly by not taking
into account the significance of global security concerns.71
Mainstream foreign policy analysts of the period such as Professor
Peyton Lyon feared that a retreat from Europe could be equated with
a retraction from the rest of the world - a matter that, re-emerged
two decades later as Canada debated its post-Cold War Europe
policy.72
The Trudeau government. quickly discovered, however, that 
despite- its awareness of Canada's need for countervailing 
relations, there was a decreasing confidence that it could be 
established on the necessary scale beyond the Atlantic community. 
According to Peyton Lyon, although's Canada commitment to foreign 
aid increased substantially in the late 1960s, relations with 
developing . countries proved too . one-sided to counterbalance 
Canada's dependence on its relations with the United States. 
Although trade with Japan was expanding greatly, Japan's interest 
in Canada did not extend far beyond a need for raw materials. It 
also lacked the defense, personal, historical and cultural bonds
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Canada maintained with Europe. Finally, although the Canadian 
public showed some sympathy for Trudeau's overtures towards Moscow, 
large numbers objected to the notion that relations with the Soviet 
Union could ever approach the intimacy of those with Canada's 
southern neighbour.73 After an extensive and sobering tour d 1 horizon 
in search of non-Atlantic sources of significant counterweight, 
Canada's political leaders consequently returned to the bosom of 
"mother Europe".
4.4.1 Foreign Policy for Canadians and the "Third Option"
Trudeau's FPC sets out six policy themes ' for the direction of 
Canada's foreign policy in the 1970s: 1) fostering economic growth; 
2) safeguarding sovereignty and independence; 3) working for peace 
and security; 4) promoting social justice; 5) enhancing the quality 
of life; and 6) assuring a harmonious natural environment.74 The 
first goal, economic growth, would be accomplished through trade 
diversification among the rising industrial powers. Diversification 
in Canadian political and economic policy was seen as leading to 
the second goal, sovereignty and independence. Intensified 
relations with western Europe during the 1970s were seen as 
fulfilling this second requirement.
Trends described in the•FPC that would not . fully, take shape 
until the late 1980s and 1990s, include the increasing importance 
in world affairs of transnational production75 and the prediction 
of a "worldwide trend toward regionalism in one form or another."76
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The current shift towards world trading areas - the.European Union,
the Asia-Pacific region, and the Americas - is the manifestation of
a trend predicted in Ottawa two decades ago.
By the end of 1970, Mitchell Sharp and his Cabinet colleague,
Jean-Luc Pepin, haid become the first Canadian ministers to visit
the headquarters of the European Commission. Federal officials in-
Ottawa were also becoming more inclined to disregard the anti-
Atlanticist thrust of the first'booklet in the FPC packet and to
take their cues from the volume entitled Europe. This booklet is
essentially a repackaging of the STAFEUR Report; in it, Europe is
once again recognized as "the only area outside North America where
the major themes of Canadian policy converge"77 and is specifically
linked to Canada's quest for. a counterweight:
The maintenance of an adequate measure of 
economic and political independence in the 
face of American power and influence is a 
problem Canada shares with the European 
nations. . . .78
It also maintains that
the more the European countries combine their 
.efforts, the more opportunities there will be 
for Canada to find rewarding forms • of 
cooperation with' them. It is not- realistic to' 
imagine that the present could be changed 90 
degrees in direction...but there would be much 
merit in seeking to develop at least some
measure of countervailing influence.79
The political need in Canada for a "countervailing influence"
resulted from increased public and official anxiety about Canada's
overdependence on its so-called "special relationship" with the
United States, a term that Sharp says
"...recognized the extensive and close ties
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between the Canadian and U.S. economies, 
unmatched anywhere else in the world in 
relations between independent countries.
Consequently, the effect of U.S. economic 
policies upon Canada was far greater than upon 
any other country.80
These fears in Canada combined with an increase in East-West 
detente ensured that, the attraction of a separate strategy for 
relations with the European Community was growing ever stronger.
It is somewhat odd, however, that the Trudeau government's 
comprehensive review of Canadian.foreign policy as laid out in the 
1970 White Paper would be noticeably silent on the question of 
Canada-U.S. relations. Indeed, much surprise and confusion greeted 
the unveiling.of the FPC booklets when none appeared on the subject 
of Canada's "most important bilateral relationship and primary 
foreign policy interest.81 This significant policy area was 
.addressed in. a separate paper two years later under Sharp's 
authorship in what was then the Department of External Affairs' 
semi-official periodical, international Perspectives. This 
"Options" paper presented three alternatives for. the conduct of 
. Canada's relationship with the United States: (1) the maintenance
of the status quo whereby relations would continue to be managed in 
what was described as an ad hoc fashion; (2) closer economic 
integration with the United States; and (3) more diversified 
multilateral ties.82 Sharp's strategy, in addition to calling for 
a strengthening of Canadian identity through the promotion of 
Canadian culture, promoted a more deliberate long-term approach to 
economic development which translated into an industrial strategy
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from which emerged the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) in 
1975 and the New Economic Program (NEP) in 1980.
The "Options" paper, consistent with the conclusions of the 
STAFEUR report and the FPC's Europe booklet, was also a reaction to 
Canada's, "vulnerability" to American policy actions, the most 
notable of which at the time was the Nixon administration's 10 per 
cent surcharge in August.1971 on all manufactured goods entering 
the United States. With the U.S. market accounting for over 70 per 
cent of Canada's international trade, this hit Canada particularly 
hard, especially since it was denied exemption from this particular 
measure.
These developments in turn put pressure on the "special, 
relationship" that had existed since the end of the Second World 
War. This point was stressed in the subsequent "Nixon Doctrine". . 
concerning "independent" relations between mature partners, forcing 
a consensus in the Canadian government on the need for redefining 
the Canada-U.S. bilateral relationship.83 The Nixon Doctrine 
ultimately succeeded in forcing the Liberal government to put clear 
policy actions behind its rhetoric on rejecting closer ties‘.with 
the United States. This development in effect nullified the first 
two options in the international Perspectives article. As a result, 
the so-called "Third Option" became the prevailing conceptual 
framework. Consequently, the biggest change in the direction of . 
Canada's post-Second World War 'foreign policy came about less 
because of what the Canadian government said it was going to do 
than because of a U.S. government decision to bring its continuing
164
foreign exchange crisis under control.
The "Third Option" was not confined to the EC. In addition.to 
Europe, Sharp had mentioned diversifying relations to Japan and the 
Soviet. Union. For practical reasons, however, the option took the 
explicit form of an attempt to build closer relations with the 
European Community. The Japanese market at the time was deemed to 
esoteric. The state-trading countries of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union meanwhile were complex and difficult markets in which 
to do business.
Interestingly, in light of the STAFEUR report and the
government's promulgation of foreign policy as an expression of
national interests, the architects of the "Third Option" later
claimed that they never intended it to divert trade away from
United States. Rather, as Sharp pointed out,.
. . .we were, not thinking in terms of 
substituting Europe for the United States as a 
trading partner...We believe we can multiply 
our .exchanges with other countries, 
particularly in Europe, with a view to 
promoting the cultural life and economic 
prosperity of Canadians without loosening in 
the process .our vigorous ties with our 
southern neighbours.84 ‘
Or, in the words of Jeremy Kinsman,, at the time, a middle-ranking
member of External Affairs's Commercial Policy Division,:
Diversification of our external economic 
relations, is not an end in itself, but is a. 
function of reduction of the vulnerability of 
the Canadian economy .:. The EEC 'is an 
obviously important; feature of the external 
• dimension of Canadian industrial development 
... Diversification does not meap a-transfer 
of any of our economic activity from North 
America elsewhere. It can be seen more aptly .
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as the development elsewhere of additional and 
strengthened ties.85
Ever since its inception, the "Third Option" has been hotly debated 
in Canadian academic and governmental circles: Was it ever a full- 
fledged policy? Was it just .an "impulse", a "tactic" or a 
"strategy"? In Sharp's view, this "Option" was a "strategy" only 
approved by the Trudeau Cabinet after "long and detailed 
discussion" - in stark contrast to the "Policy Framework" and the 
"Plan of Action" for Europe that would be adopted speedily by 
Mulroney's Conservative Cabinet in 1990.86
With the creation of FIRA and NEP, with the latter agency 
especially criticized by Western Canadians and foreign (primarily 
American) oil interests, it must be emphasized that the "Third 
Option" became largely a domestic "economic" - rather .than a 
"foreign" - policy exercise to prevent closer integration with the 
United States. As testament to its less than "popular" support and 
its exclusively state-directed nature (i.e., its germination from 
a select group of. mandarins and ministers who at the time had 
Trudeau's approval) , polls in the early 19.70s indicated Canadian 
inclination to favour the status quo rather than closer relations, 
with either the United States or Europe.87 -
Whatever its merits or failures, the "Third Option" did 
epitomize the direction of Canadian•foreign policy for the better 
part of a decade after its introduction. During this period 
bilateral Canada-EC relations were institutionalized: "high-
levels," as annual meetings between senior Canadian and EC
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officials came to be known, were established in 1972; Canada opened 
a diplomatic mission in Brussels • in 1973 and the Commission 
established a delegation in Ottawa in 1976. It was in November 
1972, after the creation of the "high-levels" that the Canadian 
government delivered an aide-memoire to the European Commission 
exploring the possibility of a general agreement on trade and 
economic matters. In 1973, a.Canadian Senate report called for the 
creation of a framework within which bilateral relations could be 
improved.88 The European Commission, increasingly intent on 
exercising its own diplomatic role,89 was receptive to Ottawa's 
overtures on formalizing and intensifying bilateral ties. It also 
saw Canada, particularly during the period of pPEC-induced economic 
crises in the early 1970s, as an alternate source of abundant raw 
materials (in particular uranium) .-
The process of formalizing bilateral relations reached its 
peak with the signing of the Canada-EC Framework Agreement on July 
6, 1976. Known in Canada as the "contractual link", this, agreement 
was implemented to promote increased commercial and economic 
links.90 The parties established a Joint Cooperation Comnmittee, as 
part of the Framework's permanent structure, responsible for 
promoting and reviewing the various aspects of commercial and 
economic cooperation. It is noteworthy that the FA left intact the 
competence of EC Member States to undertake bilateral arrangements 
with Canada.91
As Granatstein notes, however, the process of securing an
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agreement from the Commission was not, for a number of reasons, a 
foregone conclusion. The Commission did not wish to be perceived as 
a political dwarf and thus sought a substantial foreign policy 
role. Dissatisfied with Canada's 1974 aid-memoire which, had 
proposed a draft trade agreement to exchange MEN treatment on 
tariff and related charges, it advocated instead an agreement that 
"would also provide a framework for economic and commmmercial 
cooperation 'extending well beyond the field of classical trade 
policy. ' "92
The negotiations culminating in the FA could also well have 
been torpedoed as a result of public comments on Canada's 
commitment to NATO by Trudeau, whose style.it was to challenge 
conventional wisdom. Trudeau's speculations about the continuing 
utility of NATO and the support by some prominent members of his 
Cabinet (especially Jean Marchand, Jean Pelletier, Donald MacDonald 
and Eric Kierans) for .a Canadian withdrawal from NATO, or, at the 
very least a return of Canadian troops from Europe, prompted 
unfavourable reactions from Canada's'European allies.93 (Eventually 
a 50-per-cent reduction was approved in Canada's troop strength in 
Europe.)
Sharp describes Canada's announcement that it would remain in 
NATO after a 1970 review of its commitment as a "mishandling" that 
would have "unfortunate repercussions for years [emphasis added] on. 
relations between Canada and [its] allies in Europe."94 The West 
Germans, in particular, saw such actions as jeopardizing their 
support for Canada's "privileged" economic link to the Community.
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This West German reaction clearly indicated European willingness at 
that time to draw an unambiguous link between closer trade or 
economic relations and Canada's security commitment to Europe.95
Given the Germans' willingness to link support for the FA to 
Canada's- continued military commitment to- Europe, it is then 
somewhat- ironic that,- according to Granatstein, it was Trudeau's 
"close and confidential relationship" with West German chancellor 
Helmut Schmidt that allowed Canada’ a foot in the door to Europe 
when the EC seemed at its most tendentious concerning Canadian 
overtures.96 In fact, the cool reception to Trudeau's offer to 
establish the contractual link with the EC warmed somewhat when he 
undertook a modernization of the Canadian armed forces, which 
included the purchase of German Leopard. tanks for the Canadian 
troops still committed to NATO.97
Thus, after "endless coordination," the European Commission 
recommended in 1975 that the Council of Ministers authorize the 
beginning of negotiations with Canada for a framework, agreement.98: 
Even then, however, there remained a problem with selected Member 
States. The French, for example/ were distinctly cool to the idea 
of the Community expanding its competence through any such 
agreement with Canada. Deft Canadian diplomacy finally persuaded 
President Giscard d'Estaing of Francie that Canada's motivation for 
an agreement was also "political" and not simply "economic." Only 
then did the French acquiesce’and vote for the Council of Ministers 
to begin negotiations.99
The Council of Ministers nonetheless stalled over a Danish
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complaint against non-discriminatory access to Canada's natural 
resources - particularly in light of Canada's two-price system for 
the oil of. which Denmark was an importer. .Only upon resolution of 
this issue was the agreement speedily finalized. Granatstein notes 
that
The successful conclusion of the agreement was 
a triumph for Canadian diplomacy and for Prime 
Minister Trudeau, whose visits to European 
leaders had tilted the balance from opposition 
to support for the Canadian initiative. To 
persist over four years, to persuade a 
reluctant and dubious European Community to 
expand its jurisdiction, and to essay a new 
direction was a tribute to the skill of the 
officers of the Department of External Affairs 
... Moreover, the EC at the last seemed to be 
aware that ' Canada existed as an entity 
separate from the United States.100
Certainly, it was a "triumph" for Canadian diplomacy that it was 
'selected the first industrial non-Member State to have a privileged 
link with the EC. It was not the first North American state to do 
so, however, as Mexico had signed a Framework Agreement with the EC 
the year before.101
By the mid- to late-1970s, just as Canada was enhancing its 
institutional links with the Community, a combination of factors 
ensured.that the constituency for the EC in Canada among federal 
officials, politicians, and the. business community underwent severe 
attrition. A number of specific trends fed altering Canadian images 
of the EC. For example, the lack of market access provisions in the 
Framework Agreement, leaving no tax breaks, no export incentives, 
and no subsidies to encourage research and development, ensured at 
best an indifferent, and at worst a suspicious, Canadian business
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audience.102
When the increase in trade augured by the Agreement did not 
materialize, due in part to the onset of "Eurosclerosis", this 
served only to confirm, businesses suspicions and to feed 
perceptions at both political and business levels (but not yet at• 
the bureaucratic level) that the Framework was of little practical 
utility. On the political side, dismay arose over European 
inability to invigorate a common foreign policy through EPC'.
i
4.4.2 The "Third Option" As a Trade Policy Failure
An examination of the Canadian economy provides additional reasons 
for the difficulty entailed in redirecting Canadian trade flows to 
Europe. A traditional, characteristic of the Canadian private 
sector is its preoccupation with the domestic market. This Concern 
stems from the earliest days of Canada's industrialization and the 
decision to pursue the strategy of import substitution 
industrialization (ISI) which"Glenn Williams describes in Not for 
Export.103 Williams points out that, "This domestic market approach 
was similarly applied in the case of export trade whereby the 
private sector "sang psalms of praise to the 'home market' while 
downgrading the importance of export sales."104 The prevailing 
attitude appeared to be based on the perception of inferiority vis- 
a-vis other industrial estates. Furthermore, the desire to fully 
occupy the domestic market precluded export sales except in the 
cases of surplus.105
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A second result of the ISI strategy is the development of 
technological dependence. To expand domestic manufacturing, the use 
of foreign technolgy under license and/or the establishment of 
branch plants was encouraged.106 Such technology transfer offered 
Canadian manufacturers the advantage of exploiting innovations in 
relatively short order, without the time, expense and risk incurred 
in developing their own technology. As Williams notes, however, 
little concern was given to the potential disadvantages of this 
technological dependence. ISI effectively created a branch plant 
economy in Canada by encouraging foreign direct investment:(FDI).
Unless governed by a world product mandate, branch plants will 
have constraints imposed on them, by their parents. It. is not 
surprising, therefore, that trade with the United States, the home 
of most parent companies, and hence the dominant investor, is the 
most active.107 Throughout the post-Second World War period, but 
gaining momentum in the 1960s, the two economies had become more 
fully integrated with primarily raw and semi-processed materials 
flowing to 'the United States and with capital goods and 
manufactured products flowing north. An understanding . of these 
continental links is fundamental to an understanding of attempts to 
diversify Canada's trade relations.
Not surprisingly, under these circumstances the Canadian 
business sector developed close links to the ■ United States, 
enhanced by common values, ■ language and traditions. The two 
Countries became natural partners. Each regarded the other partner 
as its best customer while developing the largest bilateral trade
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relationship in the world.. This natural state of affairs was 
seemingly threatened by attempts within the Canadian government to 
alter the relationship.108 Business was from the outset more 
naturally skeptical of links with the EC.109 The Liberal government 
was pursuing a strategy that not only did not' provide any 
meaningful incentives, but went against the grain of an integrated 
North. American economy and business culture. In other words, by the 
time of the "Third Option" a continental outlook to business had 
for at least 20 years taken hold within the1 Canadian corporate 
sector, an outlook resistant to change. It. would appear that 
"Europeanist" bureaucrats at - EAITC were out of step with the 
business community on whose behalf they were attempting to foster 
closer relations with Europe.110
This "continentalist fact" goes- a long way toward explaining 
the reluctance of Canadian business to turn its attention towards 
Europe, a fact admitted in the • Canadian government's 1983 Trade 
Policy Review (to be discussed in Chapter Four). Following from our 
discussion in the previous chapter about the state-centred approach 
to studying Canada's international relations, the fact that the 
"Third Option's" diversification "strategy" overrode'the realities 
of Canada's natural trading patterns is a testament to the power of 
the Canadian state in its relations with other domestic actors - in 
this instance the business community.
In sum, the structural constraints-on diversification of the 
Canadian economy include most especially its integration with the 
U.S. economy. Coupled with recessions .in the industrialized
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economies at the end of the 1970s, such constraints provide 
necessary but insufficient explanations for Canada's waning 
commercial interest in Europe. Structural constraints provided a 
set of challenges and opportunities; the actors were left to make 
the necessary choices. Not. only were incentives to balance the 
costs of expanding economic relations outside of North America 
inadequate, but there was also a lack of sustained political will. 
Neither of Sharp's successors, Allan MacEachen and Don Jamieson, 
shared the same commitment to diversification; Trudeau himself 
eventually lost interest.111
4.4.3 The "Third Option" as a Successful Political Initiative
Business, political,- and bureaucratic elites alike were 
disappointed at the less than stellar Commercial results of the 
"Third Option." This disappointment served to, make the "failure" 
of the "Third Option" synonymous with the failure of the process of 
intensifying Canadian links with Western Europe.112 John Kirton 
takes a revisionist view and rejects the popular conception that 
the success of the "Third Option" is only measured by the 
percentage increase in Canada's exports to the EC.' According to 
Kirton such thinking provides an "unduly narrow and thus 
fundamentally misleading' view of Europe's relevance and 
relationship to Canada in both the Trudeau and Mulroney periods. "113 
In a less pessimistic vein he points out that, although Canada's 
exports to Western Europe may have not have achieved the increases
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anticipated, Canadian exports to the United,States actually dropped 
from 69 per cent in 1972 to 63 per cent in 1980.
Kirton states that Canada's political relations with Western 
Europe during the period of the "Third Option" and into the first 
term of the Mulroney’government were actually enchanced with key 
Member States such as the UK, France and Germany in a number of 
areas such as the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA), 
uranium, cooperation with European Space Agency, and the reordering 
of Francophone institutions.114 In support of his thesis he notes 
Canada's ability to engender a revised international order with 
European partners in groupings from which the U.S. stood apart as 
actively opposed. For example, in the 1970 AWPPA and the uranium 
cartel' of the late 1970s Canada with its. European partners was 
able, respectively, to prevent the. emergence of a group the United 
States wanted .and create one to which the: United States was 
opposed.115 But despite these successes, - by the early 1980s the 
Liberal Government's continuing association with the "Third Option" 
was considered damaging . in terms of public perceptions. Senior 
Canadian officials at EAITC -quietly declared the "Third Option" to 
be "dead" in 1983, although its so-called "failure" was to haunt 
the Ottawa-Brussels axis throughout most of the 1980s.116-.
4.5 CONCLUSION
In summary, Canada's relations with the EC during its first two 
decades assumed a cyclical nature. The first concerted attempt to
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expand relations came as a result of concern over UK accession to 
the EC and over dependence on/ and vulnerability to, the United 
States. The Framework Agreement represented the "foreign" dimension 
of the Government's new foreign policy direction under the "Third 
Option.,|117
Ultimately, however, in the area of trade relations' the 
primary actors' - the business world and the politicians - did not 
maintain any sustained commitment to diversification. The world 
recession, a Canadian economy characterized by a preponderance t>f 
American control, and a slowdown in the process of Community- 
building, dictated a return to a highly conservative approach to 
trade relations in Canada. On the political front, the political 
successes achieved by Canada in Europe were greatly overshadowed by 
the tendency to make the.alleged "failure" of the "Third Option", 
synonymous with the "failure" of Canada's attempt to strengthen its 
relations with Western Europe.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE IMPACT OF CANADA-U.S. FREE TRADE ON CANADA-EC RELATIONS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION
A new era began in 1980. Vast changes occurred on the global 
landscape, as they did on the Canadian domestic scene. Against what 
the U.S. perceived to be a threatening international environment, 
the Reagan administration was elected with the hope of reasserting 
U.S. hegemony. In Canada, after the country's remarkably brief 
flirtation with the Progressive Conservative government led by Joe 
Clark from May .1979 to February 1980, the Trudeau government 
returned to power for the final four years of its almost 
uninterrupted sixteen-year tenure and, after losing the 1984 
election, was replaced by a Conservative government led by Brian 
Mulroney which held power for the rest of the.decade.
This is the context of Canada's relationship with the 
Community and western Europe during the period 1980-1989. After 
1983, this decade was enormously important to the evolution of 
Canada's relationship with the United States, and far less 
important to the evolution of Canada's policy approach to European 
integration. The crisis of confidence of the European idea which 
had begun in the last years of the 1970s was carried over into the 
first half of the 1980s. This was an incentive for Canadian 
decision makers to focus more and more on relations with the. United 
States.
187
5.2 THE CONTEXT
With federal government officials- and politicians still smarting’ 
from the Canadian business .community's indifference to the 
objectives of the "Third Option," with the pressure of a recession 
.in 1981-82, and. with the Republican administration in Washington 
threatening to inflict even worse damage on Canadian interests than 
the Nixon Administration had ten years earlier, first the Liberals 
and then the Progressive Conservatives undertook a fundamental
■ 9
review of Canada's trade policy lasting until 1985.
In the early 1980s, the Canadian business community's unease 
had grown regarding the Trudeau government's determination to use 
trade policy - through the NEP, FIRA, and industrial policy - as a 
vehicle, to change Canada's economic policy orientation. The 
business community was particularly concerned with how programs 
such as the NEP and the rumoured strengthening of FIRA were being 
perceived by.their largest market, the U.S., since these federal' 
initiatives were fundamentally at odds with the Reagan 
administration's commitment to the. free-enterprise system and 
deregulation and had heightened the U.S. decision-makers' awareness 
of foreign practices that might undermine U.S. business interests 
abroad.1 The pressures of recession - hitting Canada harder than 
any other OECD country - combined with a nationalist' lurch in 
Canadian .energy and investment policies — convinced the 
traditionally cautious Canadian business community of the need for 
a change in Canada's commercial relations with the United States.
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Early in 1983, for example, the Canadian Chamber of Commerce had 
adopted a resolution asking the Trudeau government to join with 
industry and the provinces to explore the "benefits and adjustments 
required to facilitate a free-trade agreement with the U.S. to be 
effective by 1987. "2
5.3 THE CANADIAN TRADE POLICY DEBATE
With the growing domestic and international pressure, the Liberal
*
government initiated a trade policy review in 1982.. The review was 
spearheaded by Derek Burney, who had become the director of EAITC' s 
trade relations bureau in 1981 (and would later become EAITC1s 
second-highest official, as associate under-secretary of state for 
external affairs), with a small team.of like-minded' trade policy 
experts. Two prescriptive studies focusing on the roles of trade 
and trade policy in the Canadian economy resulted from the project: 
A Review of Canadian Trade Policy and Canadian Trade Policy for the 
1980s.3
The Review (released in August 1983) affirmed that Canada was 
strongly attached to the multilateral trading system. It was 
newsworthy because it became a-vehicle for a full-scale debate on 
Canada-U.S. trade relations and the merit's of a comprehensive 
Canada-United States trade agreement by calling for bilateral 
negotiations with the United States on a sectoral and functional 
basis. In the end the U.S. did not show much interest in a sector- 
by-sector initiative.
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On relations with Europe, the preview appeared to pay lip- 
service to the importance of Western Europe to Canadian interests, 
stating the needs: to match the close political and security ties; 
to blend longer-term European requirements with Canadian supply 
capability; to- provide an effective counterweight to Canada's 
substantial dependence on economic relations with the U.S.; and to 
facilitate greater investment and technology exchanges both ways.4 
At the same time, however, the review noted the limited, chances for 
significantly improved terms of access to the EC given the lack of 
tariff arrangements favouring Canadian goods - "our terms of access 
are largely determined by GATT arrangements."5
Burney had become skeptical about multilateralism as the 
.complete answer to-Canada's trade policy in the early 1980s because 
although GATT had served Canada well in the past, by this time it 
had become’ stalled. At the same time, not only had Canada-U.S. 
relations soured with the Liberal Government's nationalist economic 
policies of the past decade, but Trudeau's "peace initiative" in 
his last months as prime minister in 1984,. in which, he tried to use 
personal diplomacy to mediate the differences of- the increasingly 
antagonistic superpowers, proved to be at once ineffectual and 
irritating to Washington.6 Burney, based on his consultations and 
analysis of Canada's trade position (see Tables 3 and 4 below), had 
concluded long before it became fashionable in political and 
bureaucratic circles that bilateral free trade with the United 
States was the only path to ensure Canada's prosperity.
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TABLE 3: COMMODITY COMPOSITION (°/Q OF CANADIAN EXPORTS, 1960-1984
1960 1970 1980 1983 1984
Food and Beverage 18.8 11.4 11.1 11.6 9.7
Crude Materials 21.2 18.8 19.8 15.9 15.8
Fabricated Materials 51.9 35.8 39.8 33.3 32.0
Manufactured End-products 7.8 33.8 29.4 38.9 42.1
Special Transactions 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Hart el d ., p. 14 citing Richard R. Lipsey and Murray G. Smith, Taking the Initiative: Canada's Tjade Option in a Turbulent World (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 1985X p. IS.
Ta b le  4: distribution  o f  Canadian  exports by  tra d in g  areas 1960-1984 (°/$
1960 1970 1980 1983 1984
United States 55.8 64.4 63.2 72.9 75.6
United Kingdom 17.4 . 9.0 4.3 2.8 2.2 •
Other Western Europe 11.3 9.8 10.6 5.8 , 5.0
Japan 3.4 4.9 5.9 5.3 5.1
.Other Asia 2.2 2.9 4.0 4.4 3.8
Other 9.9 9.0 12.0 8.8 8.3
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Hart et al., p. IS, citing Richard R. Lipsey and Murray G. Smith, Tcking the Initiative: Cencdar Trade Option in a Turbulent World (Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute, 198S), p. 47.
He and his officials saw clearly the fundamental link between trade 
and domestic economic policy. His consultations with the Canadian 
private sector and academic community had demonstrated the strongly 
held view outside of official Ottawa, especially among academic 
economists, that a successful trade performance required a 
competitive domestic economy and that government trade policy 
should concentrate in the first instance on promoting 
competitiveness.
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The prq- and anti-free trade positions can. perhaps be 
summarized best by looking at the positions of Richard Lipsey, a 
leading Canadian trade policy expert and economist, and David 
Crane, a well-known journalist at the Toronto■Star, a paper that 
was implacable in its opposition to free trade. Canada had come to 
a fork in the road in its post-World War II history: would it stick 
to the old policies or would it break but and start anew?
Lipsey contended that it was time to strike a new’ trading 
relationship with Canada's most important trading* partner.7 The 
argument was simple and straightforward enough. Canada's post-War 
wealth had been built on ready markets and the products of an 
abundant and low-cost resource base. But new competitors in 
developing countries, new technologies, substitute materials and 
the increasingly higher costs, of extraction had created the 
realization that Canada's resource base was no longer an assured 
source of wealth. This -resource-based wealth could also no longer 
finance the maintenance of an inefficient manufacturing economy 
sheltered behind high tariff walls. Lipsey argued that small 
economies dependent on trade with larger economies need free, 
stable, and secure access to at least one large market in order to 
reap the benefits of specialization and long production runs that 
are available to industries in Europe, the United States, and Japan 
because of large domestic markets.
In the' 1960s, some economists had opted for a North Atlantic 
free trade area; in the 1970s a greater number had turned 
increasingly to a North American free-trade area.8 But their views
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ran counter to the lingering legacy of Canada's National Policy of
high tariffs (started in 1879 by Canada's •first prime minister,
John A. MacDonald) that continued to dominate business and official
circles.9 In the 1980s, however, economists were finding the
business community increasingly interested in more secure access to
a large market and prepared to pay for this access by opening the
Canadian market to U.S. . competitors. Federal officials and Liberal
politicians ■ could no longer stand by in the face of further
reduction in Canada's competitiveness, output,. employment and re^l 
?
incomes-. By the mid-1980s, apart from Australia, Canada was the 
only advanced industrial. country in the world that did not have 
secure access to a large market of a hundred million or more 
people. This lack of secure access to a large market threatened a 
deterioration of Canada's competitive trading position, resulting 
in higher costs for consumers and producers alike.10
Oh the other side were the nationalist forces represented by. 
observers such as Crane, whose opposition to bilateral, free trade 
was not economic but political.11 He> like many other nationalists, 
felt that Canada-United States free trade would lead first to 
economic and then eventually, political absorption by the United 
States. On the domestic front, this translated into fears that 
Canada's’ cultural sovereignty was at risk as well as social and 
economic programs that would have to re-aligned, harmonized with 
the United States or even eliminated. On the international front, 
this view was- in harmony with Trudeau's Foreign Policy for 
Canadians and the "Third Option," in that a free trade agreement
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with the United States would erode Canada's capacity to conduct an 
independent foreign policy.12 Most worrisome from the nationalists' 
perspective.was that Canada's other trading partners would regard 
it as even more of an appendage of the United States, thus 
reinforcing the "two-pillar" European view of transatlantic 
relations. For the nationalists the assumption was that 
bilateralism, and multilateralism were mutually exclusive rather 
than complementary as the pro-free traders argued, with the latter 
group pointing out that the GATT encompassed a series of bilateral 
agreements under which barriers to a great deal of cross-border 
trade had already been eliminated in the world's largest bilateral 
relationship.
But despite the strong argument for at least bilateral Canada- 
U.S. free trade made by Burney's team and academic economists, and 
despite growing support in the Canadian business community, in 1983 
free trade was still a non-starter ait the political level. Trudeau, 
whose "intellectual preference, had always been to seek 
'counterweights,'" understood both the importance of the U.S. 
relationship and its potential for restricting independent Canadian 
action.13 He had surrounded himself with advisers who believed in 
government's ability to design industrial policies to spur greater 
competitiveness. But this is .not to suggest that there was 
unanimity in the Liberal' Cabinet on the question of free trade. 
Well-known junior ministers such as Edward Lumley (one of the few 
Liberal ministers with any private sector experience and who was 
minister for international trade) and other ministers such as Mark
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McGuigan and Gerald- Regan (who held the external affairs and 
international trade portfolios respectively) were sympathetic to 
bilateral free trade with the United States. On the other side 
were more senior ministers with Trudeau's ear such as Allan 
MacEachen (twice Trudeau's, secretary of state for External Affairs) 
arid Herb Gray (the "spiritual father of the nationalism that had 
underpinned the. economic policies .of the Trudeau goverriment in 
1980-81), who were not.
No doubt reading the political signals, the senior levels of 
* >
the federal bureaucracy were not prepared to, and indeed, 
philosophically unwilling to, support a bilateral free trade 
initiative. The arguments for free trade were thus rejected by the 
senior members of Burney's own department - where multilateralism 
.was still the prevailing orthodoxy as it was in State, Commerce and 
USTR in the U.S. - making him- a "lone wolf."14 As an example of the 
persistence of the "Third■ Option" in official thinking in his 
department, concurrent with the trade policy review, another group 
at EAITC under the direction of the deputy minister for foreign 
relations was reviewing the Canada-United States relationship more 
generally and, based on limited external consultations (certainly 
not in the mold of the broad consultations engaged in by Burney and 
his officials), came to conclusions very much in the vein of 
Mitchell Sharp's 1972 paper.15
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5.4 Three Options Again
But the heterodoxy of free trade advocacy in official Ottawa 
circles did not prevent Burney and his small coterie of like-minded 
officers at EAITC from biding their time until the political winds 
changed,.which happened once the Progressive Conservative party 
came to power in 1984. Although it had not been explicit (couched 
in sectoral free trade terms), the entire thrust of the 
recommendations, to the Liberal government in the 1983 Review was 
now in the opposite direction, of the "Third Option" described in 
the previous chapter.
Indeed, Michael Hart, a senior trade policy specialist at 
EAITC and who had been a member.of the team working for Burney on 
the 1983 trade policy review, sees the debate surrounding the trade 
policy review and the actual report' as^again offering to the 
government three options, each with its own. philosophical 
underpinnings. The first option revolved around an integrated 
industrial policy that would involve nationalizing some industries, 
raising barriers to some imports and engaging in large-scale 
industrial subsidization in order to strengthen manufacturing. This 
approach, embraced by the left had never met the test of office in 
Canada and was counter to the liberal ideology of comparative 
advantage and free markets, favouring, "the mercantilist philosophy 
of engineered comparative advantage and mechanical calculations of 
national interest."16 The second option was the status quo. Canada 
would continue- to rely largely on the multilateral system but
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would, as opportunities arose, enter into special bilateral 
arrangements (e.g., the sectoral free trade option with the United 
States) This had been the policy of successive post-War Canadian 
governments (e.g., the Canada-U.S. Autopact of 1965). The "new" 
Third Option was to pursue, a free trade agreement with the United 
States within the framework of rules provided by the GATT. Such an 
approach while "not denying or denigrating the cpntinued pursuit of 
multilateral .negotiations and improved trade relations with all 
potential trading partners, would recognize the importance of 
giving the Cartada-United States relationship a higher priority."17
In summary, the ascension of a new government in 1984,
bringing with it a new political orthodoxy, would eventually ensure 
that public policy' . reflected the position that Canada's
international trade interests would now be better served through 
the enhancement of trade relations with the United States (the 
"Second Option" in Mitchel Sharp's 1972 article). The late Hyman 
Solomon, a respected columnist, put it rather succinctly: "the US 
is once more the primary focus of trade policymakers, and 'third'
or other options are well down the list and looking somewhat
tarnished."18 In reaction, the Winnipeg Free Press more pointedly 
concluded:
It has taken more than a decade for the ■ * ■
federal government to concede that the United 
States is and will remain the most important 
single export market on which most, effort 
should be expended. ... the unstated premise 
of the federal government's long-delayed 
discussion paper ... is that the Third Option 
is dead. It.has been dead for most of the past 
ten years but the department of external 
affairs and the prime minister's office
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refused to issue a death certificate until
now.19
5.5 THE CONSERVATIVE AGENDA: BRIAN MULRONEY'S EUROPE POLICY (1984- 
1988)
In 1984/ with the largest majority in Canadian political history, 
Brian Mulroney ended the Liberal Party's domination of Canadian 
politics, as the natural- governing party.. Mulroney's neo­
conservative agenda (although Canada's Progressive Conservative 
party would be considered 'liberal' by most American Republicans), 
concentrated upon integrating the Canadian economy more closely 
with that of the United States, and also advocated a heavier 
reliance upon foreign investment (i.e., the Liberals' FIRA. was 
changed to Investment Canada, an investment promotion agency) and 
the private sector.20 The neW.govenrment was initially ambivalent 
on the merits of free trade... The 1984 election campaign - unlike 
the one in 1988 - was not fought on the issue of free, trade. 
Historically, the Liberal Party had been most supportive of trade 
liberalization and the Conservative Party had pushed for increased 
protectionism. For this reason the new government initially stayed 
the course on a number of Liberal-era foreign.policy initiatives, 
resulting in the government's adoption of a "constructive 
internationalism" that, translated into support for international 
fora such as the Commonwealth and the creation of. La Francophonie.21 
It did not specifically earmark Canada's relations with the EC for 
special attention, however. The Mulroney doctrine and its 
relationship to the CUFTA will be explored here after a preliminary
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examination of two reviews of foreign policy conducted by the 
Progressive Conservative government.
The first major foreign policy review since Trudeau's Foreign 
Policy for Canadians was Joe Clark's Competitiveness and Security: 
Directions for Canada's International Relations (CSrDCIR), 
published in 1985. The Green Paper, as the CS:DCIR was known, 
identified six basic objectives - unity, sovereignty and 
independence, peace and security, justice and democracy, economic 
prosperity, and the integrity of Canada's natural resources. These 
basics bore a close similarity to the six policy themes that had 
been outlined fifteen years earlier in Foreign Policy for 
Canadians. (Significantly, six years later the Conservatives' last 
foreign policy review, the Foreign Policy Update, would drop the 
theme of "independence" from the principles underlying. Canada's 
foreign policy.)
But while both the FPC and the CSrDCIR may have been based on 
the same foreign policy principles, they were vastly different 
documents. From the Trudeau.government' s perspective, the world was 
progressing towards multipolarity as the U.S. began to be seriously 
challenged by Europe and Japan. In contrast, Clark's document 
attested to the political, economic and-military.strength of the 
U.S. , beyond which it provided a portrait of a bipolar climate - an 
intense contest between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. This contest 
between’ the superpowers seemed • real enough, especially . in the 
context of the second Cold War, which characterized this period. 
The CSrDCIR's emphasis was not on Europe as an economic threat but
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as the world's most important strategic site in this regard.
The importance attached to the competitiveness of the Canadian 
economy is what set Clark’s report apart from previous analyses of- 
Canada's international relations. A recurring theme was the 
changing nature of the global political economy, with an emphasis 
upon international trade, investment, and capital flows.22 In a 
clear reference to the United States, it was observed that "for 
Canada, protectionism poses- great dangers"23 - a view that was 
instrumental in the eventual success of the pro-free-trade 
movement. The CSrDCIR argued that the "United'States will remain 
the world's dominant economic power" as well as the world's 
foremost power generally.24 The Trudeau government had viewed the 
United States's international influence as declining relative to 
other states (even-though by 1985 it had slid into the position of 
the world's largest debtor nation) and this conditioned its foreign 
policy orientation away from North America. Conversely, the 
Mulroney government saw no sign of wavering American power and this 
was an important determinant of its foreign policy..25
In terms of specifics about Canada's relations with Europe, 
although the CS-.DCIR noted that Canada was an Atlantic nation, at 
the same time that it was "...North American and not American. . 
a Pacific nation ... a nation of the Americas ... [and] an Arctic 
nation," precious little- was said about Canadian interests in 
Europe.26 In a one-page discussion it acknowledged the European 
Community as a- "key player" in the international economic system 
since - with four of the world's ten largest economies - EC. was a
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major source of world investment and technology. The Canadian 
dimensions included a reiteration of Canada's major post-War 
interests in'Europe, including the fact that "fundamental Canadian 
political and security were engaged there"; that "thousands of 
Canadians have fought two world wars in Europe"; that Britain was 
Canada's second largest market for manufactured goods; and that 
Canada worked with West European states to strengthen the 
mechanisms of international security and to expand East/West 
contacts. As a reflection of where Europe stood within the 
Progressive Conservatives' reassessment of foreign policy, the 
CS:.DCIR reasserted that Canada's market access to Europe was being 
impeded by’ tariff and non-tariff barriers; that the European 
Community's Common Agricultural Policy had severely reduced imports 
of agricultural products and had turned the Community into a.major 
international competitor for agricultural export; and, 
significantly, that Canada's market share in Europe had declined in 
the last 25 years because of structural economic change, the 
recession, exchange rates and Canada's reduced competitiveness.27
Elsewhere in the CS:DCIR, the USSR was branded as the most 
ominous security threat to Canada, and Europe remained the "most 
critical military region in the world"28 - a position that seemed 
more appropriate to 1945 than to 1985. These.statements and others 
led observers to criticize the review for clinging to'an outdated 
"realist" assessment of global affairs, and for failing to come to 
grips with the shifting international distribution of power.29 . 
The- review was further criticized for its failure to "attach
201 .
sufficient importance to the pursuit by Canada of. responsible, 
active and-idealistic external policies’... "30 and its .replacement 
of characteristics associated with a middle power idealism by a 
more self-interested and egotistical appreciation of Canada's 
economic place in the world. > '
The CSrDCIR prompted analysts of Canadian foreign policy to 
question whether Canada was, or could be, the "Principal Power" of 
the Trudeau years, since that status was accorded to a state that 
was not so heavily influenced by Washington. That is, instead of 
Dewitt and Kirton's description of a power with a distinctive 
agenda, and which was among the top tier of states in a multipolar 
world, Clark's document portrayed Canada as a loyal ally of the 
U,S. in a bipolar world.
With the issues raised-in the CSrDCIR as its starting point, 
a special joint committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons 
on Canada's international relations was formed in 1985, and it 
released a major report, Interdependence and Internationalism (I&I) 
in 1986. Another stark indicator of how low Western Europe and the 
EC in particular had slipped on the Canadian foreign policy agenda 
was that in the I&I (undertaken by the Policy Planning Staff at 
EAITC), the amount of discussion devoted to Canada-West European 
relations was grossly disproportionate to the actual resources 
devoted by Canada to its relations with Western. Europe in the 
political, economic and cultural domains, and to Western Europe's 
position (taken as a. region) as Canada's second largest trade and 
investment partner. In contrast, large portions of the report were.
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devoted to Canada's relations with Asia Pacific.'31 The European 
Community itself was’ only mentioned twice in the entire review.
Let us now turn to a deeper consideration of the forces behind 
Canada's economic integration with the United States, which was a 
crucial development in the process of hemispheric integration that 
would occur in the 1990s and contribute to the weakening of 
transatlantic ties.
It is on the economic front that the new Mulroney Government 
veered abruptly away from nearly two decades of economic 
nationalism as espoused by' the Trudeau Liberals, becoming 
increasingly convinced (the Tories had traditionally supported 
protectionist measures) that Canada's future prosperity lay in a 
greater economic integration with the United States.32 The focus of 
much of the national debate in 1983-1985 (couched largely in terms 
of the.First and Third Options of the trade policy review - an 
industrial strategy versus free trade with the United States) was 
the ongoing research and consultations of the. Royal Commission on 
the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada. This 
research project was known popularly as the Macdonald Commission 
after its chair, Donald Macdonald, who was a former Trudeau Cabinet 
minister and later, as high commissioner to the U.K., a rabid 
proponent of the "Fortress Europe" school of thought on the impact 
of European economic integration.33 With a pro-business government 
in power, Macdonald's recommendation was that-although Canada as a 
country had been created in defiance of north-south economic 
pressures, for the sake of national prosperity Canadians now had to
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be prepared-to take "a leap of faith" by pursuing a more open trade 
relationship with the United States.34 Canada began to- negotiate a 
bilateral free trade agreement with the United States in 1986.
5.5.1 Reviews of Canadafs Europe Policy
The Liberals themselves had abandoned the idea of greater trade 
diversification. Not the change from a Liberal to a Conservative 
government in Ottawa but rather an increasingly protectionist mood 
in the U.S. Congress and its potential to reduce Canada's access to 
its largest market/ explain why - despite a resolve at the.senior 
bureaucratic levels in 1983 to "move beyond" the "Third Option" to 
improve Canada's transatlantic economic links - it would actually 
take another four years for there to be sufficient political 
interest in the Prime Minister's Office for EAITC to produce a 
comprehensive review of Canada's relations with Europe.35
The Government's 1987 review of Canada's relations with Europe 
recommended a more integrated and proactive policy approach, and 
was useful, in detailing the comprehensive nature of Canada's 
transatlantic relations, making many general recommendations (e.g., 
more ministerial trips and missions, more private sector input 
etc.). Nevertheless, it was noticeably short oh programs, and 
specific means of enhancing transatlantic relations.36 It could be 
criticized, in the same way that the "Third Option" had been, for 
not having a clear "strategy" and plan of action. In addition, any 
discussion of Canada-EC relations specifically was overshadowed by
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the emphasis on Canada's security stake in Europe, a factor that 
may be related to the .release during the same year of the 
Government's controversial Defence White .Paper, which ironically 
was couched in Cold War language just as East-West tensions were 
subsiding.37
Between 1985 and 1987, concurrent with the start of the 
Canadian-initiated free trade negotiations with Washington, the EC 
took the first steps towards renewal through its White Paper in 
1985 and then the '.Single European Act in 1987, with ’the latter 
focusing on the achievement of free trade within a single European 
market. Unlike a decade earlier, the priorities of Canadian and 
Community decision-makers were now clearly diverging.
And, in terms of Brussels relations with Washington, any 
goodwill that the Carter administration had offered the EC was soon 
replaced by the old economic antagonisms and heightened foreign 
policy differences as the Reagan administration took office. During 
the early 1980s the U.S. and the EC were on the brink of trade wars 
(with the biggest problem areas being steel and agriculture). The 
accession of Spain and- Portugal to the EC in 1986, at significant 
cost to U.S. farm exports, exacerbated bilateral tensions and began 
the politicization of trade relations that were reflected in trade 
disputes played out in the Uruguay Round of the GATT. Differing, 
often opposing, positions on East-West relations (e.g., U.S.-
opposition to European sales of high-technology to the Soviet Union 
and its allies) and North-South relations (e.g., U.S. opposition to 
EC support - in its traditional foreign policy backyard - for the
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Contadora peace process) affected the way the EC and the U.S. chose 
to trade with one-another and with others.38 The politicization of 
EC-U.S. relations, were .problematic from an institutional viewpoint 
since, unlike . the . EC' s relations with Canada and Mexico, there 
existed no bilateral organizational mechanisms to coordinate EC- 
U.S. policies: NATO's purview was and continues to be security and 
despite the provisions for economic cooperation enshrined in- 
Article 2 of the Charter - in practical terms excluded economic 
affairs; on the other hand, the EC's mandate - with the exception 
of the then still largely dormant Western European Union (WEU) 
excluded military affairs. EC-U. S. disputes in the 1980s thus often 
fell between the two. By the end of the 1980s the. growing fissures 
in the EC-U.S. alliance. - especially as the common threat from the 
East bloc dissipated - highlighted the fundamental change in the 
relationship since the early 1970s and Kissinger's Year of Europe.
. The institutional framework and policy-making framework of 
transatlantic relations were, by 1989, . in danger of becoming 
anachronistic and, as we shall see,. attempts were made in the early 
1990s to reform them. In light of the uncertain state of EC-U.S. 
relations, it could be expected that, as was the case in EC- 
Canadian relations in the early 1970s, the Commission would use its 
bilateral relations with Ottawa as an indirect lever in its 
relations with Washington; Ottawa, according to. this view, would be 
only too eager to assert its position as the EC's "other" North 
American partner. At the risk of generalization, any sustained 
disharmony in'EC-U.S. relations presents Canada- with a propitious
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opportunity to break out of the confines of the Europeans' . "two 
pillar" image of transatlantic relations. However, there is no 
compelling evidence .to show that in the latter half of the 1980s 
Ottawa actually chose to step into the breach in U.S.-EC relations. 
Indeed, as the following chapter will show, the Commission and the 
new Bush Administration succeeded in patching up their differences, 
at least temporarily, in the year before the Treaty of Paris in 
November 1990 which ended the Cold War.39 Canada, rather than being 
at the forefront of the re-thinking of the Atlantic institutional 
architecture (as it had been after the Second World War), remained 
largely an onlooker until well into 1990. •
It appears that the lack of energy devoted to relations with 
.the EC during the 19.80s should be attributed not only to the "Third 
Option", experience, but even more significantly to the Conservative 
government's preoccupation over free trade•negotiations with the 
U.S. and growing interest in the Pacific Rim. Consequently, 
Canada's economic relations with Western Europe suffered from a 
case of benign neglect," albeit on the part of both partners. But 
such "neglect" is still somewhat surprising given the concern 
esppused by most. post-War Canadian governments (the exception being 
that of the two minority .Liberal governments under Lester -B. 
Pearson from 1963 to 1967) regarding the need to maintain Canada's 
independence from the United States and given also their subsequent 
search for "counterweights" to. this end. These notably took the 
form of closer relations with the U.K. and France and the creation 
of a transatlantic partnership ' both in political and economic
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terms.40
It can be said that the 1980s were characterized by the clear 
bifurcation between the economic/trade and political/security, 
tracks in Canada's policy framework for its relations with Europe. 
It seems somewhat ironic that running, parallel with the apparent 
indifference to the strengthening of transatlantic economic 
mechanisms,, was the belief that Canada's security interests were 
more than ever anchored in Europe and thus by extension in the 
transatlantic security institutions of NATO and the CSCE. Or, in 
the . words of a Canadian journalist, the government's European 
policy "... disclosed a curious tension between the reaffirmation 
of Canada's commitment to NATO and the military contribution to 
defence on the one hand, and, with the exception of current trade 
irritants, the relative indifference to developments in the EC on 
the other."41
But the EC had not become totally irrelevant to Canadian 
interests. The EC as an institution and as a 'pillar' in Canada's 
European policy framework was, despite its inferiority in the eyes 
of Canadian decision-makers relative to the 'pillars' of NATO and 
the CSCE, nevertheless still recognized as an important pillar in 
the 'free world'- to counter a- resurgent Soviet threat, during the 
increasing-chi'll. in East-West relations in the early to mid-1980s. 
Augmenting Canada's roles in the NATO and CSCE multilateral 
institutions may not have led directly to a reaffirmation of 
Canada-EC .ties, but nevertheless ensured, as described in the 1987 
Defence White Paper, that Canadian security policy in Europe was in
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many ways more important to Canadian.interests than it had been a 
■decade earlier during a period.of detente in superpower relations. 
Indeed, what we see reflected in the Canadian policy discussions of 
this period is a .regression of Canadian perceptions, of the EC, 
mirroring Canadian and American views of the Community's importance 
within the transatlantic contextat its founding in 1957,42
5.6 CONCLUSION*
i
This chapter has covered the evolution of Canada's policy approach 
towards Europe fr-om the early to late 1980s. The official orthodoxy 
in the 1970s was that Canada had to diversify its international 
relations away from growing dependency on the United States; the 
Community was- the most convenient partner in realizing this 
essentially 'political objective. This played to largely muted 
opposition from the Canadian business community until the late 
1970s and early 1980s when a combination of a recession and unease 
with nationalist economic policies caused a growing realization 
among the private sector,, increased numbers of senior federal 
o/fficials, and some Liberal Cabinet ministers that the U.S. market 
was basic to Canada's economic well-being, and that success in that 
market would require,a stable Canada-U.S. relationship. The full 
realization of this direction came about under the first term 
(1984-1988) of the Mulroney-led Conservative government. In fact, 
the Conservative government's approach can be considered different 
from that of the Trudeau era in five•significant ways. First, in
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addition to traditional ties with. Britain and France there was a 
recognition of the increasing role that the then-West Germany would 
play in the future of Europe. Second, there was a switch from 
reliance on bilateral relationships with European powers to 
multilateral groupings that included the United States (e.g., NATO, 
CSCE), the idea being that this would contain the United States' 
thrust towards unilateralism and isolationism.43 Third, the end of 
detente in the early 1980s meant that security concerns (i.e., 
strong support for NATO in particular) rather than- economic ones 
constituted the heart of Canada's relations with Europe, since it 
was believed that Canada's economic objectives could be secured in 
its relations with the United States. Fourth, there was a return to 
''quiet diplomacy" of an earlier era, in the belief that by not 
criticizing the United States in public Canada would be consulted 
more often and have its. views accorded more weight in Washington's 
deliberations.44 And finally, the relationship with the EC as an 
institution aiid as a "pillar" of Canada's foreign policy approach 
towards Western Europe was one of benign neglect. As we shall see 
in the next chapter, this changed by the end of the decade with 
momentum' towards the creation of a Single Market in the Western 
half of Europe and the 'the dramatic geo-political changes in the 
Eastern half.
210
NOTES
1. Michael Hart with Bill Dymond and Colin Robertson, Reconcilable . 
Differences: The Rise and. Triumph of Free Trade, unpublished
manuscript, pp. 14-15. All the authors had worked on the Review of 
Canadian Trade Policy in 1983
2. Cited by Hart, Reconcilable Differences..., p. 14.
3. Department of'External Affairs, A Review of Canadian Trade 
Policy and Canadian Trade Policy for the 1980s: A Discussion Paper 
(Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1983).
4. Ibid^, p. 216.
5. Ibid.
6.. In 1983, Trudeau in the twilight of his 16 year tenure as 
Canadian prime minister attempted - unsuccessfully - to mediate the 
growing tensions between the Reagan Administration and the Soviet 
Union. Widely viewed at home and by the U.S.-' as self- 
aggrandizement, the peace initiative had no effect in moderating 
the superpower rivalries.
7. Richard G. .Lipsey and Murray G. Smith, Taking the Initiative, 
Canada Trade Options in a Turbulent World (To'ronto: C.D. Howe
Institute, 1985).
8.In Canada, for example, arguments favouring direct negotiations 
with the United States to dismantle remaining barriers had been set 
out in considerable detail by the•Senate Standing Committee on 
Foreign Affairs in three separate reports issued in 1975, 1978, and 
1982. See particularly volume three, Canada's Trade Relations with 
the United States (Ottawa: 1982). The Senate Report was also
consistent with the work of the Economic Council of Canada, which 
in 1975 had released a report ranking its support for Canada-U.S. 
free trade as the fifth among a number of possible strategies. 
Ahead of it were multilateral free trade; free trade among the 
United States, the EC, Japan, and Canada; free trade among the 
U.S., the EC,, and Canada; and free trade among the U. S., Japan, and 
Canada. Its assessment was that a Canada-United States free trade 
agreement was probably the most attainable of all the' options. See 
Economic Council of Canada, Looking Outward (Ottawa: Queen's
Printer, 1975) . The Economic Council's work'had in turn built upon 
the work of economists such as John Young, Canadian Commercial 
Policy (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957); Ronald and Paul Wonnacott, 
Free Trade Between the United States and Canada: the Potential
Economic Effects (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1967); Ronald Shearer.et. al., Trade Liberalization and a Regional 
Economy: Studies on the Impact of Free Trade on British Columbia 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press for the Private Planning 
Association, 1971); James R. Williams, The Canadian-United States
211
Tariff and Canadian Industry: A Multisectoral Analysis (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1978); and Richard G. Harris and David 
Cox, Trade, Industrial. Policy and Canadian Manufacturing (Toronto: 
Ontario Economic Council, 1983)'.
9. Canada's request to negotiate a. free trade agreement with the
United States rekindled a debate older that Canada itself. From
1854 to 1866, Canada enjoyed, the Reciprocity Treaty with the 
Americans. This treaty was abrogated in 1866 and Canadian Liberal, 
and Conservative governments in 1869, 1871 and 1874 tried
unsuccessfully to reawaken American interest in renewing this free 
trade. The U.S's rejection, according to Simpson, led in part to 
Sir John A. Macdonald's National Policy of 1879 which created a 
protected Canadian economy. In 1911, the Liberals under Sir Wilfrid 
Laurier, after negotiating the Reciprocity Agreement, lost the 
election. Their defeat would haunt Canadian governments for more 
than seven decades. See Jeffrey Simpson, Faultlines: Struggling for 
a Canadian Vision (Toronto: Harper Collins.Publishers Ltd., 1993), 
pp. 16-17.
10. Hart et al., p. 23.
11. His views are gathered, in a series of feature articles that
he wrote for the Star. "Free-trade: salvation or sell-out?" Toronto 
Star, June 8-12, 1985; and "Canada's threatened identity," Toronto 
Star, August 2-5, 1986.
12. Hart et al., p. 6.
13. Simpson, p. 20.
14. Simpson, p. 15.
15. Alan Gotlieb and Jeremy Kinsman, "Reviving the Third Option," 
International Perspectives, January/February 1981. At the time, 
Gotlieb was the undersecretary of state for External Affairs and 
Kinsman was the head of the policy planning unit at DFAIT.
16. Hart et al., p. 22.
17. Ibid., p. 23.
1 8 . Hyman Solomon, The Financial Post, October 22, 1983, p. 7.
19. The Winnipeg Free Press, September 10, 1983.
20. See D. Pollock and G. Manuge, "The Mulroney Doctrine," 
International Perspectives, January/February 1985, p. 5.
21. Cited by Kirton. p. 12 in the Throne Speech by the new 
Conservative government on Nov. 5, 1984. The speech stressed that 
"Canada's opportunity, to influence the course of world events lies
212
primarily in sound multilateral institutions..." and therefore 
promised to play its . full part again in the defense system of 
NATO..." and to take part in a "renewed multilateral effort to 
remove ... obstructions in the international marketplace." With 
regard to the United States the Government pledged only "to restore
a.spirit of goodwill and true partnership.;"
22. Canada, Secretary of State Joe Clark, Competitiveness and 
Security: Directions for Canada’s International Relations (Ottawa: 
Supply and Services 1985), p. 1.
23. Ibid., p. 7.
24. Ibid., 6a, p: 29.
25. James Rochlin, Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of 
Canadian. Foreign Policy Towards. Latin America (Vancouver; 
University of British Columbia'Press, 1994), p. 147,
26. Competitiveness and Security: Directions for Canada's 
International Relations (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services 
Canada, 1985), p. 1.
27. CS:DCIR, p. 36.
28. CS:DCIR, p. 38.
29. See;, for example, A. Dorscht, T. Keating> G. Legare and J. 
Rioux, "Canada's International Role and Realism," in International 
Perspectives, September/October 1986, pp. 6-8.
.30. Independence and Internationalism, Report of the Special Joint 
Committee on Canada's International Relations (June 1986), p. 12.
31. This is illustrated in Independence and Internationalism and 
the response of the Government in its December 1986 report. While 
an entire chapter was devoted to the U.S. and a substantial sub­
section to the Pacific Rim, trade with Europe was given only 
passing mention.
32. The 1983 Foreign Trade Review paid lip service to Canada's 
relations with Europe, but in reality was establishing the 
rationale for closer economic links with the United States.
33. Royal’ Commission on. the Economic Union and Development 
Prospects for Canada, Final Report (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 
1985) .
34. Macdonald quoted in the Globe and Mail, November 19., 1984.
213
35. During the review of the Third Option in 1983 by senior EAITC 
officials, it was concluded that even if the Third Option's 
conceptuaiizaton a decade earlier had been sound, by the early 
1980s it was so discredited in the public's mind that .any. 
continuation of government policy under this rubric would be 
counter-productive.
36. Gordon Pitts in his book on Europe noted the lamentable record 
of Canadian official visits to Europe between 1986-1990.
37. Department of National Defence, Challenge and Commitment 
(Ottawa:. Supply and Services Canada, 1987, (Cat. No. D2-73/1987E) .
38. Roy H. Ginsberg, "US-EC Relations," in-Juliet Lodge (ed.) The 
European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London: Pinter 
Publishers, 1989), p. 273.
39. Michael Smith and Stephen Woolcock (1992) The European 
Community in a Transformed World (draft, manuscript).
40. Canada was rebuffed by its European allies in the 1950s in its 
attempts to strengthen its brainchild, namely, Article Two of the 
Charter, to give the Atlantic Alliance more of an economic thrust 
rather than purely a security one. For a discussion of this, see. 
John English, The Worldly Years: The. Life of Lester Pearson, Volume 
II:. 1949-1972 (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 1992), pp. Ill, 
116-118. .
41. Paul Buteux, The Financial Post, May 2, 1988, p. 18.
42. Smith, (1991).
43. John Kirton, "The Continuing Success of the Third Option: 
Canada's Relations with Europe and the United States in the 
Mulroney Period," p. 2.
44. Kir ton, p. 11.,
214
CHAPTER SIX
[T]he inclination to support the Americans, right or wrong, must contend constantly with Canada's independent assessment o f  the forces in the 
world and with its obligation to act in world diplomacy as an independent pow er.1
RENEWING THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP: 1989-1991
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Following a period of mutual benign neglect in the 1980s/ the 
period 1989-90 was a watershed in Canada's relations with the 
European Union. It marked a shift in Canada's policy responses away 
from what had largely been declarations of intent throughout most 
of the 1980s, to statements more binding and substantive, as 
illustrated on the economic side by the "Europe 1992" component of 
the'Government's "Going Global" trade development initiative, and 
on - the political side by the formalization of high-level trans­
atlantic political links through the TAD (to be discussed in 
greater detail in the next chapter).
This fertile environment for the growth of new dimensions to 
bilateral relations was a result of the confluence of five defining 
events - the collapse of Soviet domination in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the creation -of the SEM, the reconstitution of the 
Community through treaties on monetary and political union 
initialled at the Maastricht summit as well as the .parallel 
negotiations on a European Economic Area, the difficulties . in 
completing the Uruguay Round, the crisis and war in the Persian 
Gulf and incipient' collapse of Yugoslavia - each of which was 
replete with implications for Canada-EC relations. In addition, the 
process of restructuring post-Cold War transatlantic relations was
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accelerated by the dramatic haste of German unification.
This watershed in Canada's relations with the EC/ however, was 
not just a reaction to events in Europe, but also a reaction to the 
evolution of Canada's relations with the United States and the 
latter's own renewed interest in the EC. As the discussion in the 
last chapter showed, the signing of the CUFTA in 1988 was the 
culmination of five years of intensive and divisive national debate 
and analysis on the future direction of Canada's trade policy and 
the nature of its relations with the United States. Upon 
implementation of the CUFTA in 1989, with Canada's trade 
orientation set firmly on further economic integration with its 
southern neighbour, the resources and energies of the Canadian 
Parliament and the federal bureaucracy were set free from the major 
national policy challenge of the 1980s.
By historical coincidence,, the completion of the CUFTA 
negotiations happened just before the first stirrings of change in 
Central and Eastern Europe. This chapter will show that as world 
attention turned to the ..economic and geo-political developments 
reshaping Europe, Ottawa was not only increasingly interested in 
ensuring. that its own European policy framework was consistent with 
the new realities, but also that Washington's own new-found 
interest ■ in closer relations with the EC did not marginalize 
Canadian interests in Europe.
As is the case throughout the history of Canadian'responses to 
the evolution of West European integration (as. opposed to relations, 
with Europe in general), reactions during 1989-1990 did not consist
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of mass movements, advocacy groups, or Parliament. Recalling the 
discussion in Chapters Two and Three on the theory and process of 
Canadian foreign policy, this is entirely consistent with a state- 
directed foreign-policy process. These actors - in particular 
citizens' groups representing Canadians of Central and Eastern 
European extraction and the politically powerful lobbies 
representing one million Canadians of Ukrainian descent - played 
larger roles on East-West issues, but they had relatively minor 
roles if any regarding Canada-EC relations.
As mentioned, the choices available to Canada, were contingent 
largely on matters of timing and on the political leadership and 
personally active roles displayed by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney 
and his External Affairs minister Joe Clark, who both called for 
closer relations with the EC to solidify transatlantic ties as well 
as to fashion most efficiently multilateral responses to the 
changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. These choices ought 
to be seen in the context of the Conservative Cabinet realizing 
that its existing European framework was anachronistic, and of the 
bureaucratic politics and coalition-building at EAITC - the lead 
federal government department responsible for formulating Canada's 
Europe policy. Chronology seems indispensable in elucidating the 
complicated twists and turns of Canadian, American and European 
perceptions of transatlantic relations during this volatile period.
The tangled economic, political, military and social events in 
Europe in 1989 forced a cautious re-evaluation of the Canadian 
government' s overall approach to Europe. As a result of the
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revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe, and under pressure from 
the prime minister to provide his government with a menu of 
credible and innovative policy options, EAITC produced a second, 
more corrprehensive review of Canada ' s European policy in late 1989 . 
For the first time since the 1970s sustained political attention 
was being brought to bear on the totality of Canada's relations 
with Europe, including a specific focus on the EC.
Picking up where the 1987 report left off, this review 
.(undertaken by EAITC's Policy Planning Staff), attached great 
importance to establishing a "policy framework" and, most 
importantly, a "program of action" for Canada-Europe relations in 
the 1990s. The "program of action" had an impact both in 
institutional and policy terms. For Canada's approach to Western 
Europe this translated into the "Europe 1992" component of the 
Government's wider, five-year $93.6 million "Going Global" package 
to develop long-term trade links (see Chapter 9.4) . This initiative 
was centred on the United States and was intended to spur - through 
government-supported,trade development programs such as seminars, 
trade fairs and outward investment support - stronger economic and 
trade links with Europe, Japan and the industrialized countries in 
Asia Pacific.2 The West European component was designed to prepare 
Canadian caxpanies, through a variety of programs, for the SEM. It 
will be analyzed at greater length in Chapter Nine.
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The review's main thesis was that Canada had a compelling 
interest in Europe and in European developments which it had to 
pursue. If not, Canadian vulnerability on the political, economic, 
security and "people" fronts would increase. The Department of 
External Affairs recommended that Canada promote stability by: (1) 
influencing multilateral institutional frameworks to govern 
economic and political-security realtions within Europe and between 
Europe and North America; (2) avoiding the marginalization of- 
Canada; and (3). by securing "a seat at the table" in and with, a 
"new Europe" based on the EC, a "refreshed" NATO and a 
"reconfigured" CSCE. The views of senior EAITC. officials can be 
summed up as concern about the risk of an inward-looking Europe and 
Canada's marginalization by a series of bilateral relationships 
such as Europe-U.S.S.R., U.S.-U.S.S.R., or U.S.-Europe. They 
recommended to their minister, Joe. Clark, that for both domestic 
reasons (given the large number of Canadians of European 
extraction) and international reasons (Canada as a "responsible" 
member of the world community) , Canada participate in the evolution 
of a ' new' European architecture.. The review summed up Canada' s 
interest in Europe in one word - "stability," since it was felt 
that instability in Europe would lead to Canadian "vulnerability" .3
Given the complexity and fluidity of events, it is not 
surprising that no clear consensus arose across the Canadian 
government on Canada's appropriate policy response, although EAITC 
consultations, with other federal government departments evoked 
general agreement with its view that Canada had to participate
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actively in the transformation of Europe. Some . senior federal 
officials who resisted an "active" approach (notably from the 
Department of National Defence and . the ' Canadian Security 
Intelligence Service) expressed the view that Canada should stand 
back from such participation because Canada could do nothing to 
prevent, for example,, the "rampant European tribalism" that .would 
inevitably break out as a result of the dissolution of the U.S.- 
USSR condominium that had provided stability for forty years. Other 
federal deputy ministers suggested that the proposed plan for a 
modest amount of Canadian assistance to rebuild Eastern Europe was 
too small - Canada would either have to spend billions or none at 
all, with the latter option effectively signalling its retreat from 
Europe. Still other senior federal officials, most notably from the 
Privy Council Office and the then-Department of Industry, Science 
and Technology were more supportive of the EAITC plan, noting that 
the dilemmas raised about Canada's continuing active presence in 
Europe . invariably raised the fundamental question about. Canada's 
place in the world: if Canada did not participate in Europe where 
its interests were clear, then where would it participate?4 This 
comment was reminiscent of the criticism that' Trudeau had faced 
twenty years earlier when he mused about Canada withdrawing from 
NATO and thereby retreating from Europe-. In short, by the end of 
1989, the rapid geo-political changes in Europe, the continuing 
problems in the Uruguay Round of the Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations . (MTN) and completion of the CUFTA, ensured that 
developments in Europe gained priority on Canada's foreign policy
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agenda. What created further impetus for Canada to re-evaluate its 
European policy framework was the pace of U.S.-EC relations in this 
period.
6.2 THE UNITED STATES CREATES NEW LINKS WITH THE EC
Speeches by an American president and an American secretary of 
state in 1989 appear rather ironically, 'in hindsight, to have been 
at least partially responsible for the beginning of a fundamental 
change in Canada's policy approach to Europe. In' the spring of 
1989, officials of the U.S. State Department initiated a review of 
U.S. bilateral relations worldwide. The European and Canadian 
Affairs Bureau of the State Department used this occasion to advise 
senior members of the Bush administration that, with the Community 
evolving and assuming a more prominent foreign policy role, greater 
attention should be focused on gaining access to the decision­
making process of the European-political cooperation.5. Throughout 
its relationship with the. Community, the U.S., like Canada, had 
been uneasy and somewhat confusecl by the complexities of dealing 
with Brussels, most notably with respect to the separation between 
Commission competence and EPC (and the distinct consultative 
mechanisms involved in each).6
European political cooperation has, since the late 1960s, been 
an attempt by the Member States of the Community to consult on and 
co-ordinate their foreign policy positions, with a view to 
ultimately having a common European foreign policy; As alluded to
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earlier, in the course of the 1970s and the first half of the 
1980s, however, it became increasingly difficult for the EC to 
maintain the artificial distinction between its "external 
relations" and "political cooperation" as it tried to 
compartmentalize neatly those aspects of the EC's international 
relations that fell under the Commission's ■external• relations' 
(economic and trade) competence’ and those that' affected Member 
States' security and defence postures.7 To rectify the increasing 
anxiety over the relationship between. EPC and the EC’ (both 
organizationally and in terms of mandates) Article 30 of the Single 
European Act of 1986 (itself a series of amendments to the treaties 
establishing ' the . European Communities.) codified EPC ■ in an 
international treaty and thus provided a treaty-basis for a process 
in which the European Communities and EPC would together attempt to 
make "concrete progress towards European unity" (SEA,; Art. 1(3).8
..Historically, without any direct access to the EPC process, 
the . U.S.. had been presented with immutable Community positions 
after the fact.9 U.S. officials, as Canadian'officials had done in 
1988 ■, now sought a formal link to EPC in order to have some form of 
input before the Community's final decisions were made. Some 
progress, had already been made in this area. The; Americans had, 
for example, pushed for and received agreement from the Europeans 
to brief the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Europe at the State 
Department at the beginning of every six-month . period after the 
Troika (the political directors of the current, former and future 
EC Member State Presidency) "group meeting of the EPC.10. By late
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1.989, with the rapid pace of developments in Eastern Europe and the 
momentum of 'Europe 1992,' Europe was also firmly on the American 
foreign policy agenda,11
6.2.1 Baker Sets Blueprint for Formalization of U.S.-EC Relations
A landmark speech in Boston on May 21, 1989, in which George Bush 
called for a "European partnership in world leadership," was 
arguably' the actual genesis for the- separate - but parallel - 
Canadian and U.S. transatlantic declarations that would be signed 
a year later with the Community.12 Secretary.of State Baker went a 
step further in a speech at the Berlin Press Club on December 12, 
1989, noting that as the EC moved toward its goal of a common, 
internal market, embarked on institutional reform and assumed 
increasing responsibility in certain foreign policy areas, the U: S. 
transatlantic relationship with the Community would have to evolve 
as well. He called for both the United States and the Community to 
achieve "a significantly strengthened set of institutional and • 
consultative links ... whether in treaty or some other form".13 
Baker suggested a number of specific steps: (1) to. explore better 
means of identifying and discussing potential economic conflicts 
before, they grow into political problems; (2) to look at the 
possibility of more regular contacts with the EPC working groups to 
share views on foreign policy issues; (3) to envisage systematic 
U.S. co-operation with a new European environmental agency; (4) to 
regularly discuss a number of technical issues, such as standards,
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'before decisions are made' and can have' far-ranging political 
effects; (5) to discuss a more systematic, phased approach to draw 
Eastern economies closer to the liberalized economic system of the 
West.14 As a result, there ensued a series of exploratory meetings 
to put some flesh on Baker's and Bush's calls for closer EC-U.S. 
•transatlantic links.
The importance of Secretary Baker's speech should not be 
underestimated since it reflects the evolution of the U.S.-Western 
Europe relationship - from that of patron-client in the immediate 
post-war years to that'of equal partners in the 1990s.15 The EC and 
its Member States as well as the U. S. . government took up Baker's 
initiative in a joint declaration-..on December 15, 1989. Closer 
contacts were then agreed upon during a meeting between President 
Bush and the President of the EC Council of Ministers, Irish Prime 
Minister Haughey, in February 199016; Bush and President Mitterrand 
also discussed the possibility of'a transatlantic alliance during 
a meeting at Key Largo, Florida, later that spring. In addition, 
several EC Commissioners .made proposals to intensify the 
Community's relations with. the United States in areas such as 
research and development, competition policy, the environment, 
vocational training and high-level foreign policy co-ordination.17
It must . be emphasized, however, that the Bush/Haughey 
announcement . and the other discussions with the Member States 
concerning the possibility of a transatlantic alliance were related 
to European political cooperation - an EC presidency matter - and 
were thus on a separate track, from the U.S.-Community ministerial
224
meetings. This is an important distinction. The Bush administration 
- which had distinguished itself from previous administrations by 
trying to broaden bilateral relations away from a fixation on trade 
irritants — sought consciously to develop new opportunities to 
insert the U.S. in the EC political process before decisions were 
taken.. Nonetheless, it . pointedly backed away from commerce 
secretary.Mosbacher's ill-received remarks about the U.S. wanting, 
a 13th seat at the EC table "at least as an observer."18
Mosbacher's proposal was meant as a reaction to the-perceived 
lack of opportunity for American firms to provide meaningful input 
on industrial aspects of the 1992 program, such as standards
development, testing and certification. As a result of Mosbacher's 
complaints the EC relented and agreed on May 31, 1989 to allow U.S. 
technical experts to make presentations to the European Committee 
for Standards (CEN) and the European Committee for Electrotechnical 
Standardization (CENELEC), the groups assigned by. the Commission to 
set product standards, an action that was well-received by the U.S. 
business community. Mosbacher declared in December 1989 -that he was 
"very pleased" with the way the United States, was able to
participate in the EC decision-making process. The Community, he 
said, "at times, allowed literally a seat" for the representatives 
of American interests.19 The Europeans were not amused. But whatever 
negative perceptions of U.S. intentions were" prompted by
Mosbacher's remarks, they nevertheless pointed to the Bush 
Administration's serious desire to enhance bilateral political 
links with the Community and .gain enhanced access to the EC
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decision-making processAs mentioned above, the creation, or 
indeed even the investigation, of a more comprehensive mechanism 
for managing EOU.S. transatlantic trade ties - in addition to the 
GATT - was not contemplated.
But how is the above . discussion of bilateral EC-U.S. 
transatlantic ties and the occasional raised European eyebrow over 
American presumptions relevant to the present study on Canada-EC 
relations? They point to an environment in which EC-U.S. relations 
"threatened" - by burying Canadian interests in the North American 
pillar - to equal and then surpass Ganada-EC relations in terms of 
institutional links.
The stage of development reached by the EC-U.S. Ministerial 
meetings in 1989 also shows the incremental formalization of EC- 
U.S, relations. These meetings were chaired by the President of the 
Commission of the European Communities and the U.S. Secretary of 
State, and included' a- number of U.S. Cabinet officers (USTR, 
Commerce, and .Agriculture Secretaries) and several' European 
Commissioners (always- External Relations, often Agriculture, 
Industry/ Internal Market). They had been annual events for some 
time, and were usually tied logistically to NATO ministerial 
meetings in Brussels. As EC-U.S. discussions progressed on EPC 
during,the spring of 1990, both sides reviewed proposals to make 
changes to upgrade the importance and increase the frequency of the 
ministerial meetings. This was to be achieved through a number of 
measures: holding the meetings twice a year; alternating the locale 
between Washington and Brussels; when in Washington including a
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meeting between the U.S. President and the President of the EC 
Commission; and attempting to de-link timing of the Brussels 
ministerial from the NATO ministerial in. order to create more 
focused bilateral discussions.20
The'1990 U.S.-EC Ministerials, held on April 23 and 24, were 
significant for three reasons: 1) they were the first Ministerials 
to be held in Washington; 2) President Bush for the first time had 
a one-on-one meeting with the EC Commission president; and 3) both 
sides agreed that Baker's call for a transatlantic treaty was 
premature. Commission President Jacques Delors came out strongly in- 
favour of transatlantic ties, pointing out that the United States 
and the EC could only face the new challenges to the environment, 
and in technological and social areas, by pooling their resources 
and acting as partners.21 But it is the last reason that is the most 
important for the purpose of our discussion.- In the tour d'horizon 
during the Delors/Bush meeting, Delors explained that the EC 
considered a formalized treaty to be inappropriate given the 
awkward stage in the Community's external relations: the EC was 
preoccupied with the aspirations of Central and Eastern Europe as 
well as the creation of a common market to include the EFTA 
members; and there still remained the problem of the divided 
competence between the Community and the Member States in many 
areas. Delors suggested that the operationalization of a formal 
treaty would depend on the further progression by the EC along its 
path toward Political Union (PU).
Bush was apparently comfortable with this position and both
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•sides agreed to concentrate instead.on reinforcing dialogue under 
existing mechanisms.22 Bush's comfort level at keeping the treaty 
proposal in abeyance was no doubt increased by the fact that the 
State . Department had "discovered" that some form of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation . (FCN) treaty already existed with 11 out of 
the 12 Member States of the Community.23 Following the ,Bush/Delors 
meeting and its own internal consultations, the European Council 
decided in June 1990 to begin talks with the U.S. government on a 
joint declaration.24 '
What are we to make of the myriad American political 
statements and bureaucratic adjustments in the face of the 
relaunching of European integration and why are they important to 
a study of Canada-EC relations? Devuyst concludes, that they should 
be interpreted "as the vindication of America's, traditional 
political and economic ideals."25 This reconstituted Western Europe 
in the image of the U.S. and, indeed also Canada, entailed a 
political federalism on one hand ' and a large single market 
operating on the basis of economic liberalism on the other.26 in 
fact, . it could be argued that continental Western Europe, of the 
1980s with its corporatist and dirigiste legacies and practices 
actually had more in common with Canada's political economy.
As mentioned earlier in this study, for the same reasons that 
Canada supported a Western Europe firmly ensconced in the Atlantic 
Alliance, support for European integration had been a cornerstone 
of American foreign policy since the start of the Cold War. 
European integration was believed to foster economic stability and
228
therefore social and political stability, making it a more 
effective counterweight to the perceived Communist threat, and thus 
strengthening the Atlantic Alliance.
In addition, West. European integration was seen as a means of 
binding West Germany to the West. As.Smith has pointed out, with 
‘the collapse of the Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe 
starting in 1989, and especially with German reunification, the 
European Community's integration program was once more heralded as 
a pillar of stability in a changing Europe. Smith calls this a 
"regression" of American views to the very creation of the Common 
Market, with the key difference being that the EC was now at least 
the ■ economic rival of the United States.27 For Canada, the 
Community's status as equal economic rival had dire portents since 
Ottawa could now foresee being squeezed between the "grindstones" 
of Washington and Brussels on trade policy issues.
The Community's new-found status, although not entirely-, 
comforting to U.S. and Canadian decision-makers, did have the 
effect of raising the burden-sharing issue, especially as. it 
related to the development of Central and Eastern Europe. Indeed, 
with the days of the Marshall Plan long gone, it-was clear that the 
U.S. alone could not finance the economic restructuring that was 
needed; conversely, many of the EC Member States had, through post­
war American assistance, gained sufficient economic strength for 
them to play, a more important financial role,. As Bush expressed it, 
"a resurgent Western Europe is an economic magnet, drawing Eastern 
Europe closer toward the commonwealth of free nations."28 That this
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"resurgent Western Europe" should share in a greater part of the 
Alliance's financial burden was made clear when Bush stated that he 
"was exceptionally pleased that we agreed at the Paris economic 
summit on a specific role for the EC in that Group of 24 effort to 
assist Poland and Hungary."29 It thus seemed only logical that as 
European integration stimulated economic growth and, consequently, 
also the ability of the Western Europe to shoulder an. increasing 
share of the West's international financial burden, U.S. interests 
were served by support for integration. This view was mirrored 
among Canadian decision-makers and business people alike, who were 
staring in the face of mounting public debt at home, a history of 
defaulted loans to countries such as Poland, and an over-extended 
system of Official Development Assistance,
6.2.2 Canadian Reaction to U.S.-EC Dialogue
The rapprochement in EC-U.S. relations - given the history of 
acrimony30 - was certainly not lost on senior Canadian Cabinet 
ministers and EAITC officials in Ottawa and in Washington. It once 
more raised the spectre of Canadian marginalization31 in Europe - 
the avoidance of which had been the leitmotif of Canada's 
transatlantic strategy over the previous two decades. It has been 
suggested that the reference to "transatlanticism" in the EC-U.S. 
discussions was bound to hit a raw nerve on the Canadian side since 
this concept has historically always' included Canada.32 Canadian 
officials were impressed by the dynamism and scope of the EC-U.S.
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contacts and by the commitment displayed by both sides to realizing 
the spirit of Secretary Baker's Berlin speech. They noted the 
impressive number of Cabinet-level1 contacts between the EC and the 
U.S. - in addition to the breadth of the consultative agenda which 
was developing along the lines of bilateral cooperation on science 
and development as reflective of an attempt to forge a broader 
and more cooperative bilateral dialogue in light of the "new 
Atlanticism.1,33
Although it may have appeared so at first glance, it was not 
the decision of the U.S. to reinforce and regularize its relations 
with the .Community that most impressed Canadian officials in 
Washington monitoring the EC-U.S. discussions. After all, many of 
the changes that had been imposed and implemented were a logical 
extension of past activities and reflected the* fact that the U.S. 
lacked an agreement similar to the 1976 Canada-EC Framework 
Agreement that ensured regular bilateral discussions at ministerial 
and official levels. Impressive from the .Canadian perspective, 
rather, was the sheer interest evinced, by political appointees in 
the State Department in pursuing a relationship with the EC that 
had not hitherto been evident.34 Canadian officials noted the 
recognition by the U.S. of the Community's role as the single most 
successful integrative institution in Europe. They noted also that 
the U.S. would require - irrespective of the prevailing‘European 
architecture - an expanded and formalized political relationship as 
part of its strategy to ensure protection of its interests in 
Europe.
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6.3 ADJUSTING TO CHANGE: OLD AND NEW CANADIAN RESPONSES TO THE 
MOMENTUM OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION
The- demise of .the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the 
progress towards the: SEM left an indelible mark; they forced Europe 
onto the Canadian public policy agenda. Although/- as noted in the 
previous chapter, some Canadian academics have characterized 
Canada's approach to the Community in the 1980s as one of "benign 
■neglect," the geo-political changes in Europe in 1989, coupled with 
the .completion of the CUFTA ensured that developments in Europe, 
specifically issues of security but also including the progress of 
European economic integration, became a priority for the 
Conservative government.
With growing criticism levelled at Canada for lagging behind 
other industrialized countries in its policy approach to the 
dramatic changes in East-West relations (Prime Minister Mulroney 
was the last G-7 leader to travel to the Soviet Union to meet with 
Mikhail Gorbachev), MulroneyVs November 1989 trip to Moscow thus 
added stimulus to the comprehensive interdepartmental policy review 
in Ottawa of Canada's relations with Europe.35 The attempt to 
develop a. fresh approach to Canada's European policy, a way of 
reaffirming Canada's commitment to the transatlantic relationship, 
was reflected in a series of important addresses by. both Mulroney 
and Clark and in Cabinet discussions in the first half.of 1990. 
Clark, ’ for example, referred to Canada as "a European nation," 
described Canadian interests in the new Europe as "real, 
contemporary and compelling" and said that "security in Canada has
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no meaning without security in Europe."36 He believed strongly in 
the role that the second pillar - the CSCE - could play in 
projecting Canadian interests in the new Europe. On the trade side, 
Clark's speech at McGill University on February 5, 1990, did
mention the increased trade opportunities for Canada in Europe in 
light of the Single Market, though he focused primarily - and not 
surprisingly - on Canadian responses to the collapse of communist 
governments in Eastern Europe.37 On February 7th, Clark made a 
special presentation to the Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy and 
Defence (CCFPD) in which he stressed that i.f Canada did not seek to 
intensify'its links to Europe through its three pillars - NATO, the 
CSCE, and the EC (in that order) - it would increasingly be 
marginalized in Europe.38 Citing Baker's Berlin speech, he noted 
that American concerns over decoupling and marginalization in 
Europe were similar to Canada's and that U.S. commitment to the 
'new' Europe would see Canada having to commit itself as well.
The decision of the CCFPD,'in light of Clark's presentation, 
is puzzling in certain respects. On the one hand, it Was supportive 
of- Clark's warnings and called for a continuation of Canada's 
involvement in Europe "based on Canada's national interests and 
global responsibilities". This involvement would be implemented 
through a "policy framework" so that Canada's involvement in Europe 
would be "adequate" to avoid marginalization. Yet, on the other, 
the CCFPD also cautioned that whatever issue-specific policy 
framework was developed by EAITC in consultation with other federal 
government departments would have to give emphasis to "no cost" and
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"low cost" measures. Though this important constraint on the 
options open to . Canada was understandable in light of the 
Government's pre-occupation with the surging national debt and 
deficit, to maintain Canada]s influential presence in Europe in the 
post-Cold War would certainly require more - not fewer - resources. 
On February 20th the Priorities and Planning Committee, comprising 
Mulroney's inner Cabinet where the Government's major decisions, 
were made, ratified the CCFPD's decision.
The CCFPD's decision on low cost measures for the projection 
of Canadian intersts- in Europe also appears to fly in the face of 
the apparent surge in Cabinet interest in relations with Europe - 
West and East - that can be inferred in the period 1989-1990 from 
the number of memoranda to Cabinet. For . instance in late 1989, 
prior to Clark's presentation, then minister for international 
trade, John Crosbie, had presented Cabinet with a memorandum 
summarizing the state of bilateral trade irritants between Canada 
and the EC. Moreover, in March 1990, EAITC prepared a presentation 
to Cabinet on Canada' s. relations with Eastern Europe, and the Soviet 
Union.39
Based on this author's interviews, although'by the spring of 
1990 Canadian policymakers had had some forewarning of the major 
changes in Western Europe, that is, the momentum towards the SEM, 
the state of EPC, political and monetary union, they were obviously 
caught off-guard .by the rapidity of developments in the Eastern 
half of the continent and in Germany - the Berlin Wall came down, 
the Soviet lynchpin .was pulled, there were revolutions in
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Czechoslovakia and Romania. The mutually reinforcing (i.e., human 
rights, political and economic freedom) developments in Eastern 
Europe/ had, by calling for a redrawing of the face of Europe, 
literally overnight washed away the certainties underpinning 
Canada's relations with Europe. Against this backdrop, Canada faced 
a European Community accelerating its own integration through the 
European Monetary System, achieving near unanimity on the Social 
Charter, negotiating with the EFTA with an increased urgency and 
expanding its influence into Central and Eastern Europe. With the 
unification of Germany, the "German Question" was once more at the 
heart of European politics.
In terms of architecture,' the environment was equally fluid, 
leaving Canadian decision makers a choice of Gorbachev's "Common 
European Home"; EC Commission President Jacques Delors's "EC- 
Centric" Europe; Mitterand's "Confederation of Europe"; and Kohl's 
proposal, for a new East-West Economic organization through the 
CSCE. Although none of the proposals offered detailed blueprints, 
they did demonstrate that the "new" Europe would in turn redefine 
North Atlantic and global relationships. Canadian officials 
perceived that the economic balance between North America and 
Europe was shifting : at North America's expense. An open 
cooperative Europe based on the EC would therefore be essential.
On the security side, although it was clear to Ottawa that 
NATO faced an evolutionary challenge, officials and'politicians 
were unsure as to whether it would be the instrument of change or 
whether a new forum was necessary. What appeared to have more
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consensus on the Canadian side .(although not on the European one as 
we shall discuss later in this study) was the CSCE as the preferred 
"envelope" for Canada (and the United States) to address' the broad 
political, security, economic, science and technology, and 
environmental challenges facing all of Europe.
6.3.1 Germany Makes Proposal for Transatlantic Declaration
Canadian thinking, on Europe received further impetus when, in the
aftermath of the fall of- the Berlin Wall, Hans Dietrich Genscher
(then German foreign minister and vice-chancellor),- made a
presentation, to the Canadian Parliament .on April 5th (after
speaking to Bush the previous day) in which he reinforced Baker1s
and Bush's public comments and called for a new transatlantic
architecture to bind Europe more securely to Canada and the United
States.40 As he stated:
So we are on the way to the political union of 
Europe, meaning the Europe of the Community, 
which . is not the whole of Europe ... As a 
consequence of this process, I propose to the 
American government and to your government 
. that we consider it useful; at [this] time, 
improving relations between the European 
Community and the two North American 
democracies, to give our relationship a new 
quality in addition to our membership in NATO, 
and to have a new declaration, concerning the 
common challenges we face in the political, 
economic, technological, and ecological 
fields. We should consider this approach in 
order to create a new basis of cooperation 
between the European Community and the two 
democracies in North America.41
It would appear that Genscher was reinforcing Secretary of State
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Baker's call for new thinking on the role .of the transatlantic
alliance, on the need to make its military focus a more political
or economic focus. Genscher said as much in his later presentation
to- Canadian parliamentarians;
It was not the German foreign minister, it was 
the American foreign minister [James Baker] 
who for the first time, when he presented his 
speech in Berlin, spoke of the more political 
character of the alliance - and I think Jim 
Baker is totally right in saying this...42
. Finally, a political interpretation of Genscher's proposal led some 
Canadian officials to perceive the possibility that Genscher was 
placing the newly united Germany the same distance from both North- 
America and the not yet defunct Soviet Union.43
Clark had anticipated that Genscher's visit would be an 
opportunity for Canada to work with its European partners "on 
shaping a new Europe and the- institutions it shares with North 
America."44 Genscher's thoughts on a. transatlantic declaration 
complemented the Canadian position which was to impress on the 
Germans the desire to reinforce transatlantic links from "Vancouver 
to Vladivostok, via Berlin."
A senior Canadian official has pointed out that the birth of 
a more clearly thought-out new transatlantic alliance proposal goes 
back to January 1990 when Genscher "first mentioned something along 
these lines when I called him prior to the Ottawa Open Skies 
Conference." The official further states that■Genscher was then 
thinking in a CSCE context and was concerned with ensuring 
continued North American participation in Europe as counterbalance 
to a changing relationship with the Soviet Un.ion. As it turned out,
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the idea of a transatlantic declaration never appeared on the 
agenda at the Open Skies Conference - but this did not mean that 
the Germans had dropped the idea. Indeed, according to this 
official, policy planning officials in the German Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs had in the meantime been trying - somewhat 
unsuccessfully - to transform Genscher's suggestions into a 
coherent text.45 • - '
The all-encompassing nature of the Genscher proposal, however, 
may have ensured that the idea was too ambitious at that time, 
especially since multilateral discussions were taking place on how 
to broaden the CSCE.and reconfigure NATO. One suggestion for this 
lack of immediate follow-up is that a senior official at EAITC 
feared that a movement on a transatlantic declaration would 
undermine NATO.46 Whatever the precise reason, on the Canadian side 
the idea of a declaration fell into abeyance until September 1990. 
On the U.S. side, as we have indicated, negotiations had been 
underway since June 1990. But this is not to say that Canadian 
officials and politicians were indifferent to new mechanisms and 
fora to formalize transatlantic relations. After the Genscher 
proposal, discussions among Clark, Mulroney and their American and' 
European counterparts had a new urgency.
6.3.2 Canada Looks at Ways of Strengthening Transatlantic Trade 
Ties ,
With the CUFTA completed and with Europe demanding more and more 
attention, in early May 1990, Derek Burney, by then Canadian
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ambassador to the United States, had his officials in Washington 
reflect on possible Canadian policy options, in face of increasing 
European economic integration, including new, more comprehensive 
trade arrangements between Canada and the European Community.47 The 
deliberations in Washington had coincided with the arrival of a new 
Under-Secretary of State at EAITC, De Montigny Marchand.48
Two plausible explanations may account for the fact that an 
independent analysis of Canadian trade ' policy vis-a-vis the 
Community appeared to have been initiated by the Canadian Embassy 
in Washington: 1) there was a perception within the senior echelons 
of EAITC that the Department' s European Bureau was too hemmed in by 
operational requirements to allow for bold ideas;49 and 2) the 
combination of dramatic events taking place in Eastern Europe, and 
the Washington Embassy's own close monitoring of the increased 
intensity of EC-U.S. dialogue, served to make it a logical point of 
intellectual ferment for Canada's trade policy options. Whatever 
the exact reason, the conjecture that EAITC's European Bureau was 
not at the centre of deliberations in the process of looking at 
options for Canada's future relations with the Community, does not 
strike the author as particularly unusual. In addition to his., 
intimate involvement in the trade policy review in the early 1980s 
(indicated in Chapter Three) , Burney had also been the prime 
minister Mulroney's- closest adviser as. his chief-of-staff and 
associate under-secreta.ry of state for external affairs,50 and could 
therefore offer advice unburdened by the-need to develop official 
consensus. His well-known scepticism about putting all of Canada's
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eggs . in the multilateral basket added to his credibility in 
providing this kind of advice on trade policy.51
The ..central role of Burney in Canada-EC relations at this time 
should certainly not be surprising to students of bureaucratic 
politics/ as was discussed in Chapter Two. According, to officials 
at EAITC headquarters in Ottawa, Burney, as Canada's ambassador to 
Washington, viewed his position as one of quasi-ministerial status 
- somewhat understandable given the U.S.'s primacy in Prime 
Minister Mulroney's foreign policy. The net effect of Burney's 
high-level bureaucratic and political experiences was that Canadian 
foreign policy on certain issues (e.g., free trade, Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations) was made on the PMO-Burney axis, with EAITC 
headquarters in Ottawa as a bystander and alerted to developments 
only on a "need-to^know" basis.
Burney believed that there was a causal linkage between the 
management of. transatlantic trade and economic relations and the 
prospects for security and stability. He felt that the failure to 
agree on trade and economic matters could undermine prospects for 
security.52 There was a concern that Canada's privileged position 
as the first industrialized third country to sign a commercial 
agreement with the EC in 1976 had long been overtaken by events, 
not least the Community's "1992" program, and that the GATT would 
also not serve as an optimal mechanism to ensure Canadian access to 
the new European .market. According to this view, because any. EC- 
U.S. bilateral agreement would create a privileged position for the 
United States while diminishing Canada's already small place in
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Europe, the two broad options available to Canada for enhancing 
Canadian access to and influence upon the EC were (1) a Canada-EC 
Free Trade Agreement or (2) an Atlantic Free Trade Association.53 
Canadian officials in. Washington concluded that the latter 
arrangement was optimal since it permitted Canada to achieve 
influence- that was not available through existing arrangements or/ 
indeed, through a separate bilateral agreement. It would do so by 
imposing substantial obligations on the EC- (as well as Canada and 
other participants) in areas that were within the exclusive 
competence of the EC and which were the principal instruments for 
European integration.54
There were a number of other, indications that Canada's 
relations with the EC had gained priority in the Canadian Cabinet. 
As previously indicated here, Ottawa's belated recognition of the 
EC as a formidable political and economic actor had been encouraged 
by Genscher's proposal to Joe Clark for an "EEC-North American" 
declaration "which would confirm shared principles and interests in 
openness and enhanced co-operation" .55 Underlining Canadian interest 
in. this proposal, PM Mulroney in a three-page letter to George Bush, 
on May 8,. 1990, that focused almost entirely on the need for
Canadian and. U.S. cooperation in emphasizing the continued vitality 
and complementarity of NATO and the CSCE, stated in the last 
paragraph that Mulroney continued to be. "intrigued" by Mr. 
Genscher's suggestion of a trans-Atlantic declaration "designed to 
celebrate the values that we [EC, U.S., Canada] all share."56 
Indeed, such was the concern on the status of Canada-EC relations
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at the Cabinet-level, that when Prime Minister Mulroney met with EC 
Commission Vice President Frans Andriessen on May 25, 1990 he
raised 'the possibility of enhancing bilateral . institutional 
arrangements to encourage more open market access on a reciprocal 
basis.
The "necessity" of Canada's engagement in the new Europe was 
again made public in a speech delivered by Joe Clark at Toronto on 
May 26th, and repeated in his speech in the House of Commons on May 
31, 1990 in which he proposed a new, more intense Canada-EC
relationship.57 . Catching his officials . off-guard, more 
significantly, Clark stressed the possible virtue of examining the 
desirability of a formalized open trading arrangement between 
Canada and the EC, perhaps including the U.S. and other members of 
the OECD.58 This at what was then thought to be the conclusion of 
the Uruguay Round was an important declaration because .it was'the 
first time that Canada had attempted,’ in seeking to include the 
United States and other OECD members, to apply the multilateral 
security model (e.g., NATO) to its trade relations. The proposed 
economic and trade agreement was to be real in the sense that it 
would focus on issues of access (such as were.found in the CUFTA), 
rather than just cooperation as the existing EC-Canada Framework 
Agreement did. In the end, because the speech was a Ministerial 
initiative and had limited input from officials'in EAITC, it was 
initially unclear how this transatlantic trade idea would be 
developed.
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6.3.3 Transatlantic Free Trade: Antidote to U.S. Bilateralism?
Clark's "surprising policy balloon" about a transatlantic trade 
agreement appeared as much a reflection of Canadian concern with 
the U.S. tendency towards bilateralism as it did Canada's desire to 
put its relations with Europe on a new footing.59 The alarm signals 
had gone off in Ottawa as soon as Mexico and Washington began 
formal negotiations on a comprehensive trade agreement in June 
1990. For Canadian officials, Washington's willingness to 
negotiate with Mexico confirmed their perception that the U.S. 
preferred to deal .bilaterally, • and thus suggested a high 
probability that the U.S. would turn to Brussels and also strike a 
bilateral deal - trade or otherwise - with the Community, leaving 
Canada in a vulnerable position.60
According, to Edwards, into the summer of 1990 Canada tried 
"vainly" to influence the Community on trade matters,’ again 
pursuing its two-track approach "rather than combining the 
political . and economic dimensions into a more comprehensive 
dialogue."61 A new European role for Canada was clearly warranted 
but the question remained as to the means. In a speech at Montreal 
on June 20th, for example, Clark averred that in light of'the "new- 
climate of co-operation between nations formerly divided by an 
ideological East-West confrontation" there was a need to’ transform 
the "institutions of yesterday." Clark, in keeping with the 
Government's desire to promote its "new" European policy and to 
pursue objectives in Europe that were "realistic" and "in keeping
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with the role expected of [Canada]," stressed the need'for Canada 
to make "an original and tangible contribution to the development 
of Europe...in order, to consolidate [its] position in the Europe of 
tomorrow."62 The nature of this consolidation in terms of Canadian 
relations with the Community was made clearer when Clark explained 
that he had made specific proposals to Irish Foreign Minister 
Gerald Collins (Ireland was holding the EC Presidency at the time) 
about "enrich[ing]" dialogue between Canada and the Member States 
of the European Community "particularly on major international 
political issues." The Canadian proposals (which were well 
received) included regular meetings between the Canadian Prime 
Minister and the President of the European Council, regular 
discussions between the Canadian External Affairs Minister and his 
European counterpart, and "much closer" contact between Canadian 
officials and EC experts. Indeed, these proposals foreshadowed the 
Canada-EC transatlantic declaration that would be signed five 
months later.
As a result of the Clark proposal, it was clear to middle- 
level officials at EAITC that a comprehensive analysis of Canada-EC 
trade and economic relations was ' needed in order to put . some 
economic flesh, on the bones of the political impetus created by 
Clark and Mulroney. It was equally clear that a study of this 
nature would require broad internal consultations in the 
Department,.
An intra-departmental Canada-EC working group was assembled in 
EAITC during the summer of 1990 with the intent of submitting a
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final report by December. The officials responsible-for developing 
the study were careful to point out that it would not become an 
economic research project, but rather a "study of the Government's 
political/economic priorities and judgements."63. In other words, 
the project - obviously very ambitious from the start - would have 
had far reaching political ramifications if the Government had 
chosen to pursue a transatlantic trade accord.- The political 
sensitivity of this study was further heightened because it- 
required a detailed probing of Canada's commitment to the MTN. For 
example, how well would.the GATT serve as a regulatory framework 
for EC-Canada commercial relations in the post-Urug;uay Round 
setting? Would the system of preferential trade agreements 
operated by the EC significantly . limit the potential for an 
agreement? How important was the Canadian market to the EC? And 
was a network of bilateral agreements the best response to the 
negotiating options that would face developed and developing 
countries after the Uruguay Round? It should also be added that 
this working group was also mandated to look at political issues 
writ large, that is., how’ Canada-West- European relations conformed 
to. Canada's overall foreign policy framework. These questions will 
be addressed in Chapter Eight.
Not wishing to create, high expectations, and no doubt 
foreshadowing the possibility of failure if there was no sustained 
political will, the deliberations of the. Canada-EC working group 
were kept strictly internal to EAITC. The question of how long the 
political will would last is of course crucial in understanding the
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outcome of this initiative. Unlike the "Going Global" trade 
development strategy which was generated by various geographic 
branches at EAITC to increase their resources,64 the impetus for 
this policy came directly from Clark's office. Some officials have 
characterized the whole process of putting transatlantic free trade 
on the agenda as an exercise in "damage-control". It was less the 
result of Canada's dissatisfaction with the existing state of 
bilateral relations with Brussels than it was a perception at a 
particular time, by Canadian politicians, that the U.S. and EC 
would undermine Canada's multilateral entitlements by signing a 
separate trade treaty.65
In sum, it.would appear from the above review of the numerous 
public and private, statements by Prime Minister Mulroney and 
secretary of state for External Affairs Clark on Europe, and from 
the activity by officials at EAITC in the 12-month period ending 
May 1990 that (not surprisingly given the shift from a bi-polar to 
multinodal international system) during this period the Government 
spent more enefgy redrawing its European policy framework than at 
any other time since the development of the "Third Option" in the 
early 1970s.
6.4 European Reaction to Trade Accord Proposal
Community officials, in the midst of preparations for the Single 
Market in 1993 and the upcoming Intergovernmental Meetings, 
certainly had little time to study the desirability or feasibility
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of an EC-Canada transatlantic free trade agreement. Perhaps 
because the idea had not emanated from the Commission, it was given 
little serious attention at the External Relations Directorate (DG 
I) of the Community-. Indeed, an official in DG I familiar with EC- 
Canadian relations has commented that a free trade agreement with 
Canada was so improbable that it was not even the subject of 
corridor discussions.66 Moreover, since the broader, less defined 
notion of. a transatlantic declaration had come originally from 
Genscher and there was no sustained political pressure at the 
Commission level at that time to develop it further/ it would not 
be unusual for.DG I to be out of the information loop.
Nevertheless, it would be an exaggeration to say that 
officials in the Community were completely unaware of Canadian 
thinking on this subject. A more likely explanation is that since 
the notion of a transatlantic alliance had such broad political 
ramifications it would in the initial stages have been dealt with 
directly out of the EC's Forward Studies, unit which is separate 
from DG I. This conjecture is supported by the fact that 
discussions did take place between EC and Canadian policy.planning 
officials. This author was advised that in discussion with his 
Canadian counterpart, Jacques Delors's main policy planning advisor 
was said to have been "very receptive" to ideas on an Atlantic 
alliance.67 From the Commission's perspective, however, the notion 
of a transatlantic trade agreement never departed from the purely 
hypothetical.
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6.5 Canada-EC Free Trade a Non-Starter
As mentioned, the intensity of European economic integration in 
1990 was mirrored in the initial flurry of activity at the.Canada- 
EC working group level in Ottawa. A number of reports were 
commissioned from various bureaux at EAITC dealing with issues of 
trade policy in Canada-EC relations and the implications of the 
Single European Market for particular Canadian industries. This 
begs the question of how important was the role of Canadian 
officials in sustaining the.momentum of this focus on Canada-EC 
trade relations.
In Canada, a Cabinet faced by complexity and pressure, can 
'delegate much of the responsibility for policy making to the public' 
service and the "public service..,stamp[s] public policy with its 
own values and priorities.-" The success or failure of political 
initiatives can consequently be shaped to a significant extent 
according, to motivations and preferences of bureaucrats.68 In the 
past (especially in the 1940s and 1950s) the high level- of 
influence exerted by senior Canadian public servants was 
accentuated in the formulation of foreign policy, where secrecy 
inherent in.state-to-state relations and the multifaceted, complex 
nature of diplomatic relations offered officials a certain autonomy 
in influencing policy outcomes. The influence of today's officials 
in EAITC may not be so great, but as the negotiations leading up to 
the CUFTA showed, specific issue areas -r especially trade policy - 
evidence exceptions to this change.69
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The high level of bureaucratic intensity and the absence of 
any sustained business interest in transatlantic institutions is 
noteworthy given this study's examination of the role of the 
Canadian state in managing Canada-EC trade relations. The 
bureaucratic interest waned once it became apparent that the 
Europeans did not share Canada1 s enthusiasm for exploring the 
modalities of a transatlantic free trade framework. At the same 
time, in the suitmer of 1990 the negotiation of a North American 
free trade arrangement rapidly ascended the Government1 s policy 
agenda.70 This had the inmediate effect of reordering the 
bureaucracy's priorities: Derek Burney became preoccupied with 
ensuring that Canada was included in the U.S.-Mexico negotiations; 
the resources of EAITC's Policy Planning Staff were shifted on the 
economic front to looking at the economic and trade implications of 
North American free trade and, on the political front, , to the 
implications of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the development of a 
cooperative security dialogue in the North Pacific71; and, removal 
of the European Bureau' s role as the lead bureaucratic actor, 
further hastened the demise of EAITC's Canada-EC working group. In 
the end, the Canada-EC working group died as quickly as it was 
bom. No final report was ever written.
6.6 CONCLUSION
In light of this chapter's discussion, a number of observations can 
be made on the nature of Canada-EC relations during the volatile
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period 1989-1990. Despite significant change in . Cabinet/
parliamentary and bureaucratic level perceptions concerning the
Canadian interest implications of West European integration and the
revolutions in eastern Europe, it would be wrong to view the
"cognitive shift" at the political level as being in direct
proportion to the radical change in the international system. In
fact it seems more plausible that the Government's sudden 
* »
preoccupation with a transatlantic trade accord was no more than a 
policy impulse soon superseded by the more immediately pressing and 
obviously more significant "possession" interest of continental 
free trade. Transatlantic free trade was an issue that emerged at 
the wrong time; consequently, it became a non-issue for the 
Government.
It would be incorrect. to conclude that Canada was a demandeur 
(i.e., the party most anxious for movement towards more formal 
discussions - on any given issue) during this period. : This is 
because there was never sufficient political will on the West 
European and U.S. sides to even begin negotiating a transatlantic 
trade accord.72
Canadian actions during this period demonstrated that Canada 
only paid sustained attention to its broader relations with the 
Community when Western Europe forced itself on to the Canadian 
foreign policy agenda. It had done so in the previous year, when 
Brussels became the official channel - through the G-24 - through 
which some of the Central and East European economies received 
Western aid. Mulroney1 s ranking of Canada's European "pillars"
250
(NATO, the CSCE, and the EC) in his statements and speeches 
suggests a further conclusion. That is, since the focus of Canada's 
Europe interest was still firmly entrenched in the security domain, 
this concern militated against any immediate tendency away from the 
multilateral security dimension of Canada's Europe policy to an 
increased reliance on bilateral or trilateral' trade and economic 
institutions. Nonetheless, the brief public and bureaucratic airing 
of the benefits of a transatlantic trade accord in the summer of 
1990 indicates that, the Canadian government was not indifferent to 
the implications of Genscher's proposal. As the next chapter will 
discuss., although a trade agreement was not feasible, a political 
affirmation of transatlantic ties was acceptable; Canada became a 
demandeur in this bargaining process.73
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Minister or Cabinet) on the impact of international economic and 
political developments on Canadian interests; and 3) with its 
Cabinet, liaison section CPD forms the institutional link between 
the foreign policy bureaucracy and the Cabinet.
72. Although it is true that Canada had initiated discussions for 
a World Trading Organization'(WTO).
73. G. Bruce Doern and Brian W. Tomlin, The Free Trade Story: 
Faith and Fear (Toronto: Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1991), p. 
278. •
260
CHAPTER SEVEN
THE TRANSATLANTIC DECLARATION: NEW TRANSATLANTICISM IN OLD
BOTTLES?
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, having won the 1988 
"free trade" election with a comfortable majority (although smaller 
than the 1984 majority) and having pushed through the CUFTA, was by 
mid-1990 once more concerned about ending up on the spoke - rather 
than the hub - of a U.S.-Mexico free trade agreement. - The 
Conservative government found itself in a world order characterized 
by the disappearance of old rules and certainties. In Canada, 
throughout the 1980s the left had argued that the CUFTA ensured 
that Canada was a dependent power; the new world order now forced 
a reconceptualization of Canada's role as a middle power.
This chapter examines how Canada engaged its allies, in Cooper 
et al. 's words, as a "nimble dancer," in finding a role for itself 
in the new international order as the cement of Western 
transatlantic alliance began to crack and Canada was no longer 
assured a place as a full partner . in any new transatlantic 
institutions. Canada as a "benign, responsible and selfless" middle 
power would not describe Canada's role in securing a transatlantic 
declaration. With the end of the Cold War it was evident that 
Canada's value in the eyes of its allies - based in large measure 
on its ability to mediate East-West tensions over the previous 
forty-five years - had declined, if .not precipitously, then
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certainly noticeably.1 This came as a rude shock to many Canadian 
officials and politicians who had grown accustomed to being 
automatically consulted on any major initiatives affecting 
transatlantic relations. This chapter's analysis of Canada's 
negotiation of the transatlantic declaration would tend to support 
John Holmes' rejection of the thesis that Canada was a middle power 
because of its "moral superiority," which he viewed as a "moral 
arrogance [which had] crept into the concept of middle power".2 
There are, of course, shades of Canada's wounded pride as a. good 
and deserving Atlantic partner when the Europeans and Americans 
appeared to be ignoring Canada's rightful place in any 
transatlantic, negotiations. The analysis also shows that Canada' s 
behaviour during the negotiations manifested typical middle power 
roles of "stabilization" (separating, counter-balancing and 
mediating among other states); "negative roles" (free-riding, 
fence-sitting, and status-seeking); and "good multilateral 
citizenship"3, but ones that can be reconciled with the Holmesian 
view that Canadian internationalism in the post-War, and then the 
immediate post-Cold War period, is still - "based on a very hard- 
boiled calculation.of the Canadian national interest".4
7.2 THE CREATION OF A POLITICAL DECLARATION
As was pointed out in the last chapter, without any real interest 
evinced by either the Commission, the Presidency of the Community 
or the United States (which, had been steadily formalizing its
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bilateral political. - rather than economic - links with the 
Community), a transatlantic free trade deal in practical terras was 
a non-starter.5 What seemed to attract more sustained political 
attention from the United States and the West Europeans was a much 
more general proposal for cooperation that, did not threaten 
existing multilateral trade institutions, but incorporated them 
instead. Indeed, officials on EAITC's Canada-EC working group 
concluded that many of the political requirements that were being 
served by the re-examination of EC-Canada trade relations/ that is, 
demonstrating Canada's new approach to Europe, were already being 
served adequately through the Government's "Europe 1992" trade 
development.program and its lobbying in Brussels. The prevailing 
view at EAITC was that if the option of a transatlantic trade 
treaty was not feasible,- then what was needed was a declaration of 
goodwill and cooperation — a follow-up to. Genscher's very general, 
ill-defined declaration proposal. As will be shown, the difference 
between Canada and the U.S. was that Canadian officials and 
politicians perceived a need for a transatlantic declaration to 
formalize high-level political ties with the Community; those 
formalized ties which did exist were almost entirely inter- 
bureaucratic mechanisms anchored by the economic and trade 
consultations established under the Framework Agreement. For the 
U.S.-, on the other hand, although a declaration was 'useful, ..it was 
not a necessity. •
The trigger for the Canadian TAD appears to have been the 
result of two events. First, on September 18, 1990 discussions
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between the Canadian Embassy in Washington and .the State Department 
alerted Canadian officials to the fact that the U.S. intended to 
issue a transatlantic declaration with the Community.6 (The.EC had 
prepared a draft declaration to this effect.) This was confirmed in 
discussions between secretary of state Baker and secretary of state 
for External Affairs Clark on. 21-. September, in which Baker 
explained that this declaration was to replace Baker1s more.formal 
treaty proposal that he had made at Berlin. An EC-U.S. Declaration 
would simply formalize bilateral U.S.-EC contacts that, already de 
facto existed.7 The U.S., as we have pointed out, wanted to use a 
Declaration about common principles to reinforce ‘the EC's 
commitment to consult with the U.S. before Community foreign policy 
decisions were set in stone. It appears, however, • that the Canadian 
side felt it had a proprietary interest in any transatlantic 
declaration not least reason because (as officials in EAITC 
constantly reminded the author) Genscher had first made the 
proposal in Ottawa (although the record shows that he had actually 
made it in Washington the day before).8 Canadian officials, PM 
Mulroney and Clark all felt that Canada had a right to be full 
party to "any declaration on the. Principles of Transatlantic 
Declarations," because the very term "transatlanticism" 
traditionally included Canada and therefore Canada' s exclusion from 
the Declaration would have presented perceptual difficulties.9
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7.3 THE FORMULATION OF PARALLEL DECLARATIONS
Inserting itself into the process of re-thinking transatlantic 
relations, Canada floated the idea for a short declaration that 
would have pulled the Community, Canada and the United States into 
a new transatlantic alliance. Under this scenario, NATO would not 
have been. replaced; rather, the alliance would have acted as a 
broader overall consultative mechanism into which NATO could have 
been subsumed.10 The Canadian fear was that a bilateral EC-U.S. 
declaration would change the nature of the existing Atlantic 
alliance into a. bipolar European and U.S. alliance that would be 
detrimental to Canadian interests.
The Bush Administration, however, argued that Canadian 
participation could lead to. a dilution of the effectiveness of its 
Declaration. That .is to say, a- trilateral form would (1) not allow 
the Administration to make as forceful.a point' with Congress, and
(2) raise the possibility that Mexico would also seek inclusion.11 
From the Bush administration's perspective, then, the transatlantic 
Declaration was a strictly bilateral affair. The U.S. position 
against a trilateral Declaration was supported by the French 
(although they did believe Canada had a role to play); the 
Italians, who at the time had the Presidency of the. European 
Community, wanted to move ahead quickly with an- EC-U.S. 
declaration; and Bonn, to no one's surprise (given Genscher's 
public pronouncements), was supportive of a trilateral approach.12
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The U.S. rejection of a trilateral Declaration naturally 
created a certain sense of urgency on the Canadian side to be 
associated with and included in the exercise of a new formalization 
and intensification of transatlantic relations. The flow and nature 
of the telex traffic between officials in Canada's Washington 
Embassy and Ottawa on this matter indicate that the Canadian 
government was clearly surprised at how quickly Baker's and 
Genscher's proposals had resurfaced, metamorphosed and gained 
momentum.13
The second trigger was that .the bilateral discussions between 
American and Canadian officials in Washington on the state of 
transatlantic relations coincided with the first state visit to 
Canada (at the invitation of Canada) of German President Richard 
von Weizsaecker, lasting from 16 to. 21 September.14 This 
coincidence would merit no mention if it were not for the fact that 
during Dr. Weizsaecker's visit, Canadian officials apparently 
received a draft transatlantic declaration from, their German 
counterparts15; It is unclear whether the Canadian officials had 
this declaration when they met with the State Department's then- 
under-secretary of state for European and Canadian affairs, Raymond 
Seitz,, in Washington.16 In any case, with Canada preferring a 
trilateral declaration, the U.S. refusing to have one, and the EC 
unwilling to issue a declaration with only one North American 
■partner and not the other, a compromise solution was necessary. In 
light of the positions of . Canada' s interlocutors ,• officials at 
EAITC pushed for a second-best solution: they could "live with" a
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separate declaration signed bilaterally by the EC and Canada in 
addition to the EC-U.S. declaration whose drafting was already in 
prog.res.s.17
The challenge for the Canadian side was to convince the
Europeans (primarily the French and Italians) and Americans that 
Canada had a right to insert itself into the negotiation process; 
that Canada's "milieu" interests had to be. protected.18 Immediately, 
Ottawa made several demarches in Europe, Ottawa and Washington 
stressing Canada's- integral role in any process that sought to re- 
formalize transatlantic relations. When this did not elicit any 
immediatie positive response, Canadian officials decided that a more 
proactive approach was needed. Officials in the West European 
Relations Division and the Policy Planning Staff at EAITC
subsequently (on the basis of the German draft) drew up a draft one 
page Declaration outlining Canadian interests and circulated it .to 
all the Member States of the Community, to the Commission, and to 
Washington.19 It is clear that the personalities of officials did
play a role in.influencing Canada's commitment to drafting its own
text.20. Canadian officials feared- that the longer the EC-U.S. draft 
circulated among the Member States and in the Commission and the 
Presidency of the EC, the more difficult it would be for an EC- 
Canada draft to be inserted. Canadian officials sought to impress 
on their counterparts in the Commission and the Member States that 
there needed to be two TADs, not just the EC-U.S. TAD..21
In early October, however, it became apparent that the EC-U.S. 
negotiations were not as advanced . as the Canadian side had
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initially estimated. This provided the window of opportunity for 
Canadian officials to lobby Washington, the • Community and the 
Member States to support a separate EC-Canada TAD that would be 
released along with the EC-U.S. TAD. The Italians were 
particularly helpful at this stage in supporting the Canadian 
position although, as will be pointed out, there was disagreement 
with the Italians with regard to where and when the. Canadian TAD 
would be issued. By mid-October a consensus was formed among all 
the participants that what was developing was a process of parallel 
negotiations.
Because all parties agreed that a degree of parity was 
desirable between the U.S. and Canadian TADs, the U.S., the 
Commission, the Italy and other Member States ail had to be 
satisfied with the initial Canadian effort. The Americans and the 
Commission, in particular, were not.' They wanted a more 
"substantive" declaration. Over the course of six weeks various 
longer drafts of the Canadian TAD were produced and distributed, in 
addition to German, American,- and Italian draft transatlantic 
declarations already in circulation. Not surprisingly, given the 
U.S.'s rejection of a trilateral declaration, during this period 
there was little cross-fertilization of ideas on the substance of 
the declarations between U.S. and Canadian officials as they 
drafted their respective TADs; indeed, the Canadian side received 
a working copy of the EC-U.S. TAD in confidence from sympathetic 
officials of a Member State, which was rumoured to be the United 
Kingdom.22 If Canadian officials did receive it from this source
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it would not be surprising since Clark had a good working 
relationship with Douglas Hurd, the British Foreign Secretary, who 
supported Canada's position that it had a right. to be fully 
involved in any transatlantic negotiations. But lest the 
impression be given that Canada could rely on support from only the 
key Member States, it must be stated that Canada also received 
support from Spain and Portugal widely regarded as the most pro- 
Community of all the Member States.
‘ Due to ' the parallel negotiations, the Canadian government, 
wanted the TADs. to be issued simultaneously. Timing, however, 
became a problem: the Italians wanted to sign the EC-U.S. TAD
during Prime Minister Andreotti's visit to Washington in mid- 
November; and the Canadian side wanted to issue the Canada-EC TAD 
on 22 November in Rome since this would coincide with PM Mulroney's
trip to Europe to attend the Paris CSCE meeting. The'Canadians were
particularly concerned about a prior release of the EC-U.S. TAD. 
Any time-gap between the public announcement of the EC-U.S. TAD and 
the EC-Canada • TAD would have proved "awkward" for. Canada: the
notion of a Canadian prime minister going to Washington to sign a 
tripartite or bilateral declaration during an official visit by
another head of state, in this case Italy's Andreotti, would,
according to Canadian officials, have been a political 
embarrassment at home.23
Within the Canadian bureaucracy there was also a problem of 
defining the focus of the Declaration. There was a flurry of 
activity in EAITC to determine whether the Declaration was to be
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purely political or more trade and economic-oriented. In the end, 
the PMO, the PCO and Clark's ministerial office took into 
consideration the concerns of the trade officials - particularly 
the trade-oriented staff at Canada's mission to the EC in Brussels 
- but nevertheless decided that the TAD's focus should remain 
political.24 There was also considerable concern among Canadian 
officials that the EC-U.S. and EC-Canada texts be similar with 
regard to shared transatlantic principles, values and consultative 
mechanisms, so that Canada would not be viewed.as a "second-class" 
transatlantic citizen.25 But perhaps the most important reason for 
the PMO's strong interest in bilateral relations with the Community 
and therefore in a transatlantic declaration, was the impact 
domestically of the dizzying pace, of developments in Europe. As a 
result, officials in EAITC consulted with and provided the PMO with 
ongoing reports on the status of negotiations.26
In the end, after much consultation and drafting — it would be 
tendentious to try to assert which country had the most input in 
the final product — an idea that had initially started out as an 
American treaty proposal, that was recast as a transatlantic 
declaration by the Germans, and which had - in the final phase-- 
considerable Canadian participation, was transformed into the EC- 
U.S. and the. EC-Canada TADs. In the fall of 1990, following 
discussions between Ottawa and Washington and the Community's own 
internal consultations on establishing enhanced political relations 
with Canada and bhe U.S., the "Declaration on European Community- 
Canada Relations" was unveiled in Rome by Prime Minister Mulroney
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and Italian Prime Minister Andreotti on November 22, 1990.27 The 
Transatlantic Declaration with the U.S. was issued a day later in 
Brussels.28
7.4 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE TRANSATLANTIC DECLARATION
It should be noted, in the first instance, that the TAD was 
"issued", rather than signed, indicating that Canada and the EC were 
not legally bound to adhere to the Declaration's terms - giving it 
a more symbolic rather than substantive quality.29. Second, as 
Edwards observes, when compared to the signing of the Charter of 
Paris, the day before, on November 21, by the 34 participating 
states of the CSCE, which formally declared the end of the Cold 
War, the institutionalization of bilateral political and economic 
relations through the TAD was a fairly modest achievement.30 .
That being said, the process of negotiations leading up to the 
TAD and the document itself raised a number of questions about the 
nature of Canada's place in the new Atlantic order. How important 
were high-level political ties? What about the impact of 
institutional changes in the EC? How many new bilateral links were 
actually created and how important were they? How important was the 
bureaucracy's support on both sides of the Atlantic? Did the TAD 
fill the "legitimation vacuum"? In an international system 
characterized increasingly by geoeconomics rather than geopolitics, 
how economically "real" was the Declaration? However, before 
attempting to answer these questions, it. would, be useful first to
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compare the Canadian and American TADs. That is, despite their 
similarities, there are important differences between them that 
illuminate the differing natures and foundations of American and 
Canadian relations with the Community. '
7.4.1 Comparing the U.S. and Canadian TADs
In making this comparison it is difficult not to ascribe a certain 
"me-tooism" to Ottawa. Given the parallel sets of negotiations it 
is not surprising that the texts of the Declarations are strikingly 
similar. Most generally, both the Canadian and American 
Declarations emphasized the need for multilateral - institutions such 
as the-UN to be responsible for world-wide conflict mediation; they 
called for the strengthening of the multilateral trading system 
through the implementation of GATT and OECD principles to reduce 
the number of non-tariff barriers in industrial and agricultural 
trade, services, competition policy, transportation policy, 
standards, telecommunications and other areas. Assistance to 
Central and Eastern Europe was also encouraged.
More practically, as a result of the TAD, meetings would, take 
place "regularly" in Canada and in Europe between the Canadian 
Prime Minister and. the President of the European Council and the 
President , of the Commission (see Figure 1 at end of this chapter) . 
Second, bi-annual meetings were scheduled on each, side of the 
Atlantic, between the Canadian secretary of state for External 
Affairs and the President of the Council of the European
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Communities and the Commissioners for External Relations and Trade 
Policy (at the time of the TAD's issuance these two portfolios were 
held by the .same Commissioner). Significantly, under the U.S. TAD 
the U-.S. president would meet "bi-annually" with his . European 
counterparts while the Canadian prime minister would do so only 
"regularly". Furthermore, rather than being new - a s  in the 
Canadian case - the "bi-annual" meetings between the U.S. President 
and. the President of the EC Member State holding the six-month 
Presidency of the Community, had already been'occurring for several 
years prior to the Declaration, a fact that serves to highlight the 
lack of a Similar Canadian political will in relations with the 
Community this time.31
It has been conjectured that the use of’ the word "regular" in 
Canada's TAD was a "tactical" move on the part- of Canadian 
officials who believed that the imposition of "annual" meetings on 
the Prime Minister would have created a "failure trap" since they 
were not convinced that a-Canadian Prime Minister (given Mulroney's 
and Clark's track record on European issues prior to 1989) would 
have been able to live up to this type of commitment.32 Having- 
"regular" meetings meant that Canada - could be spared the 
"embarrassment" of missing some future high-level meetings; 
Canadian Prime Ministers would instead be able to "work their way 
up" to annual meetings;
At the level of officials, the U.S. TAD stipulated an annual 
meeting between U.S. officials and the political directors of the 
EC Presidency's Troika, which was essentially a.continuation of an
existing practice.- Canadian negotiators felt that regular access 
via the Troika was not necessary since they would be briefed at the 
ministerial, level following EPC meetings.33 There was also an 
"evolution1 clause in the U.S. Declaration which provided for an 
adjustment of the existing structures of cooperation to the 
progress made in European integration, whereas there was none in 
the Canadian Declaration, presumably because Canada already had the 
Framework Agreement. Significantly, the EC and the U.S. retained 
the (option to specify contractually the arrangements upon a greater 
cohesion in EC foreign policy and to make them legally binding.
Finally, the Canadian and American TADs also called for co­
operation on such transnational, or "co-operative security," issues 
as terrorism, drug trafficking, control of population migration, 
and the environment. The reference to encouraging bilateral 
investment in the Canadian TAD, something not found in the U.S. 
Declaration, lent it more of an economic flavour than its American 
analog., although the intents of both Declarations were clearly 
political. More pointedly, given this dissertation's assertion that 
Canada's approach to its relations with the EC continued to be 
state-led, there was no mention in either Declaration of the need 
to bring the transatlantic business communities closer together; 
indeed, there were no consultations with the private sectors, on 
this initiative.
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7.4.2 The Importance of High-Level Political Ties
Returning to the set of questions posed above, the key element of 
the Canadian TAD was the establishment of a new transatlantic 
institutional framework. The Declaration re-affirmed the need for 
the full use of the mechanisms established under the Framework 
Agreement and of the already existing political contacts, such as 
the annual meetings between the Canadian secretary of state for 
External Affairs and the EC Commissioner for External Relations and 
Trade Policy under the Joint Cooperation Committee.
Since the Declaration did go some distance to meet Canadian 
officials' persistent requests for a more elaborate range of 
political consultative mechanisms, it succeeded in making bilateral 
relations less uni-dimensional and focused on trade irritants; it 
provided a broader bilateral context within which these irritants 
could be discussed. Second, the Declaration established political 
relations between Canada and the EC on a level comparable, as we 
have drscussed, to that of the U.S.. And, certainly, at the time, 
Canada had "exclusive" access to the Community in comparison to 
other "middle powers" such as Australia and New Zealand.34 (The 
Japanese, in fact, used the Canadian TAD as a model in their own 
negotiations, with the EC in 1991.)'
A senior official in Canada's mission to the EC in Brussels 
viewed the TAD. as a "powerful top-down tool", that allowed both 
sides to keep abreast of the relationship and make appropriate 
adjustments because it "suffuse[d] an entire range of formal and
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informal bilateral contacts on .international issues of mutual 
interest with a renewed spirit of'dialogue and cooperation," and it 
"broaden[ed] the interaction at the personal and institutional 
level and considerably enhance[d] Canada's ability to promote its 
interests and pursue its bilateral and multilateral political and 
economic agenda."35 An example of the broadened interaction at the 
personal level was the Canadian SSEA's twice yearly consultations 
with the Member State foreign minister who is the President of the 
Council of the European. Communities. This was-highly symbolic (the 
President "invited" the Commissioner of External Relations and 
Trade Policy to these meetings) because it stressed contact between 
Canadian and European politicians rather than between, officials, 
the latter having been the norm heretofore.. Although the 
formalization of bilateral political links was clearly an advance, 
given the evolution of bilateral relations by the end of.1993 (see 
Chapters Nine, Ten, and Eleven), it was premature for senior 
Canadian, officials to have stated unequivocally in 1990 .that the 
TAD was a "powerful" tool.
7.4.3 TAD and the Re-institutionalization of Canada-EC Relations
In looking at Figure 1 it can be quickly established that the two 
new links established by the TAD were (!) the Canadian PM meeting 
with the President of the European Council and the President.of the 
Commission (#4) , and (2) the SSEA meeting with the President of the 
Council of the European Communities (#5). The other stated links
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(i.e., the Canadian SSEA's meeting with the Commissioner for 
External Relations and Trade Policy and the contacts between 
Canadian missions and.EPC already existed. The Canadian SSEA and 
the .EC Commissioner for External Relations and Trade Policy were 
theoretically supposed to have met annually to discuss bilateral 
relations through the Joint Cooperation Committee established under 
the Framework Agreement (see Figure 2) .36 '
Another example of increased political cooperation was evident 
in debriefings on EPC decisions for non-Member States. Canada did 
not have the same level of access to the EPC decision-making 
process ' as the U.S. . As noted, Canada's links to EPC were 
formalized in the early 1980s when it began to receive a. general 
briefing on the Community's final decisions along with other "like- 
minded” (mostly OECD) non-Member States; starting in 1988 it 
received more- exclusive access through the bi-annual separate 
bilateral "political directors" meetings. This being said, in the 
domain of EPC, it was unclear how much more Canadian access had 
been brought about through the TAD, although there were now 
presumably more ad hoc links between the Canadian Mission to the EC 
in Brussels and the EPC expert groups as well as between the . 
Mission and the EPC Secretariat and the EC Council's Secretariat 
for EPC.
Also, with the additional links created as a result of the TAD 
there was initially some doubt whether the practice of having 
"High-Level" Ministerials (which predated the 1976 Framework 
Agreement by 4 years) would need to be continued.37 In establishing
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the net number of bilateral institutional linkages it becomes
apparent that there, was a fair amount of. redundancy in the
bilateral institutional structure. Of course, this was to be
expected in the short-term before some of the old linkages were
either abolished outright, indefinitely suspended or subsumed under
new institutional links. At the time of writing, the "High-Level"
Ministerials had not yet been subsumed under the new links
established by TAD. It was .unclear what significant benefit that
their continuation would bring to bilateral relations.
Decisions not to eliminate certain structures thus fed the
perennial criticism in the academic and corporate communities that
the conduct of bilateral relations was over-bureaucratized. The
creation of new institutional links represented an accretion of
organizational mass; there was an inherent belief within the
bureaucracy that more was always better. Although officials in
Ottawa contended that Canada's' relationship with the EC was
considerably greater than the government-to-government dialogue
that they had fostered through the TAD, even a cursory examination
of the history of bilateral, relations and a review of the
institutionalized nature of the relationship (Figures 1 and 2),
would leave the analyst with the impression that the process
appeared to have become an end in itself. Indeed, such observations
do not differ greatly from those.of Pentland et al., who, writing
about the Framework Agreement in the early 1980s, state that
The largely exploratory and' technical work- 
undertaken within the Working Groups of the 
continuing machinery of the JCC constitutes, 
in a sense, its own justification. The product
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. is the process...and not what might actually 
emerge from it in the form of contracts and 
deals in trade and investment areas.38
While the TAD's "product" was clearly political, the problem
remains the same. This assessment, however, must be qualified, since
the process-driven nature of.bilateral relations can be traced to
the inherent difficulties for Canadian policymakers when dealing
with an international organization that displays both supranational
and intergovernmental characteristics.
Finally , another problem highlighted by Pentland et al. was
Canada's reluctance to pursue a strategy whereby issues would be
linked. Therefore, even with the renewal of bilateral as a result.
of the TAD, the structure was still vulnerable to- the charge that
the combination of general reviews of the relationship (through
regular and private meetings at the. political level) with "intense,
narrow and isolated exercises in trade negotiation and
cooperation", would cause opportunities to be- missed for the
constructive linkage of issues in which both sides could, gain
something.39
7.4.4 Institutional Changes in the EC
As mentioned, the SEA in 1987 ensured.that by the time the TAD came 
along there was no longer a strict intra-Community separation 
between the powers Pf the Community in the field of foreign 
economic policy on the one hand and EPC on the other. In a speech 
to the European Parliament in January 1990, President Delors had
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stressed the. impossibility in the long run of separating the 
economic in the role of the EC in international relations from its 
political role.40 On the European side, therefore, the Declaration 
had anticipated a common European foreign and security policy,- 
which was then legislated through the second Intergovernmental 
Conference and at Maastricht.41 From Ottawa 1s perspective, not only 
did the TAD extend bilateral relations but in so doing it 
recognized that the EC was evolving from a foreign policy actor 
with limited power - a "political pygmy" - to.one with increasing 
diplomatic clout. This had ■ been evident with the Community's 
primary role in.the G-24 since 1989, and continued - albeit with 
varying levels of success - as it attempted to mediate the civil 
war in Yugoslavia.
7.4.5 Filling the "Legitimation Vacuum"
* .
A more intangible, short-term outcome of the TAD was that at a time 
of great institutional uncertainty in transatlantic relations 
between 1989 and 1991, it. filled the legitimation vacuum on both 
sides, of the Atlantic created by the end of the Cold War. It marked 
a new epoch in Canada-West European relations in so far as it 
represented an attempt, by Canada to maintain its status .as an equal 
partner with the Community. In many ways, though, as the post-TAD 
Community pushed for greater economic, monetary, political and even 
defence integration, Canada was destined to become a distinctly 
unequal partner. There was now the likelihood that the- economic
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asymmetry in the relationship (see Chapter Eight), traditionally 
balanced by the security guarantee offered by Canada's membership 
in NATO as evident in the negotiations- leading to the 1976 
Framework Agreement, would become increasingly politicized and put 
Canada in an increasingly disadvantageous’position. From the
More tangible evidence of the attempt to fill the legitimation 
vacuum was found in the TAD's reference.to increasing transatlantic 
cooperation on such "soft" security issues as migration, .illegal 
drugs, and. terrorism. This was a partial way of filling the void 
created by the decreasing need to cooperate on transatlantic "hard" 
security issues since Canada was no longer be needed to 
"symbolically" defend Western Europe from Soviet attack. This void 
was then widened two years later when, as part of the 1992 federal 
budget, the Mulroney Cabinet decided that in the absence of the 
Cold War Canada would.no longer maintain troops in Europe; it was 
decided that all permanently stationed Canadian troops would be 
withdrawn by the end of 1994.
7.4.6 Ths Declaration as a Way of Reforging Economic Ties
The Canada-EC relationship is often described as being driven by 
trade irritants. The.Declaration was of limited significance in 
dealing with specific trade irritants, although,, to be fair, as a : 
political document it was not designed for this purpose. That being 
said, in recognition of the increased importance of formalizing 
frameworks for transatlantic economic as opposed to military ties,
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the Canadian TAD did promise to -'make full use of the mechanisms 
established under the Framework Agreement" to enhance economic and 
trade linkages. However, as will. be.discussed in the next chapter, 
given the poor track record and even the outright characterization 
of the Framework Agreement as a "failure" in helping to resolve 
bilateral economic and trade concerns, its- reference in the 
Declaration appeared more perfunctory and declaratory than real.
Another factor preventing the TAD from having more, than a 
negligible impact on. bilateral, economic relations, despite its 
stipulation of high-level ministerial links to ' reinforce the 
existing machinery of the Framework Agreement and therefore to help 
resolve trade conflicts, was .the low participation’ by both the 
Canadian and European business .communities in the Joint Cooperation 
Committee', the administrative machinery of the Agreement. As noted 
in Chapter Three and discussed in Chapter Eleven, neither Canada's 
broad business associations (e.g., Canadian Chamber of Commerce, 
Canadian Exporters' Association) nor the Community's (e.g., UNICE) 
had ever been convinced of the benefits of meeting within the 
structures set up under the Framework Agreement to resolve 
bilateral trade disputes.
7.4.7 The TAD From the EC's Perspective
The Europeans, like the Canadians, also advocated a continued 
Canadian presence in Europe and expressed this through the TAD. 
European members of NATO supported continued Canadian military
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engagement in Europe even after the end of the Cold War and were 
disappointed with the Canadian decision to leave. On.the aid front, 
the Europeans recognized that support from Canada was important for. 
the overall success of the Phare program to provide Western 
assistance for the political and economic reconstruction of central 
and eastern Europe. This assistance could only be meaningful and 
effective if it was allocated in close consultation among all the 
transatlantic partners.42 Thus, the TAD was a statement of intent 
about a new type of transatlantic burden-sharing that, concerned 
economic assistance rather than military resources.
.A second, reason for the Commission to join the United States 
and Canada in issuing , the- TADs was that, as it had done in the 
early to mid-1970s in the context of the Framework Agreement and. 
the establishment of a Delegation of fice . in Ottawa, this was an 
opportunity for it to further its competencies in the foreign 
policy arena. Third,, and perhaps most importantly, it wanted to 
secure the political "goodwill” of its Western allies for further 
integration steps along the road to economic, monetary and 
political union. In light of German unification in October 1990, 
the. ratification of the European Economic Area (EEA) with the EFTA 
states in 1992, and the association agreements with Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Brussels faced strong concerns in North 
America about the future of "European architecture".43 But this is 
not to suggest that there was not already significant goodwill in 
bilateral relations before November 1990. After all, on many issues 
with foreign policy dimensions such • as immigration and the
283
environment, Canadian and Community positions were mutually 
reinforcing. Nevertheless, the Community recognized that additional 
goodwill' was particularly . important given the concern'among 
■observers - both, in and out of government — in Canada and the U.S. 
that the process of European integration would lead to an 
increasingly "inward-looking" Europe. Therefore, from the European 
perspective, both TADs sought to allay this concern.44
Finally, there was also a more tangential link between the TAD 
and the pace of North American integration. Just as its North 
American partners initially feared a "Fortress Europe" the 
Commission, responsible for the foreign economic policies of -the 
Member States, feared that the U.S., especially in the face of 
economic downturns in North America, would become more 
protectionist and depart from the principles of multilateralism.45 
The Community felt that Section 3 01 (1974) of the U.S. Trade Act 
and its expansion through the Omnibus Trade Act (1988) was 
particularly objectionable. Although Canada did not have the 
equivalent of, the: Exon-Florio legislation, under the Free Trade 
Agreement, -foreign, that is, non-U.S. companies had to notify 
Investment Canada of proposed investments under a threshold value 
of $5 million; if they sought control of a Canadian company with a 
value over $5 million they .had to go through a formal review 
process; in contrast, the threshold level for U.S. companies was 
over $140 million. Therefore, even though the.provisions to block 
incoming foreign investment were, in practice, rarely enforced, 
they nevertheless created a "psychological" barrier for European
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firms. For this reason, given the investment provisions being 
contemplated under NAFTA, the EC continued to monitor carefully 
whether the impact of North America-wide investment regulations 
would run contrary to GATT regulations. . .
On the whole, then, the European responses to both TADs should 
be seen in the context of the time that they were negotiated. 
Although the' Community took a a very low key approach to the North 
American free trade- negotiations, deliberately saying nothing as 
long as the signatories' obligations in any future agreement did 
not run contrary to their GATT obligations., lowering the barriers 
internally between Canada, the United States and Mexico, 
nevertheless translated into discrimination against countries that 
did not benefit from the same lower thresholds. Thus, although the 
Europeans may not have fanned the flames of a protectionist North 
America -* clearly sensitive to North. American perceptions of a 
"Fortress Europe" - they were certainly not blind to its potential 
consequences.
7.4.8 Bureaucratic Support in Canada
At the bureaucratic level, the various consultations and meetings 
scheduled under the aegis of the Declaration were intended to 
complement existing channels of communication with Canada's West 
European partners. In this way the TAD was to serve as a convenient 
bureaucratic mechanism to assist Canadian .officials in 
"systematizing" the conduct of Canada' s..relations with both the
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Commission and its Member States.46 The problem with this belief was 
that it assumed a consensus at EAITC on the TAD's utility. 
Throughout 1990 and. 1991 there were spirited discussions within the 
Department on the. relative importance of the EC to Canada's foreign 
policy in Europe. During the TAD negotiations, for example, the 
European Bureau at EAITC (not surprisingly) was of the view that 
the "NATO flag was coming down, and the EC flag was going up". But 
the reaction of the Department as a whole, according to some 
observers, was that while Canada "belonged" to NATO and the CSCE it 
did not "belong" to the EC.47
Compounding this pitting of . the security against the 
economic/political divisions at EAITC, was a feeling across all the 
line divisions in the Department that the reference in the TAD to 
the "privileged relationship" established by the 1976 Framework 
Agreement was inaccurate at best and disingenuous at worst since 
EAITC' s own internal memoranda on Canada-EC relations rarely 
mentioned the -Framework Agreement as an example of Canada's 
"privileged", relationship with the Community. In fact, on the 
contrary, there was a deep-rooted cynicism within the 'Canadian 
federal bureaucracy about the Agreement's ability to act as a focal 
point of bilateral relations. Therefore, it was argued by some 
officials, without an effective Framework Agreement to promote 
bilateral economic relations, how much value-added could be derived 
from having the opportunity for "regular" high level political 
contacts? This•in turn throws open to question the bureaucracy's 
own faith in the’ ability of the TAD to fortify the Community pillar
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of Canada's European framework.
7.4.9 The TAD and "Atlanticism"
Finally, what did the Declaration mean for Atlanticism at a 
watershed period in Canada's post-war foreign policy? From a pro- 
Atlanticist view, such as that proffered by Halstead48, Canada 
• should have been able to negotiate directly with the EC on a 
bilateral Declaration in order to assert its role as a. member, -of 
the transatlantic alliance and to create a "counterweight" to U.S. 
influence.49 This, of course, presupposed a convergence and 
balancing of interests that existed, for example, in the 1970s,' but 
that clearly no longer existed by 1990. There is also implicit in- 
the above assumption a suggestion that Canada-EC negotiations oh 
potentially precedent-setting bilateral initiatives could exist 
independently of, or even contradict, what Washington would 
consider its vital national interests. But- this assumption of 
Ottawa's independent ability to negotiate bilaterally with the 
Community requires closer examination and may exaggerate Canada's 
relative power in transatlantic relations. Why? Put quite simply, 
given the history of West European sensitivity to U.S. 
perceptions50, it was always difficult for Canada to negotiate 
independently with the Community. For instance, the Commission 
would, never have negotiated the Framework Agreement in 1976 without 
prior assurances from Washington. Indeed, this returns the 
discussion to the schema outlined in Chapter One on the four
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determinants of Canada's relations with the Community: it reaffirms 
the U.S.'s important role in setting the parameters of Canada-EC 
relations.
Apart from, the political rhetoric on both sides of the
Atlantic, it was doubtful that in the immediate aftermath of the
TAD that Europeans saw Canada as a nation with a "right" to a seat
at the European table. While this author would argue that Canada
had and continues to have real and pressing interests in Europe,
there were those who questioned the ultimate utility and
?
seriousness of the TAD as a mechanism to reinforce Canada's
Atlanticist ties. In other words, not only did the non-
Atlanticists probe the significance of TAD as a framework within
which to strengthen Canadian-EC relations, but they challenged the 
entire premise that TAD provided a Canadian.seat at the European 
table.
They also did not see Canada's political, commercial, and 
military retreat to its- continental shell as a sole reaction to 
European integration. In their view, a number Of factors were at 
play. As a result of budget'cuts,. Canada's diplomatic posts were 
severely cut by the early 1990s51, development and aid programs 
scaled down and the national fociis redirected south to the United 
States. No more symbolic manifestation of this Canadian drift from 
Europe in Europe was the decision in the spring of 1993 by Ottawa, 
as part of the federal government's deficit reduction program, to 
eliminate fully one-third of the 318 jobs at the Canadian High 
Commission in London. Given the UK's dual position as a pillar of
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transatlanticism and Canada' s eyes and ears on the Community this 
was both an administrative and. symbolic cut.
In the non-Atlanticist view, then, although the existence of 
the TAD may have strengthened the emphasis on relations with Europe 
in official. Canadian rhetoric in the early 1990s, this declaratory 
foreign policy was in fact belied by economic and strategic reality 
which ensured the decline of the Atlantic idea. Long-time analysts 
of Canadian foreign policy such as Kim Nossal pointed,out that as 
wartime bonds faded, with exchange rates shifting Canadian exports 
to the United States, with the CUFIA and NAFTA creating a 
continental economy, with the Pacific Rim creating a new pole of 
attraction for Canadian policies, with changing demographic 
patterns (i.e., by the early 1980s most immigrants to Canada came 
from.Asia), and with the rapid decline of the. former Soviet threat, 
there was a full-blown challenge to* the Atlanticist orthodoxy in 
the Government's rhetoric. Nossal asserted that "Canadians came to 
believe that they had less concrete need for an Atlantic 
connection; they no longer were as inclined to buy the arguments of 
the Atlanticists that being in Europe gave Canada a seat at the 
table; or allowed Canada to acid a moderate tone to the North 
American voice in the alliance; or provided a counterweight to the 
United States".52 Others, went so far as. to point out that seeing 
Canada as an Atlantic nation, or a Pacific nation, or an Arctic 
nation was a futile attempt by some Canadians to transcend their 
reality, to make Canadians "anything but what [they were] - a 
nation of the Americas," an attenpt to deny the "incontrovertible
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fact of geography that makes Canada an American nation.1,53 From the 
non-Atlanticist perspective, the whole legitimation argument in 
favour of the TAD was moot.
7.5 CONCLUSION
This chapter has shown that the significance of the TAD should not 
be overstated. On the one hand, it provided a framework within 
which existing bilateral mechanisms' could be used and new ones 
developed. It was a recognition by Canadian policymakers that the 
strategic management of Canada's relations with the Community .in 
the years to come would have to be broadened from the prevailing, 
and some would say, "toxic" focus on trade irritants. The TAD was 
important because it brought grist to the mill. The question was 
whether it could be made into a vehicle of real cooperation in the 
1990s. While it obviously cannot be compared to the roles played 
by NATO and the CSCE as pillars in Canada's European framework, it 
did act as the foundation of a renewed effort to strengthen 
Canada's approach to the European Conmunity.
But what the Declaration did not do is to introduce any 
fundamental changes to existing institutional mechanisms, 
particularly not to the unfulfilled 1976 Framework Agreement; there 
were no binding contractual commitments to make the TAD '.real' . 
That is to say, because the TAD has such a broad, all-encompassing 
mandate, there was a concern that mechanisms set up under it to 
facilitate political ties would become ritualistic (as some
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observers contended existing bilateral mechanisms already were)..
Were false expectations - a la the "Third Option" - once more 
being, created? One cannot help being reminded of a former Liberal 
External Affairs Minister, who, in reflecting on the disappointment 
of the "Third Option," said he could not help being reminded about 
"sound and fury signifying nothing" and then changed the metaphor 
to the "mountain labouring and. bringing, forth a mouse". Because 
the TAD was a strengthening of Canada's European policy by another 
name, great care must be taken that the public, politicians, and 
bureaucrats judge the declaration on its own merits, rather than on 
ulterior motives and desires that Canada and the EC have failed to 
agree on.54 This may prevent the feelings of cynicism that have 
dogged the Framework Agreement for the past decade.
Even more sceptically, and less generously,, between November 
1990 and 1993 it is hard to see the immediate substantive results 
of the Declaration apart from institutionalizing high-level 
political contact.55 After all, the bilateral Canada-EC memoranda 
of understanding (MOUs) and mutual recognition agreements (MRAs) on 
a number of issues (e.g., competition policy, fisheries, standards, 
Science and Technology) and that will be discussed, in greater 
detail in Chapters Nine and Ten, would have- been negotiated 
irrespective of the TAD's existence. Moreover, with regard to the 
big, highly politicized bilateral issues such as the offshore 
fisheries dispute (see discussion in Chapter Nine), it is.difficult 
to conclude with any certainty that Portuguese and Spanish fleets 
began to respect the NAFO quotas for fish caught off Canada's.East
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Coast as a result-of Prime Minister Mulroney's entreaties during 
his private meetings held in April 1993 (under the auspices of the 
TAD) with the Portuguese president of the European Council and the 
President Delors of the Commisison.
Furthermore, this study's description of the process leading 
up the issuance of the TAD reinforces the perception that the 
conduct of. U.S. foreign policy limits the options available in the 
conduct of Canadian foreign policy. ‘ This has both positive and 
negative consequences for Canada. On the one hand, without the 
cooperation of the U.S., Canada would not have achieved the 
institutionalization of high level political links in such a short 
time-frame.. On the. other hand, the process of achieving the-‘TAD 
.had also, in European eyes, no doubt reinforced the traditional 
"two pillar" theory of bilateral relations in which Canada either 
had to be excluded entirely or included in the American pillar. 
Despite having provided the text for the TAD, it was not clear that 
Canada was viewed by the EC as anying other than an adjunct of the 
U.S.; once more there were suspicions on' the Canadian side that the 
EC had difficulty in making clear distinctions between Canadian and 
U.S. interest's.
Perhaps the best way of putting the development of the TAD 
into perspective is to note that there was no one predominant 
causal factor: not- the momentum of EC-U.S. discussions (although 
they undoubtedly had an important trigger effect) nor the effect 
of the dramatic geopolitical developments in Eastern Europe on the 
thinking of the Canadian Cabinet (i.e., would they have been as
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desirous of an Agreement if the U.S. had not been engaged in 
negotiations?); nor the role played by Canadian officials, 
primarily at EAITC in interpreting and reacting to the developments 
in Eastern and Western Europe by undertaking two major reviews of 
Canada's policy framework towards the regions. Rather, these were 
all mutually reinforcing variables.
What does the TAD say about the manoeuverability of a middle • 
power such as‘ Canada in the post-Cold War era? While the musings of 
Clark on the desirability of a transatlantic trade agreement, 
spawning his Department1s short-lived Canada-EC working group, did 
not bring about any direct results and has only a tenuous link to 
the political, document that is the TAD, nevertheless this action 
along with the Government's other internal reviews in 1989 and 1990 
of its European policy framework highlights the Canadian desire to 
strengthen ties to Europe.56 The process of negotiating the TAD 
itself shows Canada as the demandeur in the negotiations, and as. 
highly dependent on its relations with Member States, specifically 
the UK and Germany, to ensure policy outcomes in its favour. 
Canada's courting of the EC can also be linked to Prime Minister 
Mulroney's ambition to be seen as an international statesmen (as he 
had been on gaining the support ' of the Commonwealth to impose 
sanctions on South Africa in the mid-1980s) . The personal challenge 
for him between 1989 and 1991 was how to insert Canada as a major 
player in the refashioning of the post-Cold War order.57 All in all, 
the processes leading up to and including the TAD demonstrate three 
aspects of Canada as a middle, power in the post-Cold War era. The
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first is Canada's ability to modulate U.S. tendencies towards 
bilateralism. The Canadian TAD was Ottawa's attempt in light of the 
tremendous changes in Europe to create a •lever; - it was and is 
Ottawa's most visible attempt not to be left out of the Washington- 
Brussels axis. Second, it. demonstrated Canada's capacity to 
leverage its limited clout by acting quickly and persuasively to 
influence its larger international interlocutors. Finally, we are 
left with the irony that- if the TAD is considered a limited 
"counterweight" to the Washington-Ottawa axis, its achievement was 
inextricably tied to.the momentum of EC-U.S. relations.
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PAST THREE
POST-TAD CANADA-EC RELATIONS AND THE SOURCES OF CHANGING
TRANSATLANTICISM
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CHAPTER EIGHT
THE STATE OF CANADA-EUROPEAN COMMUNITY ECONOMIC RELATIONS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The following three chapters examine post-TAD Canada-EC relations 
until the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, with 
particular emphasis on the nature of bilateral economic relations. 
This chapter, after profiling the domestic and international 
economic challenges facing Canada, analyzes the major trends in 
Canada-EC trade and investment-relations. Chapter Nine examines the 
Canadian response to the creation of a Single European Market and 
assesses whether the fears of "Fortress Europe" were well founded. 
Chapter Ten, after looking at Canada's position within the Triad 
and the Community's changing relative position in the international 
system, studies Ottawa's calculations, of the benefits and drawbacks 
- in response t<? the SEM and the changing nature of threats in 
Europe - of a variety of frameworks to manage Canada-EC economic 
and political/security relations.
Economies converge toward-or diverge from each other depending 
upon the policy and institutional choices each country makes. If 
policy or institutional differences become too large, contends Nau, 
countries cannot achieve significant economic interdependence.1 
That is, if governments pursue divergent exchange rate policies, as 
they did in the 193 0s and to a lesser extent in the 1970s and early
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1980s, this will discourage-stable trade and investment flows. Nau 
points out that more deterministic approaches to international 
politics emphasize "the role of relatively long-term and deep- 
seated institutions or social coalitions in economic policy," while 
his public choice approach emphasizes the role of more "immediate" 
government policies at the domestic level (e.g., macroeconomic and 
microeconmic policy), exchange-rate policies, and trade policies.2
From an historical perspective, then, the reason for the high 
degree of transatlantic economic interdependence was that Western 
Europe and Canada had over the course of more than three decades 
adopted converging economic policies (e.g., pursued international 
trade liberalization, promoted stable exchange rates, and created 
regulatory institutions - to ensure greater transparency). As would 
be'expected, in the 1980s and early 1990s "domestic" policy choices 
on both sides, of the Atlantic in reaction to domestic interests and 
the changing dynamics of the international system, in part, 
determined the' level, of transatlantic economic interdependence. 
However, what differentiated interdependence in this decade from 
earlier decades was that it was no longer possible to draw a 
distinct separation between what was "domestic" and what was 
"international." Therefore, before looking at Canada-EC trade and 
economic relations, it is our purpose to provide a brief overview 
of both the domestic and international economic environments facing 
Canada in the post-TAD early 1990s.
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8.2 THE DOMESTIC ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT
8.2.1 Lack of Competitiveness
Following from the discussion in Chapter Three, starting in the 
early 1980s, a consensus had formed among both private and public 
sector elites that Canada was slipping further and further behind 
its major Asian and European’ competitors because of its long- 
protected industries and the low value-added of its exported goods. 
It was recognized that although Canada's trade-dependent economy 
was undergoing a painful transition to a more knowledge-intensive, 
and internationally-oriented economic base, its export. mix was 
still heavily dependent on raw materials and low manufactures. As 
outlined in Part Two of this study, to facilitate the. transition 
from a protected: economy to-a more liberal and competitive one, the 
Mulroney Government - betraying the protectionist legacies o.f 
previous Conservative governments. - adopted an outward-looking 
trade policy centred on the United States as one of its most 
important- policy levers. The Government committed itself to 
improving Canadian access to foreign markets through CUFTA, NAFTA, 
and the successful completion of the Uruguay Round;' ironically, 
just as the Government was making progress at the international 
level, it faced the more intransigent domestic, inter-provincial 
trade barriers that were costing the Canadian economy an estimated 
$5 billion annually.3
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The right mix of domestic policies was also seen to be 
critical to Canada's competitiveness. Adopting sound fiscal and 
monetary policies, creating a more skilled labour force, removing 
internal market barriers, establishing tax and regulatory policies 
that encouraged investment, and human resource development were all 
•essential ingredients in any framework to promote increased 
Canadian competitiveness. With an average rate of unemployment of 
10 per cent between 1988 and 1993 and a domestic economy.that was 
likely to ’ remain subdued for several years, Ottawa had a keen 
interest in assuring that all of rts economic policy levers were 
aligned with the objectives of improved international 
competitiveness. More specifically, increasing the exports of 
Canadian SMEs- the fastest growing segment of the private sector - 
was seen as critical to this enhanced national competitiveness 
because, as government economists had Calculated, every billion 
dollars in exports created 12,000 jobs in Canada.4
8.2.2 A  Service-Led Economy
Globalization created not only a more competitive environment for 
Canada but a qualitatively different one as well. For example, 
commercial services (i.e., those that could be traded5) accounted 
for perhaps 20 per cent - .or approximately $1 trillion - of world 
exports by the end of 1992.6 Given Canada's dependence on trade it 
was not surprising that services accounted for more than 60 per­
cent of national economic output and fully 72 per cent of all jobs
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- proportions that were likely to rise in the future.7 Although the 
manufacturing and resource sectors both remained critical to 
•generating economic value-added and export earnings, firms in these 
sectors also formed a core customer base for service providers 
since services typically represent a significant portion of the 
value of traded manufactured goods. Policies that promoted 
competitive service industries were therefore seen also to have a 
great potential to bolster Canada's manufacturing competitiveness. 
With one of the largest service sectors relative to GDP in the 
world, Canada had 'strengths in a number of commercial service 
industries - including telecommunications, insurance and other 
financial services, transportation, engineering, construction 
management, and various technical and professional services. These 
were precisely the industries most affected by the SEM.
8.2.3 Fiscal Disorder
But perhaps the single most important factor affecting Canada’s 
economic viability was its fiscal performance. In the space of 
little: mQre than a decade between 1981 and 1993 Canada's 
accumulated federal and provincial debt more than doubled, from $300 
billion, or around 42 per cent of GDP8, to close to $700 billion9, 
which represented over 95 per cent of GDP (in contrast, the U.S. 
ratio was only 51 per cent) . This made Canada one of the most debt- 
burdened countries in the industrial world; its debt.was greater 
than all the OECD countries except Belgium, Italy and Ireland. Even
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more troubling, however, was that by'1993 Canada owed $300. billion 
more to foreign creditors than it was owed. The high ratio of 
foreign indebtedness to overall economic resources was' also 
revealed by the fact that Canada's external debt was more than 165 
per cent of annual exports, the generally accepted measure of a 
country's ability to finance itself (in contrast, the U.S.'s 
external debt was 120 per cent of its exports; Japan' s was minus 75 
per cent) .10
This bleak and deteriorating fiscal picture ensured that for 
both the federal and provincial governments fighting the debt and 
deficit - through austerity programs and government downsizing - 
and enhancing national competitiveness - through, for example; 
increased R&D expenditure and government-funded trade promotion 
programs targetting SMEs - became twin and linked key national 
policy objectives by the late 1980s and early 1990s. Finally, 
Canada's economic recession starting in 1989 was exacerbated by the 
political instability arising from the failure of the Meech Lake 
constitutional accord in ,1987 and the subsequent rejection of the. 
Charlottetown accord in 1992,-both of which had been designed to, 
among other things, achieve a national consensus on Quebec's future 
role in Confederation.'
8.3 THE IMPACT OF GLOBALIZATION
If one were to try to separate out the "international" dimensions 
of Canada's policy environment from the above discussion, the major
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global factors shaping Canada's international economic, policy 
between 1983 and 1993 were: (1) globalization, characterized by
increased import penetration along with, as mentioned, the emphasis 
on knowledge-intensive production and trade-in services; (2) a more 
complex trade policy agenda (e.g., investment, intellectual 
property, research and technology, regulations of service, 
.industries, competition policy) ; . and (3.) regionalism (on the 
assumption that trade would continue to grow more within regions - 
in North America,, in Europe, .in Asia Pacific - than between them 
[see discussion in Chapter Ten]).
First, starting in the 1960s but particularly in the course of 
the 1980s, there were dramatic changes in industrial organization 
and international trade, with the latter led by knowledge-based 
industries and services.11 Previous declines in the relative value 
of natural resource and agricultural trade were thus accelerated.
Second, trade had become investment, driven, conducted on an 
intra-firm and intra-industry basis, particularly in OECD markets.12' 
For instance, there was a .four-fold increase in stock, of world 
outward.foreign direct investment from $519 billion in 1980 to $2 
trillion in 1992.13 As companies competed more and more on a global 
basis investment flows also grew almost four times as fast as trade 
flows.
Third, the emerging regionalism ^  Europe, Asia, North America 
— at the same time forced companies to develop a distinct presence 
. and approach for each region. As a result, companies themselves 
became more sophisticated; trade, technology and investment were
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now viewed as complementary tools to international business 
development.14 Despite the impressive growth, of trade in goods, 
cross-border flows of services, portfolio finance, foreign direct 
investment, and technology became the main forces driving 
international economic integration. : ■ •
As a result of the above trends, Canada's economy became much 
more open and exposed to international commerce, especially vis-a- 
vis its most important markets in the U.S., Europe and Japan. As 
Canada's total, world exports increased, reflecting in part 
industry's adjustment, to - the CUFTA, NAFTA, and the post-Uruguay 
Round, import penetration in the domestic market also increased. In 
1991, the share of the Canadian market for manufactured'goods held 
by imports reached a record 45 per cent, up from just 27 per cent 
in 1980.15
Another reaction to globalization was the changing composition 
of Canadian trade with the Triad between 1970 and 1990, with end 
products forming an increasing percentage of Canada's merchandise 
exports. In 1980, 23 per cent of Canadian manufacturing'shipments 
were exported. By 1993, the figure had approached.50 per cent.16 
However, as we shall see below, this dramatic shift to manufactured 
goqds was not reflected in the composition of Canada's exports to 
the EC, where there continued to be a substantial - if declining - 
dependence on raw. materials.
Lower tariff and non-tariff . barriers and the reduced 
requirement for suppliers to'be located close to manufacturers, of 
course raised the question of how prepared were Canadian SMEs. -
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touted by Ottawa as the.vanguard of economic recovery in the early 
1990s - to compete on a global basis. Despite the pace of 
globalization, it appears, that many firms lacked the necessary 
motivation to compete. Judging by the statistics, Canadian 
companies in general still felt they could survive and prosper by 
concentrating on domestic markets or by looking no further than the 
United.States. The statistics are telling: by 1993, 60.4 per cent 
of all Canadian exports were made by just 100 mostly-resource 
companies. More startling still, given Canada's dependence* on 
trade, was the fact that only 7.6 per cent of all Canadian firms 
exported, and only .15.4 per cent of those firms were listed as 
manufacturers. But most disturbing of all was the fact that SMEs, 
the only segment of the economy that had seen increases, in 
employment in the late 1980s, represented only 9 per cent of 
Canadian manufacturers' exports.17 Finally, when the Canada-U.S. 
trade figures and intra-firm transactions were calculated out of 
these numbers^ the number of SMEs involved in business transactions 
outside Canada's borders was even smaller.
In the face of this discouraging export performance, the 
Mulroney Government made substantial commitments to trade promotion 
and investment development programs' to encourage Canadian firms to 
diversify their markets Overseas. Veering away from the more 
universal export, programs of the past, Ottawa now employed a more 
targetted approach, anchored by SMEs, to secure, global niches in 
those knowledge-intensive industries (e.g. telecommunications, 
biotechnology, etc.) and Services where Canada had and could have
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a competitive advantage.16 But resources alone could not change 
attitudes.- Canada's dependence on resource-based production, close 
proximity to the U.S., limited size, and its high dependence on 
foreign investment, had all historically combined to undermine the. 
incentives to develop a more outward-oriented economy.
On the matter of .investment, the CUFTA marked a significant 
change in attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
Canadian economy. It put an end to a 100-year strategy of 
encouraging investment in Canada to serve the Canadian.market. In 
fact, until as late as 1984, Canadian officials were still not 
permitted to promote outward direct investment.19 Time had eroded 
the relevance of such a strategy, however. By the mid-1980s, Canada 
- through. Investment Canada20 - began to compete actively for 
investment to serve the North American market arid global markets, 
a trend which was to accelerate with the creation of a free trade 
area in North America. With regard to Europe, as opposed to 
previous • decades when the Canadian government's emphasis was on 
promoting Canadian exports, it now included the aggressive 
promotion of outward and inward investment in response to the 
creation of the SEM.21
With the above analysis on the domestic and. international 
economic challenges facing the Canadian economy, the next section 
examines the bilateral Canada-EC economic relationship.
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8.4 BILATERAL CANADA-EC TRADE AND INVESTMENT FLOWS 
8.4.1 Trade
Although the EC was, after the United States, Canada's second 
largest trading partner, by the end of’1993 trade with the EC 
accounted for only about 8 per cent of Canada's total world 
merchandise trade. Tables 5 and 6 (in Appendix 3) show Canada's 
trading relationship with the EC since 1957. Figure 3 provides a 
visual representation of trade and investment flows.
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Significantly, during the decade of the 1980s, the benign neglect 
of Canada-EC relations and the renewed attention to the U.S. market 
were reflected in a steady erosion of the Canada-EC trading 
relationship. In 1982, for instance, Canada's exports to the EC 
accounted for 9 per cent of total exports and imports accounted for
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8.4 per cent; by 1993, Canadian exports to the EC amounted to 5.7
per cent of total exports and imports accounted for 8.7 per cent of
total imports. In marked contrast, Canada became more dependent on 
the U.S. market over the same time period: in 1982, the U.S. was 
the destination of 68.2 per cent of Canada's merchandise exports 
and the source of 70.5 per cent of Canada's imports; by 1993
Canada's exports to the United States totalled 80.7 per cent while 
its imports from the United States were 67 per cent. In the period 
since the. CUFTA went into effect in 1989, Canada's trade with the 
U.S. as a percentage of its world trade, increased by almost 2 per 
cent annually (see discussion in next chapter on the trade 
diversion effects of NAFTA).. In the same time period, Canadian 
exports to Asian markets remained level in percentage- terms, 
hovering just below 10 per cent. And as shown in Figure 3 and Table 
5, in 1984 Canadian exports to Asia for the first time surpassed 
Canadian exports to the EC. For the EC, meanwhile, trade, with
Canada represented less than 1 per cent of its total world trade.
From the creation of the EC in 19-57 until 1984, Canada had 
usually posted an overall trade surplus with the EC, except in 
1975. However, the relative stability in exports to the EC (due to 
a favourable Canadian exchange rate), coupled with the increase in 
imports from the EC, combined to produce for the first time a 
deficit of slightly more than $1 billion in 1984. In 1993, the 
deficit for bilateral trade with the EC amounted to $4.1 billion. 
If one includes the EFTA members to create, the European Economic 
Area, this trade deficit increased to $5:3 billion.22
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If we look.at Canada's trading relations in terms of blocs, 
trade- figures show that Canada's total trade with the U.S. rose 
throughout the course of the 1980s and early 1990s. It rose with 
Latin America in the early 1990s23, in general was flat with Europe 
(i.e., comprising the EC, EFTA, and some of the larger Centra! and 
East European countries), and declined with the Pacific Rim (from 
$17.1 billion in 1988 to 15.7 billion in 1992). In fact, in the 
same way that Canadian observers had anticipated the trade- 
diverting effects of the Community's creation in 1957 and again 
when Britain joined (recall the description in Chapter Four), the 
creation of. the SEM once more raised the question of whether 
renewed European economic integration (this time through increases 
in intra-EC trade and EFTA preferences)24 - 'in terms of their trade- 
diverting and trade-creating effects - would be protectionist or 
trade-liberating for Canada..
As we shall discuss in Chapters Nine and Ten, the process of 
European integration could also be seen as an incentive for North 
American integration. There was concern among some analysts in 
Canada that the CUFTA was contributing to more trade creation in 
North America and less trade diversification away from North 
America.25- The Mulroney Government had, after all, predicted that 
CUFTA, by making Canadian firms more competitive, would lead to' 
greater not lesser trade diversification. To take an example, 
between. 1992 and 1993 Canadian exports to the U.S. increased by 
more than the increase in its exports to all other OECD members 
combined, thus further reinforcing the world's largest bilateral
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trading relationship (valued in excess of $200 billion annually or 
almost ten times that of Canada-EC trade).
In addition to the erosion of the transatlantic trading 
relationship, another characteristic of Canada's trade with the EC 
was its weakness in manufactured exports as indicated in 
Figure 4. This confirmed the maxim about Canada's role in global 
commerce, namely, that it was "a hewer of wood and drawer of 
water". Trade opportunities for Canada in Europe fell into two 
basic categories: the price-sensitive and the less price-sensitive.
Canadian Merchandise Trade with Europe
Imports
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The former included most forestry products, metals and minerals, 
construction materials, fish and other unprocessed products. 
Despite improvement, notably the rise of office machinery and 
equipment which comprised Canada's third largest export to the EC 
in 1993, Canadian exports continued to be concentrated in 
fabricated and crude materials. In fact, the two main exports
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during the period examined in this study were (and continue to be) 
wood pulp and similar pulp, and softwood lumber, and newsprint - 
worth $3.1 billion in 1992 or fully 27 per cent of the value of 
Canada's total exports to the EC - with other metals in ores coming 
in fifth place (see impact of EC phytosanitary requirements on 
Canadian lumber exports in. Chapter Nine). Neither Japan nor the 
United States were the recipients of such a highly resource- 
dependent export mix.from Canada. By contrast, imports from the EC 
- with the exception of crude oil - consisted mostly of end 
products and fabricated materials such as airplanes/automobiles, 
and auto parts, with organic chemicals strongly represented.
On the services side, nearly 60 per cent of Canada's business 
services receipts were attributed to the United States, half from 
related companies. Corroborating the earlier observation about the 
increased trade in services worldwide, Table 7 (in Appendix 3) 
indicates that there was an extraordinary 80 per cent increase in 
Canada's exports of business services to the EC between 1986 and 
1992, due. in large measure to the creation of the SEM, with this 
area making.up 17 per cent of total receipts with over 30 per cent 
from affiliates. The most important business services sectors for 
Canada were' transportation, insurance, financial, and 
communications services.26 Not surprisingly, the patterns of 
Canada's service, trade with the EC mirrored the pattern of its 
goods exports, with the UK by far the. largest market. But as large 
an increase as there was in service exports to the EC, service 
sales to the EC nevertheless made up a declining percentage of
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Canada's world service exports.
8.4.2 Investment
8.4.2.1 Trends and Characteristics of Canadian FDI
Canada was a significant exporter of capital during the 1980s.27- 
Between 1982 and 1993, the stock of Canadian- foreign direct 
investment abroad (CFDI) more than' tripled from $35.6 billion to 
$115 billion, increasing .at a faster pace than the global stock- of 
direct investment and as a greater percentage of Canadian GDP {from 
8.7 per cent to 14.4 per cent).28 What factors accounted for the 
dramatic increase in Canadian FDI observed in Tables 8 and 9? How 
did the geographic distribution of Canadian FDI change between 1970 
and 1990? Was there a marked shift in its industrial composition - 
away from primary and resource-based manufacturing industries 
towards services and technology-intensive manufacturing industries? 
And how did these trends affect Canada's investment patterns with 
regard to the Community?
To answer the above questions, it would be helpful to first 
examine.three broad trends in CFDI: (1) a much faster growth rate
in CFDI abroad than in inward foreign direct investment to Canada; 
(2) a decline in the U.S. share of CFDI in the second half of the 
1980s, largely in favour of Europe (see Table 10);. and (3) the 
increasing importance of the financial services and chemicals and 
chemical products industries.29 In 1993, research by Industry
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Canada, building on earlier work by Dunning, Cantwell, Rugman and 
Globerman, examined some of the major push and pull factors that 
explain the rapid expansion of CFDI relative to incoming foreign 
direct investment into Canada. Those factors include a recession in. 
the late 1980s . that -pushed investment away from Canada, the 
changing structure of international commerce, the changing 
profitability of foreign locations, increased non-tariff barriers, 
exchange rates, and greater aggregate demand in Canada.30 The 
conclusion drawn from this research was.that the increased outward 
orientation of Canadian firms was due less to exchange rate and 
labour force costs31, and more to the emergence of mature and strong 
Canadian firms, the increased importance of scale economies, the 
threat of non-tariff trade protection in the U.S. and post-1992 
Europe, the need for market diversification, and-the emergence of 
niche markets.32
Based .on the statistical ‘ data in tables on the following;- 
pages, how'wefl" do the general observations about changing Canadian
investment trends and patterns account for the nature of Canada's> ■
investment toward the Community? As Tables 8, 9 and 10 show>
Canadian FDI to the EC increased by more than 500 per cent between 
1982 and 1993, although it had stagnated during the early 1980s. By 
the end of 1991 a historic high of 21.1 per cent of all Canadian 
foreign direct investment abroad was in the EC, with the greatest 
percentage of investment flow and stock in the UK.33
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Table 8:
CANADIAN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (CFDI) 
IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1971^1993
(Cdn. $ million)
Country 1971 1979 1982 1984 1986
France 87 278 229 121.  . 402
Germany 87 327 269 415 649
Netherlands 33 211 277 434 572
Belg./Lux. 35 68 63 101 146
Italy 46 112 122 141 225
U .K .  * - 218 8 277 9 . 341 5 45 5 8
Spain* -  .. ■ - - 186
Portugal* . - - - ■ - 19
Greece* - - 189 285 , 2 85
Denmark* - 125 74 39 22
Ireland* - 148 39 4 622 785
Total CFDI In 
EC
288 3,457 4,396 5,573 7,849
Total CFDI 6 , 5 3 8 2 0 , 4 9 6  . . • 3 5 ,5 5 8 4 7 , 4 2 2 5 8 , 4 9 2
CFDI in EC as 
% of total
4 . 4 1 6 . 8 1 2 . 4 1 1 . 8 13 .4.-
CFDI in U . S . - 3 , 3 9 9 1 2 , 1 6 5 ; . . 2 3 , 7 8 1 3 2 , 1 5 1 . 39 ,42 -4
CFDI in U . S .  ~ 
as % of total
5 2 . 0 5 9 . 4 6 6 . 9 6 7 . 8 . 6 7 . 4 .
CFDI in Japan 58 82 110 . 231 225
CFDI in Japan ' . 
as % of total
0 . 9 0 . 4 0 : 3 0 . 5 . 0 - 4
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CANADIAN FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (CFDI) 
IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1971-1992
_________ (Cdn: $ million)
Country 1988 1990 • 1991 1992 1993
France 1,450 1, 671 1,715 1,970
Germany . 666 837 .868 1,066
Netherlands 836 1,528 1,602 1,557
•Belg./Lux. 410 625 852 1,349
Italy 178 3 68 853 839
U.K.' 7,050 11,292 12,269 11,360
Spain 271 541 • '440 401
Portugal 106 110 162 176
Greece 76 89 89 91
Denmark 22 46 34 36
Ireland 814 939 1,102 1,766
Total CFDI 
In EC
11,879 . 18,046 19,986 20,611 22,763
Total'Can. FDI 72,146 87,886 94,435 106,534 115,375
CFDI in EC as 
% of total
16.5 20.5 21.1 19.3 ■ 19.7
CFDI 
in U.S.
46,497 52,800 54,639 61,.527 65,072
CFDI in U.S. 
as.% of total " '
64.4 60.1 57.9 57.8 =T 56.4
CFDI in 
Japan
• 354 770 1,721 2,641 2,973
• CFDI in Japan 
as % of total
0.5 0.9 !. 8 2.5 ’ .2.6
Source: Canada's International Investment Position, Statistics Canada, cat. 67-202 Historical 
Statistics, 1926-92 and cat. Sl-202, 1993.
Note: Figures for the final two years may not be strictly comparable with previous years.
* Figures are not provided for years prior to a country's membership in the EC.
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TABLE 9
CFDI ABROAD 1980-91 (CSMILLION)
YEAR UNITED
STATES
EC JAPAN OTHER TOTAL
1980 16,781 . 4,440 109 5,637 26,967
1981 22,356 4,827 99 6,565 33,847
1982 23,781 4,612 110 7,055 35,558 -
1983 26,576 4,076 200 9,007 39,859
1984 '32,151 5,573 231 9,467 47,422
1985 ' 37,074 6,803 232 10,014 54,123
1986 39,424 7,849 225 10,994 58,492
1987 43,365 10,395 242 12,792 66,794
1988 46,497 11,880- 354 13,415 72,146
1989 50,341 15,200 395 14,843 80,779
1990 52,800 18,046 770 16,270 87,886
1991 54,639 19,988 1,721 18,087 94,435
1992 61,527 20,611 2,641 21,755 106,534
1993 65,072 22,763 2,973 24,567 115,375
Increase
1983-88
(%)
80 134 77 . 81
Annual 
av'ge ($) .
3,984 1,361 51 6,457
Increase
1988-92
(%)
30 - 73 646 48
Annual 
av'ge ($)
3,757 ' ’ 2,183 577 8,597
Source: Table 9, Jorge Niosi. 'Foreign Direct Investment in Canada.' in Lorraine Eden, ed.. Multinationals in North America 
(Calgary: University of Calgary Press and Industry Canada. 1994), p..380; and author's calculations.
TABLE 10:
RELATIVE DISTRIB. OF CFDI ABROAD IN %
YEAR UNITED STATES EC OTHER TOTAL
1951 78.2 6.9 14,9 100
1961 66.4 13.2 20.4 100
1971 52.0 14.3 33.7 100
1981 66.1 14.3 19.6 100
1984 71.7 oo VO 19.4 100
1988 64.4 16.5 19.1 100
1991 57.9 21.1 21.9 100
1993 56.4 19.7 23.9 100
320
TABLE 11:
FDI (SU.S. In the U.S. On Historic Cost Basis 1985-1991 
billion) '
YEAR EC Japan Canada Other Total
1985 107.1 19.3 .17.1 41.1 100
1986 124.8 23.4 18.3 42.8 100
1987 161.0 34.4 24.7 43.3 100
1988 108.2 5.1.1 26.6 48.9 100
1989 212.3 67.3. 30.4 58.9 100
1990 224.4 81.8 30 60.5 100
1991 231.9 86.7 30 59.4 100
Source: U.S. Dept, of Commerce, U.S. Survey o f Current Business, various issues.
A number of other significant trends also come to light. In 
the three-year period between 1989 and 1991, why for instance was 
CFDI in the EC for the first time higher than CFDI in the rest of 
the world (denoted as "other" in Table 9 and excluding the U.S. and 
Japan)? And based on Tables 10 and 11, what would account for the 
startling fa<t£ that beginning in 1988 the - annual ^percentage 
increases in ^ CFDI flowing into the EC exceeded that flowing into 
the United States. At first glance, this would appear to have been 
very unusual given the U.S.'s proximity and historic source of 
foreign investment. Indeed, according to Table 10, the share of 
Canadian FDI going to .the U.S. dropped from 71.7 per cent in the 
mid-1980s to 56.4 per cent by the end of 1993, with the relative 
decline'being picked up by Europe whose share went from 8.9 per 
cent in 1984 to 19.7 per cent in 1993.
One explanation for this development is that real aggregate 
demand in.the U.S. between 1980 and 1985 increased by 3.4 per cent, 
compared to only about 0.9 per cent in the EC. Thereafter, the
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cent between 1985 and 1992; meanwhile, the real aggregate demand of 
the EC increased by 3.1 per cent in the same time period, with the 
significant improvement in the relative-profit position of the UK 
reflected in its position as the major host of Canadian FDI in 
Europe.34 Another explanation is the "aggressiveness" of Canadian 
firms. The total growth of Canadian FDI in the EC from 1984 to 1990 
was about 10 times less than that of American investment over the 
same time period ($12 billion compared to U.S.$100 billion). This 
meant- that, proportionate to the size of their economies (the U.S. 
economy is about 10 times bigger than Canada's), the increase of 
Canadian investment in :the EC was about the same as that of
American investment. In fact, it would appear that Canadian firms 
were just, as aggressive as their U.S. counterparts.. This is because 
U.S. investment stock was mature. Therefore, much of the annual 
capital flows into the EC . were reinvested earnings.35 Canadian 
capital flows_had also been in re-invested earnings but there had 
been a greater degree than the U.S. of greenfield investment or 
acquisitions. In sum, the explanation for the sharp increase in 
CFDI in the EC between 1986 and 1991 appears to rest on: (!) the
magnetic pull of Western Europe with the formation.of the SEM and
the associated fear of a "Fortress Europe"; and (2) the increased 
"aggressiveness" and global orientation of Canadian firms.
The first conclusion in the above explanation is supported by 
the fact that with the completion of the SEM, the pull of Western 
Europe as a host of CFDI waned. As shown in Table 10, after 1991 
there was a decline in the annual percentage increases in CFDI in
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the EC, a decline in CFDI in the EC as a percentage of total CFDI, 
and a noticeable diversion of Canadian investment away from both 
the Community and the United States to Asia and Latin America.-
On the second conclusion concerning th<e outward orientation of 
Canadian firms, since the purpose of this chapter is to outline the 
•general trends in. Canada-EC economic relations,, the detailed 
examination Canadian private sector strategies in response to the 
SEM will be left to the n^xt chapter. Suffice it to note here that 
the Canadian private sector's response to the emergence of the SEM 
must be differentiated between large firms and SMEs. Therefore, 
following from our description of the Canadian private sector's 
orientation in Chapter Three, the characterization of Canadian 
investment towards Europe as "aggressive" can only be ascribed 
legitimately to the few, very large (with annual sales in excess of 
$5 billion) Canadian multinationals which made significant 
investments in niche markets .in Western Europe (see Appendix Three, 
Table 17). Canadian SMES, as pointed out earlier in this chapter, 
were not outward-oriented (unlike for example those of -Germany, a 
country with a similarly high trade/GDP ratio) , and, if they 
exported and invested at all, were preoccupied with the 
ramifications of North American rather .than European free trade. 
Further to this point, Niosi hypothesizes that smaller Canadian 
firms preferred to invest and/or transfer technology to the United 
States rather than to.the EC, probably because of more limited 
resources and knowledge of the European markets.36
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TABLE 12: COMPOSITION OF CANADIAN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EC, 
1985-91 (C$million)
INDUSTRY
YEARS INCREASE (%)
1985 1988 1991 1985-88 1985-91
Beverages 1,424 2,431 2,789 71 15
Non-ferrous metals 1,784 2,109 3,292 18 56
Wood and Paper products 721 1,716 2,608 138 52
Iron and iron products 187 . 553 . 801 196 133
Chemical and allied products 254 257 495 1 93
Other manufacturing 130 318 548 145 . 72
Manufacturing subtotal 4,499 7,384 10,531 64 43
Merchandising 201 387 451 93 17
Mining and Smelling 130 73 • 151 -44 107
Petroleum and Natural Gas 655 856 1,055 31 .23
Utilities 166 30 164 -82 447
Financial 1,054 2,617 1,474 148 -44
Other Enterprises 98 534 1,230 445 130
Total 6,803 11,880 19,998 75 __ 68
Source: Table' 11, Jorge Niosi, "Foreign Direct Investment in Canada," in Lorraine Eden, ed.. Multinationals in North America (Calgary: University of Calgary Press and Industry Canada, 
1994), p. 382 based on Statistics.Canada, Canada's International Investment Position. Historical Statistics 1926-1991, Cat. 67-202, (Ottawa, 1992).
With . regard to the composition of CFDI in the EC, as Table 12 
shows, the growing share of services and technology-intensive 
•industries is. consistent with the structural changes in the global 
economy .mentioned earlier, such as the decline in prices of 
resources and resource-based manufacturing and the liberalization 
of financial services. But despite a discernible shift in the 
composition of Canada's worldwide CFDI, it is noteworthy that the
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shift was less.pronounced in CFDI in the EC, where resources and 
resource-based manufacturing (e.g., non-ferous metals and wood and 
paper products) continued to account for a large share, due in 
large part to. the types of Canadian firms doing the- investing. That 
is, not only were the foreign activities of Canadian firms highly 
concentrated, with the top 20 firms in 1991 contributing to about 
80 per cent of the total foreign assets and sales of all Canadian 
MNEs37, but these same firms' activities were concentrated in the 
resources sectors (see Appendix 3, Table. 17). Thus it was not 
surprising that, as Table 12 points out, in 199i manufacturing 
accounted for 53 per cent (or $10.5 billion) of the total stock of 
CFDI in the EC, down from 66 per cent in 1985. Much of this 
investment in 1991 was concentrated in non-ferrous metals (31 per 
cent), beverages (26 per cent), and wood/paper products (25 per 
cent) - which had shown significant increases especially between 
1985 and 1988. Financial services (a traditional sector), including 
corporate/personal banking, investment dealers, and i^nsurance, 
accounted for a still significant but declining share- of CDIA, 
amounting to 7 per cent of the total in 1991. Also significant was 
that more than 10' per cent of: Canadian investments was in computer 
technology (in the .category "Other Enterprises"). The 
petroleum/natural gas sector accounted for an additional 5 per cent 
of Canadian investment in the Community. The industrial composition 
of this investment reflected Canada's traditional strengths-and the 
international presence of Canada's computer and electronics firms.
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8.4•2.2 Canada as a Host of EC Investment
Since this chapter is measuring the level of Canada-EC economic 
interdependence, it cannot ignore the Community's stake in its 
economic relations with Canada. While European companies were 
preparing themselves for a more open internal market, many EC firms 
turned to North America in the. late 1980s, partly in response to 
the CUFTA. As EC MNEs advanced their relative global positions, by 
1990 their overseas investment* in North America was larger by far 
than North American (Canada and the U.S.) FDI in the EC. The 
Community's FDI into Canada during the period 1983 to the end of 
1992 rose from $13.4 billion (17.3 per cent of total inward 
investment stock) to $31 billion (23 per cent of total inward 
investment stock), with the UK accounting for more than half the 
investment. While the previous discussion showed how important the 
UK was as-a destination for Canadian FDI, Canada was also important 
for the UK - ranking fourth as a destination of UK investment; over 
650 British firms had subsidiaries in Canada.3® From Table 13, the 
annual average increase between 1983 and 1988 was $2.3 billion and 
slowed to $1.9 billion annually on average between 19-88 and 1991; 
between 1987 and 1988 EC FDI in Canada increased by. a startling 20 
per cent. In 1989-90,' the EC, as the second largest source of total 
FDI stock in Canada, had the distinction of, in aggregate, 
replacing for the first time the United States as the leading 
foreign investor (in terms of annual inflows) in Canada. Canada had 
become as attractive a destination for European■investment as the
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United States.
TABLE 13:
TOTAL FDI IN CANADA 1950-91 (CSMILLION)
YEAR UNITED STATES EC JAPAN OTHER TOTAL
1950 3,549 468* . 81 4,098
1965 14,408 3,075 10 371 17,864
1983 58,446 13,454 1,611 ‘3,902 77,413
. 1984 63,355 14,118 1,790 4,122 83,385
1985 66,013 14,860 1,925 . 4,428 87,226
1986 67,025 18,164 2,291 4,921 92,401
.1987 71,806 20,485 2,479 7,073 101,843.
1988 73,710 24,963 3,149 8,723 110,545
1989 78,217 • 27,488 4,104 9,149 118,958 ’
1990 80,931 31,094 4,138 10,425 126,588
1991 83,775 30,786 ' 5,345 11,724 131,630
Increase 1.983-88
%
25 88 106 131 43
Annual av’ge ($) 2,943 2,380 340 1,019 6,681
Increase 1988-91
%
Annual av’ge ($)
14 s” .23 70 34 19 _
3,355 1,941 732 1,000 7,028 -
N o tes:‘Figure for the UK only.
Source: From Table 1A in Jorge Niosi, 'Foreign Direct Investment in Canada,' in Lorraine Eden, ed„ Multinationals in North America (Calgary: University of Alberta and Industry 
Canada, 1994), p. 370.
To what can we attribute the large jump in annual Canada-EC 
investment flows.between 1986 and 1990 and the combined $50 billion- 
in investment stock? No doubt they are in great measure, a function 
of the magnet pulls of both North American and European' economic 
integration, and the significant.degree of globalization underway 
that was discussed earlier in this chapter. In terms of North
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America, it should be noted that the substantial growth of FDI 
flows had also greatly increased the economic linkages between the 
EC and the United States. In 1991, for example (see Table 11) EC 
investors owned more than half the FDI stocks in the U.S., while 
two-fifths of American-owned FDI stocks were located in the EC. At 
historical prices, these investments together were worth more than 
U.S. $420 billion.39
The growth evident in bilateral North America-EC investment 
flows thus supports the thesis that globally growth in foreign 
investment was outstripping growth in world merchandise trade. For 
this reason, it was clear that investment would be of increasing 
importance in Canada's relations with the EC. For example, as the 
trade statistics show., the precipitous decline in average annual 
percentage increases in the value of Canadian exports to the EC 
between 1986 and 1990 (e.g., from 18 per cent average annual
increases between 1986-1988 to 4 per cent between 1988 and 1990) 
and which turned into annual percentage declines from 1990 to 1993, 
were partially offset by the annual percentage increases in 
Canadian FDI flows during the same time-period. This shift in the 
value and nature of Canada's economic links to the Community can be 
explained not only by the trade-diverting aspects of, say, the 
CUFTA and NAFTA, but also by Canadian companies having decided to 
replace their exports by investment in the Community. The trade- 
investment link will be explored in greater detail in the next 
chapter.
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8.4.2.3 Policy Implications of Investment Regimes
What, then, were the policy implications for Ottawa of (1) the high 
level of CFDI, and (2) the high level of CFDI in the Community? 
With the rapid increase in Canadian investment.abroad, there was 
more pressure on Ottawa, not surprisingly, to create effective 
international investment regimes.’ For this reason, Canadian 
policymakers pressed for a number of initiatives, including the 
inclusion of investment provisions in both the CUFTA and the NAFTA, 
the review of the OECD Code of Liberalization in Capital Movements, 
the OECD Code of National Treatment Instrument (NTI), the trade- 
related investment measures (TRIMs) in the MTN, and the bilateral 
foreign investment protection agreements. The concern from the 
Canadian standpoint was that without a single European standard of 
entry for investment (i.e., Article 58 of Treaty of Rome), it 
remained under-the jurisdiction of the individual Member States, 
allowing for'^ a wide variety of discrimination on foreign direct 
investment across the.Community.
As discussed earlier, from the EC's point of view, since 
Canada accorded national treatment on investment to the.U.S. under 
the CUFTA and with the improved North American investment - regime 
under . NAFTA, similar treatment was of interest to the EC and the 
Member States, particularly without an OECD-wide obligation for 
Canada to extend the CUFTA threshold levels for foreign direct 
investment. In 1993 threshold levels were still higher' for*U.S.
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investors than they were for investors of- other countries. This 
issue was an irritant for EC countries and arose in the context of 
the OECD Code of Liberalization of Capital'Movements, since the 
preferential treatment accorded to the U.S. was inconsistent with 
the non-discrimination obligation of the Code. What this meant was 
that the NAFTA, through its substantial liberalization of 
investment and services, would benefit, those EC. interests (across 
most sectors with the exception of automobiles and textiles, where 
more stringent rules of origin applied) that already had a 
substantial business presence in one of the NAFTA countries.40
The Canadian side was slow to move on EC concerns, because 
even if it had extended thresholds to OECD member countries this 
would not have resulted in any reciprocal treatment for Canadian 
firms. This is because, as mentioned, the EC had no formal policy 
on foreign direct investment. Brussels had riot gained competence in 
this area froin either the Treaty of Rome or subsequent Community 
law. Thus, it-was the Member States, not- the European, Commission 
acting for the- Community, that had had to individually adhere to 
FDI-related international obligations in multilateral fora, such as 
the OECD, or in bilateral arrangements, such as bilateral 
investment treaties.41 In short, Canadian policymakers realized that 
they would receive nothing in return from the OECD Member States. 
This was a major . concern. given that a number of larger Member 
States (most notably France and Germany) - that presented 
significant markets for Canada- - had corisiderable and effective 
formal and informal barriers to inward foreign investment.42
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8.5 The Context of Canada-EC Economic Relations
Having examined the trade and investment trends and before going on 
♦
in Chapter Nine to discuss the.Canadian reaction to the SEM, it is 
important first to understand the context of Canada's economic 
relationship with the EC. This includes. Canada's relative place in 
the EC's external relations, the level of tariff barriers facing 
Canadian goods, and the key bilateral trade irritants.
' *
8.5.1 The EC's Preferential Agreements
For both historic and economic reasons, the EC maintained a multi­
layer system of trade preferences vis-a-vis third countries on both 
a reciprocal and unilateral basis.43 About 60 per cent of EC 
imports originated from preferential sources, with the full Common 
Customs Tariff (CCT) applied only to - Canada, the U.S., Japan, 
Australia, New^Zealand, and South Africa. Preferences were granted 
in the context of free trade agreements, through a wide range of 
association and cooperation agreements44 and the Community's. 
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme.
The EC's external trade was conducted through a hierarchy of 
preferential trading agreements built around a network of about 50 
bilateral agreements introducing strong elements of discrimination 
into the multilateral trading system. ■ Its most important 
preferential ties were with other states in Europe, usually 
described as the first and second concentric circles of influence.
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The EFTA represented the first concentric circle of third 
countries and was the EC's largest single trading partner, 
accounting for more.than one-fifth of trade outside the Community. 
The EEA, ratified by all the.EFTA countries in 1993, promised to 
significantly expand the size and importance of the. SEM. Canadian 
policymakers anticipated that the EEA would be but a short step 
before some EFTA states received full EC membership, which happened 
on January 1, 1995 with the accession of Austria, Finland, and
Sweden. The second concentric ring represented the former COMECON 
states, most of which, ' after 1989,- had signed individual 
"association" agreements with Brussels.
The impact of the emergence, of a pan-European economic zone on 
Canada and other industrialized non-European middle-sized states 
(e.g., Australia, New Zealand) meant they were relegated further to 
the third, or outer, ring of the EC's external, relations. 
Policymakers in Ottawa watched. with some apprehension as the 
spillover from~the SEM program to the first and second '^ concentric 
circles" promised to lead to a further increase in intfa-European 
trade (see discussion in Chapter 10.2) and thus to fewer 
opportunities for Canadian products to' be price competitive.
8.5.2 The Impact of EC Tariff Rates on Canadian Exports
In general, EC tariffs on Canadian exports were relatively low. For 
instance, from the mid-1980s onwards, the simple average tariffs 
were 6.4 per cent for industrial products and 12.4 per cent for
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agricultural products (although it was less the tariffs that were 
a concern to third countries than the variable levies and quotas 
imposed . on agricultural exports).45 And with a range of raw 
materials - including wood pulp, hides and skin, unwrought copper, 
nickel matte and tin - subject to very low or zero tariffs, Canada, 
with a large proportion of its export mix (e.g., wood pulp) in raw 
materials, was affected less by EC tariffs than, say, the United 
States or Japan.
. However, this was not to say that tariff rates were not a 
concern for Ottawa. Since, the Commission imposed low or zero 
tariffs on primary., unprocessed products and increased its tariffs, 
as the degree of processing of a particular product increased, 
Canada faced particular barriers to the upgrading of its natural 
resource exports. For instance, a variety of other wood products 
(e.g., wood panels) faced a series of escalating tariffs the more 
these products were processed; semi-fabricated copper goods faced 
duties of 5 to 6 per cent; aluminium, lead, and zinc in metal form 
faced tariffs of 3 to 6 per cent; and steel faced both import 
quotas and tariffs.
The above description leads to two observations. First, the 
increasing depth and breadth of the EC's preferential trading 
arrangements with its European neighbours (see'Chapter 10.3.2.2 and 
10.3.2.3), including arrangements for freer trade in precisely' 
those sectors (e.g., most prominently wood products) that mattered 
the most to Canada's transatlantic trade, ensured that even a 1 or 
2 per cent tariff rate on Canadian products would make - them
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uncompetitive, in relation to the same tariff-free products entering 
the Community from Nordic or East European suppliers. And second, 
in the absence of a Canada-EC free trade agreement, it is easy to 
see why Canadian trade officials were especially motivated to use 
the MTN to push for zero tariffs across a range of products (e.g., 
steel, pharmaceuticals and medical equipment) but particularly for 
forestry products (including paper and wood)46 -
8.5.3 Bilateral Irritants
When combining the bilateral trade and investment flows, there is 
no question that the Community was and remains Canada's second most 
important economic partner* after the. United States. Given the 
overall volume of . economic ties it is not surprising that a number 
of major- trade conflicts arose over the years. For the most part, 
however, the EC and Canada were able to resolve their differences 
bilaterally through compromise: For a few seemingly intractable 
problems, both- sides' resorted to trade dispute .‘Settlement
mechanisms within the GATT framework.
What were the major bilateral trade irritants? From the
European perspective they included Canadian countervailing duties 
on certain EC beef exports, discriminating provincial liquor board 
practices, and the appropriation by Canadian winemakers of certain 
European geographical names. On the Canadian.side, they were the 
ban on certain sealskin; imports (effectively ending the
Newfoundland seal industry in the 1970s), the Commission's threat
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to ban furs from animals caught in leghold traps, allegations of 
European overfishing just outside Canada's 200-mile economic zone 
on its East Coast and Ottawa's subsequent ban (starting in 1986) of 
EC vessels from Canadian ports47, the allegedly reduced access to 
the EC market for Canadian grains due to the EC' s Common 
Agricultural Policy, the size of the Community's tariff-free quota 
for Canadian newsprint, and, as will be discussed in the next 
chapter, the impact, of plant health issues on the export of 
Canadian lumber.
To be sure, bilateral Canada-EC trade conflicts were 
overshadowed by the larger economic stakes in Canada-U.S. trade 
relations; nevertheless, the nature of the former disputes should 
not be downplayed since they-had very real domestic political and 
regional economic ramifications in Canada and tended to - as 
mentioned earlier in this study .- make bilateral relations appear 
irritant-driven to publics on both sides of the Atlantic. Not 
surprisingly,TEastern Canada, and specifically the Maritimes were 
most severely affected by the above-mentioned disputes.
The bilateral Canada-EC fisheries dispute [which would come to 
a head in March arid April 1995] perhaps best illustrates how the 
relationship was 'perceived by both sides. Although the fishing 
dispute had its origins in the early 1980s, it took another decade 
before the prospects of the eradication of certain fiish Stocks 
forced Ottawa to declare a moratorium on their harvesting and thus 
pushed Canada headlong into a conflict with the Europeans, who 
insisted that Canada was unreasonable and inflexible in its
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conservation policy and that several years of restructuring were 
needed before the Spanish and Portuguese fishing industries could 
adjust to. lower quotas. The.continued perception in Canada of the 
deleterious effects.of European overfishing, particularly by Spain 
and Portugal, in violation of NAFO quotas and after Ottawa had 
taken the decision in '1992 to shut down its own fisheries industry, 
ensured that there was considerable domestic political and economic 
pressure on Canadian politicians to confront Brussels. The dual 
economic and political pressure is easy to understand since with 
the largest source of employment in Newfoundland and Npva Scotia 
now gone and 3.0,000 workers unemployed, Ottawa was forced to 
increase its transfer payments and to offer compensation to the 
Maritime provinces - the traditional "have-nots"- of Canadian 
confederation. Although it would have been possible to sustain such 
expenditures in .previous decades, by the- early 1990s with 
recessions and-burgeoning provincial and federal debt the European 
actions (thei* Europeans considered themselves scapegoats for 
Canada's own mismanagement of its fish stocks) came to be seen $s 
an . attack on the very economic survival of Canada's Maritime 
provinces
Another important dispute was linked to a 1985 Canadian 
countervailing duty on European beef imports. Although the EC won 
a GATT ruling on a technical point (the cattlemen, as primary 
producers, did not have the "standing" to request the imposition of 
a duty on processed beef), Canada rejected the ruling and the 
countervailing duty remained in place. As we shall see in the next
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chapter, the EC's phytosanitary requirements, such as the concern 
over the pinewood nematode (PWN), also posed a serious restriction 
(depending on exchange rates) on exports of forestry exports,, a $30 
billion dollar export industry and Canada's second largest■export 
earner after automobiles and auto parts..
What can be concluded from the range of bilateral, irritants? 
First, the impact of the disputes was larger in certain regions 
than in others: in the case of forestry products, for example,
Eastern Canada (in particular Quebec and New Brunswick) suffered’ 
more than British Columbia, which had alternate markets in the 
Pacific Rim.
Second, with regard to the resolution of disputes, there 
appeared no interest by either side to use the bilateral mechanism, 
the Framework Agreement, that ostensibly had been set-up for this 
very purpose. Article II of the.Agreement, for example, discourages 
restrictive-trade practices by firms in either Canada or the EC and 
creates an obligation to resolve trade disputes by "cooperat[ing] 
at the international level and. bilaterally in the solution of 
commercial problems of common interest, and us[ing] [the parties'] 
best endeavours to grant each other the widest facilities for 
commercial transactions in which one or the other has an interest." 
Furthermore, Article IV provides the- rudiments of a dispute 
settlement mechanism. This article envisaged that the Joint 
Cooperation Committee (JCC) would meet at least once a year. The 
article stipulates that special meetings "...shall be held at the 
request of either Party. Subcommittees shall be constituted where
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appropriate in order to assist the Committee in the performance of 
tasks." In fact, the history of the JCC showed that it met 
infrequently - not once between 19,86 and 1989 - and had become a 
"rubber-stamp for industrial cooperation' and other bilateral 
activities in the area of environment and science and technology".48 
After analyzing the Agreement, Roseman criticized both Canada and 
the EC for the Framework Agreement's underutilization and went so 
far as to say that it was a "misused" resource.49 He advocated the 
selection of a few low-level trade irritants for resolution within 
the JCC to increase its credibility in the eyes of Canadian and 
European officials as well as the respective business communities. 
The suggestion was not adopted and trade disputes continued to be 
dealt with through GATT mechanisms or through the separate semi­
annual high-level consultations.
Third, as we will examine in greater detail in the next 
chapter, the re-regulation" of Europe fostered by the SEM in 
tandem with a^n increase in absolute terms of the volume of 
bilateral trade promised to cause more contested bilateral trade 
issues, not necessarily fewer. This would prove to be the 
necessary incentive to-re-examine the conflict resolution methods 
available to both parties and the utility of other bilateral trade 
.agreements (see Chapter 10.3). Finally, to put the impact of 
Cana;da-EC irritants on the bilateral trading relationship into 
perspective, it should be noted. that while bilateral irtitants 
affected approximately 10 per cent of two-way trade, or $2.5 
billion, in Canada’s much larger trading relationship with the
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United States they affected a smaller percentage - about 5 per cent 
- but a larger value at $15 billion.50
8.6 CONCLUSION
What concluding observations can be distilled from this chapter's 
analysis of bilateral trade . and investment flows? From. Ottawa's 
perspective, and borrowing from David Baldwin's analysis of 
"sensitivity'-' and . "vulnerability" interdependence, the 
transatlantic economic relationship displayed "asymmetrical 
vulnerability interdependence". It was "asymmetrical". because the 
cost of altering the relationship was much higher for Ottawa than 
it was for Brussels, since trade with Canada represented less than 
1 per cent of the EC's-world trade and was the location of about 5 
per cent of the total foreign investment stock of the EC Member 
States-. Furthermore, the review of historical statistics showed 
that although “there.was an erosion in Canada \s trading relationship 
with the Community' from the mid-1980s on, there was also a 
significant increase in bilateral investment between 1986 and 1991 
as private sectors on both sides of the Atlantic responded to 
regional economic integration. This, surge in investment was, 
however, followed by a decline in. subsequent annual, bilateral FDi 
flows. ‘
The erosion of bilateral trade ties, the post-1991 decrease in 
bilateral investment flows,. and the higher growth rates in Asia 
Pacific, did not however displace the EC from its position as the
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second most important economic (comprising trade, investment and 
portfolio investment) partner for Canada. Indeed, by 1993 the oyer 
$50 billion, in bilateral investment stock ensured sufficient 
economic interdependence that neither side of the Atlantic could 
ignore the other over the short- to medium-terms, something that 
was evident in mutual concerns over prevailing investment regimes. 
In fact, there was a clear paradox in Canada's trade relations with 
the EC: the erosion in bilateral trade was offset by surges in 
bilateral investment, particularly in the EC's FDI to Canada. In
1988, for the first time (see Table 9 and Table 5 in Appendix Two)
the value of Canada's investment stock in the EC ($11.8 billion) 
exceeded the value of total exports ($11.2 billion). European and 
Canadian business, were now favouring investment rather than trade 
ties in transatlantic relations, whereas historically exports had 
preceded investment (see discussion in Chapter Nine).
It would_be conjecture to attribute this growth in bilateral 
investment solely to the emergence of regional trading blocs in 
North America and Europe, yet the fact remains that the emergence 
of these blocs in conjunction with, or as .a response to, the 
structural transformation of. the world economy contributed to 
greater not lesser economic ties between Canada and the Community. 
However, judging from the response of Canadian policymakers to the 
bilateral relationship until 1989 (during the decade of•"benign
neglect"), the consensus was that as a foreign economic policy
interest, the EC was less of. a priority than Asia Pacific or even 
Latin America. This (mis)perception, no doubt fed by memories of
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the "Third Optipn, " was also due to the fact that observers tended 
to focus on trade imbalances rather than on the overall context of 
the economic relationship. There was less of an appreciation of how 
much bilateral economic convergence there was due to increasing 
bilateral investment flows.
Another factor that was frequently overlooked was that even 
with only a minute share of the EC's world, trade, Canada still 
received a disproportionate amount of the Community's attention, a 
fact that can be attributed ! to Ottawa's penchant for 
multilateralism and its ongoing contacts with Western Europe at a 
cross-section of international fora.51 One senior EAITC official 
termed this the "hidden leverage" that most observers of 
transatlantic relations (on both sides) grossly underestimated.52 
Of course, changes in regulations in either Europe or North America 
- whether on investment regulations, tariff-rates,' or non-tariff 
barriers - that often led to trade conflicts always placed Canada 
in a more "vulnerable" negotiating position* since it had more at 
stake in bilateral, economic relations.
Nowhere was this vulnerability more appaxent, as we discussed, 
than in the catch-22 situation that Canada found itself in with 
regard to diversifying its export base. Here Canada faced a "double 
whammy". First, in response to the decreasing importance of raw 
materials in the post-industrial age, Canada sought to increase the- 
value-added proportion of its. export mix, but as it did so these 
goods were destined to be slapped with higher EC duties. 
Nonetheless, Canada appeared to have no choice but to upgrade its
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exports due to increasing competition - particularly in resource 
exports - from non-EC European countries. Canadian officials 
concluded that based on current trends there was a looming danger 
that Canada would eventually become only a residual supplier to the 
West European market. Second, as will be discussed, in the next 
chapter, while Ottawa recognized that the Community's Single Market 
program would provide increased opportunities .for precisely those 
types of non-resource-based industries (e.g., high-technology, 
services) that it felt would fuel Canada's future economic growth, 
at the same time it .saw the potential for value-added Canadian 
products to face protectionism by another name since EC "1992" also 
represented a "reregulation" of the West European economy.
Finally, as a result of structural changes- in the world
economy and their attendant impacts on domestic policy choices,
that is, with the "big business "-led CUFTA and NAFTA agreements
having forced Canadian industry - large and small' - to ‘adopt a
north-south rather than east-west orientation, it is somehow not
surprising that Canada's economic policy approach to its relations
with the Community - as large as the bilateral economic stakes were
- was left to be fashioned largely by EAITC and not Bay Street (the
Canadian equivalent of Wall Street). This lack of Canadian private
sector interest in re-thinking the frameworks for transatlantic
* »vc
economic relations was evident by the fact that only ^  government 
minister (Joe Clark) and a prime minister (Lester Pearson) had ever 
publicly advocated transatlantic free trade. Keeping this in mind, 
the next chapter examines the Canadian response to the SEM.
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CHAPTER NINE
CANADA AND THE CHALLENGE OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 
9.1 INTRODUCTION
Thus far, this study has explored the context for Canadian 
responses to European integration, both in historical terms - from 
the creation of the EEC, to the "Third Option", and to Ottawa's 
participation in the TAD. Building upon our earlier description in 
Chapter Three of the differentiated interests of Canada's foreign 
policy actors and on Chapter Four's discussion of Canadian concerns 
over the loss of the Commonwealth Preferences and the common EC 
tariff,, the purpose of this chapter is to examine the Canadian 
response to the creation of the SEM.
A number of observations are in order about what this chapter 
will confine7itself to. First, since detailed analysis of the 
"1992" program - the creation of a truly single market, entailing 
the free movement of goods,, services, capital and people, by 
January 1, 1993 and one which targets non-tariff barriers to trade1 
- is well covered elsewhere2, this chapter will avoid a re­
description of the essential elements of the SEM.
Second, it is clear that the Single Market's promise of 
European economic renewal and growth had ramifications for the 
Community's structural power and leverage as a member of the Triad. 
By definition, then, the creation of the SEM promised to change the
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relative power balance within the Triad and Canada's role therein. 
The SEM's inescapable economic and political effects on the nature 
of transatlantic relations will be left to Chapter. Ten.
Third, following from the previous chapter's discussion, 
although the "1992" program clearly had the potential to spawn new 
bilateral irritants, in retrospect, the SEM had a less of a direct 
impact on Canada-EC economic relations than did the bilateral 
fisheries dispute, that was the single longest-running source of 
Canada-EC tension during the period from 1986 to the completion of 
the Single Market on January 1, 1993. Although the value of East 
Coast fisheries exports to the EC were negligible when compared to 
lumber or newsprint, it was the domestic impact ' of Community 
actions that ensured that this agenda item remained at the top of 
Ottawa's "hit list" in its diplomacy with Brussels. However, as 
with coverage of agriculture3, because fisheries had little to do 
with regulatory change as a result of the "1992" program, we leave 
this to future research.
Finally, it should be noted that it is a serious 
underestimation to limit the assessment of the external impact of 
the "1992" program to the changes in the functioning of the. EC 
market and to modifications in EC external trade policy. The 
implementation of the Single Market program had far more important 
and numerous ; consequences than were first expected due to the 
exigencies of increased integration. This required the Community to 
intervene into new policy territories and to reinforce some other 
common policies. Thus we must acknowledge that Canada industry was
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not only affected by; for example, changes in the "horizontal" 
elements of the "1992" program such as public procurement 
legislation and changes in standards and certification procedures, 
but also by how these changes affected "flanking" issues - that is, 
phytosanitary, plant and animal health, environmental and Science 
and Technology policies - that were more indirectly affected by the 
SEM. This demonstrated the breadth and depth of the integration 
process.
TABLE 14: SECTORS MOST AFFECTED BY THE $EM
IMPACT SECTOR MNE GAINERS
INVOLVEMENT
1. Reduction in protection and increased a. Financial services High Europe & Japan & Canada
competition b. Telecommunications High Europe and U.S.
services
c. Pharmaceuticals Medium Europe
2. Shift from fragmented local to a. Distribution Low Europe
integrated EC market b. Food processing Medium ?
c. Transport Low Europe
3. Gain of technical economies of scale a. Electronics . H igh . Japan
through sale of standardized goods and b. Packaging Medium Europe & U.S. & Canada
services c. Consumer goods Medium Europe .& Japan
4. Dependence on public procurement a. Computer equipment and High Europe & Japan & Canada
services
b. Defence contractors Low Europe & U.S.
c. Telecommunications Medium Europe & U.S. & Canada
equipment
5. Industries where the single market leads a. Chemicals Medium Europe & U.S.
to import substitution (EC goods instead b. Electrical components High Japan
* of imports) c. Office, equipment High Japan
Sources: John Dunning, "MNE Activity: Comparing the NAFTA and the EC," in Lorraine Eden, ed., Multinationals in North A m erica (Calgary, Alberta: University of Calgary Press and Industry 
Canada, 1994), Table 3, p. 289. The conclusions on Canadian gains are drawn from: Royal Bank of Canada, "Is Canada Ready for Europe 1992?", Econoscope, Vol. 16, No. 1, (Feb. 1992), 
pp. 13-16; Europe • 1992: Implications o f a Single Market,. Pan I (Ottawa: EAITC, April 1989): Europe 1992: Your Business Opportunity (Ottawa: EAITC. 1989); and the author's own survey 
. of 233 Canadian firms with major interests in Europe.
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Following from Table 14, the focus of this chapter will be to 
show the response of the two most affected Canadian commercial 
sectors - telecommunications and financial services - to the 
changes brought about by the "1992" program. Due to limitations of 
space, we cannot cover all the affected Canadian industries in one 
chapter (e.g., chemicals, biotechnology, transportation), since 
this would require a book-length analysis along the lines of the 
sector-by-sector treatment in Hufbauer's Europe 1992: An American 
Perspective.4 In addition, given the importance of "flanking" 
issues, we will also examine bilateral relations in Science and 
Technology (S&T) and assess the impact of Canadian forestry 
practices, technical standards and the Community's phytosantitary 
concerns on exports of Canada's forestry products.
Following these case studies, this chapter will evaluate the 
effectiveness of Canada's response to the SEM by examining the 
impact on the Canadian private sector of Ottawa's international 
business development/trade policy approach to the SEM as well as 
the differentiated impact of the "1992" program on Canadian SMEs 
and MNE s. By examining, the responses of a sample of key Canadian 
industries to the creation of a West European free trade area, and 
by evaluating the state and private sector motivations and 
strategies, we will demonstrate the validity of the modified state- 
oriented approach in describing the conduct of Canada's foreign 
economic policy to the EC.
But before looking at the sectors most affected by the SEM, we 
will first set the stage by outlining the forecasts of the trade
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diversion and trade creation effects of the SEM and how Canada, 
along with other third countries such as the United States, 
Australia and New Zealand, initially responded the prospect of a 
West European trade "bloc".
9.2 THE BENEFITS OF THE SEM
9.2.1 Estimates of Trade Creation and Trade Diversion
As mentioned, the SEM while continuing the process of trade 
liberalization among the EC members, also raised some fears among 
third countries. Since there is an abundance of literature on 
theories of economic integration and their effects5 and good 
treatments of customs unions theory as they apply to EC 
enlargement, We will concentrate on the trade diversion and trade 
creation projections of the SEM.
The projections of the expected growth generated by the SEM, 
not surprisingly, have varied among both the Commission, scholars 
and other analysts. As a rigorous analysis of all these projections 
is already set out elsewhere6, it is sufficient for us to note the 
various estimates of trade creation and. trade diversion and then to 
look at the estimated impact of the SEM on Canada's trade patterns 
with the EC. It is inpossible, as Redmond cautions, to isolate with 
any precision the impact of the SEM on the EC external trade 
partners. This is because governments, corrpanies and consumers 
inside and outside the
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Community are continuing to adjust.7 What can be done is to
identify the principal trade effects - that is., the internal trade 
creation, trade diversion,, external trade creation, trade
suppression and so on.8
A growing number of studies have tried to quantify these and
similar effects for EC trade with' the rest of the world - for
example, for the EC's trade with EFTA9 and with the developing 
world10. To this author's knowledge, however, no public studies have 
attempted- a rigorous quantification of the effect of the SEM on 
Canada's overall trade patterns with the EC (there, were many such 
studies on the impact of the CUFTA on Canada's trade with, the 
U.S.). But before going on to.look at possible affects on Canada-EC' 
trade patterns, . let us review the various estimates of trade 
creation as a result of the SEM.
The Commission, through the Cecchini Report, estimated the 
benefits from the completion of the SEM to be an an increase in the 
Community's GDP by a range Of 4:5 to 7 per cent - 200 billion 
European currency units or almost $300 billion Canadian (based on 
1992 exchange rates) .11 Baldwin estimated slightly higher gains from 
the internal market than Cecchini, in the region of 3.5-9 per cent. 
Furthermore, in addition to his prediction of a medium-term bonus, 
Baldwin predicted that this bonus would be augmented by a permanent 
rise in growth that, when expressed as increase level of output, 
would be about 9-29 per. cent of GDP.12 El-Agraa has reservations 
about Baldwin's high projections, which, if added to Cecchini's 
estimate, would create an overall figure of 11-3 5 per cent increase
354
in • EC QDP.13 Whatever the. exact gains, they were of sufficient 
magnitude as to attract the attention.of non-EC nations such as 
Canada.
What was the evidence available to Canadian decision makers 
that the SEM was leading to an increasingly protectionist EC trade 
bloc? While this is a complex issue, one indicator of protectionism 
was the degree of trade diversion that took place between 1986 and 
1993, for which one rough measure was the increase in.the "regional 
bias-ratio/" or the ratio of intra-regional trade to the.share of 
world trade. Prior to 1986 intra-Community trade had largely 
benefitted from the creation of a customs union and the integration 
process more generally. Demers and Demers state that the regional 
bias in the EC rose from 1.28 in 1980 to 1.77 in 1989, a more 
important increase in regional bias than in any other regions such 
as North America or East Asia.14 Under another measurement, from 
1958 to 1986,- intra-EC trade grew by a factor of 36 in nominal 
terms, while J3C trade with the outside world grew by.a factor of
16. Compounding this increased intra-EC. trade was the impact of the 
EEA and the evolving economic links with Central-.and Eastern 
Europe. The magnetic, pool of the SEM on these countries also, in 
general, increased regional European trade flows at the expense, of 
European exports to non-European countries. .
Yet this did not necessarily mean that there Was greater trade 
diversion than' trade creation. In the. case of the impact of EC 
integration on EC-U.S. trade, for example, estimates made by 
Yannopoulos suggest that the formation of the original common
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market of six led to trade creation in excess of trade diversion to 
the extent- of U.S.$18.5 billion (in 1988 prices); the further 
enlargement to. nine members generated a positive balance of 
approximately. U.S.$800 million; and the subsequent enlargement, to 
12 had the effect of reducing U.S. exports.15
. As for Canada, it is likely that the creation and enlargement 
of the EC has historically been more detrimental to trade. This was 
noticeable when the United Kingdom joined the EC in 1973, causing 
the disappearance of preferential tariffs for Canadian products in 
the British market. Canada's exports of grain to the UK, for 
example, went from $400 million to $30 million.16 In addition, free- 
trade agreements between the EC and some of Canada's main 
competitors for forest products - notably the Nordic countries - 
also hampered Canadian exports to the EC (e.g., the Community's 
import of Finnish rather than Canadian newsprint). But as noted in 
the previous chapter, trade diversion' did not necessarily mean that 
overall bilateral Canada-EC economic relations had been eroded as 
Canadian firms chose to use European subsidiaries to serve their 
European markets.-
So what were the SEM's possible effects on Canada's export 
position? Assuming that the income elasticity of Canadian exports 
to Europe was not lower than 1.517 and taking the Cecchini report's 
lower estimate of 4.5 per cent GDP growth, Potter and Bence have 
estimated the trade-creating effects of the SEM would raise the 
level of Canadian exports by a further $776 million or about 6 per 
cent (based on 1993 total export value),18 Another Commission study
.estimated that the merchandise trade diversion effect of the Single 
Market program could represent up to 2.6 per cent of overall EC 
imports, which in the case of Canada would amount to $300 million.19
Whether the economic gains accruing to Canada as a result of 
the SEM would be $300 million or $776 million, Canadian observers 
calculated that if the SEM produced the expected growth, then trade 
creation would, all - things being equal, exceed trade diversion. 
However, if the growth stimulus of the Single Market did not occur, 
the trade diversion effect would be more threatening. For instance, 
it was recognized that lack of growth coupled by increasing 
competition from not only the EFTA countries but also the EC's 
southern tier (e.g., Greece) would create additional pressure on 
traditional Canadian exports such as textiles where Canada faced 
tariff barriers.20 Exacerbating this scenario was the calculus that 
since the successive GATT rounds had reduced tariff barriers what 
was even more worrisome was the prospect of the multitude of 
possible non-tariff barriers.21 Canadian observers of European 
integration were thus'very concerned about the impact of measures 
such as anti-dumping duties, rules of local content and origin, 
technical standards.^  and requirements for certification, and 
environmental regulation., .
9.2.2 Intra-North American Trade as a Source of Trade Diversion
Other regional integration movements such as the creation of the
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North American free trade area reinforced any trade-diverting or 
trade-creating effects of the SEM on Canada-EC economic relations. 
It could be expected, for example, that since the Canada-U.S. 
economic relationship was the world's largest bilateral economic 
relationship, that further bilateral economic integration through 
the COTTA and the NAFTA would affect the bilateral trade and 
investment flows between Canada and the Community.
Although a number of factors - e.g., exchange rates,
diminishing levels of demand in Canada and abroad, the composition 
of exports to the EC and the US, downturns and upturns in the 
global economy - obviously make it difficult to isolate with any 
precision the trade-creating and trade-diverting effects of COTTA, 
nevertheless if the objective of Canada-U.S. free trade was to 
increase Canadian access to the American market then the statistics 
show that there was significant trade creation. Canadian exports to 
the U.S. market increased by an annual average of 0.56 per cent 
between 1986-1993 or approximately $900 million per year. Or, put 
another way, trade in goods with the U.S. became eight times 
greater than trade with the EC (the ratio in trade in services 
remained constant, however) . Schwanen, for one, surmises that in 
those sectors liberalized under free trade, two-way trade'between 
Canada and the U.S. rose sharply relative.to trade between Canada 
and the rest of the world between 1989 and 1992.22
Can it be concluded, therefore, that North American economic 
integration created an incentive for Canadian trade diversion away 
from Europe or that the SEM created an incentive for intra-North
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American trade and investments? In the' absence of a sector-by- 
sector comparison of Canadian exports to the United States and the 
EC we can only posit a correlation between the--CUFTA and this 
greater intra-North American trade, where the estimated $900 
million increase would have certainly compensated the Canadian 
economy for any trade diversion resulting from the SEM.
The next section shows how the above calculus of the relative 
economic costs and benefits of North American and European economic 
integration coloured and shaped the policy responses of Canadian 
decision makers to the SEM.
9.3 INITIAL THIRD COUNTRY REACTIONS TO THE EC'S SINGLE MARKET
By 1988 the EC . was at pains to reassure the world community - 
through communiques23 and speeches by its Commissioners24, and 
through the. document "Europe 1992: Europe World Partner,1'25 .- that 
a "Fortress ■ Europe" was not in the offing. But the Community's 
industrialized third country trading partners such as Canada, the 
United States, Japan, Australia and'New Zealand could have been 
excused for being wary of the SEM's initial intentions for them. 
The. Cockfield White Paper contained only a single sentence on 
relations with third countries, and a menacing one at that: 
"Moreover the commercial identity of the Community must be 
consolidated so that our trading partners will not be given the 
benefit of a wider market without themselves making similar 
concessions".26
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. . Michael Smith calls the lack of sustained attention to the 
external dimensions of the SEM a "blind spot" in the early stages 
of the program, and one that boded ill for EC-U.S. relations.27 
Redmond does not appear surprised at Brussel's lack of attention to 
its external relations in the early part of the "1992" program, 
given the Community's historical track record. For example, as 
Redmond notes, the Treaty of Rome devotes only 10 of its 248 
articles to relations with the outside world.28
In general,- the increasingly assertive use of rules of origin, 
and "local content" regulation by the Community in the late 1980s 
created the initial impression among industrialized third countries 
that the SEM had a protectionist agenda. The debacle surrounding 
semiconductors, for example, raised suspicions about, "forced 
investment" and indirect protection of EC manufacturers. The SEM 
also raised the issues of Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs) and 
quotas in sensitive areas: whereas prior to 1992 these were at the 
national level, after the completion of the Single Market they were 
to be established at the Community level.
A sampling of third country concerns about the SEM indicates 
that these countries did not consider the "1992" program to be 
benign. For the Americans, the greatest concern was that "the use 
of 'reciprocity' measures seemed, to indicate that, even long 
established foreign enterprises could be affected by the changing 
terms on which access to the Single' Market could be granted."29 
Perhaps more menacingly, the EC posed a challenge to American 
domestic structures; if reciprocity could be sought in areas such
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as financial services, it could translate into major domestic 
reforms. For Japan, the concern was that the Europeans would now 
use the SEM to single out Japan and impose an increasing number of 
VERs on Japanese products - especially Japanese automobile exports 
- to redress the Japan-EC trade imbalance.30 For Australia and New 
Zealand (although their respective trade patterns had by the late 
1980s already shifted .to the Pacific at the expense of Europe), the 
Single Market program once more (after the loss of preferential 
access to the UK market) created the spectre of a preferential 
trading zone which would limit access to the exports of their raw 
materials and agricultural products.31 .
Canadian policymakers, although obviously concerned at the 
possibility of a "Fortress Europe", appeared more willing than 
either the Americans, Australians or the New Zealanders to accept 
Brussels' post-1988 vows to make the Community a world partner. 
Based on the trade diversion and trade creation calculations noted 
.in section 9?2 above, the Canadian• reaction was largely, positive 
because of. the belief that the■SEM would facilitate access for 
Canadian exporters and direct investors.32 Ottawa saw a number of 
advantages:
(1) the opening of. public procurement in the previously 
excluded sectors; '
(2) the prospect of a European Monetary Union (EMU) that, by 
eliminating all exchange rate uncertainty among.EC countries, 
and the transactions costs involved in operating in more than 
one currency, offered considerable savings33;
(3) the single EC financial markets offered Canadian banks and 
their investment dealer affiliates interesting.opportunities, 
especially since Canadian banks had expertise in mergers and 
acquisitions/ one of the most important areas of activity in
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the completion of the Single. Market; and
(4) it was felt that direct investment by Canadian firms would 
complement Canadian exports, as previous empirical work had 
demonstrated for U.S. multinationals.
By 1989, the EC's granting of "Single Licenses" in the financial
services area and the fact that third countries' such as Canada were
permitted to have input into the European standard setting process,
had gone some way to mollifying Ottawa. Because the composition of
Canadian exports to the Community over the decades had become less
• • *■
concentrated in agriculture and raw materials, Canada's response to 
the "1992" program, unlike New Zealand's, was not overshadowed by 
its concern with the efforts to liberalize agricultural trade 
within the GATT.34 Indeed, what differentiated Canadian responses 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s from those at the time of the 
EC's creation was that, although the CAP' was a continuing concern, 
it no . longer dominated Canada's, perception of the impact of 
Europe's integration on its economic interests. In essence, there 
was no longer the knee-jerk antagonism towards the. process of 
European integration that had typified earlier Canadian responses.
There were three other major reasons for Ottawa's more 
balanced reaction and the Canadian business community's general 
indifference to transatlantic policy convergence. Following from 
the discussion in Chapter Five, ever since the findings of the 1985 
Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Union, the perception in 
Canada was that western Europe had been supplanted by the United 
States and Asia Pacific as the major sources of economic threat. 
With the CUFTA in hand and with the negotiations started on the
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NAFTA, the federal government and the business community had 
achieved their goal of a "level playing field" with Canada's 
largest trading partner. The foundation was thus laid for a future 
anchored outside the Atlantic Community; the United States, in 
contrast, saw a "new" economic superpower on the horizon just as it 
had defeated the Soviet military superpower. Second., the major 
bilateral irritants outlined in the last chapter (e.g., oil seeds, 
wine appellations, the fishing practices of EC Member States) all 
.predated the "1992" process -and were not directly affected by it.
Third, Canada's response to the SEM should be seen, as 
Wool’cock perceived the case to be with the United States, as one 
which . did not treat the "1992" process in isolation but which 
subsumed the process within the larger question of market access in 
both the EC and Canada and the evolution of the multilateral trade 
negotiations in the Uruguay Round. Ottawa's key concern, having 
observed EC-U.S. frictions over steel and agriculture, was that the 
coexistence of the SEM.with the Uruguay Round and the fact that EC- 
U.S; relations were central to the GATTwould lead to Ottawa being 
"side-swiped" by U.S.-EC trade disharmony. This, especially so, if 
an agreement in the GATT became intertwined with important aspects 
of the SEM, and if problems encountered in the Uruguay Round fed 
back into attitudes towards the SEM itself. By the spring of 1991, 
after the failure of the Round to make progress on agriculture in 
particular, Ottawa's worst fears appeared to have been confirmed.
Problems in the interlinkage between the SEM, Canada foreign 
economic interests, and the GATT, were not ju&t confined to
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agriculture, but rather manifested themselves due the actions of 
the Community in a range of trade disputes. On certain issues, the 
EC, for example, had a tendency to stonewall when facing 
artibration under the GATT's dispute-setttlement mechanism. Thus a 
number of international trade disputes over non-tariff barriers 
(e.g., rules of origin, quantitative restrictions) that were the 
basis of negotiation during the Uruguay Round became inseparable 
from the challenge of the SEM strictly defined. For example, as far 
as Japanese car exports from the United States or Canada were 
concerned, it seemed the EC would recognize them as Canadian or 
American: Canadian officials emphasized to both the EC and Japan 
that products from Honda, Toyota, CAMI, and Hyundai assembly 
facilities were Canadian products and should have been considered 
for export to the. EC and not included in any quantitative 
restrictions between the EC and Japan. There was nevertheless a 
Concern in Ottawa that the EC and Japan would quietly negotiate a 
voluntary restraint system that would limit exports from Canadian 
plants.35 Although Ottawa monitored the rules of origin and 
quantitative restrictions issues closely, in retrospect they were 
much more central to EC-U.S. and EC-Japan trade relations, and the 
affects of these disputes on Canada's market access to the 
Community (apart from. in the telecommunications sector) were 
negligible. Nevertheless, they demonstrated how the overlap between 
the SEM and the Uruguay Round agendas had the potential to squeeze 
Canada foreign economic policy between the often conflictual 
relations of the Triad members (see discussion on Canada in the
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Triad in Chapter 10.2.1).
To conclude, on one level Ottawa's approach to its bilateral 
relations with Brussels focused on the external implications-,of the' 
"1992" program and whether this represented a move towards a 
"Fortress Europe".- On a second level, however, the debate concerned 
bilateral relations in terms of market access issues in the EC and 
Canada and how.this interrelated with the multilateral system, a 
discussion which covered the old festering disputes going back to. 
the early days of the Common Market and the CAP, and to the early- 
to mid-1980s dispute over fisheries. In these cases, the impact of 
the SEM was indirect but nonetheless important.36
Moving away from the more general discussion of the initial 
Canadian reactions to the SEM, The next section looks at the 
Mulroney Government's specific program responses.
9.4. OTTAWA * S PROGRAM RESPONSE TO THE SEM
Two major factors shaped Ottawa's program response to the SEM. 
First, Ottawa was prepared to agree with the Commission that, as 
pointed out in the last chapter, tariffs were generally. low on its 
exports to the Community and that, in any case, the "1992" program 
was about eliminating non-tariff barriers. And second, related to 
this point, for Canadian firms to be more internationally 
competitive and thus by definition .for them to be more adept at 
penetrating the larger, more efficient Community market, Canadian 
federal officials concluded that: (1) Canadian firms would have to
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be encouraged by government to invest abroad (which would entail a 
.fundamental change in Canada's international business development 
strategy); and (2) that government would have to simultaneously 
push at the level of the EC Member States and multilaterally to put- 
in place investment regimes that both encouraged and protected 
.CFDI.
Ottawa's approach reflected a growing realization that due to 
structural change in the global economy it was no longer heretical 
. for government to'promote FDI, since research showed that there was 
not a clear trade-off between outward direct investment and jobs 
lost in the domestic economy.37 With the Canadian labour movement 
battered by the setback of the CUFTA, a consensus was achieved 
between the business community and the Mulroney Government on the 
benefits of strengthening the forward and. backward linkages of 
international, business with the domestic economy38, which meant that 
it was difficult for'Ottawa to discourage Canadian companies from 
"exporting jobs" to the EC.39
The Mulroney Government's position was that an expanding 
Community would require Canadian companies to position themselves 
increasingly within the EC through outward investment, strategic 
alliances, and joirit-ventures.40 In 1991, approximately 70 per cent 
of Canadian business alliances were made with other Canadian firms, 
but it was recognized that a growing number were also being 
organized with, foreign companies.41 A number of federal programs 
were thus developed to promote technology-transfer and investment 
as complementary techniques to exporting. The overarching framework
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for this international conpetitiveness strategy was, as 
mentioned earlier in this study, the federal government's 1989 
"Going Global" international business strategy.
9.4.1 "Going Global": A New International Business Strategy
With "Going Global" Ottawa for the first time not only 
privileged investment, but also sought to integrate investment 
strategies with technology innovation, production and 
marketing. The reasons were not difficult to discern. 
Investment in distribution channels and service facilities 
which provided customer services in local markets promoted 
exports to the home company. Alternatively, when a Canadian 
parent could sell components to its affiliate in Europe, 
exports would follow Canadian foreign investment in the EC, 
whereas without a Canadian presence in the EC this market 
could be lost to competitors. Chapter Eight's findings and 
this chapter's investigation into the types of Canadian 
investment in the EC demonstrate that Canada-EC economic 
relations reflected a more general phenomenon in the global 
economy: increasingly exports followed investment rather than 
the historic pattern of investment following exports.
Recalling Chapter Three's dicussion on the "disconnect" 
between Ottawa and the private sector on Canada' s 
international trade strategy, "Going Global"'s significance 
was that it demonstrated that Ottawa was beginning to wean 
itself off its reliance on the traditional export-oriented 
trade development strategies {e.g., based on trade fairs and 
ministerial-led trade missions) and to
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recognize the complementarity of trade and investment. The 
Government recognized that the promotional aspect of Canada1 s 
international business strategy would have to be de-enphasized in 
favour of a greater concern about how Canada' s Trade Commissioner 
Service (rather than just Canada's trade negotiators) could 
increasingly monitor and react to emerging market access issues 
{e.g., investment, labour, social, environmental policies) .42
“the SEM, which promised to change the 
contours' of the European economy, therefore had the effect of 
•highlighting the anachronistic nature of Canada's traditional 
international business development programs and was an incentive 
for the above mentioned changes in Ottawa's strategy. How so? 
First, the new EC regulations and market access concerns that 
resulted from the "1992" program, particularly at the Commission 
and major capitals {e.g., Bonn and London for environmental 
standards and regulations, Brussels on Canadian forestry practices 
etc..), were precisely the types of market access issues that the 
Canadian government and business would be facing in other parts of 
the world. And second, as noted in the last chapter, although the 
proportion of Canadian exports to the EC conposed of end products 
had steadily increased since the creation of the Common Market, raw 
materials and low manufactures still represented more than 50 per 
cent of Canada's exports. Canadian officials recognized that these 
goods, if they continued to be only exported, would become 
increasingly vulnerable to environmental restrictions as a result 
of the emerging pan-European market that stemmed from the spillover
effects of the SEM.
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9.4.2 The "Europe 1992" Component of "Going Global"
The West European, or "Europe 1992" component of the Mulroney 
Government's "Going Global" strategy was two-pronged and consisted 
of: (1) the European Trade and Investment Development Strategy,
with its investment development component, known as Strategic 
Ventures, receiving an unprecedented $505 million worth of 
funding43; and (2) targeted programs to strengthen Canadian 
capabilities in priority high-technology sectors (see discussion on 
S&T in this chapter). Under the new "Europe 1992" program 
traditional market development programs (such as EAITC's Program 
for Export Market Development [PEMD])) were de-emphasized in favour 
of the Strategic Ventures program whose objective it was to foster 
linkages between Canadian SMEs and small, rapidly-growing high-tech 
firms in Europe (see 9.7.1) . This, Ottawa felt, would help Canada's 
commercial relations, with Europe to become more investment- and 
technology-driven, to improve Canadian competitiveness more 
directly, and to increase the value-added of Canadian exports to EC 
markets.44 It is significant to note that unlike the more universal 
trade development programs of years past, "Going Global" target ted 
Canadian SMEs to help them become more outward-oriented; Canada's 
MNEs were considered to have adequate resources and, so .it was 
rationalized by Ottawa, did not require what amounted to indirect 
subsidies.
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As well, with Canada as partner to the CUFTA, Ottawa wanted to 
"sell" Canada to European companies as a North American base. It 
was noted by Canadian federal officials that Canada's reputation as 
a less competitive market than the United States ironically served 
it well as the initial springboard. In addition, with the high- 
level of EC investment in Canada, Canadian subsidiaries of EC 
companies could benefit from the Canada-U.S, Free Trade Agreement's 
. provision for enhanced access to each other' s public procurement 
markets (as discussed in Chapter Eight).
The focus on investment in the Mulroney Government's trade 
response to the SEM - in contrast, for example, to the lower 
emphasis placed on the investment in the Asia Pacific dimension of 
"Going Global" - was not at all surprising. Given the high 
dependence of Canada's forestry sector on the EC forestry products 
markets, Canadian officials predicted that a failure for this 
sector to engage in joint ventures or mergers would endanger its 
future export prospects. Indeed, using the calculation of 15,000 
Canadian jobs resulting from $1 billion in exports, officials 
calculated that significant losses in this sector's market share in 
Western Eurpe. would have serious economic repercussions for the 
economies of Quebec and New Brunswick.
In other cases, the choice between exporting to or investing 
in the EC was affected by protectionist measures adopted by the EC. 
For instance, as we shall discuss in section 9.5.2.1 of this 
chapter, Canadian firms in the telecommunications sector faced the 
choice between expanding plant, equipment and Research &
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Development (R&D) in the EC or in Canada, and many decided to 
locate in the EC . simply because of- the origin and local content 
rules, even if cost considerations would have otherwise favoured a 
Canadian location. And, although the issue of "screwdriver" plants 
was a volatile issue in Japan-EC relations,. what attracted more 
attention in Canada, as exemplifed by the DeHavilland case was how 
the EC's competition policy would exert an important influence on 
bilateral investment patterns through the treatment of proposed 
mergers and acquisitions.45 For these, reasons, Canadian policymakers 
saw. how protectionist tendencies in the EC could lead to
distortions in direct investment patterns as well as-a reduction in 
the benefits of the integration process for Canadian and non-EC 
firms. Thus, as noted in the previous chapter, it was in the 
interest of. Ottawa to push for both a bilateral competition policy 
agreement with the ' Commission as well as an international 
investment regime.
In .sum,~ then, Ottawa believed that Canadian industry needed 
to have a better understanding of whether its products and services 
could be sold on an EC-wide basis or whether national markets would 
remain paramount, and, if exports were uncompetitive, whether
investment' was warranted. For this reason, under the "EC 1992"
component of "Going Global" starting in 1989, EAITC embarked on a 
two-year informational program in Canada to apprise Canadian
industry of the implications of the SEM. . This exercise, which 
entailed 21 sector studies, six general guides for investors and 
exporters46, and numerous seminars and conferences, was notable in
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that although it was organized by industry associations (e.g., 
Canadian Exporters1 Association, Canadian Pulp and Paper 
Association) it was financed almost entirely by the federal and 
provincial governments.
This largely passive Canadian business response to the SEM, as 
noted in Chapter Three,, contrasted sharply with the keen interest 
displayed by the Canadian private sector in ' any trade policy 
initiatives undertaken by Ottawa with the United States. Here 
Canada's business community needed no prodding and was willing to 
both participate and fund independent analysis of the CUFTA's and 
the NAFTA's impact. The state-led nature of Canada's .response to 
the SEM will be detailed in the following sections on specific 
sectors.
9.5 THE CANADIAN PRIVATE SECTOR RESPONSE TO THE SEM
As Table 14 shows, based on this author's survey47 of 253 of the 
most active Canadian firms in the EC, and calculations by the Royal
f
Bank of Canada, the Single Market was of least benefit to the. 
Canadian food processing, food products, metals and minerals 
sectors, while its greatest benefit was in highly, specialized 
niche markets for Canadian firms such as in telecommunications and 
computers and in traditional sectors such as financial services. It 
was estimated that the Canadian machinery and equipment sectors 
would be more adversely affected, as firms in these sectors meet 
increased competition from European producers. In fact, it was
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conjectured that the development of Canadian exports to the EC.was 
hampered even more by the "19.92" phase of European economic 
integration (than it had been by the UK's accession and, before 
that, the creation of the Common Market) due to the rapid increase 
of intra-EC trade and EFTA preferences. Thus while the "1992" 
program may not have been as protectionist as initially 
anticipated, neither was it going to present Canada's private 
sector with.boundless opportunities. Furthermore, at.the peak of 
the preparation for the SEM, most Canadian businesses' were still 
adapting to the new environment created by the CUFTA.
The following section analyzes the specific impacts on Canada 
of the "1992" program.
9.5.1 Standards and the Elimination of Technical Barriers
According to^  the Cecchini report,48 technical barriers (i.e., 
technical standards or regulation, and certification procedure) 
constituted the most important obstacle to intra-Community trade. 
Before 1985, and in the absence of a new approach to standards and 
technical regulations, the European Community, had tried to reduce 
technical barriers to trade through harmonization measures. ■ (i . e., 
directives aimed at the adoption of similar technical rules 
applicable in all Member States).49 In nearly all sectors, this 
approach proved to be.inefficient.
In.a resolution dated 7 May 1985, the Council adopted a new 
approach in favour of more flexible rules. Harmonization was still
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accomplished through directives in a limited number of cases, but 
these directives only laid down essential requirements in critical 
areas related to public health, safety and environment. With the 
exception of these essential requirements, national standards 
became subject to mutual recognition, a principle derived from the 
1979 decision of the European Court of Justice in the "Cassis of 
Dijon" case. This principle of mutual recognition appeared to make 
it harder in theory for an EC country to discriminate against an 
EC-based subsidiary of a non-EC firm.
Parallel to this process, European standardization bodies 
(CEN, CENELEC, ETSI)50 began to. develop non-compulsory, European- 
wide standards to the maximum extent. For instance, Woolcock et al. 
note that by 1990 1,250 ENs (European standards) had been worked 
out, although national standards in the Member States still 
exceeded those at the European level by a factor of nine to one.51 
The Commission therefore demonstrated a willingness to move as 
quickly as possible, although it was recognized that the complete 
harmonization of standards at the European level would take a great 
deal of time because of the complexity of the problems involved.
But there remained some uncertainties and concerns about the 
European standard-making process, starting with the need to produce 
to EC technical, regulations or to promote acceptance of third 
country products not made to voluntary European standards. Related 
to this, despite improvements in the transparency of the process, 
was the fact that third countries, except those of EFTA, had 
historically had little if any direct input into the policy
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process. Second, the EC's strict essential requirements related to 
health and safety affected third country producers, although here 
the effect was more pronounced on developing as opposed to 
developed countries. Third, there was the fear that the EC would 
.introduce technical standards for high-tech products in order to 
exclude, at least temporarily, foreign competitors and to allow 
time for its own industries to become competitive.
That' being said, it was true that most EC standards were 
actually inspired, by international standards produced by such 
organizations as the International Standards Organization (ISO). 
Third countries such as Canada had input (one.vote) here, although 
not as. much as the Europeans who could pool their votes (viz., the 
EC, Germany, the UK and the other Member. States each had one vote) . 
Thus it was no accident that Canada was. highly active in the 
various steering committees, not only of the ISO but also the other 
international standard-setting bodies.
Because ^Canada recognized the likelihood, of any new EC 
standards being harmonized and closer to the existing international 
standards, Ottawa was very keen to transmit its views oh specific 
standards to the European standardization bodies through its crown 
corporation, the Standards Council of Canada (SCC). While it was 
recognized' that the purpose and structure of the European 
Standardization System were both significantly different and 
considerably more complex than the National Standards System in 
Canada, many of the responsibilities assigned to elements of the 
proposed new European Standardization Council were markedly similar
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to those in corresponding elements of the SCC.52 The Canadian side 
used this similarity in order.to stimulate increased cooperation 
and transparency and convince the Europeans of the benefits of an 
arrangement between the SCC and CEN and CENELEC in the form of an 
information exchange.53 In 1992 Canada and the Commission began to 
negotiate an MRA on standards;, in the same year the Canadian 
Standards Association opened an office in Brussels. Because 
Canada's highly centralized standards setting system made its 
system more compatible with the European approaches (indeed the 
Europeans looked to the Canadian system ' as a model for their 
proposed Council) than the highly decentralized American system, 
Canada was able’ to exert more influence on European standards 
decisions.54
Another concernfor third countries such as Canada.was the EC 
policy on testing and certification. Until 1991, while EC-wide 
procedures . on mutual recognition of national testing and 
certification, procedures were implemented internally, there was no 
system to manage relations between the EC and third countries. 
Canada was concerned that its private sector would be forced to 
undergo much more costly and time-consuming approval procedures 
than its EC competitors. The.Commission eventually allowed third 
countries, including Canada, to establish trial, procedures for 
mutual recognition so that foreign laboratories were able to 
certify the "Euro-worthiness" of their exports.
It is difficult to make a general statement about the impact 
on Canada of changes in the EC's standards and certification
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regimes, since these regimes affected, different sectors in 
different ways. In comparison.to, say, the United States with a 
higher value-added percentage of expiorts to the EC, standards were 
less of a concern for Ottawa's policymakers, than they were for 
Washington's. Obviously, the principle of mutual recognition was 
good for Canada in that Canadian manufacturers could expect to see 
a considerable cut in the time required for approval for the export 
of their goods to a given Member State. But, in the high end 
sectors of communications and electronics, the standards issue was
9
still very much on the minds of Canadian industry, especially in 
high-technology industries (see discussion on telecommunications). 
Institutionally, given similar structures, the standards is one 
area of the "1992" program where there appeared to be■substantial 
convergence between Canadian and European policy approaches.
9.5.2 Public Procurement
Liberalization of public procurement markets in the EC was one of 
the major goals of the Single Market program. Public purchasing 
among the 12 Member States varied between 10 and 20 per cent of 
GDP, and was significantly higher than the average of 8 to 12 per. 
cent of GDP estimated for all industrialized countries.55 The 
economic stakes were thus considerable, with state and local 
governments . accounting for about 70 per cent of all government 
purchasing in the EC., The other purchasing was done by central 
government departments .and by bodies which benefitted from
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exclusive rights granted by public authorities. The main components 
of this latter category were the four traditionally excluded 
sectors of energy, telecommunications, water, and transport.
The European Commission saw important economic consequences 
emerging from the opening-up of procurement markets in the .formerly 
excluded sectors, since it affected areas where public demand was 
capable of providing Community . firms with a sufficiently large 
market to enable them to strengthen their competitiveness in world 
markets. Since detail on the main legislative changes to liberalize 
EC public procurement is available elsewhere56, we will focus on how 
these changes affected Canada's market access.
■With respect to third countries, the Commission envisaged two 
kinds of measures when it appeared that- European .firms did not get 
from a third country the equivalent access that third country's 
firms enjoyed in Europe, or when European companies did not enjoy 
national or. MFN. treatment. In particular, the Commission would 
first conduct7negotiations with the third country to try to solve 
the differences. If the issue was not resolved, the Commission 
could implement some measures to limit third country access to the 
EC market.
Changes in EC regulations were intended to open public 
contracts more effectively to all Community-established . firms. 
Consequently, European subsidiaries of Canadian firms were to 
receive the same access throughout the Community to government 
purchases and contracts as European companies. Suppliers from 
outside the EC continued, to be governed by the GATT code on
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Government Procurement. Signatories to the code had agreed to 
provide mutual, non-discriminatory access to public procurement 
markets in specified sectors. (But as will be pointed in section 
9.5.2.2, the multilateral procurement code was insufficient, and 
thus the liberalization of public procurement in the EC created 
incentives for Canadian investment.)
The concern in Canada was that some provisions of the EC's 
utilities directive would hamper Canadian industry's ability to 
take advantage of more open public procurement. To begin, under 
this directive external bids did not have, to be considered. If they 
were, of particular concern were: a 50-per-cent value-added rule 
which enabled public authorities to reject a bid if more than 50 
per cent of the value of the goods was generated outside the EC; a 
mandatory 3 per cent price preference granted to EC bids over 
equivalent offers of non-EC-origin; and a provision that described 
the circumstances under which entities could have, obtained waivers 
from adhering~to existing European standards in favour of national 
standards. In addition, there was an EC requirement for reference 
to European standards in public procurement contracts, and the 
public authorities did not even have to consider a non-EC tender if 
it did not meet the content requirements.
.But ' perhaps the biggest problem for. Canada was that 
procurement practices in the excluded sectors were characterized by 
close relationships between the procurement agencies and national 
suppliers.57 Between 70 and 95 per cent of the procurement in these 
sectors was sourced from national suppliers, with the result that
, 379
in tr a-Community. trade was very small. Compounding this natural 
difficulty in displacing host nation suppliers, Canadian suppliers 
did not have assured access to procurement bodies in the EC in the 
excluded sectors because these sectors were excluded from the 
disciplines of the GATT Government Procurement Code.
The protectionist- implications of this situation must be 
qualified, however. First, Canadian officials repeatedly expressed 
their frustration to this author that even though Canadian business 
had been provided with ample opportunity to bid on Community public 
procurement contracts, there was little interest. Second, Canadian 
firms benefitted from the piecemeal liberalization of procurement 
that took place in the excluded sectors. .Much of this was linked to. 
privatization efforts in the UK (the location of the bulk of 
Canadain FDI in the Community) , the greater • role of the private 
sector in infrastructure development, and the Commission's agenda 
to end the Post, Telephone,.and.Telegraph (PTT) monopolies in the 
provision of- services and equipment other than basic voice 
telephony.
In sum, it was felt that the creation of SEM would result in 
significantly improved access of EC-based suppliers to the. 
previously excluded sectors in all the Member States, and that this’ 
would open up new. opportunities for Canadian firms. At the same 
time, it. was also recognized that the new entrants would face 
formidable challenges. Those challenges included strong competition 
from existing suppliers, high start-up and distribution costs, the 
50 per cent local content.provision and, during the transitional
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period, ongoing technical and certification barriers to trade. In 
short, it appeared that although Canada produced a range of 
internationally competitive products that were compatible with the 
needs of the EC procurement entities, the effect of strong EC 
competition combined with the high institutional, commercial and 
non-tariff barriers would limit future direct export opportunities 
to a handful of products, primarily in the telecommunications 
sector, which will be discussed in the following section.
9.5.2.1 Telecozmminications *
Perhaps nowhere was the impact • of the liberalization of public 
procurement practices felt more than in the telecommunications 
market. This was a particular target for the Commission given its 
significance for Europe's economic future. Woolcock et al., for 
example, point out' that the EC market for telecommunications 
services was -one of its largest and most dynamic sectors, worth 
about 80 billion ecus (1988 figures) and projected to grow at a 
rate of 11.5 per cent to 154 billion ecus by 1995.58
In Canada, as well, the telecommunications - equipment and 
services sector was a major sector, of the Canadian economy. In 
fact, by. 1991 . as a percentage of Canada's, exports it had 
outstripped lumber. Widely considered a world leader in the 
telecommunications field, the carriage and manufacturing industries 
in Canada in 1991 together generated more than $23 billion in 
revenues and employed some .125,000 people, representing 3.5 per
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cent of Canada's exports.59 It was also one of the fastest growing 
sectors, with the telecomnunications share of GDP having a real 
growth rate of 5.8 per cent in 1991 compared to a.decline of 1.1. 
per cent for the national economy.60
How, then, did. the procurement changes prompted by the Single 
Market program affect export: opportunities for Canadian firms in 
the telecomnunications market? To start, EC tariffs on
telecomnunications equipment were low - between 5.1 per cent and 
7.5 per cent, although as mentioned in the last section this was 
the least of Canadian suppliers' concerns. In the period leading up 
to "1992", the EC was the second largest export market for Canadian 
telecomnunications equipment after the United States. The major 
markets for Canadian telecomnunications parts and equipment in the 
EC were the UK and Ireland, which together accounted for 80 per 
cent of total.Canadian exports to the EC. As would be expected, 
•given the. changing investment and export patterns, a significant 
portion of these sales consisted of exports of Canadian parts, 
components and sub-assemblies to manufacturing operations owned by 
Canadian firms in these two countries (e.g., UK - Northern 
Telecom's STC PLC subsidiary, Newbridge, Mitel and Gandalf; France 
- Northern Telecom; and the Netherlands - Gandalf) . It has been 
estimated that in 1990, sales to the EC of the four largest 
Canadian telecomnunications companies (Northern Telecom, Mitel, 
Gandalf and Newbridge Networks) totalled $490 million. And, in 
August 1992, the Commission approved the partial acquisition of 
Matra Comnunications, a French company, by Northern Telecom.61 This
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joint venture (see Table 16 in Appendix Three) and public 
networks in France, provided the Canadian multinational with 
new markets in the European Community. This acquisition was 
consistent with the trend among Canadian multinationals (see 
Table 17 in Appendix Three) to invest in the EC by entering 
into joint ventures, not only with firms in the UK but also 
with firms from the other Member States.
A few observations about Northern Telecom's international 
activities would perhaps also highlight some of the broader 
trends in Canada-EC economic relations. Indeed, the 
experiences of Northern Telecom makes for an interesting case 
study. For our purposes, suffice it to note here that the 
evolution of Northern Telecom from an essentially North 
American company in 198862, to one of the top three "outward- 
oriented" Canadian communications firms by 1993, with foreign 
assets making up 61 per cent of total assets, demonstrates the 
impact of globalization and the pull of regional integration 
(CUFTA, SEM) on the strategy of one of Canada's largest 
multinationals.63
In fact, so great was the pull of the European market 
that just over one-half all of Northern's outward investment 
between 1986 and 1993 - see Table 16 in Appendix Three - was 
made in the EC. In the wake of the (U.S.) $2.8 billion 
acquisition of STC PLC, a large British telecommunications 
company, 26 per cent of Northern Telecom's sales were 
generated outside of North America and it
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became the eighth largest telecannunications equipment supplier in 
the EC.64 By the end of 1993, Northern Telecom's "identifiable 
assets" in Europe as listed in Table 16 exceeded those in either 
Canada or the U.S..
But with the notable exception of Northern Telecom, and even 
with the low tariff barriers, Canadian industry found the 
telecomnunications equipment market largely closed to competition 
from suppliers from other Member States, much less third countries. 
This would explain the high degree of intra-firm trade between 
Canadian manufacturers and subsidiaries in the EC. As mentioned, 
the main barrier to entry was the monopoly purchasing power of the 
telecomnunications authority and its close working relationship 
with certain national suppliers. Between 70 and 90 per cent of 
contracts awarded -by telecomnunications administrations were found 
to have gone to national producers. The ratio was highest in those 
member states that had a strong national industry (e.g., Germany, 
France) ,65.
There were other problems for Canadian suppliers, too. For 
example, market access restrictions existed for terminal equipment 
through standards , and standard-setting procedures; testing, 
'certification and attachment policies; and, in some cases, foreign 
investment policies, Large companies such as Northern Telecom as 
well as smaller third country suppliers faced high costs in meeting 
different national standards in the EC. Company executives 
complained to this author that it cost millions of dollars every 
time a new product' was taken through the redevelopment and
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approvals process needed to enter the new European market. This 
occurred because the markets for terminal equipment were maintained 
in separate national markets because the state administered 
authorities monopolized domestic sourcing, importation and supply 
of terminals. In some countries, notably France, Italy and the UK, 
companies were required to fulfill certain nationality or residency 
requirements.before they could even enter.the approvals process; 
having an agent,to circumvent this requirement also proved costly.- 
In some Member States,' Canadian firms found that procurement 
decisions by PTTs were overtly political. Northern Telecom, for 
example, encountered such interference when trying to bid for a 
switching system for the Italian telephone company. (SIP):66 To 
mitigate these problems, some large Canadian.telecommunications 
firms invested heavily in-the EC market. This would explain, for 
example, Northern Telecom's acquisition of-S.TC PLC, as it-brought 
about the desired treatment as a domestic supplier.
In terms.of value-added service providers, many of the Member 
States . imposed restrictive terms, and conditions. With the 
significant exception of the UK, the price of le'ased lines was 
kept artificially high.by PTTs (particularly in Germany, Spain and 
Italy) to deter the development, of private networks. Over the 
years,, some Member States had used regulations to close their 
domestic telecommunications markets to foreign companies, by 
prohibiting foreign ownership of basic facilities and denying the 
right of establishment for foreign providers of enhanced services.'
The relationship between purchasers and suppliers in the
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telecoinmunications industry in most Member States had become 
one of near-monopsony in procurement counterbalanced by an 
oligopolistic supply industry. Even with liberalization, it 
was clear to both Canadian officials and to the Canadian 
business community that it would be difficult for new entrants 
to displace some of the existing national suppliers such as 
Alcatel, Siemens and Ericsson - the three firms that were 
expected to continue to dominate product manufacturing in the 
Community into the mid-1990s - as well as the second rank 
suppliers such as Bosch, Philips, and Italtel/ATT.
Thus, in the telecommunications sector - uniquely among 
the excluded sectors since it was the one sector in which 
Canadian companies were world class - an open, unified Europe 
promised greater export opportunities as well as increased 
returns on direct foreign investment. It was forecast that the 
increased export opportunities would likely be in the terminal 
equipment market, since this market was to be liberalized 
unconditionally. In contrast, increases in direct exports were 
less likely in the network equipment market due to its high 
entry barriers together with the 50 per cent value-added rule. 
Thus, for this market segment investment, licensing 
arrangements or joint ventures would be necessary for Canadian 
firms. Finally, it seems obvious that as European firms 
benefitted from economies of scale they would also pose 
increased competition for Canadian firms in their domestic 
markets.67
What can we conclude about the Canadian 
telecomnunications sector's response to the SEM? First, it is 
significant that exports of half a billion dollars in
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telecomnunications equipment by four Canadian companies (not 
to mention Northern Telecom's investment) was only about $100 
million less than the total value of softwood lumber exported 
by Canada to the Community in 1992. Thus, the effect of the 
expansion of the Canadian telecommunications sector was not 
only that it further diversified Canada's export mix to the 
EC, but instead of investment replacing exports, the magnetic 
pull of the SEM created increases in Canadian investment flows 
and exports.
It appears then that although Canadian firms had been 
successful in carpeting against EC firms in third markets 
(based on the principal criteria of competitive prices, 
product quality, technical and financial reliability, and 
product conpatibility with existing systems) , in the 
previously excluded sectors the presence of strong, well- 
connected national suppliers in most Member States meant that 
Canadian firms would have had a very hard time carpeting 
unless they did so with a strong local partner.
For the above reasons, the Canadian federal government 
encouraged joint venturing and other forms of partnership as 
an integral part of Canada's response to the SEM (see also 
Table 18 in section 9.7) . Another impulse, as we will discuss 
in section 9.6.1. on Canada-EC cooperation in S&T, was to not 
only use strategic alliances for their marketing and 
distribution benefits but also to permit Canadian firms to tap 
into foreign research. For example, in an innovative industry 
such as telecommunications, it was recognized that for 
Canadian firms to remain carpet it ive they would have to have 
access to world-class technology, much of which resided in the
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EC. This was Northern Telecom's strategy when it gained an R&D 
facility in the UK to complement its existing R&D facility at 
Maidenhead through its purchase of STC PLC.
9.5.2.2 Reciprocity for EC Firms in Canada
With the EC adopting a comprehensive procurement offer by opening 
up procurement at all levels of government and in. the formerly 
excluded sectors, this had the effect of putting pressure on 
countries such as. Canada and the U.S., signatories to the GATT 
Public Procurement Code (the EC represents Western Europe), to in 
turn pressure their sub-federal units. At the time of writing, the 
GATT Public Procurement Code covered purchases by central
governments only, and it excluded purchases in a number of major 
sectors such as power generation, telecommunications,
i
transportation, construction and services contracts. In fact, the 
Code covered less than 5 per cent of the total non-defence,
purchases of its members.
Therefore the other side of the liberalization of -the EC's 
lucrative procurement market was that' the Commission had made it
clear that it expected EC-based firms to be given preference in.
procurement decisions in the excluded sectors in the absence of ' 
multilateral or bilateral agreements ensuring “comparable and 
effective" access for EC. firms in third countries. How then did the 
Commission view its "comparable and effective access" to the
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Canadian market? In the telecommunications industry, for instance, 
EC officials charged that Canada had refused to open its lucrative 
yet much smaller market by not allowing the Europeans to break into 
vertical supplier arrangements. The Europeans had an interest in 
seeing a deregulated domestic telecommunications market, preferably 
with Northern Telecom no longer enjoying a privileged supplier 
relationship with Bell Canada. EC officials note rather wryly that 
Northern Telecom was "sitting rather pretty," since Canada did not 
intend to introduce competition from Alcatel and Siemens.68 In 
addition, the Europeans complained that the regulations for common 
carriers and pricing set by the Canadian Radio-Television and 
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) also worked to exclude EC 
companies from providing services and selling their products. The 
issue'of "reciprocity" brought out by the "1992" program that had 
so exercized American decision makers in the late 1980s, then, 
raised in Ottawa's mind the issue of. whether to protect Canadian 
commercial interests in Europe by. negotiating a bilateral 
procurement agreement with . the EC, or encouraging the EC to 
negotiate improvements under the.GATT Public Procurement Agreement.
Another risk high in the minds of Canadian decision makers was 
the disruptive effects on Canada of a U.S.-EC bilateral- deal on 
procurement, especially if. Such disharmony was over the 
telecommunications sector and caused Canada to be side-swiped. In 
the first scenario, Canadian officials realized that this would 
almost certainly cause' Canadian .telecommunications equipment 
suppliers to source their ’products to the EC from’ their U.S.
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operations. ■
Ottawa was also served notice by the Commission that it would 
be looking at the major provincial utilities such as Quebec Hydro, 
Ontario Hydro', and British Columbia Hydro. In this regard, the 
Community was very interested in the attempts in Canada to remove 
existing inter-provincial barriers to trade in public procurement. 
One success was the "Intergovernmental Agreement on Government 
Procurement," covering goods only, which was signed in November 
1991 and came into effect in April 1992. Although Quebec did not 
sign this agreement, it did state at the time that it would comply 
with its stipulations. Western Canada and the Maritimes had 
regional agreements in effect that extended beyond the national 
agreement in terms of lower thresholds for covered goods contracts 
and some services.
Despite the movement in both Canada and the Community to 
increase.access to public procurement, Canadian officials had to,be
-T
realistic about how much progress could be made given the relative 
power of Canada to negotiate bilaterally with the EC on this, issue: 
in 1992, the total Canadian public procurement market was worth 
about $84 billion compared to the $1.7 trillion value of the total 
public procurement market of the members of the GATT Public 
Procurement Code. In reality, then, despite the excessively 
optimistic projections of Canadian government trade officials, what 
the liberalization of EC government procurement meant was enhanced 
Canadian export opportunities in all the formerly excluded sectors, 
but with the. greatest returns coming from investment In the
390
transportation and telecommunications sectors.69
9.5.2.3 Financial Services
In the financial services- sector, the SEM sought the elimination of 
many internal Community barriers. Again, this process raised the 
question of the EC's leverage to press for "effective market 
access" vis-a-vis its trading partners. One of the issues that was 
raised by the Commission with regard to the Canadian financial 
market was the receipt of the same financial sector concessions as 
provided to the United States under the FTA.
The Banking Directive was considered the bellwether for how 
the Community would deal with third . countries in financial 
services. Early drafts of the directive gave grounds for fears of 
narrow reciprocity. The final draft called for "national treatment 
offering the same competitive opportunities [to EC credit 
institutions]jas are available to domestic credit institutions" and 
"effective market access comparable to that granted by the 
Community to credit institutions from [third countries]-." This 
wording was less overt in demanding sectoral reciprocity than 
earlier formulations, but its-precise significance depended on the 
criteria used to determine "effective market access comparable to 
that granted by the Community." Similar "effective market access" 
requirements-existed in the insurance directives.
In practice however, the EC's, commitment to grandfather 
existing authorized operations of foreign financial institutions in
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the EC alleviated many Canadian concerns. In particular the EC 
grandfathered Canadian institutions both with respect to their 
ability to continue current operations and to branch out. The 
ability of a Canadian bank to make acquisitions in the EC could, 
however, still be undercut by reciprocity requirements.
The EC, especially the UK, complained about Canada'applying 
the federal 10/25 rules to all countries except the United States. 
Under existing Canadian policy, the transfer of shares in banks 
(Schedule A), federally-chartered life insurance and trust 
companies, cannot result in any single non-U.S. non-resident owning 
more than 10 per cent of a company incorporated in Canada; nor can. 
it result in non-U.S. non-residents owning collectively more than 
25 per cent of the company's shares.
In addition, the cCmmercial logic and effect of the Directives 
was expected to increase intra-EC collaboration between Member 
States' financial firms. This would result in a stronger European 
financial sector which would promote the expansion internationally 
of European firms in the financial services industry. At the same 
time, Canadian banks- did not appear- interested in. using the 
benefits of the Single Market, to expand their European operations. 
This was because 'of their retreat from the more competitive EC 
markets, which preceded and succeeded the implementation of the 
Single Market program. Indeed, the Royal Bank, Canada's largest- 
chartered bank, announced in 1992 that it was retreating from its. 
retail operation in continental Europe. Indeed, it was ironic that 
in that same year it released a study that was quite" positive on
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Canadian market opportunities in the Single Market.70 Finally, the 
effect of the SEM on Canadian securities and insurance sector was 
estimated to be small. In the securities sector, London was the 
focus for. Canadian interests and essentially no barriers existed 
for traders; the Canadian non-life insurance sector was foreign 
dominated.
An early bilateral initiative with the Community in the » 
financial sector was considered by some, Canadian officials in 
response to the EC's request for further liberalization of foreign 
access to Canada's markets, particularly in the banking sector. The 
benefits to Canada of the ' approach were, not clear in Ottawa. 
Canadian officials considered negotiating with the EC - for a price 
- the same treatment,provided to the United States under the CUFTA. 
It was felt In Ottawa that timing was of the essence if Canada were 
to obtain any benefits. In particular, the Canadian side wanted to 
carefully assess: (1) the extent to which the EC would put pressure 
on Canada ho provide "effective market access" as the 
implementation of the various 1992 Directives got under way; and 
(2) the results of the services negotiatipns in the Uruguay Round, 
before developing firm views regarding an initiative in the 
financial sector. Because financial services had been negotiated 
within the Uruguay Round negotiations on services .(General 
Agreement on Services), there had been no formal requests to the 
Community by Canada' for, a bilateral Canada-EC agreement on 
financial services as there had ^ been on science and technology, 
competition policy, and on standards and certification. Again, this
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demonstrates the intersection of the SEM, the GATT, and Canada's 
foreign economic policy.
The following two sections of this -.chapter examine the 
indirect impact of. the SEM on Canada-EC relations in S&T. and in the 
forestry products sector.
9.6 The SEM'S SPILLOVER EFFECTS
9.6.1 Canada-EC Cooperation on Science and Technology
By. .1989, two years after the Single European Act had come into 
effect, Canada, became very keen to exploit the advantages of the 
SEM in the area of S&T. With the Single Market program having 
accelerated the Community's research programs, Willy de Clerg, 
then External Relations Commissioner, gave Ottawa what Ottawa took 
to be green.light to pursue a bilateral S&T agreement with Brussels 
by stressingj”the .'possibilities of international cooperation in 
science and technology, space, transport and communications.-71 The 
needs and benefits of closer S&T links with the Community, -in 
Ottawa's view, stemmed from Canada's relatively modest role in the 
field of international S&T: it contributed only 4 per cent of the 
world.'s scientific literature and. 2 per cent of the world's global 
technology pool. This performance was reflected downstream from R&D 
activities as illustrated by the^growing deficit in Canada's trade 
in technology-intensive products despite the impressive growth - as 
mentioned - in the communications sector. Recalling our discussion
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of Canada's competitive position in Chapter Eight, this lack of S&T 
was a contributing factor to the continued.reliance on the exports 
of low-manufactures and raw materials. At the same time, Canada 
faced increasing competition from the opening of Eastern. Europe and 
the former Soviet Union72 and the increased technical sophistication 
of the Pacific Rim countries.
In a global economy that placed a premium on value-added goods 
and services, all of which required a strong technical foundation 
in order to remain competitive, it was easy to see why Canadian 
policymakers were very eager to raise the profile of Canada/EC S&T 
collaboration. The existing arrangements, for example,, of bilateral 
S&T ties with Germany,. France, and the • United Kingdom and some 
provincial arrangements were -seen as insufficient by the late 
1980s., In institutional terms, Ottawa increased its S&T resources 
so- that by 1989 EAITC had a five S&T officers,, three of whom were 
in Europer plus one- "space" officer in Paris; by 1992 the number of 
S&T officers-had risen to seven and were supported by an S&T 
division at EAITC, with eleven technology development officers. .As 
well, EAITC earmarked $175,350 for "Contributions for Technology 
Development with Europe" in the fiscal year 1992-93, an amount: that 
was, however, dwarfed.by the Department's $1.8 million contribution 
to the. Japan Science & Technology Fund.73
To provide some perspective on the. state. of EC-Canada S&T 
relations in the period leading up to the. SEM, despite the 
Framework Agreement having been intended .to intensify scientific 
and technological cooperation, in actual fact Canada's formal
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cooperation with the EC. in this sphere had never gone much beyond 
the exchange of information and Scientists, and the occasional 
joint research project between laboratories. Until the end of 1992, 
access to the major Research and Technology Development Framework 
Programs of the Communities was restricted to European partners 
only. As ■ research was tied directly to the goals of the Single 
Market - both to' improve trans-S&T capacity and international 
competitiveness - Canada's exclusion was also seen by Ottawa as an 
exclusion from the EC's economic/trade objectives. The fear in 
Canada was that to the extent that the Single Market program 
incorporated a greater degree of pan-Europeanization., this in .turn 
would lead to pressures on each constituent Member State and also 
on other European countries (most notably the EFTA members) to look 
to others in Europe for more S&T collaborations. This would be at 
the expense of potential collaboration with non-EC nations such as 
Canada. •
-jm  —  -
But Canada was not completely frozen out of the Community's 
S&T programs. Canada's most focused experience in collaboration 
with Western Europe took place in conjunction with the. EUREKA 
program.74 To support Canadian companies interested in EUREKA, 
Ottawa had established a $20 million program called Technology 
Opportunities in Europe (TOEP). However, because of the program's 
low use by Canadian firms it was terminated in 1989.
Given its spotty record on S&T collaboration with the EC, the 
Canadian government starting in 1989 began to approach the EC. with 
a view to negotiating a bilateral S&T agreement.75 However, after
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the disappointment of TOEP, the renewed impetus from the Canadian 
side was based on the belief that such a framework agreement would 
build on and tie together activities • that already took place 
bilaterally and through multilateral forums such as IIASA, IASC, 
the OECD/CSTP, NATO Science Program and ESA. A 1990 study produced 
under the auspices of the "Going Global" strategy, called for a 
more focused approach to bilateral relations with the.EC on S&T. 
The idea was that an Agreement on Cooperation in Science and 
Technology would facilitate the matching of consortia and. R&D 
networks, the assessment of standards, and the cataloguing of 
international interests and priorities of Canadian universities and 
corporations, with a view to permitting Canadian organizations to 
get access to the Community's S&T programs.76
With the Commission receiving the mandate in mid-1992 to 
negotiate an S&T agreement with Australia, Canada saw a strategic 
opportunity-to push again for its own S&T agreement.-' In June 1992 
the Canadian-’ Government presented a .."strengths" paper to the 
Commission highlighting.the scope for S&T partnerships given that 
many of .Canada's strategic sectoral priorities mirrored the 
Community's.77 The Canadian paper noted that with the particular 
technologies- featured in the Community's Third Framework Program 
there were Canada-EC. "complementarities" in light of Canadian 
strengths in communications technologies, information technologies, 
the development of telematics of general interest, environmental 
research and technology development, agriculture, forestry, non­
nuclear energy, nuclear research and development, and
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biotechnology.
The Europeans appeared interested in taking increasing 
advantage of the linkage between S&T activities, trade and 
investment highlighted in the Canadian study for a number of 
reasons. First, particularly in the high technology sectors, 
conventional marketing was being replaced by strategic 
alliances based on licensing, joint ventures, co-production, 
subcontracting, and marketing arrangements. Second, as the 
COTTA and the NAFTA were phased in, the Community recognized 
that Canada would become increasingly attractive as the entry 
point into the North American market and, significantly, 
Canada had a well established community of SMEs which would be 
attractive to EC SMEs. Undoubtedly, this was one of the
reasons why the Commission saw the benefits of having Canada 
join its BC-Net system, as we discussed in Chapter Three. In 
early 1993 the Commission received the mandate to negotiate an 
S&T agreement with Canada, although at that time it was
estimated that it would take a year or more for the agreement
to get through the Council.
In conclusion, the above discussion demonstrates: (1) the 
spillover effects of the SEM; (2) the asymmetrical nature of 
Canada-EC relations, with Canada as the demandeur; (3) that 
the 1976 Framework Agreement had failed to expand S&T 
relations; and (4) the lack of Canadian private sector in 
receiving government assistance to participate in EC research 
programs.
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9.6.2 The Impact of the Environment on Canada's Forestry Exports
Between 1991 and 1993, concerns with the environment were at an 
all-time high internationally. The destruction of tropical rain 
forests focused attention on the Earth's bio-mass. With 10 per cent 
of the world's forest products of Canadian origin and half of 
Canada's landmass consisting of forests, it was perhaps not 
surprising that the management of Canada's forestry resources were 
coming under increasing domestic and international scrutiny. To the 
extent that the Single Market process had raised the profile of 
environmental issues in Europe, this raised the question of whether 
Canada's forestry practices affected Canada-EC economic relations 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As it turned out, Canadian 
forestry practices created a major bilateral Canada-EC economic and 
political irritant; so much so that, as in the case of the 
fisheries, this conflict succeeded in overshadowing and underminig 
the multiplicity of other bilateral contacts.
Before describing the conflicts, it is important to understand 
that the largest component of exports from Canada' s forestry sector 
come in the "commodity" sectors of lumber, wood pulp and newsprint, 
as opposed to further value added sectors.78 As well, forest 
industry development within Europe must be recognized such as the 
growth in newsprint capacity and changes in the EC's preferential 
arrangements (particularly with regard to the Nordic countries) .
To begin, the EC was the world's largest importer of, and 
Canada's second largest customer (after the United States) for, 
forest products. As noted previously, Canadian forest product 
exports to the EC corrprised more than a quarter of all Canadian
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exports. The reason that access to the European market was -vital 
to Canadian interests was that with net exports exceeding $19 
billion annually making up 14 per cent of Canada's total world 
exports, the forest products sector was the largest contributor to 
Canada's balance of trade and the second' largest export sector 
after automobiles.79 For this reason, both Ottawa and the provincial 
governments were very concerned that the Canadian share of the EC 
market would be deleteriously affected by: the European
environmental movement (which had received support from some 
members of the European Parliament); the EC's technical standards
i
on forestry products; EC phytosanitary and plant health policies; 
and the prospect that Canada's market share would be eroded by 
competing European producers at both ends of the vaiue-added 
spectrum. At stake directly were 45,000 domestic jobs.
Although criticism in Western Europe* of Canadian forest 
products and practices rather than being widespread .was 
concentrated in the UK - where the criticism focused.on "the issues 
of .recycling' and sustainable yield (i.e., destruction of virgin 
forests) - and Germany - where the criticism focused on acid rain, 
•forest management,, and mill effluents80, the media coverage both in 
Canada and the spillover into the European press (pushed by what 
the- Canadian government and industry referred to as "fringe 
groups"81) could not be ignored. Canadian government and industry 
were forced to act, as both the European Commission and the 
European Parliament increasingly expressed concern over the state 
of the tropical forests of the world, as well as of Europe's own
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forests; environmental standards started to figure prominently on 
the EC agenda (particularly on the processing with the use of 
chemicals and preservatives). This-occurred despite the fact that 
historically management of forestry resources had rested solidly 
with the. Member States. As a result of contact between certain Euro 
Parliamentarians (primarily the Greens and Socialists) and 
Aboriginal groups in Canada, the European Parliament was exposed to 
Canadian forestry practices and the issue gained a high visibility. 
That discussions in the .European Parliament82 would link national 
and "domestic" issues such as Aboriginal land claims with disputes 
over the efficacy of managed clear-cutting in British Columbia and 
Canada's export quota of newsprint, stung Ottawa particularly hard.
.There was also a strong economic anchor - smacking ' of 
protectionism to Canadian observers - to the protests of some Euro 
MEPs who demanded that the Commission initiate anti-dumping actions 
on both Canada and Scandinavia on the grounds that because their 
industries were not engaging in ecologically sound forest 
management practices, they were able to dump pulp on the Community 
market and thus caused serious damage to the EC's forestry 
industry.83
In addition to these environmental concerns, there were a 
number of specific barriers to Canada's exports of* forestry 
products. The EC Construction Products Directive (CPD), put in 
effect in June 1991 and dealing mainly with codes and standards 
affecting engineering and design, concerned Canadian industry 
because it appeared set to precipitate a large number of testing
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and. certification procedures. The process was driven by the 
'Commission, with technical committees appointed by the EC.84 There 
was some debate on the effect of Eurocode 5 - the attempt to set a 
common EC building code for wooden structures - on Canadian 
.interests. There was also concern in Canada that the new standards, 
such as those that applied to ;fire-testing, might be.inconsistent 
with Canadian standards and that Canadian suppliers could therefore' 
face adjustment problems.85 The feeling among EAITC.officials was. 
that because the code would be product-neutral (containing - no 
product information) it would not pose a large barrier.86 What was 
of greater concern to Canadian officials .was the development of 
product standards, since, once completed, these Euro-standards 
would replace Member State standards and would thereby directly 
affect Canadian interests. Ottawa's approach, therefore, was to get 
as many Canadian products.included in the product standard lists.
In order to ensure that Canada had direct input into the
. . . .  ' j,
product standards decision-making process, that is, so that Canada 
would have a say on drafts produced by . the European technical 
committees (TCs) responsible for drafting' product standards 
(including those pertaining to timber), Ottawa made sure that the 
Confederation of Forest Industries of British Columbia (COFI)87, 
which had an office in London, had representation on the Eurocode 
technical committees. COFI tracked CEN work on standards through 
the UK members of CEN such as BSI. Apparently, the impetus to get 
COFI more intimately involved in standards monitoring came from 
EAITC which provided COFI with a stream of grants; by 1993 COFI was
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one of the few Canadian industry associations still receiving 
direct subsidies from EAITC.88 According to a senior Canadian 
official who was interviewed, COFI's eight-person London 
office (reduced to three at the end of 1993) had always acted 
as a marketing arm of the Canadian forest industry rather than 
a shop monitoring trade policy issues.89 The implication was 
that Canadian industry was not equipped financially to deal 
with EC market access issues by itself as the debacle over the 
Pine Wood Nematode (PWN) worm in 1991 would demonstrate.
9.6.2.1 The Pine Wood Nematode (PWN) and Canada1 s Lumber Exports
The PWN was one of the most contentious of bilateral EC-Canada 
issues in the period leading up to the SEM. By 1991 Canada 
(and the U.S.) had for many years been exporting lumber to the 
EC, which in that year had a total value of $1 billion of 
which $700 million was so-called "green" or untreated lumber. 
Lumber was Canada's single biggest export item to the EC.
The pine wood nematode is endemic in North America 
forests and is primarily found in the pine tree species. The 
PWN is transmitted from one tree to another by a vector (a 
beetle) which enters host trees which are weakened or 
decaying. However, the PWN apparently does not result in 
significant losses to North America forests due to climatic 
conditions - the PWN needs a temperature of minus 20 degrees 
Celsius to develop. (In contrast, the PWN has caused serious 
damage to Japanese pine forests, where it is widely
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accepted that the PWN was transmitted many years ago from North 
America by the export of full tree logs with bark on.)
Until January 1,,1991, there were no common EC-rules on import 
.conditions for lumber from North America to safeguard against the 
introduction of the PWN. Some countries required a drying treatment 
to bring the moisture content down to below 20 per cent - so-called 
kiln drying. This process was supposed to kill off any PWN, but was 
considered a time-consuming and costly process increasing with the 
size of the lumber. Other countries, like the UK which was prime 
importer, had for 10 years been practicing a less rigorous 
requirement demanding that the lumber be debarked and /inspected for 
grubholes to verify the possible-, presence of the PWN. This 
verification was undertaken by the sawmills in exporting countries 
- producing the so-called "mill certificate" accreditation.
In the early 1980s Finland detected the^presence of PWN in a 
consignment- of Canadian wood (chips), and as a consequence 
prohibited the entry of coniferous wood from. Canada and the U.S.. 
This led to .the request for common EC import rules and the- 
phytosanitary-related requirement to kiln-dry all Canadian softwood 
lumber, which took effect on January 1, 1992. Thereafter, all
imported coniferous wood from North America had to be treated by 
kiln drying to less than 20 per cent moisture content. However, at 
that time Canada and the U.S. had insufficient kiln dry capacity to 
fulfill this requirement. Consequently, the EC granted them a 
temporary derogation applicable for one year and for ten Member 
States, allowing them to export lumber under the mill certificate
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system under-the auspices of Agriculture Canada and USDA.
In the - meantime, a joint Canada/Community research program 
■(initiated in 1991) was verifying the effectiveness of the kiln 
drying requirement and alternative methods including the mill 
certificate. This research concluded that an effective method to 
kill PWN and the vector was to pasteurize (heat treat) the wood to 
obtain a minimum wood core temperature ,of 56 degrees Celsius for 3 0 
minutes.90 These requirements were approved by the Standing 
Committee on -Plant Health (SPC) in July 1992 and were implemented 
into Community legislation by Commission decision in December 1992. 
Upon presentation of the results of the scientific study, both 
Canada and the U.S. in September 1992 requested the above mentioned 
measures only be applied to high risk species (primarily pines) and 
that less stringent requirments apply to medium- and low-risk 
species.
Canada.'s attempt to have less stringent requirements brought 
the argumentsrto a head since the scientific evidence produced by 
Canada was considered inconclusive by the SPC. The SPC proposed 
having heat treatment for all high risk species (pine and mixtures) 
starting in June 1993; making non-pine and non-thula lumber 
imported into the Community that was under the mill certification 
program at that time also submit to the heat treatment, but only 
after a phase-in period of 8-12 months; and allowing large 
dimension wood to be exempted from the heat treatment until such 
time that technical developments would allow heat treatment. 
Canada's reaction was that it wanted to differentiate among species
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of wood. The Member States, however, showed no readiness to accept 
this, with the exception of the large dimension non-pine wood 
(provided that this type of wood'still had a mill certificate) . The 
reason was that the danger of transmission of the PWN from non-pine 
to pine was considered real.
On the Canadian side, there was much consternation at the 
Commission proposals and the Member State reactions. Officials
i .
responsible for Canada-EC relations at EAiTC found themselves 
spending, in the words of one official at the height of bilateral 
discussions in the summer of 1992, "80 per cent of his time" on
just the PWN issue.91 Indeed, it was projected that because Canadian 
industry's capacity.for heat treatment was still inadequate, there 
would be significant disruption in the exports of. lumber from. 
Quebec, the Maritimes and coastal British Columbia. Further, the 
requirement to have all lumber heat treated without allowing Canada 
(and the U.S.) to justify their case would result in significant 
increases in £he costs of exports to the EC.
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TABLE 15: CANADIAN EXPORTS OF LUMBER TO THE EC
Lumber Type
Quantity
Value (CDN $000)
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
Lumber,conif. 3,832,940 3,607,401 4,088,221 3,177,314 2,548,201
$721,207 $695,211 $834,028 $662,.560. $625,824
Lumber, Oak 95,420 31,553 22,452 25,482 • 21,770
$50,116 $22,762 $16,417 $15,608 $16,672
Lumber, Beech '• 379 552 953 778 868
$64 $161 $291 $288 $270
Lumber,non-conif 84,195 49,348 66,581 63,329 50,520
$38,372 ' $26,606 $28,505 $29,198 $30,581
Total . 4,012,934 3,688,854 4,178,207 3,266,903 2,621,359 '
$809,759 $744,740 $879,241 $707,654 $673,349
Source: Statistics Canada, Cat. 270-202, 1993.
Based on the above description of the PWN as a bilateral trade 
irritant, lumber exports was one area where there was a clear 
causal link between an EC non-tariff barrier and changes in 
Canada1 s;export patterns to the EC'. In 1993, UK inspectors found a 
PWN larvae wEich led to a ban on Canadian lumber igaports. In 
Canada's exports to the UK - the largest importer of Canadian 
lumber - the addition of the higher production costs associated 
with heat treatment on top of the UK importers' existing requests 
that Canadian lumber be cut to special sizes, combined to lead .to 
a signifant loss in green lumber exports. As Table 15 shows for the 
aggregate EC market the loss was an estimated $20.0 million (based 
on exchange rates) in green lumber exports between 1990 and 1992 
plus an estimated $100 million in additional loses due to the 
uncertainty created by the PWN. The hardest hit region of Canada as 
a result of.the PWN was the lumber.industry in Nova Scotia; the
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least affected' region was British Columbia industry since it still 
had the Pacific market.
As in other bilateral disputes, this Canada-EC trade irritant, 
was taken to Geneva under a draft agreement in the GATT discussions 
on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. (SPS-Agreement) . The'finding 
was that the European importer had the right to take protective 
SPS-measures determined by the level of. protection against risks. 
The importers' measures had to be the least trade restrictive in 
achieving this objective, not be maintained against available 
scientific evidence, and be proportional to the risk. It was up to 
the exporter, however, to demonstrate. that his measures were 
equivalent to the importer's requirements in order to avoid any 
risk.-
Another observation that arises out of the PWN case-study is 
the role of a key Member State such as the UK with which Canada has 
a special relationship. As told to this author by a Canadian 
official, Canadian interests were stymied by one UK official in 
particular who was responsible for coordinating the EC's forestry 
research program. It appeared from the example of the .UK' s position, 
on the PWN, that although Canada could count on the UK to represent 
its. interests on many issues, it could not do so for one that posed 
so. significant a threat to Canadian commercial interests. This 
should not strike one as surprising especially as the machinery of 
government in the UK adjusts to increasing integration with the 
Community machinery and the shift in Britain foreign policy from 
the Atlantic and Commonwealth to Europe becomes in Wallace's words
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"incremental and pragmatic".92
If the EC's phytosanitary restrictions caused Ottawa headaches 
with regard to Canada's lumber exports, then the situation with 
Canadian newsprint exports was largely self-inflicted. Together, 
both highlighted a "double whammy" on Canada's forestry products 
industry. As indicated, pulp and newsprint was generally traded 
duty free. There was a quota of 600,000 tons for tariff-free 
newsprint (worth about $0.5 billion to Canada at 1992 exchange 
rates and representing on its own about 5 per cent of the total 
value of Canadian exports to the EC) beyond which a levy of 4.9 per 
cent was charged (9 per cent if not water lined) . The story on the 
Canadian quota, as told to the author by Canadian officials, is 
that in 1986 Canada's Minister for Trade, James Kelleher, 
miscalculated when, rather than waiting to see what the Commission 
would offer in terms of a duty-free quota for Canadian newsprint, 
went into negotiations with the Europeans and "lowballed" with an 
offer of 600,000 tons - which the Commission officials to their 
delight apparently promptly accepted.93 Canadian officials believe 
that the EC would have accepted a higher Canadian quota, pointing 
to this as a major bungle that had had ramifications ever since in 
terms of making Canadian exports less competitive.
What can we conclude from looking at developments in the 
forest products sector in the period leading up to the SEM? While 
non-tariff barriers such as environmental concerns {e.g., banning 
certain grades of Canadian pulp which used processes resulting in 
unacceptable emissions), standards and certification procedures, 
and plant health issues such as the PWN, and poorly negotiated
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quotas, certainly all . had an impact on Canada's most export 
important sector with the EC, it shpuld be remembered that these 
were not the only and, perhaps,'not the most important factors.
In weighing the relative . impact of the SEM on Canada's 
forestry sector, it should be kept in mind that it was the 
combination a larger more efficient market being.created plus the 
EC's preferential agreements with other European states that 
reduced Canadian competitiveness. The outlook for Canadian exports 
'to the EC, although.looking reasonably favourable in volume terms 
in the early 1990s would clearly have been better if there had been 
an agreement on free trade in forestry products - thus eliminating 
the duty advantage enjoyed by the EFTA members, notably Sweden, 
Finland, and Austria. Canada's traditional export products to the 
EC - paper, paper board., market pulp, newsprint, and unseasoned 
construction grade lumber-- were under increasing competition from 
new low-cost^producers,. with only slight growth forecast in the 
coming two decades94; meanwhile, market growth for solid products 
(e.g., construction grade lumber), was expected to face increased 
competition from low cost sources such as the Baltics and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States and the Nordic countries95; and 
the EC and Nordic countries were moving quickly towards self- 
sufficiency in higher value-added products. Even when Canada 
attempted to focus on.the growth in demand of printing and writing 
papers, it was clear that Scandinavian producers already dominated 
the EC market; Canadian suppliers were not easily going displace 
their innovative Nordic competitors. In short, Canada was in the
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uncomfortable position of witnessing market share erosion at both 
spectrum’s of the forestry sector, its most important export sector 
to the EC.
That being said, other factors may still have had 
a greater inpact on the ability of Canadian suppliers to compete in 
the EC market than tariffs and quotas (for example, exchange rates, 
investment climate in Canada, product innovation (R&D), increased 
capacity in the Southern United States and Latin America and 
environmental constraints) . In terms of the impact of EC tariff 
barriers, the price effect of EC tariffs on Canadian forest 
products was offset in in the late 1980s and early 1990s by the 
shift in exchange rates.
In conclusion, the emergence of a Single Market had less of an 
inpact on Canada's forestry sector than it had on, for example, the 
Canadian telecornnunications sector; nevertheless, issues related to 
the SEM, such as the environment, and the expansion of preferences 
to the EFTA states and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
did significantly hinder the access of Canadian forestry products 
to the EC market. And furthermore, the Canadian forestry industry - 
accustomed to promoting its goods rather than tracking market 
access issues - appeared particularly ill-prepared and dependent on 
the federal government to protect its interests with regard to 
environmental campaigns launched from Europe and on specific non­
tariff barriers such as the PWN.
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9.7 EVALUATING THE BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE SEM
Given the SEM's breadth, any evaluation of the Canadian response 
risks being weakened by its lack of precision. Yet, a number of 
observations can be made and are supported by the statistical 
statistical evidence in Chapter Eight, the data on the investment 
decisions of individual Canadian firms, and this chapter's more 
qualitative discussion of the challenges and opportunities for 
third countries resulting from the Community's attempt to legislate 
an end to inefficient non-tariff barriers.
In general, it is striking to discover that despite Ottawa's 
efforts to respond aggressively to the SEM on first the trade 
policy front (e.g., calling for global free trade, negotiating 
reduced tariff rates on those products heavily represented in 
Canada's export mix to the EC, promoting new regimes on investment 
and other emerging trade policy issues, and proposing and 
negotiating bilateral sectoral accords with the Commission) and, 
second, on the international business front, through "Going 
Global, " the combined results were decidely mixed. Nevertheless, it 
is probably too soon after the implementation of the SEM to label 
the Canadian response as a "disappointment" as was the case with 
the "Third Option". On the one hand, Ottawa's effort probably did 
reduce the amount trade diversion at Canada's expense that arose 
from the economic repositioning leading up to the SEM; on the 
other, it is unlikely that the Mulroney Government's response 
would, in the medium- to long-terms, succeed in fundamentally 
reversing the trend of weakening transatlantic economic links. The 
reasons are five-fold:
1. Although the SEM first affected large European companies it 
also had very real ramifications for large non-EC companies in
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non-EC markets. However, the breakdown of the Canadian 
corporate sector indicates the paucity of large, global, and 
majority-owned Canadian companies. Those that did exist were 
restricted to those certain sectors (mining, forestry 
products, engineering) that were less affected by the SEM but 
more vulnerable to the EC's preferential agreements.
2. Those large Canadian companies capable of responding 
aggressively to the SEM were in many cases subsidiaries of 
U.S. firms, and the strategies for the Single Market had 
already been elaborated by the parent firms.
3. Some of the strong Canadian sectors (mines and resources, 
forestry, and fishery products) were only indirectly affected 
by the SEM, although the case of the PWN showed that even an 
indirect effect could have deleterious domestic economic 
consequences for Canada. As well, although these sectors may 
have been less affected by the SEM they were more vulnerable 
to the EC's growing network of preferential trade accords.
4. Canadian supply was weaker in sectors such as agri-food and 
public procurement, in which the impact of the Single Market 
was significant.
5. For many Canadian companies, especially SMEs, the U.S. and 
Mexico were more obvious markets. This was because the 
elimination of non-tariff barriers, which was the hallmark of 
the "1992" program benefitted those Canadian suppliers - 
usually not SMEs - who could afford to invest in the EC.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, for an evaluation of the 
Canadian response to have any value a distinction must first be 
made between how Canadian MNEs and SMEs responded both to the SEM 
and to Ottawa's planned approach to European economic integration. 
Historically, Canada's largest, mostly resource and financial 
services firms had been responsible for the vast majority of 
Canadian investment and exports to Europe.
The concentration of Canadian trade and investment with Europe 
in a few MNEs was quite extraordinary and can be discerned from 
Table 17 in Appendix Three. For instance, it is significant that of 
the 30 Canadian firms with the largest interests in Europe, 16 were 
among the 30 most outwardly-oriented Canadian-based firms96, and 11 
of Canada's 20 largest firms also happened individually to have
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made the largest investments in Europe.97 Furthermore, based on the 
survey data compiled by this author on the 253 Canadian firms with 
the largest interests in Europe and aggregate CFDI data98, the 
eleven Canadian firms with the largest interests in Europe were 
responsible for approximately 80 per cent of the total investment 
in the EC between 1988-1992." And to reinforce the point even more, 
it is instructive to recall that if 60 per cent of Canada's exports 
were from 20 of Canada's largest firms, we may surmise that the 
same large Canadian multinationals (listed in Table 17) responsible 
for the preponderance of CFDI in the EC were also responsible for 
the majority of Canadian exports to the region.
Thus, what the emergence of the SEM did was to further 
increase the concentration of Canadian MNE activity in Canada's 
investment and trade patterns with the EC, something that may not 
have been anticipated or planned by Ottawa in its focus on SMEs and 
its desire to diversify transatlantic links across all firm sizes.
9.7.1 The Role of Canadian SMEs
TABLE 18: 
INTERNATIONAL TECH. ALLIANCES OF CANADIAN FIRMS, 1990-
91
SECTOR U.S. EC JAPAN OTHER* TOTAL %
DISTR.
Advanced
materials
10 10 2 2 24 15
Biotechnology 16 27 3 2 48 30
Electronics 16 30 10 10 66 41
Transportat ion 9 8 4 1 22 14
Total 51 75 19 15 160 14
Total (%) 32 47 12 9 100 -
Note: ‘Mostly Korean firms; there were no Mexican turns among the "other".
Source: From Table 12 in J. Niosi, "Foreign Direct Investment in Canada,” in Lorraine Eden, ed., M ultinaionds in North America (Calgary, Alberta: University o f Alberta and Industry Canada, 1994), 
p. 382.
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But, as Table 18 above shows, there were some positive 
benefits to Canada's state-led response to the SEM.Indeed, of 
Canada's international alliances, Europeans were by far the most 
popular partners. During the 1980s, the number of strategic 
alliances formed by European firms increased dramatically, partly 
in response to research and development programs and regional 
initiatives. From 1990 through 1991, Niosi indicates that Canadian 
firms concluded more foreign technical alliances with the EC than 
with American partners. Table 18 shows that alliances with EC 
partners constituted almost half the total foreign alliances of 
Canadian firms. American alliances were less numerous than EC 
alliances across the board, except in transportation equipment. In 
short, after 1989, there was a significant shift of Canadian MNEs 
abroad but, despite the COTTA, Canadian investors considered the EC 
to be at least as good a destination as the United States.
The findings on strategic alliances - for example, those 
between BCE/Northern Telecom group in Europe (with Matra in France 
and Mercury in Britain) and Bonbardier (with the Transmanche 
consortium and Aerospatiale in France) as well as the lure of small 
Canadian biotechnology firms that attracted large European 
pharmaceutical firms (like Allelix, and Biochem Pharam) - can be 
explained by the complementarity of European and Canadian 
industries. It can also be explained by the more widespread use of 
strategic alliances in the EC than in the United States through the 
many inter-European programs launched since 1984, including the 
previously discussed EUREKA S&T program and the SME-oriented BC-Net 
(to be discussed below) .
Although strategic alliances were up, what Ottawa apparently 
could not do was to induce Canadian SMEs to form alliances with EC
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firms. As noted in Table 17, the Canadian partners of international 
alliances were most often large corporations with significant EDI. 
Of course, it is true that certain SMEs, particularly in the 
technological sectors such as computers or telecommunications or 
biotechnology adopted measures to reinforce their presence in the 
EC through alliances, but this appears to have been the exception 
rather than the rule.
But the rather discouraging response of Canadian SMEs to 
Ottawa's inducements to penetrate Community markets and to 
participate through strategic alliances in Community S&T programs, 
rather than causing federal officials to move resources out of 
Western Europe to other regions, instead appeared to strengthen the 
resolve of the Government. It so happened that in the late 1980s 
while the Canadian Chamber of Commerce was exploring the modalities 
of mechanisms to help its membership exchange trade leads and 
strategic alliance information through electronic means, the EC was 
at the same time exploring ways of linking the SMEs of the Member 
States. At that time, the Commission's SME matching system, known 
as BC-Net, was not yet open to third countries such as Canada. It 
was this focus on the promotion of strategic alliances for SMEs 
that in July 1993 led to the accession of Canada to the European 
Commission's BC-Net, for the first time allowing Canadian SMEs to 
be linked to the EC's SMEs.100 The rationale on the Canadian side 
was that the BC-Net was consistent with both government and 
business strategies to help Canadian SMEs, which, as mentioned 
earlier in Chapter Eight, flowed from the belief by Canadian 
decision makers that Canada would only be brought out of its 
recession in the late 1980s and early 1990s through an export- and 
investment-led economic recovery spearheaded by SMEs.
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The state-led nature of the BC-Net initiative was readily 
apparent. Ottawa hoped that this program would help to diversify 
Canada-EC relations away from their state-to-state character by 
creating a separate channel for Canada-EC business links. Although 
the Canadian dimension of BC-Net was promoted as a "private sector- 
led" initiative with the Canadian Chamber acting as the private 
sector link in Canada and was "supported" by the federal government 
departments of Industry, Science, and Technology Canada (ISTC), 
EAITC, as well as the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, British 
Columbia, and Nova Scotia, it should be noted that neither the 
Chamber nor any other Canadian private sector actor evinced any 
interest in setting up this transatlantic business network 
independent of government funds. In fact, the Chamber only agreed 
to act as the Canadian business partner once it was assured by the 
Industry department that it would not be responsible for the start­
up costs. This was in stark contrast to the Chamber's willingness 
to pursue setting up private sector trade offices in the United 
States, something it presumably could ask its 170,000 members to 
support.101
Interestingly, the focus on joint ventures between Canadian 
and EC firms - through the mechanism of business cooperation 
centres - had been called for nearly 20 years before at a forum on 
Canada-EC relations.102 As noted by Hodges at the time, while 
governments propose, non-governmental actors "dispose, negate or 
bring to fruition links set up at the governmental level".103 Thus, 
the success of the BC-Net in fortifying non-governmental Canada-EC 
ties would rest largely on the interest of Canadian SMEs in 
pursuing conmercial opportunities. Canada's historical track-record 
in this regard was not good.
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Another point that emerges from the creation of BC-Net is that 
not only was it not private sector-led, but the lead government 
department was ISTC (since it was responsible for the government's 
SME strategy)104 and not EAITC, further reinforcing the thesis, 
outlined in Chapter Three, that the management of Canada's foreign 
and trade policy was increasingly becoming fragmented. That being 
said, the almost corporatist character of BC-Net fit nicely into 
the calls by both the federal government and the private sector for 
a new form of public-private sector partnership in the promotion of 
Canada's commercial interests abroad.
In sum, the Mulroney Government' s response to the SEM between 
1986 and 1993 did not appear as of this writing in 1994 to have 
made any significant changes in the way Canada's business community 
reacted to the SEM. This is because the state's programs targetted 
SMEs, yet the vast majority of the investment, exports and 
strategic alliances was undertaken by Canada's few large MNEs. 
Indeed, it would be expected that with the major Canadian MNEs 
(Bombardier, Northern Telecom, Seagram, and McCain) having already 
made most of their investments in the EC before 1990 (see Table 17 
in Appendix Three and cross-reference with aggregate investment 
flows in Table 9 in Chapter Eight), the fear of Canadian officials 
would come true, namely, that Canada would become an increasingly 
residual supplier to the EC market.
In the past, it was suggested that the "Third Option" had 
failed because it was state-led, yet the case of the Canadian 
response to the SEM suggests that there was not so much of a 
"failure" on the part of government as there was relative 
disinterest on the part of private actors due to the structural 
make up of the Canadian economy.
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9.8 CONCLUSION
A number of conclusions may be drawn from this chapter. First, 
while the creation of the SEM may have removed many of the 
statutory.barriers, it, also revealed in starker terms many of the’ 
structural impediments that existed in Europe.
Second, as . difficult as it was to measure empirically the 
impact of the SEM on specific Canadian industries because the 
evidence was often fragmentary and anecdotal, in the case of the 
PWN the case study in this chapter showed that there was an 
unambigous link between this non-tariff barrier and the precipitant 
drop in Canadian lumber exports to the Community between 1990 and 
1992.
Third, it appeared that Canada's responses to the SEM were 
both similar to, and different from, those of its larger neighbpur, 
the United. States, and those of other middle powers to which it is 
frequently compared,, notably, Australia and New Zealand? It is not 
hard to see why. Although each country was in the. proverbial 
"third" concentric, circle in terms of.the EC's external relations 
and therefore had similar general concerns about the third country 
impact of the "1992" program's horizontal measures, there were 
clear differences in these countries' sector-by-sector level of 
response to the SEM since each country had qualitatively and. 
quantitatively different export and investment profile in its 
relations with the Community. For instance, Canada was less 
concerned about the SEM in terms of automotive 1 parts exports in
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comparison to the United States and Japan, although it shared these 
same countries' concerns about access to European 
telecommunications markets; Canada was less concerned about 
agricultural exports (although they were of course still important) 
in comparison to, say, Australia and New Zealand; but it was 
certainly much more concerned about phytosanitary requirements than 
were the United States, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Thud,
Fourth, spillover from the 1992 process raised contentious 
issues in specific sectors such as European concerns about plant 
health in terms of Canadian lumber shipments, which often occurred 
against a background of existing trade frictions such as European 
and Canadian environmental campaigns to force changes in Canadian 
forestry practices.
Fifth, the response of the Canadian business community was 
most highly visible by the reactions of a handful of Canadian 
multinationals; the response from SMEs was generally one of 
indifference given the pull of the U.S. market in the aftermath of 
the CUFIA.
And finally, as vexing as bilateral trade problems were for 
both Ottawa and Brussels, the major bilateral issue between 1987 
and 1993, was not directly related to trade or the SEM: The 
fisheries dispute puts into perspective the overall impact of the 
SEM on Canadian economic interests in Europe.
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NOTES
1. The four main elements of the Community having, potential 
effects on exporters and investors, either directly or through some 
modifications in the Community's external trade policy, were: (1) 
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CHAPTER TEN
PROSPECTS FOR NEW ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN CANADA-EC 
RELATIONS
10.1 INTRODUCTION
Thus far in this study we have examined and appraised the Canada-EC 
relationship from a Canadian perspective in a number of fashions: 
historically, by outlining Canada's approach to West European 
integration from the immediate aftermath of the Second World War to 
the formation of the Common Market; by charting the vicissitudes of 
the Trudeau and Mulroney governments' differing approaches to the 
EC, from the STAFEUR Report, through the 1976 Framework Agreement 
and to the negotiations leading to the TAD; and by looking at the 
state of bilateral economic relations as well as the impact of the 
SEM. ' -
The purpose of this chapter is quite ambitious. It is to bring 
the post-TAD economic, political, and security strands of Canada-EC 
relations together. The backdrop to the•Canada-EC relations is, of 
course, the uneven progress and nature of post-1990 European 
integration until the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty in 
November 1993. Since a veritable academic and policy industry has 
arisen on European integration1, this chapter will only address 
details of European integration.as they pertain to Canada’s larger 
European interests. •
The first section, of this chapter examines Canada's interests
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in the context of its relations with the Triad. As this study has 
shown,. Canada was historically vulnerable to problems in U.S.-EC 
relations and, as Japan's economic might grew, felt (albeit to a 
far less extent) the problems in U.S.-Japan and EC-Japan Relations 
as well. As we shall explain, this was a symptom of three more 
deep-seated, structural features of transatlantic economic 
relations, such as the relative increase in the economic muscle of 
the EC compared to the United' States, the loss of Canada's 
Atlanticist influence, and continued growth in economic 
interdependence without commensurate progress in policy convergence 
between Canada and the Community. This, raises questions about the 
respective roles of Canada and the EC in the world economy and how 
they coped with the linkage between domestic structure and demands 
of ever more integrated economies.
The second section, following from Chapters Eight and Nine, 
looks at the gptions Canadian decision makers faced as they sought 
to reconfigure the economic framework for Canada-EC relations in 
light of the inadequacy of traditional bilateral and multilateral 
institutional mechanisms and the EC's growing economic power as a 
result of the SEM. This section therefore provides an evaluation of 
five different scenarios contemplated by Ottawa in the early 1990s 
as a new basis for Canada-EC economic relations, including a 
Canada-EC free trade agreement and a NAFTA-EC free trade zone..
Since this chapter is concerned with the transatlantic 
security debate only in so far as it has affected Canada-EC 
relations, the analysis on this dimension of bilateral relations
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will be necessarily brief. This is not to say, however, that the 
nature of transatlantic security - as the historical record shows 
(e.g., the Trudeau government's position on NATO) - was unimportant- 
in the evolution of bilateral relations between 1989 and 1993. 
Certainly, the •economic dynamic of .the relationship still far 
outweighed the political and .security dimensions, although the TAD 
had shown that there was now interest on both sides to broaden 
contacts. Indeed, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
"pillar" of the Maastricht Treaty’promised to precipitate more, not 
less, interaction between Canada and the EC oh European and 
international security issues. For the first time in their 
respective bilateral histories, each party would face the other 
across a broader range of bilateral security issues running the 
gamut from the "hard", security issues of non-proliferation and arms 
control to the ascendant "soft" or- "cooperative security" issues, 
including sustainable development, peacekeeping, promotion of good 
governance and human rights, and the problem of refugee flows. The 
problem was that as the Community : attempted to extend its 
competencies, into the security and. defence domains, it was 
difficult to reconcile . the Europeans' search, for greater 
irfdependence in security and defence policy with a continued, 
active North American involvement in Europe's security architecture 
through the traditional Atlantic institutions of NATO and the CSCE. 
From the Canadian perspective, then, there was some confusion as to 
the appropriate European, institutions with which to pursue the 
"hard" and "soft" tracks of transatlantic security relations. In
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terms of bilateral. Canada-EC relations, the question was.whether 
Ottawa saw the Commission becoming as important a "security" player 
as NATO and the CSCE. And, if so, how would the intersection of 
West European (e.g., WEU, Eurocorps) and Atlantic, security
. . ' 7institutions affect Canada's security interests.
Finally, this chapter concludes that Canada-EC relations past, 
present and future can only be understood in the wider context of 
Canada's bilateral relations with the Member States (both major and 
minor) and the participation of both Canada and the EC and/or its 
Member States in various multilateral forums, whether security- 
related as in NATO and the. CSCE or economic as in NAFO, the G-7 and 
the GATT.
10.2 CHANGING HEGEMONS: THE EC IN A MULTINODAL WORLD
As noted by-Woolcock, the EC's trade and investment relations with 
the outside world are characterized by two contradictory trends. On 
the one hand there is an ever closer economic interdependence which 
creates a high level of policy interdependence.2. On the other hand, 
there appears to be a tendency towards increasingly fractious 
political relations.associated with claims and counter-claims about 
the construction of regional trading blocs. The global trading 
system is radically different if-we consider Europe as a single 
unit rather than the sum of its constituent parts. As it devotes 
more and more of its attention to a pan-European preferential 
trading area, there is a greater tendency for the- EC to shape the
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international system rather.than for it to be a passive taker.
The EC's claim to global powerplayer status - a fact that had 
been hotly debated in the 1970s (e.g.-, "civilian superpower"3) - 
appeared legitimate finally with the "1992" program and the move 
toward monetary and political union. This status was now less 
controversial and a more enpirically supportable assertion. Indeed, 
a fundamental change in the world economy was the growing weight of 
the EC. The EC's population of 340 million was more than 12 times 
larger than Canada's, almost 100 million times larger than that of 
the United States, and more than 200 million larger than Japan's. 
Until the ratification of the NAFTA, the EC represented the largest 
trading area in the world, with a total GDP that exceeded (U.S.) $6 
trillion in 1991. Comnunity competence, as pointed out in this 
study, had also been extended to more and more policies of 
relevance to international cormerce, creating a magnet effect, on 
neighbours.4 If the GDPs of all the EFlA Members States were added 
to the EC's GDP to create the European Economic Area, the GDP of 
this pan-European market easily exceeded that of the North American 
bloc.
Another indicator of the EC's economic stature was that in 
1991, exports originating in the EC accounted for 41 per cent of 
total world exports (including exports to other EC Member States) 
and almost 25 per cent of Community GDP.5 In contrast, Canada's 
exports made up less than 4 per cent, while U.S. exports accounted 
for about 15 per cent of total world exports. In terms of 
investment, in 1990., for the first time since the end of the 1970s,
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.the EC had larger direct investment flows than the United States6, 
for example, accounting for 41 per cent of U.S. FDI in that year.
But perhaps the most illuminating trend was not that the EC' s 
world trade was surpassing that of the North American bloc or that 
it was taking significant amounts of North American investment, but 
rather the degree to which it was internalizing multilateralism,, 
reflected in the fact that although its share of world exports 
increased by 5 per cent from 36 per cent in 1980 to 41 per cent in 
1990, much of this was due to intra-EC trade.7 In . fact, excluding 
intra-EC trade, the community's 16 per cent share of world exports 
had actually decreased slightly between 1985 and 1990, a trend 
attributed to the growing importance of the newly industrializing 
Pacific Rim economies.8 Indeed, as this study has noted, the high 
level of intra-Community trade, (at almost 60 per cent of all 
Community trade) likely explains the increasingly weak 
correspondence between Canada's trade and investment links with 
Europe.9 ~ *
The EC was a powerful political organization: i‘t includes two 
of the world's five nuclear powers and foiir G-7 members (in 
addition to have an observer role itself) . Moreover, if the G-7 
Summit is considered the premier post-Cold War international forum 
for the industrialized world, then it is significant to note the 
steady economic decline of the United States relative to the EC and 
Japan: for example, at the inception of the Summit in 1975 the 
United States by itself commanded. 45.5 per cent of the Group's ' 
economic power (as expressed in Gross.National Product [GNP] in
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1995 U. S. dollars) ; in 1993 it commanded 39.5. per cent.10
This decreasing relative U.S. economic power has led observers 
of U.S.-EC relations such as Michael Smith to note the "regression" 
of North American images of the EC-in the early 1990s.11 According 
to Smith, the key difference between North American reactions in 
the 1950s and reactions in the 1990s to transatlanticism was that, 
in the 1990s the EC not only acted at least as the equal of -the 
United States on the. economic front, but acted as its political 
6qual as well.12 This was evident, in the EC's role in dealing with 
the economic and political, needs of Eastern Europe • after 1989. 
Furthermore, despite the Community's internal economic difficulties 
in the early 1990s (characterized by low annual growth rates and 
high unemployment.) , the steady way in which, the Community 
progressed to enacting the 282 directives to create a fully 
integrated market as part of the "1992" program demonstrated that 
it had become,more disciplined compared to.the period in the 1970s 
when it ^ lost- its momentum. In addition, the EC's move towards 
monetary union' was very- significant and sure to change the 
perceptions of its international partners, since the EC had never 
had a single voice in monetary and exchange rate policy.
To repeat a point made at the end of Chapter Nine, this 
decline in U.S. power had implications for the manoeuverability of 
smaller states such as Canada. The changing status and role of the 
U.S. influenced Canada's perceptions of the Community. Thus while 
the•Community was largely irrelevant to Canadian policymakers in 
the early to mid-1980s, there was a cautious change in perception
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in; the 1990s at the official level. It was certainly not a full 
return to the great expectations of Canada-EC relations in the 
1970s, however, in large measure because Canada's economic 
relations were now more oriented to the United States and Asia 
Pacific.
10.2.1 Canada in the Triad
Canada as. a middle power has always been keenly aware .of how 
relations between the other members of the Triad have the potential 
to affect its political and. economic interests, both negatively and 
positively. This is because Canada's major political and economic 
relationships are formed within the Triad. For this reason it is 
useful to look at how int.er-Triad relations affected Ottawa's 
interests. in its dealings with the Community. The focus in the 
following discussion will be on EC-Japan relations, since the EC- 
U.S. dimension is addressed throughout the present study.
As mentioned, it has been the mantra of Canadian government 
officials (and less so of Canadian academics) , based largely on the 
existence of the Framework Agreement, that Canada's relations with 
the Community have historically been more "special" and 
"privileged" than those of Japan or the United - States. This view 
was not necessarily shared by the Commission, however. Willy de 
Clercq, the EC's former.Commissioner for External Relations, once 
remarked that he was s^urprised that Canada-EC Ministerial-level 
contacts were considerably less frequent than those between the EC
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and the U.S., the EC and Japan.. Nevertheless., most commentators on 
EC-U.S. and Japan-U.S. relations would agree that generally they 
have been conducted, on an an -ad hoc basis, according to 
multilateral ground-rules. Although,, to be fair, Canada is not as 
"privileged" since most bilateral trade conflicts in its relations
with the Community are likewise taken.to the GATT.
As described, EC-U.S. relations have historically been 
characterized by periods of intense bickering over specific trade 
irritants and misunderstanding as Washington preferred to deal 
bilaterally with the Member States or exercise its power in Europe 
through its leadership in NATO. El-Agra observes that relations 
with Japan also tended to be cool if- not outright hostile.13 
Starting around 1989, however, there was a general rapprochement in 
both EC-U.S. and .EC-Japan relations as both Washington and Tokyo 
adopted a more positive outlook on the Community's post-Cold War 
role both in Europe (e.g., SEM, aid to the CEEs) and globally.
Conceptually, then, it. is perhaps useful to see Canada as an
appendage in an EC-U.S.-Japan trade triangle although, as Nanto 
points out,, this triangle really does not exist. Instead, there is 
a dynamic of three separate bilateral relationships - "each varying 
in intensity and balance," with the EC-U.S. link historically, the 
strongest and deepest, followed by the Japan-U.S..link,. and the 
Japan-EC nexus the weakest.14 Canada, therefore, as we saw in the 
context of the TAD, had the option to use its leverage through its 
special relationship with Washington to improve its access to the 
European market and European decision makers. However, given the
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much weaker Japan-EC axis, prior to 1990 Ottawa saw little benefit 
in indirectly pressing its interests to the Community via Tokyo. 
The Tokyo-Brussels route gained more legitimacy in Canadian eyes in 
the 1980s once Japan was pushed away from increasing exports to the 
United States and pulled to larger markets in Europe. At the same 
time, Europe was looking to' the higher, growth rates of Asia 
Pacific.
By the early 1990s, with the duels over Japanese "screwdriver" 
plants no longer aggravating Japan-EC relations and with Brussels 
for the most part viewing Tokyo as a more responsible actor in the 
international trade system15, Ottawa found itself increasingly using 
its diplomatic, goodwill with Tokyo16 to move the Community on 
specific bilateral issues. At the same time, Ottawa also sought to 
benefit from the EC's efforts to reduce market access barriers in 
Japan that were, in Brussels' eyes, the cause for its substantial 
trade deficit. Of course, there was also the danger that this 
liberalization would be skewed to the EC's advantage and therefore 
to Canada's disadvantage. For this reason, Ottawa saw particular 
benefit to teaming up with.the EC in pressing for a multilateral 
trade negotiations track in Asia-Pacific, thereby liberalizing 
Japan's market. This approach was evident in Ottawa's preparations 
for its Ministerial-level meetings with-the EC .in 1989.
It is somewhat ironic that Canada, which had begun in the 
1980s to disavow its "Europeanness" - in favour of its "North 
Americannesswas in the early 1990s using its European 
connections to secure its interests in Asia Pacific. This is not
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.urprising, however, since Canadian policymakers by the late 1980s 
viewed Asia-Pacific (especially China17) as vital - both 
economically and politically - to Canada's international standing 
into the next century.18 The Asia Pacific region, with a population.- 
of almost.two billion and an aggregate gross national income twice 
that of the European Community and growing rapidly, and having four 
of Canada's ten largest export markets. (Japan, China, South Korea, 
Hong Kong) representing just under. 7 per cent of Canada's world 
exports (compared to the EC's 6 per cent share), had by the end of 
1993 become a region hard for Canadians to ignore.
How much of a "free rider" was Canada in these evolving 
bilateral relations within the Triad? On-the one hand, ’ the apparent 
rapprochement in bilateral EC-U.S. and EC-Japan relations boded 
well for Canada. It allowed Ottawa to reinforce its bilateral 
negotiations with Brussels by selectively using, its influence in 
Washington and Tokyo, where Ottawa/Washington and Ottawa/Tokyo 
concerns overlapped vis-a-vis the Community. At the same time, 
Canada could use a selective alliance with the Community to further 
its separate interests in Washington and Tokyo. On the other hand, 
Canada could no longer claim with any legitimacy that it was the 
only industrialized third'country with a "privileged" relationship 
with the Community, thus creating the potential that its•interests 
would be marginalized as the EC's relations became more 
institutionalized with Japan and the United States.
But for all the talk of bilateral rapprochement, Ottawa's 
policymakers were aware that the period of harmony during the
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immediate post-Cold War period (1991-93) could he, but the "lull
before the storm," the "storm" being the potential for greater 
rather than lesser transatlantic and transpacific trade conflicts 
in the absence of a common, unifying, transcendental cause Such as 
the containment, of Soviet power. Multilateral aid packages to 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union obviously did not create 
the same value-driven transatlantic and transpacific interests. The 
.Clinton Administration's "two-edged trade policy" - for example, 
supporting the expansion of trade while threatening sanctions 
unless U.S. firms received fair treatment abroad - threatened to 
make bilateral discussions with the Europeans and Japan all the 
more nettlesome, leading to escalation of reprisals from both 
sides,, and ultimately down a slippery slope towards.a full-scale 
trade war.19 This meant that just as in the EC market, where EC-U.S. 
tensions threatened to side-wipe Canada20, Canadian exports, to 
Japanese markets were threatened by American action. The perception 
in Ottawa was-that if the Americans wanted to bludgeon Tokyo into 
an artificial "balance" of exports and imports, the Japanese could 
be forced to simply buy U.S. instead of Canadian. Thus, the extent 
that bilateral relations within tfie Triad became less Or more 
conflictual had very real implications for a small open . economy 
such as Canada's caught between the larger members of the Triad. It 
seemed likely that with.their growing economic power, largely at 
the expense of the United States, the EC and- Japan would 
increasingly lock horns with the U.S. as the other shaper, in the 
international system, leaving.Canada in the vulnerable position of
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being side-swiped as the three giants grappled.
10.2.3 REACTING TO THE SEM AND THE TRIAD: NEW ECONOMIC 
FRAMEWORKS FOR CANADA-EC TRADE RELATIONS21
This chapter has thus far reflected on the evolution of the world 
trading regime from an American-led system to conditions of rough 
equality among the EC and North America, with the Asia Pacific 
region rapidly gaining ground. The discussion has also highlighted 
Canada's limited room to manoeuver in this three-way configuration 
of economic power, making any meaningful initiative to improve 
Canada-EC relations all the more difficult. Yet these bilateral 
relations had to be reinforced because the management of 
transatlantic trade and economic issues was seen by Canadian 
decision makers to be more, critical than ever before as economic 
security supplanted militairy security as the paramount, national 
interest. So,, after the completion of the NAFTA and the issuance of 
the TAD, and in light of the ongoing efforts to encourage Canadian 
trade, investment and other business links- to the Community in 
anticipation of the SEM, .the next challenge for Canadian 
policymakers tasked with rethinking Canada's European policy 
frameowrk in 1993 was a re-visitation, of the transatlantic 
"options" articulated by Derek Burney and his officials at the 
Washington embassy (recall our discussion in Chapter 6.3.2 and 
6.3.3) .
Before evaluating the various options, a number of questions 
were raised by Canadian officials. First, could Canada compete for
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EG attention at a time of intense European integration (i.e., in 
terms of its deepening and. widening) activity without recruiting 
the U.S. in this activity? If Canada attempted to pursue such an 
initiative alone - as it did with the Framework Agreement in the 
first half of the 19.70s - did it risk an equally shallow outcome? 
On the -other hand was a formalized U.S.-Canada-EC and possibly 
Mexico alliance in Canada's interests (see "Future Research Agenda" 
in Chapter Twelve)?
Second, under conditions of international economic tripolarity 
there was the inclination for North America to ally itself against 
Japan. Thus how would a. transatlantic alliance affect Canada's 
relations with Japan, especially if the North' Atlantic trading 
relationship, although a key pillar of- the global economy, no 
longer outstripped trans-Pacific economic relations? Would there 
have to be a parallel initiative (as suggested by prime minister 
Mulroney's .successor, Kim Campbell) of an Asia Free Trade 
Agreement? C
Third, even the success of completing the Uruguay Round was 
viewed as unlikely to protect the interests of the advanced and 
highly sophisticated North Atlantic, trading bloc. The GATT was, and 
its successor the World Trading Organization (WTO) would be moving 
slowly into the "new areas" of services, intellectual property, and 
investment. The GATT had not yet come to grips fully with the trade 
consequences of environmental protection measures. Thus, it would 
have .to be decided whether Canada would seek specifically to 
improve bilateral prospects with the Community only on economic
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matters, and within this category in those sectors where the GATT 
was insufficient, or whether such a transatlantic trading 
arrangement would be part, of a larger design to (1) encourage 
trading liberalization among the U.S., Japan and the EC, and (2) be 
linked to increasing Canada's presence in light of diminishing 
traditional security concerns. If a new transatlantic trading 
relationship was deemed appropriate what would be the best tactical 
way of achieving it? Would Secretary of State for External Affairs 
Joe Clark's call for an OECD-wide initiative be revisited? Or would 
it be a smaller Canada-EC or Canada-EC-U.S. approach. And if a 
broader OECD or a strictly transatlantic initiative was taken how. 
would its issue-inventory differ from the current MTN? The agenda 
might include those areas not dealt with in the MTN negotations 
such as competition policy, policy convergence on tax policy, 
consumer protection and the environment.
Fourth, as a result of the Framework Agreement's 
ineffectiveness, Canada had always used as its primary mechanism 
the various GATT rounds to seek improved access to the EC market. 
Consultative meetings between Canada and the EC tended to focus on 
lists of trade irritants, specially on agriculture, fish, and 
beverages, without any bilateral contractual mechanism for 
resolving them. Major bilateral irritants such as the dispute over 
overfishing were being addressed, primarily by ad hoc means outside 
the scope of the Framework Agreement such as at the. UN or NAFO. 
GATT panels had been used in some instances, but had been 
difficult to arrange in others, and the results had been incomplete
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or unaccepted. Canada, more than any other member of the G-7 
depended on the strength and credibility of its GATT rights. It was 
therefore in Canada1s ■interests to ensure that any new bilateral 
agreements would be GATT-compatible and add to the vitality and 
consistency of GATT principles .-
Fifth, the EC's trade with other countries of Europe such as 
the EFTA members and Eastern Europe, including that with the former 
Soviet Union, was expected to involve in the medium- to long-terms 
increased access for the EC to energy, mineral, forest, and 
agricultural resources, precisely those elements of Canada's export 
mix to the Community.
Sixth, as pointed out in Chapter Eight/ Canada had only had a 
marginal presence in European market and a marginal influence upon 
European economic and trade decisions. Eighth, any successful new 
arrangement between the EC and Canada, would have to be compatible 
with the Treaty of Rome and the. GATT.
Seventh,- there would have to be consideration of what EC 
procedures govern the decision to open talks and conclude 
negotiations. For example, although the Commission was responsible 
for negotiating trade agreements, the Council of Ministers had an 
important role in authorizing any negotiations. Finally, what would 
be the chances - given the. history of negotiations leading up to 
the TAD outlined in Chapters Six and Seven - for the EC and U.S. to 
sign a bilateral agreement?
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10.3.1 The Emergence of Bilateral Agreements
In light of the above considerations, what had in fact emerged 
between 1991 and the end of 1993 (parallel to the ratification of 
the directives that were creating the SEM) were negotiations on a 
series of five bilateral Canada-EC sectoral and issue-specific 
trade arrangements. Following from pur discussion in Chapter Nine/ 
for instance, in 1992 the European Council had given the Commission, 
the mandate to start negotiating a S&T agreement with Canada. By 
the end of that year, the Standards Council of Canada and the 
European Organization for Testing and Certification (EOTC) had 
completed a Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA) for products in non­
regulated sectors; for regulated products, the Commission gave 
Canada notice that it would also be ready to negotiate.22 An MRA on 
national testing and certification procedures was clearly of 
benefit to Canada since, as a third-country, it enabled Canadian 
rather than European laboratories to certify the Euroworthiness of 
Canadian exports across a number of’ specific categories of 
products.- This created a more level playing field for Canadian 
firms. exporting to Europe in these categories. There was also a 
requirement for reciprocity, meaning that the European Organization 
for Testing and Certification (EOTC) would also be able to test and 
certify conformity to Canadian standards. A bilateral Canada-EC 
fisheries agreement was also signed in 1992.
In 1993, Canada and the EC finished negotiating a Memorandum 
of Understanding (MOU) on competition policy that by the end of the
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year was awaiting political ratification. A Canada-EC customs co­
operation agreement was also completed. On the issue of investment, 
the larger EC market had relatively few major Canadian corporations 
established on a scale that would enable them to take advantatge of 
the Single Market. For this reason, Ottawa was eager to obtain a 
provision for national, treatment of investments to: (1) ease the 
way for smaller Canadian firms to form alliances in Europe, and (2) 
increase two-way flows of investment at all levels.
10.3.2 Alternative Models for Canada-EC Trade Relations23
Although the above bilateral agreements had indeed created another 
"layer" of transatlantic policy interdependence, they were 
considered more as "victories" on the Canadian side than on the 
Comnission side (the Cocntiission had been in no hurry to begin 
negotiations) . There was a strong suggestion that Ottawa would have 
preferred a network of interlocking sectoral agreements with 
Brussels but had to settle for a more piecemeal approach. (Recall 
that Trudeau1 s Liberals had approached the Reagan administration in 
the early 1980s about bilateral sectoral free trade but the 
proposal was rejected by Washington because it did not provide 
enough incentives.) In Ottawa's eyes, the bilateral MRAs and MOUs, 
in combination with existing mechanisms (e.g., Framework Agreement 
and the GATT), while necessary, continued to be inadequate as a 
means of "ordering" Canada's relations with the Cdrrtnunity. To 
ameliorate this state of transatlantic economic affairs, Canadian
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officials had seven choices:
1) reliance on existing Framework and GATT 
arrangements
2) an improved Framework Agreement
3) A traditional EC-EFTA-style link
4) An EEA-type link
5) Canada-EC Free Trade Agreement
6) A Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement
7) Canadian membership in the EC
These choices were, however, quickly reduced to five more realistic 
choices.. .The first, namely the status quo, was no longer 
appropriate for the management of Canada's relations with the new- 
Europe of the early 1990s. The last choice - raised in a House of 
Commons debate by the Conservative Diefenbaker government as a 
response to the creation of the Common. Market - was equally a non- 
starter. These five choices were further consolidated into three 
realistic options: 1) an improved Framework Agreement supplemented 
by "deep cut" liberalization in areas not covered by GATT and the 
continuation of negotiations at the GATT for other sectors; 2) an 
EFTA- or EEA-_ style link; or .3) a Canada-EC or a Canada-EC-U. S. 
transatlantic free trade agreement. The obvious drawback of the 
first option was that Canada-would only be one of many countries 
having such a relationship with the EC. Also, the first two options' 
implied only limited change. The third was‘ the most radical and 
would depend on substantial political will among Canadian, U.S. and 
EC leaders.
450
10.3.2.1 Improving the Framework Agreement
The Framework Agreement neither added to nor substracted from GATT 
rights and. obligations. For Canada, as we have discussed, the 
Agreement emerged as part of the "Third Option" policy, and, 
despite the general, non-binding nature of the Agreement, the 
Canadian side expected it would increase Canadian exports, 
particularly in the manufacturing sector. In the 1970s, the EC - 
faced with the prospect of energy shortages - considered the 
Agreement as a means to gain access to the supply of Canadian raw 
materials (e.g., uranium). Measured against these differing 
expectations the Agreement had already by the late 1970s failed, to 
live up to its promises. The trade' data in Chapter Eight reveals 
that the conposition of Canadian exports remained heavily dominated 
by resource exports; meanwhile, the EC continued to seek assured 
access to Canadian raw materials (e.g., fish allocations) .
In terms of the cooperation undertaken through the various 
working groups, there was significant activity in the Science and 
Technology areas (e.g., radioactive waste issue). However,, the 
latter did not appear to have generated direct commercial benefits. 
Of the Industrial Working groups, the Metals and Minerals were 
active and useful. Until as late as 1990 activity in other sector 
Working Groups such as Aerospace and Telecomnunications was. less 
fruitful, although in the last three years discussions have become 
more substantive.
Some assessments conclude that the EC has not been forthcoming
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in some areas, particularly, as we have discussed, on resource 
upgrading and manufactured exports, where Canada is the demandeur. 
To reiterate, as Canada upgraded its resource exports it was 
slapped with higher tariff rates, although as a result of the 
Quadrilateral meeting in Tokyo in 1993, tariffs were to be.reduced 
in these areas over a 10-year period.
Another problem was that the Agreement and its subsidiary 
groups were always government bodies without any major 
participation from the private sector. As a result, the focus 
appeared, more than, anything else, to be on exchang-es .of 
information among government agencies with little direct link to 
the private sector, particularly on the EC side. Furthermore, at a 
time when Canada was becoming less and less activist under the neo- 
Conservative ideology of the Mulroney Government, leading 
increasingly to privatization and the delegation of responsibility 
to non-state actors, the Agreement's inter-goyernental focus was 
anachronistic* to say the least and operated.far less efficiently 
than, say, the ITAC/SAGIT consultative structure (set up, as noted 
in Chapter Three, to bring the Canadian private sector into the 
discussions on the CUFTA). On a more positive note, the Agreement 
and the "high levels," as the semi-annual meetings of senior EC and 
Canadian officials were called, at least provided a formal 
"framework" whereby Canada was able to raise bilateral issues at 
senior official levels within the Commission.
For the Agreement to be reformulated and have any status in 
bilateral relations, it was considered that a .first.step could be
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the folding of the institutionally separate "high levels" into the 
organizational structure of- the Agreement. Thus an expanded 
Framework Agreement would consolidate all existing agreements under 
one umbrella including perhaps an environmental accord, a 
reciprocal agreement on government procurement, mutual agreement on 
product standards, certification and testing involving the 
Standards Council of Canada, membership in CEN/CENELEC/ETS! and in 
the EOTC and reciprocal agreements for European standards bodies, 
and a science and technology agreement. The chances of this 
happening were not propitious, however. The Agreement had never 
functioned as the primary means, for Canada and the EC to pursue 
their objectives for developing the relationship. Indeed, it had 
been little more than a statement of good intentions on both sides, 
with little political or bureaucratic will to make fundamental 
changes.
10.3.2.2 EC-Ef'TA-Style Arrangements
To reiterate, the GATT governed the terms of access for the EC and 
Canada to each other's markets: it provided the dispute setttlement 
procedures. The problem was that before the completion of. the 
Uruguay Round in 1993, the GATT applied to trade in industrial 
products only (the negotiations for the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services [GATS] had not yet been completed). And, importantly, 
the GATT did not prevent the erection of preferential barriers to 
Canadian goods by virtue of the EC's network of bilateral trade
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agreements with non-Member European countries, former colonies, and 
other groupings,
Canadian officials were well aware that virtually every nation 
that had entered into a cooperation agreement with the Community 
found it insufficient ' for the overall management . of its 
relationship with the EC. Many of these countries saw their 
cooperation agreements as temporary "second-best" solutions or 
Steps to achieving full member status. For instance, the EC had 
traditionally concluded agreements with the., individual' EFTA 
countries on a bilateral basis (primarily tariff-free treatment for 
most industrial goods). Although the preferential agreements with 
the EFTA countries excluded trade in agricultural goods, those 
association agreements with European states (e.g., Hungary) did 
provide preferences.on their agricultural exports, in looking at 
these preferential agreements, Ottawa took a number of 
considerations into account. For example, what sector-specific or 
issue-specific arrangements had the EC been prepared to negotiate 
with particular countries? In the case of Sweden, for instance, 
Canadian officials.noted that cooperation went beyond the EC-EFTA 
free trade agreement to include formal agreements on the exchange 
of information on transport, environment, fishing and transport. 
There were also informal meetings on industrial policy, development 
aid, and economic policy. Indeed, it is precisely these types of 
broad-based regular meetings and agreements that'were envisaged by 
Canadian officials under the.umbrella of the TAD.
Ottawa was also aware that the EFTA's motivation to. negotiate
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a broader agreement with the Community arose not so much from 
shortcomings in the bilateral agreements that its members had with 
the EC24 as from the success of the SEM initiative which changed the 
economy in which the agreements had to function. The prospect of a 
stronger and more dynamic EC market had therefore led EFTA 
countries to increase the premium they placed on secure access to 
the EC market.
Canadian decision makers realized that if Canada wanted to 
emulate a traditional EFTA-style link this would be restricted to 
free trade in industrial goods, through the abolition of tariffs 
and quotas. It would not include trade policy issues including 
procurement, subsidies, and trade in services, precisely those 
issue-areas that would greatly affect value-added Canadian exports. 
Additionally, in the financial services area, the lack of mutual 
recognition on rules governing trade in bank supervision and trade 
in securities was .a major obstacle to bilateral trade in the EFTA- 
EC case. Anotlier consideration from the Canadian perspective was 
whether any of' these arrangements had been subject to GATT 
challenge, or whether they could be challenged in the future.
10.3;2.3 EEA-Type Link
it was recognized that an EEA-type agreement would rectify the lack 
of breadth of the existing EFTA-EC agreements-, since, as we have 
already described in this study,r it would entail the free movement 
of goods (except agriculture) , services,, capital and persons.on the
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basis of the relevant acquis communautaires. Further, it would mean 
extending to Canada or harmonizing EC policies in fields as diverse 
as social programs, research and development, consumer protection, 
small business programs, and tourism.- There would also be a joint 
judicial body for the settlement of disputes.
10.3.2.4 Canada-European Community Free Trade Agreement
By far the most ambitious option was to/revisit the proposal for a 
Canada-EC free trade agreement, perhaps modeled on the CUFTA and to 
go beyond an EEA-style arrangment. This would entail the 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and 
services., including those arising from product standards, 
restrictive rules of origin, and government procurement 
restrictions (as well, there was the possibility of looking at 
agriculture, although all parties realized that this would, be an 
extremely sensitive area). It was expected that a bilateral free 
trade agreement would expand conditions for investment and services ■ 
liberalization through national treatment, building on the Uruguay 
Round's GATT, the CUFTA, the NAFTA, and the OECD's NTI; it would 
facilitate conditions for fair competition within the free trade 
area; it would establish effective procedures for the joint 
administration of the agreement and the resolution of disputes 
modeled on the CUFTA' or the NAFTA, including binding dispute 
settlement in trade remedy cases; and it would lay the foundations 
for further bilateral and multilateral cooperation to expand and.
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enhance the benefits of the agreement.25 A permananent secretariat
would be charged with institutional management and servicing the
»
dispute settlement mechanism.
However, it was Unlikely that this type of trade agreement 
could have been extended to. include the expanded' harmonization of 
trade policies envisaged by the EEA whereby Canada would harmonize 
its competition policy, ■ government procurement and other policies 
with the EC. This would undermine the preferential nature of the 
EC's agreements with EFTA, not to mention infringing the United 
States' GATT rights for which the U.S. enjoyed remedies under the 
CUFTA. Finally, a key question here was what kind of incentive was 
there for the EC to conclude a full, GATT-compatible free trade 
agreement, or indeed an EEA-type agreement, if the magnitude of 
access granted - as the bilateral trade flows highlighted - was out 
■of all proportion to its access gained.
10.3.2.5 A NAFTA-EC Free Trade Agreement
As noted earlier in this chapter's discussion of Canada's position 
within the Triad, the potential acrimony in post-Cold War EC-U.S. 
relations in conjunction with th,e lack of confidence in existing 
bilateral institutional structures (e.g., Framework Agreement) 
outside the GATT, in addition to the need to create an incentive 
for the Community to expand its economic links with Canada, led to 
renewed speculation on the Canadian side of the utility of a 
trilateral (Canada, U.S., EC) or NAFTA-EC transatlantic free trade
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agreement. Indeed, there was some speculation in 1990-91 within the 
Canada-EC Working Group at EAITC that the next step or option for 
Canada's relations with the "new" Europe was, ironically, closer to 
the Pearsonian notion of an Atlantic Community: only now it'would 
be expanded on both sides of the Atlantic to include the EFTA 
States (through the EEA) and Mexico- through its accession to 
NAFTA.25 In. its broadest conception, as Joe Clark had implied in his 
1990 Humber College speech,'it could also be extended to other OECD 
members such as Japan. Its objective would be, perhaps under the 
overall umbrella of the TAD, to act as the new economic 
architecture for Canada and U.S. interests in- Europe, and to 
protect European interests against the risk of a protectionist bloc 
in North America.
The benefits of . a transatlantic free trade agreement were that 
it would enable Canada to carve out its own space in Europe and 
achieve the influence it did not have through current arrangements 
or indeed through a separate bilateral agreement. It would do so 
because unlike the Framework Agreement it would impose substantive 
obligations on the EC (as well as Canada and other participants) in 
areas currently under exclusive competence of the EC. It would give 
Canada-, in the words of former U.S. secretary of commerce 
Mosbacher, a seat at the European table that it was in danger of 
losing given the waning influence of NATO and the CSCE. Such a free 
trade agreement, the argument went, would-effectively weave Canada 
and the U.S. into the European preferential trading system, 
although with the perennial and unavoidable dilemma for Ottawa that
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the EC and the United States would dominate such an arrangement.
The thinking within EAITC about the possibility of either a 
Canada-EC or a transatlantic agreement - recall that these 
discussions.were internal to the.Department; there was no support 
for such proposals from the Department of Finance, the more 
powerful of two departments in Ottawa - received a gentle rebuff 
from the West Europeans in 1992. The occasion was a fact-finding 
trip, to Europe in the summer of 1992 by a Canadian Parliamentary 
Sub-Committee. The Canadian MPs raised just this possibility of an 
Atlantic free trade agreement with'their European contacts and were 
told "'yes, . but please not now'”.27 At the time, this was not 
surprising since the Community was preoccupied with a host of 
internal matters such as the implementation of the Single Market, 
ratification of Maastricht, the question of enlargement, and the 
Uruguay Round negotiations. .
But there were other significant reasons why there was little 
possibility that, for example, Canada.and the U.S. could create the 
momentum necessary for the negotiation of a true, GATT-consistent, 
free trade agreement with • the EC. As this study has shown, the 
United States never seriously considered a. bilateral transatlantic 
free trade deal with the Community. Even countries with much closer 
ties with Community had had to settle for partial coverage, with 
preferential access but not barrier-free. The EFTA. countries had 
come the closest under the EEA, but the Community was careful to 
reserve substantial discretionary powers in managing these 
relationships. Moreover, in Community eyes, countries such as
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Canada, New Zealand, Australia,, and the United States, were likely, 
to always rank in an outer, or third concentric ring, ' behind the 
EFTA nations and the Central and European nations.
On specific trade policy issues such as government 
procurement, resources and, for example, liquor boards,' that 
involved sub-national governments, it was clear that it would be 
particularly difficult to guarantee the EC reciprocity without also 
admitting the Canadian provinces and the U.S. and Mexican states to 
the negotiating table. This was not to mention the difficulty in 
administering two free trade agreements with differing provisions 
on, e.g., rules of origin, dispute settlement, procedures, and 
contingency measures.
A second set of difficulties centred on the fundamental 
problem of differing levels of integration in North America and 
Europe. In comparison to the SEM, the CUFTA (or what Dunning calls 
NAFTA-phase- one) was a modest initiative, that is, it abolished 
tariffs between Canada and the United States over a 10-year period, 
something that had been abolished in the Community in 1968. The 
NAFTA, by improving on certain elements of the CUFTA such as 
standards, investment and procurement, still did not approach the 
comprehensive nature of the integration project in Europe as a 
result of• Maastricht.
There was thus the question of the lessons of European 
economic integration for North American integration. Table 19 shows 
that in a number of areas the levels of integration were so far. 
apart that it would be hard to envisage possible harmonization to
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.form an "Atlantic Union" in the near- to medium-terms. For example, 
the EC's "single banking licence" versus the fact that all 
financial institutions in the United States and Canada had to 
comply with host country regulations;. (2) the principle of mutual 
recognition on standards and norms between Member states and .panT 
European standards in . matters of health, safety, . and the 
environment versus the fact that mutuai recognition of standards 
was not a formal part of CUFTA, although it began to be addressed 
in the NAFTA; (3) competition in the realm of public procurement 
and the transparency of tendering, procedures versus the fact that 
the CUFTA did not cover provincial, state, and local governments 
and thus opened up only a sma.ll segment of the. U.S. and Canadian 
procurement markets, something that was only partially remedied 
under NAFTA; and (4) a monetary union, scheduled for the end of the 
decade, would, if. achieved, lead to a single European currency and 
central European bank, whereas nothing of this nature was 
contemplated by .Canada, the United State and Mexico.
It is true, of course, that the side agreements on environment 
and labour between Mexico and the. United States under the NAFTA 
were steps-closer to broadening and deepening the North American 
integration process, as were steps (as recently as July 1994) to 
remove Canada's deleterious inter-provincial trade barriers. But 
given the level of European economic integration already achieved, 
the fact that -it had gone beyond the economic arena and had begun 
to encompass "flanking issues" such as social policies, including 
joint legislation on such fundamental issues as environmental laws
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and human rights, made it increasingly clear to Canadian officials 
(hopeful as they might have been) that it was unlikely the 
Europeans would contemplate- (in the near-term) a comprehensive 
transatlantic agreement either individually or multilaterally with 
Canada and/or the United States and Mexico. Simply put, there was 
a glaring lack of parity in the respective levels of integration.
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Table 19: THE EC AND NAFTA (as at 1993): SOME COMPARISONS AND CONTRASTS
EC NAFTA
1. TRADE AND PRODUCTION
(a) Informal cooperation
(b) Complementation agreements
(c) Removal of tariff barriers All intra-EC barriers eliminated. Common external tariff 
1 adopted
All to be eliminated or phased out over 5,10, or 15 years. 
Special provisions for agricultural products,energy and 
basic petrochemicals. No common external tarif, e.g., 
Mexico will be allowed to maintain relatively high tariff 
levels on imports from the rest of the world.
(d) Removal of non-tariff barriers Most to be removed by the end of the 1990s. Some degree of liberalization is occurring, e.g., with 
respect to safeguarding government procurement. The 
elimination of NTBs, e.g., technical standards, trucking and 
port service, may take longer to achieve. Immediate goal is 
national treatment and intra-NAFTA compatibility in 
standard-related measures. Sets up a new regime in 
intellectual property.
(e) Rules of Origin The question of what constitutes an "EC Mttde" good (i.e., a 
good with a substantial EC content) is still a matter1 of 
controversy, but the EC is gradually establishing the rules of 
the game.
Involves preferential tariff treatment for goods considered 
to be North American. Local content percentages beginning 
to be identified, e.g., in automotive'products. Within 
NAFTA, rules of origin are replacing intra-North American 
tariffs and NTBs. .
(0  Services Inter-EC regulations on trade and rights of establishment to be 
largely eliminated. Principle of mutual reciprocity established. 
Under the "single banking license", a bank approved to operate 
in one Member State will be able to branch across the 
Community .Similar provisions incorporating this principle of 
mutual recognition are being developed for the securities and 
insurance services.
Principle of equal treatment to be established. Gradual 
liberalization of financial services up to 2000. At present, 
however, all financial institutions must comply with host 
country regulations.
(g) Dispute Settlement Harmonized by European Commission. Trilaterdlizes the CUFTA process.
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Table 19: (Continued)
(h) Special provisions For agriculture and a limited number of strategically sensitive 
manufacturing and service sectdrs.
Economic coordination and transfers found in EC unlikely 
to be part of NAFTA. For example, each nation will 
operate separate agricultural programs.
2. FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE Gradually being accomplished by the introduction of the EC 
passport and the harmonization of labour laws and employment 
conditions.
' * '' '•
.A truly liberal movement of labour is not part of NAFTA. 
De facto, there are likely to be many obstacles to the free 
movement of people, especially between Mexico and the 
United States. Treaty specifically allows for the cross- 
border movement of business persons.
3. FREE MOVEMENT OF ASSETS Largely activated. Most financial markets are 
already deregulated. There are currently few 
restrictions, on the sourcing of capital or on 
currency movements. Concept (but not practice) of 
European Monetary Union is accepted by most of 
the 12 MemJber States.
Free movement of currency. Expropriation of 
assets forbidden. Concept of national treatment 
established. Some control permitted of intra- 
NAFTA corporate acquisitions.
4. MONETARY AND FISCAL UNION A goal (of most of the EC) yet to be achieved. 
Some fiscal harmonization is being achieved in the 
"EC 1992" program.
Not immediately envisaged. Only a limited 
amount of fiscal harmonization is currently in 
operation (especially between Mexico and the 
United States and Mexico and Canada).
5. SOCIAL PROGRAMS Extensive social policies, and fiscal transfer 
mechanisms; EC developing its own environmental 
policies.
Little coordination of social programs; no clear 
policy on the environment.
6. POLICIES OF NATION STATES 
TOWARDS FDI
Attempts to move toward harmonization, but a 
recent study of the OECD shows considerable 
latitude among Member States remains, e.g., 
toward liberalization of FDI in services.
No formal coordinative system envisaged.
7. POLITICAL UNION AND COMMON 
SECURITY AND DEFENCE
Political Union (PU) as well as Common Security 
and Foreign Policy envisaged as a result of - 
ratification of Maastricht Treaty.
Not currently envisaged.
Source: Adapted from John Dunning, Table 2, in "MNE Activity: Comparing the NAFTA and the EC," in Lorraine Eden, ed.. Multinationals in North America, 1994, p. 280-81; and Royal Bank of Canada, "Is Canada Ready for Europe 1992?", 
Econoscope, Vol. 16, No. I, (Feb. 1992), p. 6.
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F-urther militating against European desires to negotiate, and 
moderated only slightly by the negotiations on bilateral MRAs and 
MOUs, were divergent transatlantic interests on a variety of very 
sensitive issues.. For example, any new agreement from a European 
perspective had to address: .«. ■
(1) fisheries: where Ottawa wanted the Europeans to accept the 
NAFO moratorium; .
(2) agriculture: mutual controls on trade distorting
practices-subsidies and variable levies;
‘3) access: grains, oilseeds, red meats from Canada in exchange 
for wines, meat, processed foods from the Community, 
with dairy products being most problematic in light of 
Canada's marketing boards; increased forestry/paper access for 
Canada through elimination of such non-tariff barriers as 
phytosanitary requirements plus elimination of the EFTA 
preference; and
4) government procurement: with Canada seeking access in
those sectors such as telecommunications and power generation 
where it had the greatest comparative advantage and the EC 
seeking access to provincial utilities and domestic 
telecommunications market).
But, to reiterate, what incentive did the EC need to conclude 
a full, GATT-jbompatible, free trade agreement with Canada, since 
the magnitude of access granted would be out of all proportion .to 
its access gained? Therefore, the only possibility for European 
interest hinged on whether the Americans could be convinced of the 
value of such a step. But, here as noted above, the differing 
levels of integration on both sides of the.Atlantic were a major 
stumbling block.. And, even if the EC and the United States could be 
interested, how would negotiations be. initiated without frightening 
the Japanese and other countries of Asia Pacific into taking 
parallel measures? A transatlantic free trade agreement designed to 
slow the eroding economic link between North America and Europe 
would then endanger North America's links with a rapidly growing
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Asia Pacific region.28
This brings us to Article 2 of the NATO treaty. In 1992 - this 
idea seemed again to arouse some interest among Canadian officials 
at EAITC since it was felt that it was precisely in the post-Cold 
War world when exhortation to greater economic- collaboration could 
help maintain a. solid • North Atlantic community. However, the 
Europeans quickly made it clear to Canadian officials that they 
were not interested in discussing economic issues within the 
context of NATO when they were already doing so as part of their 
Single Market process and monetary union. Again, returning to the 
discussion about European attitudes to Atlantic free trade before 
the creation of the Common Market, then as now, the Europeans had 
trouble accepting the North American rationale for plurilateral 
economic institutions to bind the Atlantic partners when there 
already exist the Quadrilaterals, the OECD- (for research), the G-7, 
and, in Europe,, the UN's Economic Commission for Europe.
10.3.3 Learning from History: Prospects for an "Atlantic Community"
The above discussion also raises the question. of what Canadian 
policymakers learned about the prospect for new transatlantic 
arrangements in the early 1990s from a decade of intensive 
transatlantic and European institution-building between 1947 and 
1957. And,, furthermore, how did the longstanding debates over the 
nature and future of "Atlanticism"29 intersect discussions and 
negotiations over the future of bilateral. Canada-EC relations?30 It 
would be useful, for example, to discern whether the policy debate 
surrounding the negotiations of the NATO Treaty, touched upon in 
Chapter Four, brought to light any "laws" Of transatlanticism and
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Canada's role therein-for Canadian policymakers in the early 1990s. 
And, if so, did these "laws" provide for a favourable or 
unfavourable prognosis for a comprehensive transatlantic treaty? As 
we have discussed, the niajor policy questions preoccuping the 
Western Alliance's members in the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War and also extending into the mid-1950s - What to do about 
Germany? How much aid to channel to Europe? What to do about 
Eastern Europe? - in many respects mirrored those in the period
1989-1991 - Was German re-unification a positive development? How 
much aid could be channeled to the CEEs? How did Russia affect
t
European security? The difference was that in the intervening
period the EC had become at least an equal of the United States,
the. threat of nuclear war with the Soviet Union .had dissipated,
Japan had become an economic power,. and Canada's relative economic
power and "prestige" as a middle power, despite its G-7 member
status, had. seen a steady erosion since the Suez Crisis in 1957 .
Furthermore, what lessons were there from the spate of
speculation arid scholarly research On the modalities of an Atlantic
Union in the-mid- to late-1960s31 that followed from Karl Deutsch's
Political Community and the North Atlantic Area32, and that appeared
to have been given impetus by John F. Kennedy's acclaimed Fourth of
July speech in 1962? As Kennedy stated:
We do not regard a strong .united Europe as a rival 
• but as a partner. ... We see: in such a Europe a 
partner with whom we could deal on a basis of full 
equality in all the great and burdensome tasks of 
building and defending a community of free, 
nations... I will say here and now on this day of 
independence that the United States will be ready 
for a Declaration of Interdependence - that we will 
be prepared to discuss with a United Europe the ways 
and means of forming a concrete Atlantic Partnership 
- a mutually beneficial partnership between the new 
union now emerging in Europe and the old American 
union founded here 175 years ago.33 [my emphasis]
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Perhaps' the major lesson to be drawn was the continuing 
central role of the United States in any discussions of the future 
of transatlanticism. Indeed, Lester Pearson recognized that the 
United States was the "key to any progress toward an Atlantic 
alliance". He was apparently very frustrated by the State 
Department’s lack of support in the late 1940s and early 1950s for 
his vision of an Atlantic Community on the count that it could have 
provoked the. Soviet Union.34 According to Holmes, Canadian decision 
makers were not attracted by George Kennan's "dumbbell" concept of
i
an Atlantic Community which visualized two globes of power, one on 
the European end based on the Brussels pact, and another at the 
North American end which would be connected by a bar of mutual 
interest and collaboration.35 The idea was that two representatives 
would be able to make decisions more quickly than the 15 
representatives of NATO-. It is not hard to see how Pearson and his 
colleagues were miffed, since it once more showed how the Americans 
were quick to^marginalize Canadian interests and how the Europeans 
would continue to see transatlantic relations according to the "two 
pillar" metaphor. Following. this theory's discreditation in the 
early -1950s36, ‘ it would be a full decade before Kennedy's speech 
once more re-ignited the flame of Atlanticism.
The promise held in Kennedy's speech for an Atlantic Community 
(encompassing security ties and free trade) and anchored by the 
Common Market and the U.S., was soon overshadowed by a host of 
problems. Six months after the speech, de Gaulle barred Britain's 
membership in the Common Market and thereby undermined Washington's 
interest since. the U.S. was' only interested in a Partnership 
between "equals, " a status that the Common Market could not
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approach without Britain. Additionally, from Washington's 
perspective, there was the "Canadian problem" since Canada lay 
strategically in. the heart of the Atlantic area. The Americans were 
in quandary, knowing that Canada could not become part of the 
Common Market and that Ottawa would not cede to Washington the 
power to speak on Canada's behalf on security and defence matters. 
This alone in Washington's eyes had the potential to preclude such 
a bilateral Common Market-U.S. partnership.37 Furthermore, as Coffey 
points out, it.became obvious in the course of the Kennedy Round 
negotiation, starting in 1963, that neither the U.S. nor the EEC 
was prepared to make the types ' of across-the-board tariff 
concessions that were necessary to create a free trade area.38 
Thereafter, as we have discussed, in Part Two of this study, 
Washington-Brussel relations grew progressively more acrimonious. 
As it turned out, then, NATO - led by the U.S. - became the 
preferred multilateral institution that came to embody the notion 
of "Atlantic Partnership".
As we saw, although the TAD was not a transatlantic "treaty," 
it nevertheless did elicit within both the scholarly and policy­
making communities renenewed speculation-in the possibility of an 
Atlantic Union. Canadian officials realized that if there was to be 
any reasonable success in creating a more comprehensive 
transatlantic treaty, the ball would once more be in Washington's 
court. The greatest change from 45 years previously was that the 
UK's role would increasingly be one of onlooker, given that, the 
locus of European input on transatlanticism was shifting from 
London to Bonn as the Anglo-American "special relationship" grew 
weaker.39
But perhaps the most significant difference between the
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choices available to Canadian, American and European policymakers 
in the early 1990s as compared to the late 1940s and first half of 
the 1950s was that the successful completion of the Uruguay Round 
on December 15, 1993 and the movement towards ratification of the 
WTO on January 1, 1995, in many ways made the search for a
transatlantic trade treaty redundant and, in so doing, seemed at 
the time to lay to rest the Pearsonian vision of Canada's 
participation in a North Atlantic Community. (Although, as will be 
pointed out in Chapter Twelve's discussion of the future research 
agenda, with new Liberal Prime Minister Jean Chretien's call for a 
NAFTA-EU free trade agreement in 1994, this was obviously not a 
permanent condition.) The dismissal of a transatlantic free trade 
agreement also presupposed that many of the outstanding issues in 
transatlantic commerce could be dealt with within the WTO.
Indeed, there were other "voices" that insisted the global 
economy still held incentives for such an Atlantic Union if: (1) 
the WTO did not progress as rapidly in its work program on the 
"new" trade policy issues such as the environment, competition 
policy, and investment, all of which had implications for Canada-EC 
relations; (2) the attempt to create an Asia Pacific free trade 
zone became bogged down in the protectionist tendencies in the 
region; and (3) as the Community devoted more and more of its 
attention to a pan-European preferential trading area, there would 
be a greater tendency for it to shape the international system 
rather than for it to be a passive taker. In the United States 
these voices contended that a confrontational approach to the 
Community was not in U.S. interests, leading to a detailed call for 
joint action issued by the Carnegie Study Group on U.S.-EC 
Relations in July 1993. That report, Atlantic Frontiers, called for
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the building of a single market, based on broader and improved 
contacts over a range of new areas, including better coordinated 
microeconomic, environmental, and monetary policies. The aim of the 
report was to expand and deepen the constituencies that supported 
Atlantic ties.40
What was curious from the Canadian perspective was that in 
1992 and 1993 when neo-protectionist forces in the United States 
(e.g., due to domestic interests on agriculture, forestry, fishing 
off the coast of British Columbia, etc.) and in Europe were already 
threatening to undermine the WTO agenda, the Canadian policy 
community outside of government (i.e., pro-free trade think-tanks 
such as the C.D. Howe Institute, Fraser Institute, Centre for 
International Studies to the name the most prominent) evinced no 
interest in calling for a review of the benefits of transatlantic 
free trade or in allying themselves with like-minded U.S. 
institutes and study groups. Instead, Canadian analysts in these 
institutes concentrated on the need for a NAFTA to protect Canadian 
interests.
10.3.4 Balance of Benefits: Canadian Private Sector Interests
The discussion above has looked primarily at how the Mulroney 
Government viewed its transatlantic economic options and the 
historical precedents for closer transatlantic ties. But while 
government can create the conditions for trade, it is business that 
trades. For this reason it is irrportant also to examine the 
Canadian business community's attitude towards free Canada-EC and 
transatlantic free trade.
The Canadian business community supported bilateral and
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trilateral treaties with its North American trading partners to 
reinforce and "supplement" the market-liberalizing GATT. In the 
words of a 1988 Canadian Chamber of Commerce submission to the 
Canadian Parliament on the need for the CUFTA: "...at the end of 
the ten year phase-in period, Canada would be more productive and 
competitive in both its own and world markets as a result of this 
agreement."41 However, this did not imply that the same business 
community saw a need for a separate transatlantic free trade 
treaty. As was evident in the survey of Canadian companies with 
significant commercial interests in the Community, when Canadian 
executives were asked about their desire for an Atlantic free trade 
area - "To what extent would your company benefit from an Atlantic 
free trade area?" and "Do you think that the Government of Canada 
should push for an Atlantic free trade area"? - 80 per cent 
responded that they foresaw only a minor to medium increase in 
their exports. Significantly, to the second question, 90 per cent 
felt there was only a minor need for a new trade agreement given 
the existence of NAFTA and the WTO. For Canadian business the 
progress of the MTN combined with changing global business patterns 
- characterized by increased trade and investment in the Asia 
Pacific region combined with greater intra-European trade - 
superceded the incentives for an Atlantic Union.
Second, from a business perspective, the real question was 
whether a Canada-EC trade agreement or a broader transatlantic 
agreement would neutralize the advantage enjoyed by the EFTA 
countries and forestall any future advantage by the CEEs with 
respect to raw materials and agricultural exports to the EC. In 
other words, without such an agreement, was there a greater 
likelihood that Canada in the near- to medium-terms would become a
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residual supplier to the EC? As noted, this was certainly a concern 
for the Canadian forestry products sector.
However, the real question was whether such sectoral interests 
in Canada could create the momentum for broader transatlantic free 
trade. Would an expanded agreement, for example, have provided the 
framework in the post-Uruguay Round to address the residual 
barriers to trade that remained on Canada's trade irritant "wish 
list" as discussed in Chapters Eight and Nine? Would a Canada-EC 
agreement, by according national treatment to investments, have 
neutralized or eliminated the discriminatory national investment 
regimes of the Member States and thus further increased the 
significant CFDI flows to the EC? And would such an accord have 
provided the private* sector with a more effective way than the 
GATT of resolving existing and future bilateral trade disputes? 
This last question deserves further explanation. In the case of 
access to the United States market, Canadian business clearly 
wanted a more predictable, "less politicized" and more timely 
process with the power to deliver binding decisions when disputes 
over trade or investment practices occurred in either the U.S. or 
Canada42. With regard to economic relations with the Community, 
there was no where near the same broad-based (as opposed to 
sectoral) pressure from the private sector for the trade inpairing 
issues mentioned in this study to be taken to an extra-GATT 
binational dispute settlement forum. With the federal government's 
historic inability to attract the Community to CUFTA or NAFTA-style 
dispute panels, the impression was that the business community was 
content to let Ottawa go down its "wish list" in order to test the 
Community's interest - with varying levels of success - in 
bilateral agreements on an issue-by-issue basis.
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But even if there were noises about the desirability of a more 
comprehensive transatlantic trade agreement at the political and 
business levels, it was unclear whether there was sufficient 
support from a mandarinate in Ottawa that had, in the course of the 
1980s, winnowed out its Europeanists. For example, the senior 
Canadian official responsible for formulating and implementing 
Canada's trade policy agenda in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
(indeed Derek Burney's successor at EAITC) viewed a bilateral or 
trilateral treaty as unnecessary. He noted the lack of convergence 
in transatlantic relations. Canada and the EC had adopted parallel 
deepening and widening strategies: the former had strengthened the 
NAFTA with follow up agreements (e.g., Chile) to act as 
counterweights to the U.S.; the latter meanwhile was "preoccupied" 
with developments in the East and thus, in this official's mind, 
had little energy left to deal with the rest of the world.43 On the 
question of whether an Atlantic free trade agreement would reverse 
the apparent erosion of Canada-EC trade and investment flows, this 
official - subscribing to the Prime Minister's mantra - pointed out 
that the completion of the CUFTA and the NAFTA would in fact 
increase in value terms Canada's extra-U.S. trade since Canadian 
firms would use the American market as a springboard. Therefore, 
contrary to Joe Clark's musings on the need for a transatlantic 
treaty, this official, citing U.S.-EC friction as the major 
impediment to broader multilateral liberalization, believed 
Canada' s interests were better served by working with the Community 
through multilateral channels rather than through bilateral ones. 
Finally, the official asked rhetorically how the rest of the world 
would react to a combined North American-European bloc.
In the end, what are to we conclude from the above cost-
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benefit analysis of the choices facing Canadian decision makers and 
their European counterparts? It seemed the key prerequisite for any 
new transatlantic Canada-EC or Atlantic Conmmity mechanism was a 
strong political commitment (and time and resources) to fostering 
this relationship on all sides. A first step in this direction had 
already been taken through the TAD. That being said, given a 
description of Canada's relations with the Comnunity as one of 
1 asymmetrical vulnerability interdependence" and the fact that the 
EC was preoccupied with its own internal interests, the most 
important variable was how interested the Europeans were in such an 
initiative, and whether it would be in the short- medium- or long- 
terms. At the time, however, there was no political will in Europe 
and the Canadians had to content themselves with the small 
"victories" of gaining bilateral issue-specific agreements.
10.4 THE POST-COLD WAR TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY ARCHITECTURE
At the same time that Canada was repositioning itself within the 
Triad and reacting to the SEM, it felt the loss of its Atlanticist 
influence in Europe as a result of the policy struggles that were 
part of NATO reform, the setting up of the North Atlantic 
Cooperation Council (NACC) in 199044, the reform of the CSCE, and 
the EC's development of a European security and defence identity 
(ESDI) for which the WED45 appeared to be its chosen instrument.
While this study is not about the evolution of Canada's 
security policy towards Europe, it is nevertheless important to 
show how the evolving transatlantic security debate between 1989 
and 1993 over the future of certain multilateral security 
institutions - most notably NATO and the CSCE - had the potential
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to intersect the Ganada-EC bilateral relationship and to change the 
nature of future relations. The rationale for the following 
discussion is that just as there was an unambiguous link between 
Canada's security commitment to Western Europe in the 1970s and its 
ability to gain closer institutionalized relations with the 
Community, there was a similar attempt made in the early 1990s to 
link Canada's emphasis’ on "cooperative security" - that is, the 
thesis that national security is enhanced through consultation on 
the whole range of political, economic, environmental, and social, 
inter-state relations46 - with its ability to forge a new basis of 
mutual interests with the Conmmity.
But before looking at the EC-Canada- dimension of transatlantic 
security, it is important to outline briefly the major 
transatlantic security debates and Canadian responses. There are a 
number of issues here, but the most important from this study's 
perspective was the problem of coordination between NATO and the 
WEU and the uncertainty over the U.S. role in Europe.
From the early 1980s onwards the strongest advocates of an 
independent West European defence structure were France and 
Germany, countries at the forefront of setting up European security 
and defence structures- in the form of security competence for the 
new European Political Union, upgrading of the WEU and the 
establishment of a Franco-German army corps.47 While France was more 
vocal, Germany stood by its side at every important juncture. 
Official documents always refer to basic compatibility between NATO 
functions and ESDI, even though everyone involved knew the process 
was very competitive and had impaired the Atlanticist spirit that 
united NATO during the Cold War. And after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, these fissures in the transatlantic security
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framework widened. Simply put, the authority and relevance of NATO 
- and thus the North American role in Europe - were being 
diminished. Where did Canada fit into this evolving debate? Moens 
cautions that although not much should be read into Canada's 
weakened position in European councils, there were nevertheless 
tell-tale signs as we shall discuss below.48
Moens lays out three opposing views on Canada's security role 
in Europe in the post-Cold War period. To the "North American 
Continentalist", the EC's desire for an enlarged security role, the 
gradual American disengagement from Europe, combined with the 
creation of a single North American trading area, doomed to failure 
Canada's attempt to remain involved in European security. A second 
group, the "post-Cold War Atlanticists;" contended that the 
traditional rationale for Canada had not changed because in a 
worse-case scenario Canada wanted to avoid a deterioration of 
security in Central Europe, be it intra- or interstate, that would 
threaten, the NATO area itself. In this logic, Canada wanted as much 
as possible-to keep the United States directly engaged in Europe, 
including staying committed itself. ' ,
The third view, drawing its position from Canada's involvement 
in Europe (its 2,200 peacekeepers stationed under UN auspices in 
the former Yugoslavia) and the general attention given to a 
revitalized a post-Cold War UN, contended. that Canada had' to 
deregionalize and concentrate on its first international vocation - 
peacekeeping. In ■ this view, any theological attachment to 
Atlanticism or a return to the Trudeau era's "Third Option" had to 
be abandoned in favour of a pragmatic position that viewed Europe 
as just one of many areas for involvement depending on UN 
commitments. It. favoured the development, of European institutions
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as regional •implementors of the UN, which meant advocating a 
peacekeeping mandate for NATO. Importantly, apart from Canada's UN 
obligations,' supporters of this view saw little independent ground 
for Canadian security policy in Europe.
It is not necessary here- for a detailed .review of Ottawa's 
policy zig-zags on European security during these years.49 Canada's 
"three pillars" approach to Europe announced in Joe Clark's Humber 
College speech in the Spring of 1990 seemed quite optimal at the 
time. Since NATO, the CSCE and the EC were in flux, it behooved 
Canada to try and engage all. Historically, the ability of Canada 
to gain "privileged" economic access to the European Community had 
been based, to a significant extent, on Canada's participation in 
the post-War transatlantic security framework.10 Canada was rewarded 
for playing a support function in the military security provided by 
the United States- Suffice it to say that Canadian.planners had a 
difficult time making Canada's voice heard given.the competition, 
among the various institutions, compounded by the Yugoslav crises 
and the unforseen UN role on the continent. It is even difficult to 
place Ottawa’s position firmly in any one of the above-mentioned 
schools of thought since the Mulroney Government was itself 
divided, with EAITC scrambling not to lose any ground in any 
European institutions and not to offend Canada's European allies by 
undertaking a variety of initiatives. These include advocating 
briefly, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, a renewed emphasis 
on Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1992; proposing 
associate membership to NATO for stable Visegrad states; and 
attempting to mold the CSCE to fit Canada's vision of "cooperative- 
security"50.
Beginning in the summer of 1991,. Canada, usually a . small
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player in the European arena, made a major contribution by 
deploying troops to the EC monitoring mission in Yugoslavia, and 
later two battle groups to UN Protection Force in Yugoslavia 
. . (UNPROFOR) . The Canadian commitment became the' second largest 
contingent of peacekeepers in Yugoslavia after the French.. In terms 
of Canada's interests, Moens points out that when a connection 
•between NATO and the UN appeared, Canada played "a quiet but 
important facilitory role" in helping along a series of meetings 
between Brussels and UN staff in New York.51 Furthermore, by 19.93, 
as if to underscore Canada's • support of a UN-centred European 
policy approach, Ottawa insisted that the overall integrated 
command of the peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia be in the 
hands of the UN, not NATO.
However, if the above comments seemed to signal a renewed. 
. Canadian security commitment to Europe, they.must be balanced by 
the domestic constraints in Canada and the ongoing rivalry between 
the departments of External Affairs and the Department of National 
Defence (DND)on the appropriate Canadian role in Europe. By 1992, 
with a recession, that would not go away, an ever-increasing 
. national debt and deficit, and the Cold War over, it was 
increasingly hard politically for the Muironey Government to close 
domestic military bases (historically part of regional industrial 
development) for budgetary reasons/ and leave Canada's European 
bases open. In this environment, National Defence, burdened with 
aging equipment, the victim of budget cuts, and prohibited from 
closing unneeded domestic bases, supported the withdrawal of 
Canadian troops from Europe.52 External Affairs' argument, namely, 
that Canadian troops in Europe were an important signal of Canada's 
commitment to European security and. were crucial to keeping NATO
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North American, was overridden by the Conservative Cabinet. So, 
Prime Minister Mulroney, after stating in the fall of 1991 that 
Canadian troops would stay as long as they were "needed and 
wanted, " decided by the spring budget of 1992' that they were no 
longer needed. Despite protests by Canada's European allies that 
echoed the displeasure 20 years earlier over Trudeau's downsizing 
of Canada's military presence in .Europe53 - Mulroney decided to 
withdraw all permanently stationed Canadian troops in Europe by 
1994.54
. By 1993, this state of affairs had put Canadian policy­
makers in. a tricky position and re-ignited the "burdensharing" 
critique that the Europeans and Americans had directed at Canada 
since the early 1970s. If NATO became the inclusive {i.e., . 
including all European states) collective security organization. 
in Europe55 rather than one that developed its security role in 
close cooperation with the "cooperation partners" of the NACC and 
further strengthened the CSCE to become a regional security \ 
organization ynder Article 52 of the UN Charter56, then for 
Canada not to dissipate whatever influence it still had with its 
European and American allies, it would have had to begin thinking 
about reversing its decision on: troop withdrawals. But apart from 
the peacekeeping commitment to Yugoslavia, the Mulroney 
Government had no political will to flip-flop on its European 
security policy and commit new troops.
Commentators have written extensively about the 
complications created by the existence of the WEU for the 
prospects of new European security architecture for the post-Cold 
War era. On the margins of the Maastricht Summit in December 
1991, it was decided that an expanded WEU should embody the ESDI
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and should also serve as the European pillar of NATO, arid at the 
Petersberg Ministerial Meeting in June 1992, it was agreed to 
make the WEU more operational, through the creation of a military 
planning cell to refine three main tasks for WEU forces 
(humanitarian and rescue, crisis management, and peacekeeping).57 
Complicating matters.even more from a Canadian perspective was 
the Franco-German army corps which it was agreed would be placed 
under NATO command in crises ranging from war to international 
peacekeeping.
These developments raised serious questions about the 
relationship between the WEU and NATO and by extension the role 
for Canada,•as a North American partner, in crises on European 
soil. As Canada*s former ambassador to NATO, John Halstead, has 
noted, the question was whether the focus of defence planning and 
consultations among the European members of NATO should take 
place in NATO or in the WEU, and should the WEU eventually have 
'an independent military role? If the former, how can the EC 
develop an ESDI? But if the latter, how can the.U.S. and.Canada 
continue to be involved in European security?58 The view in 
Washington was that the ESDI should develop in whatever way the 
EC wished, as long as it did not affect NATO's role as the forum 
where all the allies made common security policies and took 
decisions to execute them.59 The U.S. supported the idea of a 
common European security policy, provided-it was brought to NATO 
for debate and adjustment to the alliance position. There 
remained concern in Washington, however, that some European 
allies would want to establish policy making in the European 
Defence Community (EDC) as an alternative to NATO. If this were 
to happen, it would' put in. question the essential underpinning of
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the transatlantic link.
Whatever formulas are reached to reconcile the mandates of 
the NATO and the WEU60, none of them could alter the fact that 
between 1990 and 1993 there was an inherent tension between the 
transatlantic and the. European view of the alliance, which served 
to complicate the construction of a new European security 
architecture in the future and thus undermined transatlantic 
solidarity, including the prospects for free trade.
10.4.1 "Cooperative Security" as Glue of Transatlantic Relations
So, where did Canada fit into this complicated.landscape of 
cross-cutting interests and how did this affect its relations 
with the EC? Clearly, without a permanent troop commitment in 
Europe, it was increasingly difficult for Canada to have much 
influence on any major Alliance decision. That being said, and 
returning to our discussion of the various schools of thought on 
post-Cold War- transatlantic security, there was a major 
structural transformation that Canada faced which was obviously 
not limited to the transatlantic relationship but affected it 
greatly, namely, the growing interpenetration of economic and 
security issues: a case in point was Canada's formulation of a 
"cooperative security" approach to its international security 
relations and its pursuit of organizing relations in Europe on 
the logic of this concept, as was done with the'entrenchment of 
cooperative security elements in the TAD and its attempt to 
organize the CSCE around these principles. Thus, perhaps it can 
be said that the distinguishing feature, of the early 1990s was 
that the objective change predicted in the academic literature on
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interdependence in the 1970s was now matched by a "cognitive 
shift" on the part of policy elites.
The cognitive shift, though fundamental and substantial, by 
the early 1990s was not complete; it had not been thoroughly 
incorporated into policy processes and political dialogue on both 
sides of the Atlantic. In many ways it. contributed to the 
institutional overlap and confusion described above that 
characterized the transatlantic relationship.
What was the impact of the cognitive shift on Canada-EC 
relations? The first, as mentioned, was to enshrine cooperative 
security issues in the TAD. Canadian policymakers expected that . 
Canada's future participation in transatlantic security would 
likely be in peacekeeping or cooperative security-type issues. As 
the EC was developing its own apparati to perform these 
functions, it was> however, increasingly difficult to see how 
Canada might benefit from performing a European role that would 
actually no longer be seen by the EC as a support function in a 
priorized policy agenda (Soviet containment). Herein then lay the 
dilemma for Canadian foreign-policymakers.. It. was entirely 
unrealistic to expect Canada to have the same amount of influence 
in Europe in such a reformulized policy agenda. Although both 
Ottawa and Western Europe had an interest in cooperating on such 
1990s "co-operative" security issues as terrorism, refugee 
management, drug trafficking, and nuclear non-proliferation, this 
cooperation, was not likely to produce the same type of close- 
knit, value-driven transatlantic relationship that bound Canada 
to Western Europe during the Cold War. Regardless of the level of 
adjustments to existing architecture-, Ottawa had to ask itself on 
what policy congruence and with what rewards it was going to
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build stronger political ties with Brussels if it was destined to. 
have less and less influence in NATO and especially if the WEU 
took over.NATO's functions in Europe, something that would depend 
in large part on Washington's perception of its European 
interests. Finally, if Canada did indeed want to build 
cooperative security relations with the EC, one has to question 
how serious Ottawa was. The evidence suggests that between 1990 
and 1993 Ottawa was intent on making the CSCE - not NATO or the 
EC - the linchpin of its European security architecture.
9 -
10.5 CONCLUSION
The three central or structural changes discussed in this chapter 
— the respective weighting of the EC, U.S. and Japan in the world 
economy, the loss of Canada's Atlanticist -influence both in the 
economic and security domains, and governmental attempts to deal 
with growing interdependence — had important policy and 
institutional'^  effects for Canada-EC relations.
This chapter, by looking at both the likelihood for new 
economic and security arrangements at the end of the Mulroney 
Governments second.term, has emphasized how the politics of 
structural change, and the recognition of fundamental shifts by 
policymakers, are clearly at the root of many transatlantic 
policy difficulties'. Although the policy agendas of both Canada 
and the EC had begun to diverge significantly after 1985, the . 
radical transformation only began after 1989. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union, the move towards economic, political and monetary 
union in the Community and its implications for the rest of 
Europe, the completion of the-CUFTA. and the NAFTA in North
America combined with the completion of Uruguay Round and the 
start of the WTO, all meant that policymakers, on both sides of 
the Atlantic were confronted with a radically transformed set of 
choices and issues. By looking at the options available, to Canada 
in this new environment, that is,.by examining Ottawa's emphasis 
on enshrining cooperative security principles in .its relations 
with its European "pillars" and the modalities of a new 
transatlantic trading arrangement, what this chapter'and indeed 
the entire study describes is the attempt by a middle power to
streamline and coordinate divergent policy directions and
9 *
institutions.
What also comes through the analysis is an interesting 
change in the complexion of Canada's-relations with Western 
Europe. On the one hand, on one range of broad, overarching 
issues such as aid to Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, 
the desirability to complete the Uruguay Round, and assistance to 
the developing world, there is a basic consensus between Canadian 
and Community^elites on both the goals and the means (with the 
exception perhaps on the means of resolving agricultural disputes 
within the Uruguay Round). This may not be surprising. What is 
notable is the other range of broad issues discussed, that is, 
the future of.Europe's security architecture and transatlantic 
economic relations - where the policy conclusions or actions to 
these developments on the part of the EC and Canadian elites are 
notable for their lack-of general agreement.
On transatlantic security links, as this chapter described, 
there was not only confusion regarding the Community's future 
security role with regard to its Member States' participation in 
NATO and the WEU, but in.terms of Canadian responses there was
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serious, disagreement within the bureaucracy under the Mulroney 
Government on how to maintain Canada's security links to Europe. 
Meanwhile, on the trade side, the Canadian business community 
evinced no interest in a free trade agreement with the Community 
but exhibited great interest in a free, trade agreement with Asia; 
meanwhile, Canadian Parliamentarians and Ministers threw up trial 
balloons about, the utility of an Atlantic free trade zone; and 
senior Canadian bureaucrats, following the completion of the 
Uruguay Round, saw no value in embarking on a separate 
transatlantic free trade track. The Community for its part, was 
preoccupied with trying to realize the goals set out in the 1985 
White Paper and the 1987 Single Europe Act, in addition to 
dealing with the complex issues surrounding expansion beyond the 
12 Member States and domestic economic downturns. These internal 
developments took precedence over what to do about transatlantic, 
relations.
Compounding the problem of making transatlantic interests 
more convergent was the fact that both Canada and the Community 
appeared to view,the solutions to their respective Atlantic" 
frameworks in fundamentally different ways. This chapter's 
analysis, of the various options open to Canadian policymakers at 
the end of 1993 points to Ottawa's need to redefine the balance 
between prosperity and security; basically spending less on 
European security and gaining more from an expanded European 
market by investing more in West European trade and investment 
development efforts. .However, it is not clear that there was a 
convergence of Canadian and European interests in this regard.
Not only this, but domestically there appeared to be no 
consensus on the appropriate Canadian response to European
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integration. If we recall the discussion in Chapters Three and 
Nine, with the exception of the few Canadian multinationals, the 
Canadian business community was relatively indifferent to the 
Community market in spite of the federal government's 
exhortations, incentives and programs; Canadian business leaders 
talked about the "maturity" of the West European markets and 
lobbied government to spend less not more on trade development 
schemes for this region. And, at the same time that an - 
aggressive,, unified Canadian response to the SEM - that is, a 
"Team Canada" approach in which business and. government would 
"sing from the same song sheet" - was missing in Canada, on the 
EC's side, the process of revising its role in Europe was.almost 
entirely in the opposite direction from Canada's. So, in the two 
years after the TAD, while policymakers in. Ottawa were framing 
their approach to the Community around the prospects for new 
bilateral trade arrangements, in Western Europe the debate had 
turned upon the ways in which a concern for security could be 
grafted on tor the traditional civilian power base established
-sm ■
through Community activities and institutions. This apparent . 
divergence of Canadian and European strategies and outlooks was a 
major hammer-blow to transatlantic interdependence; Canada, as a 
result became much’ more of a demandeur in transatlantic 
relations. The extent to which Canada could intensify its 
relations with the Community now depended more than at any other 
time in its history’on what the Community's interests were. The 
next chapter returns to the theoretical basis for Canada's 
evolving relations with the Community. Chapter Twelve then offers 
some predictions on the future of Canada-EC relations.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
LESSONS FROM CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICYMAKING TOWARDS THE EC
11.1 INTRODUCTION
In this chapter we return to the discussion of the levels-of- 
analysis problem (Chapter Two) and the frameworks and process of 
Canadian foreign policy (Chapter Two and Three) to determine what 
this study on Canada-EC relations has taught us about the relative 
importance of domestic determinants and international constraints 
on Canada's foreign policy. This prompts a series of questions: Why 
was priority given to Canada's relations with the EC in 1989-91, 
leading eventually to the issuance of the TAD? Why was it so 
difficult to develop a new framework for Canada-EC relations that 
would encompass a multiplicity of inter-govemmental links, and so 
go beyond a focus on bilateral economic relations? Finally, how did 
the structural change in the international system after 1989 either 
hinder or aid Canada's foreign policy approach to the Community?
On the first question, this study has shown that there are 
many factors at various levels, that is, both political and 
economic and domestic and international, that must be taken into 
account when analyzing any diplomatic relationship. The theoretical 
objective of this study has been to show the challenge in combining 
levels of analysis in order to weigh the significance of various 
factors. "What is needed," according to Benjamin Cohen, "is a 
methodology that considers domestic- and systemic-level variables
494
simultaneously, rather than sequentially, and specifies whatever 
interactions there may be among all relevant variables in a 
rigorous manner."1 While acknowledging that systemic and domestic 
pressures impose constraints on state behaviour, this study 
demonstrates that there is still a degree of latitude for state 
action. How domestic actors in Canada, both inside and outside of 
government, identify their interests and recognize their latitudes 
of action vis-a-vis the EC with regard such policy challenges as 
the TAD and the SEM, is a function of the manner in which these 
problems are understood by these actors or are represented by those 
to whom they turn for advice under conditions of uncertainty, be 
they Canadian officials abroad (e.g., Derek Burney, Canada's 
ambassador to Washington or Donald MacDonald, the anti-EC Canadian 
High Commissioner to the UK, or Canadian business leaders' relative 
indifference to the SEM) , or foreign figures such as the UK foreign 
minister, Douglas Hurd, and German Foreign Minister, Hans-Dietrich 
Genscher.
This study also shows that system-level factors played a 
crucial role in prompting a review of Canada's European policy 
framework in 1989, and that at the domestic level Canada's policy 
approach can be characterized as one of bureaucratic politics, 
which is consistent with the state-centric models of Canadian 
foreign policy. The examination of extensive government documents 
shows that with regard to the EC (as opposed to assistance to 
Eastern Europe) Canadian decision makers - primarily the Prime 
Minister, his Secretary of State for External Affairs, and
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officials at EAITC - were reacting to system-level stimuli and only 
marginally to domestic actors. It demonstrates that Canada1 s 
political leadership and senior bureaucrats had devised a two­
pronged response, the "Europe 1992" trade development component of 
the "Going Global" program and the TAD, based on their own 
perceptions of the threats that two systemic events, the creation 
of the SEM and the "legitimacy gap" in transatlantic relations 
created by the ending of the Cold War, posed to Canadian interests. 
The discussion below, in greater detail, applies the levels-of- 
analysis heuristic to the analysis of Canada-EC bilateral relations 
described in this study.
11.2 THE SYSTEMIC FACTORS
11.2.1 The Paradox of Canada's Post-Cold War "Roam for Maneouver"
Starting in 1989, the old question of how Canada, as a middle 
power, could play a mediating role between the Cold War powers of 
the United States and the former Soviet Union gave way to a new 
question: How could Canada best respond to a world in which
"ethnic-cleansing" zones and free trade zones existed side-by-side? 
At first glance, the end of the Cold War appeared to give Canada 
more room for manoeuver: rather than having a foreign policy that 
flowed from outside constraints, Canada's foreign policy could now 
flow from its domestic needs (a development that harkened Trudeau's 
motivation for his Foreign Policy for Canadians in 1970) . This
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however presented a paradox: on the one hand Canadian decision 
makers had more sovereignty; on the other, with the meshing of 
national and international issues and the increasing number of non­
state actors the nat ion-state:'s room for manoeuver became much more 
difficult to grasp.2 Not only this, but while the traditional 
"constraints" inposed on Canada by a bipolar international system 
may have disappeared, they had been replaced by increased 
globalization and economic competition.
Canada was no longer the player that it once was. To allude to 
the title of a recent book by Arthur Andrew, a distinguished former 
Canadian diplomat, what Canadians witnessed over the 45 years since 
the end of the Second World War was the Rise and Fall of a Middle 
Power.3 Not only was Canada's ability to marshall resources in the 
pursuit of its objectives diminished, but other countries 
(particularly those in Asia) were rapidly catching up, and some, it 
was expected would, in the next decade, begin to pass it. There was 
even been speculation as to whether Canada deserved to be a G-7 
member based on its GDP, which would actually make it the world 
eleventh largest industrial power. Furthermore, Canada's claim to 
being a middle power was now less credible in light of its 
ballooning national indebtedness to foreigners. What this 
discussion points out is that Canadian policymakers, after being 
released from the straighjacket of the Cold War, had to come to 
terms with Canada's diminishing relative global economic and 
political power as they faced an emerging European Community.
Canadian foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the Cold
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War was in large measure reactive, in contrast to Canada's 
leadership role during the "Golden Age" of its diplomacy. An 
initiative such as the TAD, where, as will be discussed below, 
Canada took a leadership position, may prove to be the exception 
rather than the rule of future Canadian foreign-policy making. The 
major challenge for Canada's foreign policy in the years ahead will 
therefore be to adjust to its declining influence while at the same 
time being actively engaged in those areas that provide a clear 
comparative advantage.4 The question is: Will its transatlantic 
relations and its bilateral relationship with Community constitute 
a comparative advantage in the years ahead in the context of its 
overall foreign policy agenda?
Cana.da.-U. S. -EC Triangle
What also emerges from this study's analysis is the rational actor 
approach of Canada in the management of its relations with the 
United States. Evidence has been presented to support the thesis 
that Canada's relations with the United States in large measure 
determines the configuration of its other bilateral relations - in 
this case with the European Community. In this vein, although the 
TAD was very much an outgrowth of Brian Mulroney's desire by 1990 
to be perceived as reacting positively to the new geo-political 
realities of Europe, which included the Community's increasingly 
important role, it was also a byproduct of Canada-U.S. relations. 
Some observers have asserted that the TAD, like the "Europe 1992"
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component of "Going Global" that preceded it, reflected the 
Conservative Government's desire to use improved bilateral 
relations with the Community to decrease domestic political 
pressure. In other words, the existence of the TAD as part of a 
campaign of "diversification" was a useful way of deflecting 
criticism from a segment of the population - Canadian 
"nationalists" who claimed that free trade was a sell out and that 
Canada was becoming the 51st state.
The notion of creating a "counterweight" of course gives rise 
to a discussion of Canada's ability, despite its modest national 
attributes, and through its emphasis on and pioneering efforts in 
establishing multilateral institutions, to manage the inpact of the 
international system beyond what could be expected. In Canada's 
diplomatic history there have been occasions in which it has 
exhibited a leadership capacity, to wit: Was Canada, in the case of 
the TAD, merely following U.S. policy responses to increasing 
European economic and political integration? That is a question. Or 
was Canada demonstrating a discernible leadership?
One likely interpretation, starting from the Bush and Baker 
speeches and moving through the more formal negotiations between 
the EC and the U.S. beginning in June 1990, would conclude that the 
U.S. led, while Canada followed. But as Cooper et al., assert, it 
is misleading to deduce leadership by looking solely at the 
leader's behaviour because it assumes that one need not bother 
"examining too closely what followers were actually doing, what is 
motivating them, what is driving their behaviour".5 For this
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reason, in this study we have examined in detail the Canadian
responses to the increasing EC-U.S. dialogue. What we are
challenging is the tendency to paint a cynical portrait of Canadian
participation in the formulation of the TAD in particular; and the
suggestion that Canada as a smaller power is inherently reactive
within the international system, although as we mentioned, the
passing of the bipolar world will not greatly expand Canada's room
for manoeuver. Following from Chapter Seven, to determine whether
Canada played a leadership or followership role in the creation of
the TAD it is necessary first to define the terms and then to
review the choices that were available to Canadian policy-makers.
It is useful first to distinguish between "leadership" as a
political phenomenon from "dominance" and "naked power" .6 Accepting
that American leadership on the TAD was political, there still
remains the problem of using a leader-centred approach because it
"seriously distorts how we understand the nature of leadership in
international politics".7 To see why one only has to look at the
act of followership. As Cooper et al. state:
Those who look as though they are following may well 
be engaged in an act of followership. . .Then again, 
those putative followers may not be so much 
following a leader as finding themselves in step 
with a leader because of complementary interests.
And finally, those who look as though they are
following may also be engaged in an elaborate
deception, purposely misleading those who are 
inclined to think. . .that they are leading.8
In the case of the TAD, Canada's followership role did not
result from coercion (since the U.S. initially did not desire
Canadian participation in a possible transatlantic accord) , but was
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closer to an act based on pragmatism {i.e., it did not want to be 
left out of a possible transatlantic accord) reflecting the 
complementary political and economic interests of both Canada and 
the U.S. vis-a-vis the European Community. In other words, once 
Canada saw that the EC-U.S. negotiations were moving inexorably 
toward some type of Declaration, Canada insinuated itself into the 
process and made concrete recommendations on how the eventual 
declarations could be structured. It moved EC-U.S. discussions 
towards the TAD in such a way that it included a meaningful role 
for itself.
The case study of the TAD indicates that, as a player of 
modest size in the international system, Canada has had to move 
swiftly to ensure that its interests are taken into account. The 
EC1 s move towards economic and political union created structural 
changes in the international system and presented a number of 
options to Canadian decision-makers. Canada could have pursued a 
strictly national strategy and relied on its existing high level 
Ministerial meetings to enhance its political links with the 
Community; this, however, appeared unacceptable, especially from 
the perspectives of officials at EAITC who viewed the TAD as a 
unique opportunity to ensure that the Community would become a 
permanent fixture on the Prime Minister's and the Secretary of 
State for External Affairs' calendars.
Second, Canada could have done nothing as the U.S. and the EC 
negotiated a declaration. But, this option had two significant 
counts against it: 1) the Europeans were quite willing to use
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Canada as an intermediary in their discussions with the U.S. 
(indeed Canadian officials were leaked confidential drafts of the 
EC-U.S. Declaration); and 2) neither Brussels nor Washington were 
exercising vigorous leadership roles in the drawing up of the 
Declarations.
The third choice was for Canada to attempt to make use of its 
niche role by being both an intermediary for the Community and an 
architect of the final agreement. As it turned out, Canada did take 
on a more proactive role as predicted in Cooper et al. 1 s conception 
of a more "entrepreneurial" Canadian foreign policy, but only once 
EAITC officials began to draft a "Canadian" text which swiftly 
became the model for the final text. Ottawa was moving from its 
Cold War role as a "helpful fixer" to one of a "good dancer". by 
moving swiftly to provide a model of the eventual TADs, Canadian 
officials became "policy entrepreneurs".
So, it may be more accurate to say that while Canada may have 
been a follower throughout the EC-U.S. preliminary discussions in 
the spring and summer of 1990, by October of that year Canada's 
role changed to that of leader. We conclude that just as the U.S. 
possessed "structural" (i.e., political) and what can be referred 
to as "transforming leadership" that transformed the interests, 
priorities and expectations of Canada in its policy responses to 
increasing European integration and transatlanticism, Canada also 
appeared to possess a certain "intellectual" leadership that 
allowed it to obtain the TAD on its terms - albeit in the format of 
a parallel agreement.9
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Finally, the chronology of TAD shows unequivocally that 
increased personal contacts between Community leaders and Prime 
Minister Brian Mulroney and Mulroney's close relationship with U.S. 
President Bush, although necessary and important, were not 
sufficient to create the final agreement. Rather, the explanation 
lies in the proclivity of the EC and the U.S. to intensify
bilateral relations which in turn determined the policy options
available to Canadian decision makers. Thus the EC-U.S. 
negotiations set parameters for the subsequent EC-Canada 
’Declaration.
On the economic side, the Mulroney Government's response to
the SEM was two-pronged: on the trade policy side it wished to
ensure that the "1992" program was not in fact creating new
barriers of access for Canadian products and services; and on the
trade development side, it was couched in terms of Canada's
declining global competitiveness, that is, the belief that the
CUFTA, by making Canadian companies more competitive in the U.S.
and home markets, would also allow them to more easily penetrate
European markets. The business community's response, however, was
divided between the small number of Canadian multinationals that
%
had made investments in Western Europe prior to 1992, and the many 
more Canadian SMEs that looked to the U.S. not as a "springboard to 
world markets" - as Ottawa would have preferred - but rather the 
final destination for their exports. This, then, were the systemic 
impacts on Canada-EC relations. The next section examines the 
interaction between the political and bureaucratic levels in 
Canada.
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11.3 THE DOMESTIC DIMENSION: BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS
The fostering of closer political and economic ties between Canada 
and the EC in the late 1980s and early 1990s reinforces the axiom 
that just as the successful inplementation of a trade development 
strategy depends on a coordinated trade policy approach, the 
success of a nation's overall foreign policy outlook and subsequent 
actions requires appropriate nursing and support at the highest 
political levels. Smith and Clarke, for example, state that the 
political framers of a strategy (viz., the politicians as distinct 
from officials) can have an unexpectedly strong influence on its 
ultimate impact. The more politicians intervene in the subsequent 
or "sequential decisions" needed to implement a strategy by 
driving, influencing, testing or even side-stepping the 
bureaucracy, the more likely will it be for the initial decision 
and its eventual impact on intended targets to coincide.10
This assertion must be qualified, however, because a middle 
power such as Canada is most often a demandeur in the international 
system, which may explain why Canadian politicians, even if they 
want to side-step their foreign policy bureaucracy and follow up on 
the inplementation of specific foreign policy initiatives, still 
have only limited success in making their initial foreign policy 
decisions bear a close resemblance to their actual inpact. 
Accepting the inherent limitations of being a smaller state, the 
question then is to what degree was the necessary high level of 
political support evident in Canada's relations with the European
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Community?
In light of these assumptions, the descriptions of Canada's 
foreign policy-making in Part Two of this study are consistent with 
other recent analyses of Canadian foreign policy-making in that 
Cabinet ministers held the ultimate authority for, and actively 
pursued, foreign policy outputs, while the members of the 
bureaucracy were the sources of most policy positions and were 
responsible for their implementation; other domestic actors 
remained on the sidelines.11 The descriptions of the objectives, 
actions and interactions of !the bureaucratic and political actors 
in the period leading up to the TAD support strongly the modified 
statist approach as an explanation for Canadian foreign policy 
actions.12 This is consistent with Allison's bureaucratic politics 
model. Evidence of the "the pulling and hauling that is politics," 
that is, the search for compromise, was evident both within the 
Canadian government and at the international level. In the former 
case, the players - the Canadian and foreign officials and leaders 
- did not make decisions by a single rational choice13, but rather 
considered options through negotiation, resulting in a "political" 
TAD with references to the need for closer economic ties. At the 
inter-state level, in the process of negotiating the TAD with the 
EC (including the Member States) and the United States it was soon 
very clear to Canadian officials that, for example, given Canada's 
relative position of power, it would be impossible for them to 
stick rigidly to their ideal objective (i.e., a trilateral EC- 
Canada-U.S. transatlantic Declaration) when presenting their
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positions to Cabinet members for approval. The form of the TAD (as 
do most policies) evolved as negotiations progressed and, in the 
end, the Canadian and U.S. TADs demonstrated a delicate balance of 
compromises.
Whereas there was no reason in the Canadian political 
leadership1 s mind to pursue aggressively relations with the EC from 
the end of the 1970s to about 1989, after this time as the 
international community's attention increasingly focused on the 
collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet 
Union, bureaucratic actors, primarily officials at EAITC (but not 
as we saw necessarily those in the European divisions) were in a 
position of having the attention of the political leadership and 
were thus able to have considerable input into Canada's Europe 
policy by drawing up detailed strategies for Cabinet.
Although, in theory, there was a clear separation of power and 
responsibility between the Cabinet and bureaucracy, in practice it 
was a handful of officials in three EAITC Bureaux - the Policy 
Planning Staff, Political and Security Bureau, and the European 
Bureau14 - who played the lead role in positioning Canadian 
transatlantic interests. It is important to note that unlike in the 
U.S. federal government where the jurisdictional lines on Europe 
policy would have been spread among the Departments of Commerce, 
USTR, Department of Defense, and State, in Canada, because of 
EAITC's broad responsibilities for foreign, security (as opposed to 
defence), and trade policies, Canada's Europe policy at the 
bureaucratic level was fashioned in large part by EAITC.
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But lest the impression be given that Canadian politicians had 
little to do but give their starrp of approval to their officials, 
it should be pointed out that the TAD was first proposed at the 
highest political levels by the Germans and the Americans - a 
systemic influence. Once Canada became involved, support from 
secretary of state for external affairs Joe Clark and prime 
minister Mulroney was crucial in determining the bargaining 
strengths and influence of the civil servants vis-a-vis each other 
in the various division at EAITC and the power of EAITC relative to 
PCO and DND, all of whose interactions affected Canada's role in 
the final outcome. The interest taken by the Prime Minister's 
Office in the negotiating process reflected the increased 
inportance accorded to EC-Canada bilateral relations in the Prime 
Minister's foreign policy agenda. This is a signifant development 
since in Canada, as mentioned, the Prime Minister has significant 
power to effect changes in foreign policy orientation. Finally, as 
is the norm in Canadian foreign policy-making, Parliament did not 
play a significant role in the development of the TAD.15
What also needs to be enphasized is that Canada's Europe 
policy was not just a product of the "pulling and hauling" between 
the political and bureaucratic levels (e.g., PMD vs EAITC) but also 
resulted from inter-bureaucratic turf wars such as those between 
EAITC and DND on Canada's security interests in Europe, and between 
EAITC and the rest of the federal government (e.g., in 1991 it kept 
the existence of its own Canada-Europe working group a secret from 
other departments while at the same time sitting on the inter­
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departmental committee on Europe) . There was also intra- 
departmental tension at EAITC between the pro-Community and pro- 
NATO forces, that is, between those officials in the divisions 
responsible for NATO and the CSCE pushing for a reformed NATO as 
Canada's primary European pillar, while officials on the Policy 
Planning Staff and in the European Bureau pushed for a Departmental 
position that reflected the increasing prominence of economic 
issues and the capacity of the Community to affect Canada's 
international economic and political positions.
At’the same time, by 1989, as a result of Canada's support of 
the G-24' s decision to aid in the reconstruction of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Canadian aid to the regions (eventually it would 
also be directed to the countries of the former Soviet Union) 
became a top EAITC priority and contributed to the "pulling and 
hauling" within EAITC's European bureau.16 From an institutional 
perspective, Canada's official aid program (known by its acronym 
RGZ) , supported by a vocal and powerful domestic constituency of 
emigre groups and Canadians of East European descent, soon 
overshadowed all other divisions within EAITC's European Bureau. 
RGZ, Starting with a staff of 10 officials in 1989, by 1993 had 
expanded to over 60 program managers with a budget of $75 million 
and dwarfed the regular European trade and relations divisions17; 
by comparison, five officials worked in the European Community 
division. It would appear, therefore, that in spite of Ottawa's 
substantial investment in the "Europe 1992" component of "Going 
Global," the institutionalization of the aid program did have the
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effect of diverting ever scarcer Canadian governmental (and also 
private sector) resources (e.g., policy analysis, programs) away 
from Western Europe to the CEEs.
As Stephen Krasner puts it, bureaucratic politics analysis 
implies that the office - not the occupant - determines how players 
behave.18 But it is easy to overstate the role of institutions. 
This study suggests that the influence exercised by Canada's 
foreign policy decision makers on Ottawa's policy output, that is, 
their ability to exert power (which Allison defines as blend of 
bargaining advantages, skill and will) , was not a function of their 
bureaucratic positions per se. Welch in a critique of Allison's 
Essence of Decision points out that Allison was his own clearest 
critic when he said that "The hard core of bureaucratic politics 
mix is personality". He continued, "How each man manages to stand 
the heat in his kitchen, each player's operating style, and the 
complementarity or contradictions among personalities and styles in 
the inner circles are irreducible pieces of the policy blend."19
Recalling the discussion in Chapter Three on the respective 
roles of the PMD and EAITC in the Canadian foreign-policy process, 
this mix of "operating style" was clearly evident in the 
formulation of Canada's policy towards the whole of Europe. As 
mentioned, due to Mulroney's dissatisfaction with policy advice on 
Europe emanating from EAITC, in 1989 he had appointed a new Under­
secretary of State for the Department. That the Under-Secretary, de 
Montigny Marchand, would send orders to draw up a new European 
strategy to the Policy Planning Staff, under its then Director
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General Mark Moher -and not to the European Bureau under the 
Assistant Deputy Minister (Europe) , Jacques Roy, was certainly a 
reflection of the low confidence Marchand and his minister, Clark, 
had in the "personalities" in the European bureau at the time. In 
addition, that a defining "Memorandum to Cabinet" on Europe in 
1990, as it was explained to this author, was hashed out one 
afternoon in the office of Jeremy Kinsman, then the assistant 
deputy minister (Political and Security Affairs) and again not in 
the European Bureau20 points ' to the fact that in Canada' s policy 
approach to Europe bureaucratic offices did not play as 
determinative a role as did the occupants of those offices.
On the other hand, from an institutional perspective, it is 
clear that the pressures exerted by the emigre community in Canada 
and the personal situations of Mulroney (whose wife is of Serbian 
descent) and Clark, who before 1989 had had very little interest in 
things European but was carpel led to return to the European file by 
virtue of his hosting the "Open Skies" conference in Ottawa in 
1990, combined to force institutional change within the Canadian 
federal government. As mentioned, this institutional adjustment 
within EAITC favoured Eastern Europe at the expense of Western 
Europe. The reasons are not complicated. There were few votes to be 
had on the grounds that Canada had to "reconfigure" NATO and the 
CSCE. Such debates were left to the officials at DND and EAITC and 
a small clique of defence and strategic analysts largely situated 
in academia; second, the EC as a "pillar" in Canada's European 
policy framework meant little to Canadians who, if they had any 
European heritage, identified with the individual Member States. 
Most importantly, a large portion of the Canadian population could
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identify with the plight of their East European cousins and thus 
aid to the region was a hot political issue for Prime Minister 
Mulroney and his Cabinet. So it can be said that societal actors 
succeeded in achieving institutional and therefore a policy change 
in Canada's external affairs that privileged Eastern Europe in 
Canada's overall European policy framework; relations with Western 
Europe and the EC in particular were left largely to the interplay 
of officials and Cabinet Ministers.
The foregoing discussion, by assuming a modified statist 
approach to Canadian foreign policy, highlights the problem of 
defining the state, where the principal divergence is between those 
who focus on institutions and those who emphasize the role of 
individuals.21 Therefore, • should Canada's response to the SEM and 
indeed the Mulroney Government's overarching strategy for its 
response to European integration be traced back to public sector 
institution (s) - EAITC and/or the PMO? This would be consistent 
with Krasner's definition of states as "central decision-making 
roles and institutions"?22 Or, should its origins be traced back to 
the role of individuals within these institutions as per 
Nordlinger's view that "the state is made up of and limited to 
those individuals who are endowed with society-wide decision-making 
authority"?23 Riddell-Dixon states that Nossal24 refines the 
Nordlinger approach by noting the institutional affiliation as a 
key explanation for individual preferences. With EAITC responsible 
for both Canada's foreign security policy as well as its trade 
development and trade policies, this ensured that the preferences 
of the political, bureaucratic and private sector actors were 
influenced considerably by this Department's ability/inability to
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respond to the SEM and the EC's emerging role.
Finally, given the high-level of bureaucratic/Ministerial 
tension normally associated with parliamentary systems of 
government, the case of the TAD shows - despite the significant 
bureaucratic turf battles over whether to favour a security-led 
(i.e., NATO-first) Europe policy approach or an economically-led 
one - that there was surprising little conflict between senior 
officials and Cabinet Ministers on whether Canada should have been 
engaged in Europe at all. The consensus at the political- 
bureaucratic level in 1989-1992 was that Canada's interests were 
better served by being "in," rather than "out" of, Europe. 
Fundamental disagreements over the means of staying in Europe 
(e.g., the TAD as a "political" or "economic" document) could not 
overshadow this reality. In contrast, this type of general 
consensus was not evident in the private-public sector interface, 
as discussed in Chapters Three (the 'disconnect' on trade 
promotion) and Nine and as will be noted below, on the appropriate 
policy response to West European economic integration.
11.3.1 Continuing the State-Led Approach
This study has focused largely on the political and bureaucratic 
actors in Canada-EC relations. But with disappearance of the threat 
of nuclear war in Western Europe and as economic discussions of the 
Europe "1992" package dominated the agenda, the observer might have 
expected a shift away from the conventional state-centred view of 
Canada' s policy approach in its relations with the Community to one 
with greater input from the business and academic communities. 
Instead, we see a still further intensification of state-to-state
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links in the post-1989 era.
The TAD exercise and the relative lack of interest in the SEM 
among Canada's SMEs (compared to opportunities in the U.S. and Asia 
Pacific) helps to explain the largely indifferent attitude of 
Canadian business to the changing nature of transatlanticism. This 
was clear in the negotiations leading up to the TAD where there was 
a discrepancy between the lack of reference to the private sector 
in that document and the Government's own public exhortations to 
the organized business comnunity to participate more actively in 
Canada's policy approach to economic integration in Europe.
The growing policy interdependence, the globalization of 
business, and the re-intensification of a Community foreign policy 
in the late 1980s, pointed to a new plateau of complexity in 
bilateral EC-Canadian relations. At the same time, the number of 
important European institutional actors was on the rise: whereas 
before Canada could target the Commission and a few key Member 
States, now it also had to consider the growing authority of the 
European Parliament and the central roles of the European Court of 
Justice and the Council of Ministers as well as the re-invigorated 
EPC. All these developments made the task considerably more arduous 
of consolidating existing bilateral mechanisms of cooperation and 
consultation. In terms of Canada's Europe-wide policy framework the 
most apparent change was the gradual transfer of Canadian political 
capital away from NATO and the CSCE to the EC. Thus the experiences 
of the TAD and the SEM show that Ottawa's dominance in the foreign 
policy process vis-a-vis Europe did not change radically; it merely 
adjusted its agenda.
It should also be cautioned that Canada's last flirtation -
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the "Third Option" - with a concerted effort to promote closer 
economic relations with Europe alledgedly failed, to a large 
extent, because it was state-led. This in turn points to the 
domestic constraints that militate against a move away from the 
failure prone state-led approach to relations with the Community. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, relations with the Community 
received little sustained and coordinated support from Canada's 
business community as represented by the major broad-based business 
associations. To be fair, the response from the European side to 
creating bilateral transatlantic industry mechanisms to channel 
business views was equally underwhelming25, with both UNICE (the EC 
employers' federation) and the PCCCI in Brussels declaring that 
they had no mandate to extend external links since they saw 
themselves as basically lobby organizations for EC businesses vis- 
a-vis Brussels.26
There is a striking irony here. Although the Canadian federal 
government's diplomatic and trade resources were overweighted in 
Western Europe at the expense of other emerging markets and with 
Western Europe - after the United States - being Canada's most 
familiar market, the government received little broad policy 
feedback from the private sector on its strategic approach to the 
European Community - apart from business association 
representatives calling for the government to cut its program 
expenditures in Western Europe.27 What did, in fact, happen was a 
largely ad hoc effort by the Canadian business community over the 
years to further Canada-EC business dialogue. The Canadian private 
sector preferred to work through industry-specific trade 
associations (e.g., Canadian Pulp and Paper Association, COFI,
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Canadian Advanced Telecommunications Association) , going so far in 
a very small number of cases to set-up association branch offices 
in Europe to act as listening posts, but largely ignoring attempts 
to set-up bilateral forums for broader discussions on policy issues 
that affected a cross-section of industries.28
11.4 CONCLUSION
It is therefore hard to escape the conclusion that Ottawa' s renewed 
attention after 1989 toward the EC was not so much a result of the 
pressure of Canadian industry as it was an attempt by political and 
bureaucratic elites to politicize Canada's relations with Brussels 
in order to compensate for Canada's relative loss of influence in 
NATO and the CSCE. This was logical since the EC itself of course 
promulgated a larger political role and indeed appeared to expand 
its competence quickly in the years after the release of the Draft 
Treaty on European Union and under the aggressively integration!st 
leadership of Jacques Delors. Indeed, as this dissertation has 
shown4 to have received a similar TAD as the Americans was something 
of a policy victory for Canada. But of course Canada could not have 
done it alone. If it had not been for a few strong allies among the 
Member States such as Germany, the UK, and some of the smaller most 
pro-EC states such as Portugal, the Commission may have overlooked 
Canada. It is legitimate to ask, as Edwards does, whether bilateral 
Canada-EC relations ("remarkably immune to change in historical 
perspective") continued "to bumble along bringing about some 
marginal improvement to reinforce a sense of transatlantic 
solidarity in face of the profound uncertainty"?29 Or whether
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increased Canada-EC dialogue did indeed bring about a more 
fundamental change in transatlantic relations. But perhaps more 
pointedly, what needs to be considered is how long the artificial 
political relationship between Ottawa and Brussels could go on 
given Canada's underwhelming participation in European security 
fora and the Single Market. This, perhaps sharply worded question 
does not call for a scaling down of Canadian involvement in Europe 
but rather should lead to a re-examination of Ottawa's strategy of 
maximizing relations with Europe. A very brief discussion follows 
in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER TWELVE
FUTURE DIRECTIONS: CANADA AS A DEMANDEUR IN TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS
12.1 INTRODUCTION
By the time of the Maastricht Treaty's ratification in 
November 1993, vestiges of the seminal 1969 STAFEUR Report 
final recommendations (described in Chapter Four) were still 
evident in Canada's policy towards Europe. In Ottawa's 
declaratory policy and in its foreign policy actions (e.g., 
Canadian peacekeepers in Yugoslavia) , it was clear that 
Canadian decision makers still considered Canada' s security to 
be intimately - although perhaps no longer inextricably - 
linked with that of Europe. And in keeping with the STAFEUR 
report's predictions, although Western Europe and the 
Community had become increasingly self-reliant, European 
decision makers nevertheless recognized that they still had to 
maintain a basic interdependent relationship with North 
America. However, given the changing face of Europe's security 
architecture and a nascent "common" EU-led security policy as 
outlined in Chapter Ten, the nature of this interdependence 
was now very different. With the creation of a pan-European 
economic area dominated by the Community, the security and 
economic tracks of transatlantic relations had a tendency to 
criss-cross more often, heightening transatlantic frictions.
And so this study has shown that with the end of the Cold 
War it is no longer possible to rely on shared perceptions of
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interest shaped by the awareness of dominant conflicts and 
powers, as was arguably the case in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, 
and well into the 1980s. Put crudely, there is more than ever 
a need for the definition of shared interests and the 
identification of clashing priorities in the Canadian- 
Community relationship. At the same time, however, conditions 
make this infinitely more difficult than in the past. How can 
Canada rebuild the leverage with Europe that it has lost in 
the aftermath of the Cold War? In the thorny area of value 
differences, how can the decreasing "psychic" link be reversed 
or at least measures taken to demonstrate the importance of 
common understandings and values which bind Canada and Europe?
12.2 TOWARD A NEW TRANSATLANTIC DIALOGUE
In order to maintain a linkage between the greater concern 
with co-operative security issues and the Canada-EU economic 
relationship, it is time for Canada to consider launching an 
overarching dialogue with Europe - beyond the TAD - on the 
future of the transatlantic relationship. This discussion 
must include trade, investment, monetary and fiscal policy, 
defence and global burden-sharing. This process would involve 
six levers (in addition to Canada's link to NATO and the CSCE) 
including the Framework Agreement, the TAD, relations with the 
institutions of the Community (primarily a strengthening of 
relations with the Commission and especially the European 
Parliament) , European Political Cooperation (through Canada's 
special access), relations with the key Member States (with
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specific focus on Germany as the EU's economic engine), and 
relations with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 
These avenues would allow a number of practical steps to be 
taken, many of them bilateral initiatives which would not sit 
well with Canada's multilateralist traditions.
12.2.1 Canada's Future Role in Transatlantic Security
Canada has in the past used its founding role in NATO as a 
basis for much of its influence in Europe. Even in the post- 
Cold War environment this source of leverage should not be 
underrated. However, in the future Canadian security policy in 
Europe will only remain relevant if Canada plays along with 
the EU agenda. The political drive in Europe is for a 
European security and defence identity which is increasingly 
distanced from the traditional Atlantic Alliance. A more 
promising although less binding strategy is for Canada to 
pursue transatlantic cooperative security links with Brussels 
and, at the same time, to indirectly increase its leverage 
with the Commission by promoting itself as a trade partner and 
political role model to the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe.
12.2.2 Less State-Driven Transatlantic Relations
Another element of change in Canadian-EU relations should be 
an attempt to make the process less state-driven. Despite 
Canada's high level of economic interaction with the 
Communities, there is no European Community studies 
association or transatlantic policy network similar to those
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which Canada has with the Asia Pacific (e.g., the Vancouver- 
headquartered Asia Pacific Foundation, Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Council, and most major Canadian universities have 
Asia-Pacific Centres)1, or those which address American-EU 
relations (e.g., European Parliament-driven Transatlantic 
Policy Network) . Thus, Canada would benefit from a heightened 
interest in Europe on the part of not only the business 
community, but also academia as well.
12.2.3 Enhancing Diplomatic Links
One aspect of past approaches which will retain or increase 
its value in Canadian-European relations is the capacity of 
prime ministers to engage in personal diplomacy to ensure that 
Canada's voice is heard. In the absence of a value-driven, 
security alliance, formalized personal access through the TAD 
will prove invaluable. In the current global context and 
given an understanding of the dominant actors in the Canadian 
foreign policy process, the utility of personal diplomacy 
should not be underestimated2, a practice made easier by the 
communications revolution and the fact that Canadian leaders 
meet frequently with their West European counterparts in an 
increasing number of fora.
Also in the realm of diplomatic relations, Canada will 
not be able to lessen its attention to the particular foreign 
policy perspectives of the individual Member States when 
consulting with the Community through the EPC framework. As 
Allen and Smith have suggested, by preserving the principal of 
consensus within the intergovernmental framework, the EU
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Member States have, "undoubtedly chosen to accept limits on 
their ability to act in the world as a single entity. "3 The 
importance of the individual Member States is underscored by 
the fact the each of them has a chance to influence Community 
policy during its six month presidency. In terms of assets 
which could provide leverage in these situations Canada could 
offer itself as a credible G-7 voice for the smaller EU states 
in return for access to EU decision-making which affects its 
interests. Canada can also bank on the fact that it is North 
American rather than American. As in the past, Canada could 
be useful as an intermediary, able to exert leverage to shift 
- however slightly or greatly - U.S. positions.
Whatever the new directions in Ottawa's European policy 
framework as it shifts its emphasis from the NATO and OSCE 
"pillars" to the EU, what is not in doubt is that Ottawa> 
despite its eventual success with the TAD, is today more than 
ever a demandeur in transatlantic relations.
12.3 Future Research Agenda
The reflections and conclusions in this study may spark a 
number of future research agendas. First, they challenge other 
researchers to test further the four determinants of Canada-EC 
relations that were posited in Chapter One. Second, following 
from the analysis in Chapters Eight and Nine, there is as yet 
no sector-by-sector analysis of trade diversion and trade 
creation resulting from the SEM. Such a research project would 
answer more definitively the question of the degree of threat 
to Canada posed by the most recent phase of European economic
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integration.
And third, the call for a NAFIA-EU - as opposed to a 
strict Canada-EU - trade agreement by the Liberal Prime 
Minister Jean Chretien and his International Trade Minister in 
the fall of 1994 creates a profound deja viz. As this 
dissertation highlights, the Chretien Liberals have fallen 
into an old and established Liberal pattern with regard to 
Europe. Following from the discussion in Chapter Ten, the 
future research question here concerns whether transatlantic 
free trade will simply end up ; reviving all the old EU- 
U.S. transatlantic quarrels over agriculture, government 
procurement, and European film and television rights and 
thereby see Canada sideswiped, or, whether given recent 
musings by London on the need to prevent an isolated United 
States there is sufficient incentive today for the Europeans 
to give serious consideration to such an initiative. All these 
questions and other ruminations on Canada-EU relations await 
careful analysis on another day.
12.4 CONCLUSION
By the end of 1993 the observer searching for a "grand design" 
in transatlantic relations would be disappointed. As with all 
such designs, perceptions lag behind reality, especially in 
Canada which is so preoccupied with internal matters (Quebec 
independence, spiraling national debt, and slower growth 
rates) . The vast majority of Canadians still see a Europe made 
up of nation-states. This traditional Europe with national
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parliaments, flags and anthems, is still the most visible 
Europe. Meanwhile the Europe beneath the surface - that of an 
integrating giant - is being transformed. It is to this Europe 
that Canada must now adjust - to a European Union that is 
becoming the "first pillar" in Canada's European policy 
approach.
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APPENDIX TWO:
Table 5
CANADIAN EXPORTS 
TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1958-1993
   (Cdn. $ million)
Country 1958 1960 1965 1970 1972
France 45 73 . 87' 157 160
Germany 202 166 189 388 • 3 1 9 .
Netherlands 75 63 . 128 281 260-
Belg./Lux. 70 69 128 192 201
Italy : 30 68 93 187 204
U.K.* - - - - -
Spain* - ~ -  . . - -
Portugal* -  . - - -
Greece* . - f . - . -
Denmark* - - - - ■■ -
Ireland* -■ - - ■ -
Total Can, 
exports to EC
422 439 . 625 1,205 1,144
Total Can. 
exports
4,823 5, 256 8,525 16,820 20,140
Exports to EC 
as %  of total 8.7 8.4 7.3 7.2 5.7
Exports to 
U.S.
2, 827 2,932 4,840 10,900' 13,963
Exports to 
U.S. as % of 
total
58.6 ■ 55.8 56.8 64.8 69.3
Exports to 
Japan
105; 179 *. • 316 813 965
Exports to 
Japan as % of 
total
k
to 00 3.4 3.7 4.8 ,4.8
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Table 5
CANADIAN EXPORTS
TO EUROPEAN CCMMDNITY 1958-1993
■ .____ .__________  (Cdn. $ million)_______
Country 1975 1978 1980 1982 1984
France 350 479 1,017 • 754 736
Germany 609 792 1,668 1,284- 1,225
Netherlands 481 574 1,442 1,058 1,088
Belg./Lux. 381 486 1,002 791 701
Italy 479 486 1,004 702 600
U.K. ' 1,789 1,898 3,245 2,725 2,535
Spain* - - -
Portugal* - - -■ - -
Greece* - - 77 50
Denmark, 28 64 89 87 98
Ireland. 18 31 116 99 99.
Total Can, 
exports to EC
4,135 4,810 9,583 . 7,577 7,132
Total Can. 
exports -
33,103 52,842 76,159 84,535 112,383
Exports to EC 
as % of total 12.5 9.1 12.6 9.0 6.3
Exports to 
U.S.
21,652 37>175 48,172 57,679 84,928
Exports to 
U.S. as % of 
total
65.4 70.4 63.3 68.2 75.6
Exports to 
Japan
2,122 3,062 4,374 4,594 5,666
Exports to 
Japan as % of 
total
' 1 6*4 5.8 5.8 . 5.4 5.0 •
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Table 5
CANADIAN EXPORTS
TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1958-1993
 _______________ (Cdn. $ million)
Country 1986 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993
France 1,012 . 1,227 1,304 1,424 1,422 1,284
Germany .1,309 1,775 2,323 2,434 2,308 2,489
Netherlands •. 1,009 1,437 1,649 1,725 1,500 1,354
Belg./Lux. 845 1,335 1,252 1,106 1,094 919
Italy 711 1,034 1,188 1,074 1,175. 952
U.K. 2,731 3,607 3,541 3,038 3,127 2,925.
Spain 140 245 . 387 509 452 335
Portugal . 154 169 180 ' 153 166 105
Greece 66 61 97 • 70 74 91
Denmark 111 136 138 129 150 118 '
Ireland 91 217 139 136 92 93
Total Can. 
exports to 
EC
8,179 11,243 12,198 11,798 11,560 10,665
Total Can. 
exports
120,669 138,498 148,979 145,924 162,596 .186,682
Exports.to 
EC as % of 
total
6.8 8.1 8.2 8.1 7.1 5.7
Exports to 
U.S.
93,237 100,886 111,599 109,653 125,725 150,636
Exports to 
U.S. as % 
of total
. 77.3 72.8 74.9 75.1 77.3 80.7
Exports to 
Japan
5,967 8,813 8,230 ‘ .7,159 7,485 8,459
Exports to 
Japan as % 
of total
4.9 6.4 5.5 4.9 4.6 4.5
Exports to 
EFTA
1,906
Exports to 
EFTA as % 
of total
1.0
Source: Exports: Merchandise Trade, Statistics Canada, cat. 65-202, 1992, annual 1984-92, and 
cat. 65-006, Dec. 1993, monthly, and other cat. prior to 1984.
Note: Figures may not be strictly conparable.
* Figures are not provided for years prior to a country's membership in the. EC.
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Table 6
CANADIAN IMPORTS.
FROM EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1958-1993
• (Cdn. $ million)
Country 1975 1978 1980 1982 1984
France 487 684 773 877 1,256
Germany 795 1,244 1,455 1,384 2,249
Netherlands -159 227 264 267 509
Belg./Lux. 143 202 . 251 264 444.
Italy 380 525 611 725' 1,172
U.K. 1,222 1,600 1,974, 1,904 2,474
Spain* - - -
Portugal* - - - - ■
Greece* - ■ - • 30 42
Denmark 78 97 120 129 206
Ireland 32 • 57 101 129 157
Total. Can. 
imports f ran 
EC
3,296 4,636 5,549 5,709 8,509
Total Can. 
imports
34,636 49,938 69,274 67,926 95,459
Imports from 
EC as % of 
total
9.5 9.3 8.0 8.4 8.9
imports from 
U.S.
23,559. 35,246 48,614 47,917 66,466
Imports form 
U.S. as % of 
total
68.0 70.6 . 70.2 70.5 69.7
Imports from 
Japan .
1,205 2,268 2,796 3,536 6,171
Imports from 
Japan as % of 
total
 ^ 3.8 4.5 4.0 5.2 6.5
.S'S*
Table 6
CANADIAN IMPORTS
FRCM EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1958-1993
 ■ (Cdn. $ million)
Country 1986 1988 1990 1991 1992 1993
France 1,664 2,884 2,448 ' 2,672 2,689 2,260
Germany 3,572 3,841 • 3,835 3,740 3,532 3,504
’ Netherlands 664 762 719 598 599 666
Belg./Lux. 569 608 566 447 448 530 .
.Italy 1,750 1,954 1,954 1,793 1,747 1,934
U.K. 3,573 4,629 4,898 4,158 '4,095 4,429
Spain 495 713 496 461 436 . 501
Portugal 82 119 171 170 185 ' 179
Greece 73 68 71 68 64 58
Denmark . 244 258 248 240 243 233
Ireland 173 216 257 352 393. 431
Total Can. 12,859 16,052 15,663 14,699 14,431 14,725
inports
from. EC
Total Can. 112,511 131,171 136,245 135,334. 147,994 169,460-
inports
Inports 11.4 12.2 11.5 10.9 9.8 8.7
from EC as 
% of total
Inports 75,227 -86,020
from U.S.
Inports 66.9 65.6
form U.S. 
as % of 
total
Inports 8,367 9,261 ' 9,525 10,262 10,762 10,690
from Japan . . .
Inports, 7.4 7.1 7.0 7.6 7.-3 .6.3
Japan as %
of total '• ■ •  ■
Inports 
from EFTA
Inports 
from EFTA,
% of total
Source: Inports: Merchandise Trade, Statistics Canada, cat. 65-203, 1992, annual 1984-92, and'
cat. 65-007, Dec. 1993, monthly, and other cat. prior to 1984.
Note: Figures may not be strictly comparable.
* Figures are not provided for years prior to a country's membership in the EC.
3,180 
1.9
87,875 86,288 96,514 113,602
64.5 63.8 65.2 67.0
Table 7: Tkade Flows in Canada-EC Business Services, 1986-1992 (in C$ millions)
Area Receipts
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
EC .977 1,218 1,295 1,374 1,487 1,514 1,608
UK 324 448 518 518 560 582 643
Belgium 39 45 67 42 54 73 n.a
France 179 193 200 202 227 236 aa.
Germany 149 221 \  . 205 239 243 242 ,n.a
Italy 71 90 92 89 93 72. n.a
Holland 96 • 100 118 160 169 159 n.a
U.S. 3,362 3,680 4,420 4,582 4,895 5,238 5,568
All 5,882 6,585 7,559 8,023 8,322 8,827 9,376
EC as % of All
Payments
EC* 1,612 1,645 1,823 1,960 . 1,849 2,111 2,150
UK 1,067 9% 1,027 1,120 978 1,259 1,240
Belgium 41 45 43 39 40 52 n.a
France 172 212 294 320 284 264 n.a
German/ 148 149 167 172 208 211 n.a
Italy 72 79 92 101 126 115 n.a
Holland 90 122. 160 154 154 151 n.a
U.S. 6,687 6,914 7,591 8,426 8,812 8,882 9,637
All 9,484 9,954 11,036 11,952 12,370 12,957 13,839
EC as % of All
Balance
‘Prior lo 1991, refers only to West Germany.
Source: Statistics Canada, C u a U s  Iniem aionri Tnsaactiuns in Servlets, 1988-89, cat. no. 67-203 (Ottawa, 1990); Statistics Canada, 
( (n u ll's  inienusionJ Tnnsaeiioni in Services, 1989-90, cat. no. 67-203, (Ottawa, 1991); Statistics Canada, I 'auxkts Iruem aionJ 
T nruntions in S e n  ices, 1991-92, cat. no. 67-203, (Ottawa. 1992).
TABLE 16: Investments of Northern Telecom, 1983 to 1993
Date Type of 
Investment
Name of Company Host
Country
Financial
Detail
Description Industrial Activity
May 1993 Acquisition
(Greenfield)
NETAS-Northem Electric 
Teledommunikasyon AS.
Turkey 51% increased participation from 
31% to 51%
1993 Acquisition Lagantere Groupe‘S.GA. France Cdn.$45M
Jan. 1993 Partnership Bell Atlantic Meridian Systems U.S.A Association with Bell marketing, sales and services for . 
communications equipment
July 1992 Acquisition o f 
minority stake '
M atraSA France 20%
Cdn$140M
April 1992 Acquisition
..•r .- . . 
Novatel . •, Alberta
March 1992 Joint Venture
1 . e
Northern Telecom de Espana 
1 *
Spain 50% Joint venture with Agroman 
Inversiones S A  (37.5%) 
and Radiotronica S.A  
(12.5%)
Feb. 1992 Joint Venture MOTOROLA-NORTEL U.S. A Joint Venture with Motorola sales o f telephone service in 
Canada, the Antilles, Central and 
South Anerica- and the US-
Feb. 1992 Joint Venture Northern Telecom Elvvro Poland Joint Venture with Elvvro o f  
Poland
manufacturing o f  communications 
equipment
1991 Divestiture Subsidiary of STC UK $335 M
Date Type of 
Investment
Name of Company Host
Country
Financial
Detail
Description Industrial Activity
Feb. 1991 New
Investment
Northern Telecom Asia/Pacific Asia ■ sales and services
Feb. 1991 New
Investment
Northern Telecom Europe Europe
Nov. 1990 Acquisition STCPLC UK 2560 M 
$U.S.
Purchase o f all shares
1989 ' Joint Venture Microtel (branch o f BCTel) Canada 51%' joint venture with BCTel
1989 Acquisition AWA-Nortel PTY 40% » ' *
1988 Divestiture Northern Telecom PLC UK 70 M $
Cdn
Sold to STCPLC
1987 New
Investment
NT Meridien S.Ait'' ’  ^ .
V ‘ 1
• France installation and manufacturing 
and R&D
Oct. 1987 Acquisition STCPLC
t *
UK 24% 
$728 M 
$U.S.
Interest accruing at 27.5%
1986 New
Investment
Northern Telecom Europe Ltd. Europe Management services in 
Europe, Middle East and 
Africa
July 1985 New
Investment
Northern Telecom Pacific Asia
1983 New
Investment
Subsidiary o f Bell-Northem 
Research
UK Laboratory
1983 . Joint
Investment
Research in UK/Northem 
Telecom Pic
*
UK
c_n
OJ
«nd Industry Canada, 1994), Table 3, pp. 432-34.
A n  A ndysis o f A clivilirs a id  I 'tjorm mce  (Calgary Univ. o f Calgary Press
TABLE 17: TOP 30 CANADIAN
HRIVB'
INVESTMENT IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Company Name Industry Sales (U.S.S 
Mllions)
Cbiaitry fte-1986 Investments • R)st-1986 Investments: Description
BCE Inc
(sec also Northern Telecom)
Communications 17,200 UK BCE took 30% interest in London- 
based Videotron Corp. In 1992 BCE 
created BCE Telecom international to 
manage all its international interests.
Royal Bank of Canada
-- T "T1 ■■
Depositary
Institution
'< '
12,414
' V  _
UK, Netherlands, Greece, 
Germany, France, 
Belgium, Spain,
Subsidiaries in UK, 
Netherlands, Greece, Germany, 
France and Belgium; branches 
in UK and Spain; and 
representative office in Italy.
In 1992, Royal Bank closed its branch 
network in continental Europe.
George Weston Ltd. . Wholesale Trade 9,3 Id UK subsidiary
Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce
Depositary
Institution
9,176 UK, Italy, Holland, 
Germany, France
subsidiaries
Bank of Montreal Depositary
Institution
8,816 UK, Germany, 
Netherlands
2 branches and a subsidiary 
called First Canadian Financial 
Corp. BV (Neth)
Canadian Pacific 
(see l^aidlaw Inc.)
Conglomerate: 
Transportation, 
resources, real - 
estate, waste 1 
management, 
hotels
8,711 UK, Germany, France, 
Netherlands
subsidiaries include CP Hotels 
(Nederland) BV; CP 
Steamships Ltd. (UK); as well 
as affiliates in other EC 
countries
CP Forest Products Ltd, as a 
subsidiary, sells a wide range o f  forest 
products in EC
The Bank o f Nova Scotia Depositary
Institution
8,287 Ireland, UK, Germany subsidiary in UK, Scotiabank 
(UK) Ltd.
In 1989, the bank established a 
subsidiary, NDS International 
(Ireland) Ltd to handle off-shore 
lending. It also has an interest in First 
Southern Bank Ltd. (Ireland). As o f  
1992, it planned to expand its branch 
network in Greece.
Northern Telecom (see Table 
14)
Commun. Equip. 8,182
Brascan Ltd. (see also 
Noranda and Macmillan 
Bloedcl)
Mining 7,979 Holland Brascan Inti BV
Company Name Industry Sales (U.S.S Country Pte-1986 Investrrents Post-1986 Investments: Description
IVfllions)
Alcan Aluminum Primary Metals 7,748 . UK, Belgium, France, 
Germany
Alumaier, Technal SA, and 
AJumines de Provence 
(France); PALCO (Spain)
In 1988 Alcan made significant 
investment in Ireland at Aughinish 
Alumina Ltd. In June *90 it signed JV 
with then Eastern German producers. 
In June '91 it formed strategic alliance 
between its UK subsidiary and Japan's 
largest aluminum producer, Nippon 
Light Metal Co. (in which Alcan 
holds 44.3%  interest).
Noranda Inc. (as unit o f  
Brascan, see also MacMillan 
Bloedel)
Lumber &  
Woori .
7,118 UK, Germany, 
Netherlands,
Sales subsidiary in London; 
commodity broker, Rudolf 
W olff & Co in UK and 
Germany; Highland 
Waferboard Mill (Scotland).
Sun Life Assurance Co. o f  
Canada
Insurance *
<
'6,856 UKr Ireland Subsidiaries: Sun Life 
Assurance Col o f  Britain with 
branches in 60  UK towns; 
subsidiary in Dublin, Ireland.
Seagram Co. Ltd. Food & 
Products
6,242
.
Abitibi-Price Newsprint n.a. UK subsidiary/Abitibi-Price 
Sales
In 1990, Abitibi acquired 50% stake 
in North British Newsprint Ltd. 
valued at Cdn$400 million.
Banque Nalionale du Canada Depositary
Institution
n.a. UK, France branches In 1989, BNC made a JV with 
Banque R^gionale d'Escompte et 
Depots (France) to serve French- 
speaking Belgium, Lux., Sw itz , and 
N. Africa. In 1991, it announced 
similar agreement with Caixa Galicia 
in Spain.
Bombardier Inc. Transportation 3,400 Belgium, Ireland, France, 
UK
•
In 1986, first acquired Belgian 
subsidiary BN. In 1989, it acquired 
Short Bros. PLC, and also purchased 
ANF Industrie SA o f  France for 
Cdn$22 million. In '90 it purchased 
Procor Engineering Ltd. o f  UK. In 
1991, it announced the consolidation 
o f  its European subsidiaries into 
Bombardier Eurorail SA (Belgium). 
This made Bombardier the fourth 
largest firm in the European mass- 
transit sector. In 1992, Bombardier 
formed a strategic links with 
Transmanche consortium and
CAE Industries Ltd. aerospace n.a Germany CAE Electronics GmbH In 1991, it announced that its German 
subsidiary was joining Lufthansa 
Commercial Holding GmbH
Inco Ltd. Primary Metals 2,100 UK, France, Germany, 
Italy, Belgium .
Subsidiaries: Inco Europe Ltd., 
Inco Engineering Products, 
Greengrove Welding Wires, 
Doncasters, Incoform Bramah, 
Turbo Products, Renston 
Engineering. Inco A lloys Int'l 
(UK); Wiggin Steel and 
Alloys, SETTAS SA  
(Belgium).
Lawson Mardon Group Packaging 
* •
f '
4
»
n.a
■r * f '  '
r *
UK, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy
Lawson Mardon Group 
(Europe) Ltd, Trentesaux- 
Toulemond and Manelco 
(France); LMK3 Rotopac and 
Hammans Packaging 
(Germany); Superior Packaging 
(Ireland); Fibrenyle, Iridon, 
Thermoplastics, Smith Bros., 
Cellogals, Lloyds, Mardon, 
Pazo, and william Thyne (UK).
In 1988, LMG entered a  JV with MB  
Group (UK) to manufacture plastic 
beverage containers In 1989, they 
acquired the packaging division o f  
UK candy maker, Rowntree- 
Maclntosh. In 1990, their London- 
based subsidiary purchased two 
German manufacturers in a m ove to 
position the firm for opportunities in 
E  Europe. Lawson Mardon further 
expanded in 1990 with the purchase 
o f  two UK firms, Jeyes Ltd. and 
Kooters (Liverpool) Ltd.
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. (See  
Brascan)
Forest Products n.a UK, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany
MacMillan Smurfit SCA Ltd. 
(UK), 50% interest in UK  
Corrugated PLC. Its European 
subsidiaries are MacMillan 
Bloedel Europe BV and 
MacMillan Bloedel (Limburg) 
BV (Neth.); MacMillan 
Bloedel Holdings (UK) Ltd, 
and Mercator Qiartering Ltd. 
(UK)
In 1989, it invested an additional $50  
million in Dutch coaled paper 
manufacturer, KNP BV, and through 
it gained an interest in operations in 
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.
McCain Foods Ltd. Food Processing n.a UK, Netherlands, France, 
Belgium
Subsidiaries: Scarborough 
(UK); McCain Foods Europe 
N V  (Neth.); McCain 
Alimentaire SARL (France); 
Frima (Belgium).
In 1986, McCain acquired Beau 
Marais (France). In 1990, McCain 
purchased Dutch potato producer H A  
van Tuyl BV. Europe is fastest 
growing market, representing 45%  o f  
annual sales.
Molson Companies Brewer &  
Retailer
n.a UK, Netherlands, Ireland Molson Breweries (UK) Ltd. 
and Molson Financial Ltd. 
(UK); brewery in Cork 
(Ireland); Panlice BV and 
TMCL Int'l Holdings BV  
(Neth.).
Moore Corporation Business Ponns n.a UK, Netherlands, France, 
Italy, Germany. Licensing 
only in Greece.
Subsidiaries are Moore, 
Decoflex Ltd. and Delphan 
Ltd. (UK); Carbonia BV  
(Neth.); Lampar SARL 
(France).
In 1989 Moore acquired ($40 null ion) 
Belgium business forms firm,
Lithorex. Moore has new continental 
head office in Switzerland, opened in 
1989, to give it a continent-wide 
market In 1991, it entered into JV 
with Atel (Italy), opened sales office  
in Germany, engaged in licensing 
agreement with Greek firm It is also 
targetting Spain.
Power Corporation o f  
Canada
Conglomerate n.a. France, Belgium, Group Bruxelles I^ambert SA  
(Belgium)
In 1991, Power opened an office in 
Paris to coordinate its European 
operations.
Seagram Company Ltd. Distiller
\ •
6,242 France, UK [ ? ] In 1988, Seagram purchased French 
Cognac-maker, Martel 1 for U.S.$925  
million, and Champagne giant, Mumm 
& Cie.
Stelco Steel. n .a Netherlands Stow Int'l (Neth.)
Toronto-Dominion Bank Depositary • 
Institution f
I
r
,a a UK_ UK subsidiary In 1991, TD  Securities announced a 
cooperation arrangement with 
Hambros Bank o f  London in the field 
o f  corporate finance, and global 
M & A
John I abatis Ltd. Food & 
Beverage
n.a UK, Italy, Ireland BCL Finance (Ireland) Between 1985-87 a UK subsidiary 
was set up, Labalt Breweries o f  
Europe. In 1989, Labatt's purchased 
Italy’s Birra Moretti Spa and Prinz 
Brau.
Royal Trust Co. Depository
Institution
n.a UK, Germany Royal Trust Bank Royal Trust began its European 
expansion in 1985, with European 
assets in 1991 totalling $8 billion. In 
1989 it bought 25% o f  Gries & 
Heissel, a German bank. In 1993, due 
to significant non-performing loans 
outside o f  Canada, Royal Trust was 
sold to the Royal Bank.
la id law  Inc. (see Canadian 
Pacific)
Transportation 
& Waste 
Management
n.a UK . In 1989, Laidlaw acquired 29%  
interest in Atwcxxls PLC. It also has 
28.8%  stake in British auction and 
security services firm, AD T PLC.
1 lot linger Inc. Newpaper • 
Publishing
5,800 UK Controlling shareholder (82%) 
o f  Daily Telegraph PLC and 9  
% o f  United Newspapers PLC.
In 1990, Hollinger acquired a 10% 
interest in Trinity Int'l PLC in 
Liverpool.
Souict Data compiled from •ullwr'* survey of top 253 Canadian active in Europe; &om J Knubley. M. Legaull & S. Rao. ‘Multinationals and FDI in North America," in L Eden, e d . MulibKlionuls in North /fm emtrfCaiRiry: University of Crdearv Press and 
Industry Canada. 1994), p 166; Company Annual Reports, a d  Dirtiness Week, July II, 1994, p 62. -
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CAE Industries Ltd. aerospace n.a Gennany CAE Electronics GmbH In 1991, it announced that its German 
subsidiary was joining Lufthansa 
Commercial Holding GmbH. .
Inco Ltd.
;
Primary Metals 2,100 UK, France, Gennany, 
Italy, Belgium
Subsidiaries: Inco Europe Ltd., 
Inco Engineering Products, . 
Greengrove Welding Wires, 
Doncasters, Incoform Bramah, 
Turbo Products, Renston 
Engineering, Inco Alloys Int'l 
(UK); Wiggin Steel and 
Alloys, SEITAS SA 
(Belgium).
Lawson Mardon Group Packaging
'<
n.a
.-"tf ' .....
UK, France, Germany, 
Ireland, Italy
Lawson Mardon Group 
(Europe) Ltd, Trent esaux- 
Toulemond and Manelco 
(France); LMG Rotopac and 
Hammans Packaging 
(Germany); Superior Packaging 
(Ireland); Fibrcnyle, Iridon, 
Thermoplastics, Smith Bros., 
Cellogals, Lloyds, Mardon, 
Pazo, and william Thyne(UK).
In 1988, LMG entered a JV with MB 
Group (UK) to manufacture plastic 
beverage containers. In 1989, they 
acquired the packaging division o f  
UK candy maker, Rowntree- 
Maclntosh. In 1990, their London- 
based subsidiary purchased two 
German manufacturers in a move to 
position the firm for opportunities in 
E  Europe. Lawson Mardon further 
expanded in 1990 with the purchase 
o f two UK firms, Jeyes Ltd. and 
Kooters (Liverpool) Ltd.
MacMillan Bloedel Ltd. (See 
Brascan)
Forest Products n.a UK, Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany
MacMillan Smurfit SCA Ltd. 
(UK), 50% interest in UK 
Corrugated PLC. Its European 
subsidiaries are MacMillan 
Bloedel Europe BV and 
MacMillan Bloedel (Limburg) 
BV (Neth ); MacMillan 
Bloedel Holdings (UK) Ltd, 
and Mercator Chartering Ltd. 
(UK)
In 1989, it invested an additional $50 
million in Dutch coated paper 
manufacturer, KNP BV, and through 
it gained an interest in operations in 
Netherlands, Belgium and Germany.
McCain Foods Ltd. Food Processing n.a UK, Netherlands, France, 
Belgium
Subsidiaries: Scarborough ' 
(UK); McCain Foods Europe 
NV (Neth.); McCain 
Alimentaire SARL (France); 
Frima (Belgium).
In 1986, McCain acquired Beau 
Marais (France). In 1990, McCain 
purchased Dutch potato producer H.A. 
van Tuyl BV. Europe is fastest 
growing market, representing 45% o f  
annual sales.
Molson Companies Brewer & ■ 
Retailer
n.a UK, Netherlands, Ireland Molson Breweries (UK) Ltd. 
and Molson Financial Ltd. 
(UK); brewery in Cork 
(Ireland); Panli^e BV and 
TMCL Int’l Holdings BV 
(Neth.).
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FISHERIES PRODUCTS INTL LTD. (24)
FLECK MANUFACTURING INC. (24)
FULCRUM TECHNOLOGIES INC. (24)
GANDALF TECHNOLOGIES INC. (24)
GEAC COMPUTERS CORP. LTD. (25)
GENTEC INC. (25)
GLENAYRE ELECTRONICS LTD. (25)
GOLDER ASSOCIATES LTD. (25)
GORDON CAPITAL CORP. (25)
GOWLING STRATHY & HENDERSON (26)
GREEN FOREST LUMBER CORP. (26)
GROUPE VIDEOTRON LTEE. (LE) (26)
GULF CANADA RESOURCES LTD. (26)
HAMMOND MANUTFACTURING CO. LTD. (27)
HARLEQUIN ENTERPRISES INC. (27)
HAWKER SIDDLEY CANADA LTD. (27)
HAYS FARMS INTL LTD. (27)
HEWLETT-PACKARD (CANADA) LTD. (28)
HILL & KNOWLTON (CANADA) LTD. (formerly PUBLIC AFFAIRS RESOUR (28) 
HIRAM WALKER 3l SONS LTD. (28)
HOLLINGER INC. (28)
HOMESTEAD COMPUTER SERVICES LTD. (28)
IAF BIOCHEM INTERNATIONAL INC. (29)
IDACOM ELECTRONICS LTD. (30)
IKO INDUSTRIES LTD. (29)
IMAX SYSTEMS CORP. (30)
IMP GROUP LTD. (29)
IMPERIAL METALS CORP. (30)
INCO LTD. (31)
INDUSTRIAL ALLOYS LTD. (31)
INTER A TYDAC TECHNOLOGIES INC. (31)
INTERNATIONAL SEMI-TECH MICRO ELECTRONICS LTD. (31)
IPSCO INC. (32)
IRD MECHANALYSIS LTD. (29)
ISG TECHNOLOGIES LTD. (30)
! ITALIAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE OF CANADA (64)
ITT CANADA LTD. (30)
J.H. LOCK AND SONS LTD. (35)
JOHN LABATTS LTD. (32) ■ ■ ■
KOCKUMS CANCAR DIVISION - HAWKER SIDDLEY CANADA (32)
LADNER DOWNS (33)
LAFLEUR BROWN DE GRANPRE (33)
LAIDLAW INC. (33) '
LAURENTIAN GROUP CORP. (33)
LA VALIN INC. (33)
LAWSON MARDON GROUP LTD. (34)
LETTE & ASSOCIES (35)
LGS GROUP INC. (32) ,
LIBBY-ST. CLAIR INC. (35)
LOEWEN, ONDAATJE, MCCUTCHEON & CO. LTD. (35)
LUMONICS INC. (35)
LUNDRIGANS-COMSTOCK LTD. (35)
MACDONALD DETTWILER & ASSOCIATES LTD. (36)
MACLEOD DIXON (36)
MACMILLAN BINCH (36)
MACMILLAN BLOEDEL LTD. (37)
SHAVER POULTRY BREEDING FARMS LTD. (52)
SHERRITT-GORDON LTD. (52)
SHL SYSTEMHOUSE INC. (50)
SMITH, LYONS, TORRANCE, STEVENSON & MAYER (52)
SNC GROUP INC. (50)
SOLARCHEM ENTERPRISES INC. (53)
SPAR AEROSPACE LTD. (53)
SR TELECOM INC. (51)
STANLEY ASSOCIATES ENGINEERING LTD. (53)
STELCO INC. (53)
STELCO TECHNICAL SERVICES LTD. (54)
STIKEMAN ELLIOTT & ASSOCIATES (54)
STONE-CONSOLIDATED INC. (formerly CONSOLIDATED-BATHURST) (54) 
SUN LIFE ASSURANCE CO. OF CANADA (54)
SUPERBURN SYSTEMS LTD. (55)
SYSTEMS INTERFACE INC. (55)
TJ.L : SYSTEMS LTD. (55)
TELESAT CANADA (55)
TERRA NOVA FISHERIES LTD. (55)
THOMSON RESEARCH ASSOCIATES (56)
TORONTO-DOMINION BANK (56)
TORY, TORY, DESLAURDERS & BINNINGTON (56)
TOTEC GROUP INC. (56)
TRI-STAR INDUSTRIES LTD. (57)
TRIDON LTD. (56)
TROJAN TECHNOLOGIES INC. (57)
UFL FOODS INC. (57)
UNITED DOMINION INDUSTRIES LTD. (formerly AMCA INTL LTD.) (58) 
UNITED GRAIN GROWERS LTD. (58)
UNITRON INDUSTRIES LTD. (58)
UNIVERSAL SYSTEMS LTD. (58)
UTDC INC. (57)
VELAN INC. (58)
W. & H. VOORTMAN LTD. (59)
WALBAR CANADA INC (59)
WALL COLMONOY (CANADA) LTD. (59)
WARRIOR INDUSTRIES LTD. (59) :
WESTERN BREEDERS SERVICE LTD. (59) .
WESTINGHOUSE CANADA INC. (60)
WESTON LTD. (GEORGE) (60)
WOOD GUNDY INC. (60)
WOODBRIDGE GROUP (60)
X-L FOOD SYSTEMS LTD. (61)
XCAN GRAIN LTD. (60)
XIOS SYSTEMS CORP. (formerly AES DATA) (61)
ZANIMOB HOLDING (61)
ZENON ENVIRONMENTAL INC. (61)
ZEPF TECHNOLOGIES INC. (61)
